Suszko's Thesis maintains that many-valued logics do not exist at all. In order to support it, R. Suszko offered a method for providing any structural abstract logic with a complete set of bivaluations. G. Malinowski challenged Suszko's Thesis by constructing a new class of logics (called q-logics by him) for which Suszko's method fails. He argued that the key for logical two-valuedness was the "bivalent" partition of the Lindenbaum bundle associated with all structural abstract logics, while his q-logics were generated (...) by "trivalent" matrices. This paper will show that contrary to these intuitions, logical two-valuedness has more to do with the geometrical properties of the deduction relation of a logical structure than with the algebraic properties embedded on it. (shrink)

In Tsuji 1997 the concept of Jeffrey-Keynes algebras was introduced in order to construct a paraconsistent theory of decision under uncertainty. In the present paper we show that these algebras can be used to develop a theory of decision under uncertainty that measures the degree of belief on the quasi (or partial) truth of the propositions. As applications of this new theory of decision, we use it to analyze Popper's paradox of ideal evidence and to indicate a possible way of (...) formalizing Keynes' theory of economic action. (shrink)

In this paper the general notion of Bourbaki structures, interpreted in terms of Suppes predicates, will be used to axiomatize a system of meta-rankings in the sense introduced by A. K. Sen. It will be argued that this axiomatization must take place in a Kantian-ruled world in order to provide a link between meta-rankings and individual actions.Dedicated to Prof. Francisco A. Doria on his 50th birthday.

We first state a few previously obtained results that lead to general undecidability and incompleteness theorems in axiomatized theories that range from the theory of finite sets to classical elementary analysis. Out of those results we prove several incompleteness theorems for axiomatic versions of the theory of noncooperative games with Nash equilibria; in particular, we show the existence of finite games whose equilibria cannot be proven to be computable.

We first state a few previously obtained results that lead to general undecidability and incompleteness theorems in axiomatized theories that range from the theory of finite sets to classical elementary analysis. Out of those results we prove several incompleteness theorems for axiomatic versions of the theory of noncooperative games with Nash equilibria; in particular, we show the existence of finite games whose equilibria cannot be proven to be computable.