The discussion concerning the patenting of academic knowledge is already closed for many people. It has become a type of credo, solemnly intoned at all levels: universities must commercially valorize the knowledge that they generate as extensively as possible.The public means that are reserved for universities can never increase at the same rate as the mounting costs for highly specialized research. So universities, if they want to work at the top level, must increasingly appeal to private resources. Universities are increasingly (...) forced to aim at contract research, sponsorships, commercialised service, the patenting of technical findings, and spin-offs: Cash for knowledge!The pressure for the unfettered commercialisation of academic knowledge does not only come from within the universities. The message also comes from the politicians and those who are committed to economic prosperity. They argue that the commercialisation of intellectual property contributes to new employment because it makes new industrial developments possible and reinforces the competitiveness of ventures. They make it seem that universities form the motor of the knowledge economy.In a country without considerable natural resources and with extremely high personnel costs, innovation is of vital importance. Few convictions are equally as expressly avowed at so many differing forums. The direction of the march seems clear.It was once different. The knowledge that was acquired, deepened, preserved, and transmitted within the universities was not for sale. In fact, its sale could present difficulties because academic knowledge has never answered to the properties of a marketable thing. Use does not deplete knowledge and if you consider it your mission to bring to light knowledge, you do not want to exclude anyone from making use of it.Academic knowledge could thus not be an object of trade, at least so long as nobody was intent on keeping that knowledge secret, and so long as nobody appealed to regulations, whereby one could restrict the legal use of that knowledge. Today neither of these strategies are taboo within academic centres. The patenting of all forms of qualifying knowledge is even encouraged.A patent assumes, on the one hand, that one makes public the knowledge upon which a technique rests, while one, on the other hand, can grant use of that technique exclusively to who one gives a licence, whether or not for a fee. This system is put forth as attractive for all parties. The researchers can keep up with technical details, and the entrepreneur can commercialise the finding. Everyone is happy.Or perhaps not? Are there reasons to be concerned that universities must increasingly submit themselves to the laws of the market? Are there arguments for evaluating academic performance differently than the performance of entrepreneurs? Must one regret that knowledge is commercialised as much as possible?The proponents of the commercial orientation point out that all kinds of new incentives will give a new impetus to the old academic system and will increase the relevance of academic research. They seem to dismiss resistance to the renewal as a nostalgic outpouring of a privileged group that used to have it too good, a group that for too long knew to retreat too safely back into a series of unworldly problems.The opponents of the economically oriented approach fear that the proper character of the academic mission will be lost. They fear that the loss of academic autonomy will make the specific function that a university fulfils within society impossible. In what sense?In our society, there is not one type of sphere, and there is not one valid set of standards, the basis upon which performances are evaluated, functions are judged, or objectives commended. There are strongly divergent spheres and each have their own specific function. The laws that apply in one sphere do not necessarily have authority in another sphere, and the standards that apply in one sort of relationship often have little or no meaning in another relationship.Each sphere recognises its own standards and answers to its own system of exchange for compensation, approval, and recognition. What applies in the sphere of law does not necessarily apply in the sphere of someone’s personal friendships, or is not applicable among family members. What applies in trade does not necessarily apply in the sphere of art.Even more, things go wrong when the autonomy of these spheres is not respected. Within the domain of art, love and friendship, monetary laws are not valid, at least in a healthy situation. That is not to say that the rules that apply within the free market would be wrong or unethical – far from it. It seems self evident that these laws are valid under the condition that they apply in the environment to which they belong, and that one respects these limits.This applies for all spheres. It would be unjust if one would apply the standards of friendship to the spheres of jurisprudence or education. Manifestly, it seems self evident not to define justice as a univocal principle that must be extended with the same consistency in every type of sphere. Rather, it is just to respect the individual character of the normative relationship that applies in the diverse spheres of life, and to prevent one sphere from colonising another.Justice assumes that one prevents the political sphere from stipulating what must be said, or concealed, within the academic sphere. Academics must answer alone to that which is expected of them within the academic sphere. Political pressure may exert no influence on this. Why cannot one say the same about economic pressure?Do we run the risk that the economic sphere will colonise the academic sphere just as the economic sphere previously colonised the sphere of media? What must one imagine in this supposed risk? In what sense should economic laws threaten the academic sphere?In the academic sphere, it is traditional to follow one’s own interests and investigate anything whatsoever without having to ask if this knowledge is useful for something or how the fruits of this research fit within the economic context. The academic search for a better understanding of everything has an unconditional character.The manner in which researchers evaluate the performance of each other seldom has to do with the economic effects that their findings have, but with their reliability, the meticulousness with which they were checked, the scrupulousness with which the sources were collected, and the honesty with which they were communicated. The function of the academic is to collect and refine knowledge, and to bring to light the truth.By doing so, universities offer a type of foot-hold within society. They make it possible that a place exists where one can be obedient to what lets itself appear most truthfully today. Nobody has to fear, at least as long as the autonomy of the academic sphere is respected, that the communication of a particular subject was rhetorically coloured in function of a commercial interest, was applied according to the wishes of the sponsor, was brought into conformity with what was agreed upon by the financiers, or answered to the demands of a patent.It is possible that the influence of the commercial sphere shall be less dramatic than pessimistic academics imagine, but nothing indicates the opposite. Today we are giving a new strategy power, and nobody knows how the magician’s apprentice will bring it off.This forms the context of the questions that we shall try to answer together this number of Ethical Perspectives, and we will restrict our discussion to patents. We are aware that the discussion about patents illuminates just one part of the problems, which have to do with the relation of the worlds of academia and commerce. But there is a reason for confining oneself to an aspect of this problematic relationship. If one were to broaden the scope of inquiry further, one would risk missing the complexity of the subject matter already covered, and be consigned to a far too general and aimless debate.We have brought together a number of specialists, jurists, ethicists, and people with practical experience with the field. They shall introduce us into the problematic, confront us with their points of view, and help to answer our questions: Are there moral limits to the patenting of academic knowledge? Is patenting always the most efficient strategy? Does not perhaps the university sell its soul if it gradually leaves itself subject to the laws of the market?We will begin by asking how in particular a university should proceed with the patenting of knowledge. Modern universities were inspired by the ideals of the Enlightenment, which was characterised by the open distribution of unselfishly pursued knowledge.The privatisation and commercialisation of knowledge would seem to conflict with this traditional vision. Jürgen Mittelstrass and Bart Pattyn provide a theoretical and historical basis for protecting the autonomy of university research from the corrupting aspects of the market economy.But, are there reasons for giving up the traditional outlook? Few or no universities have not chosen to patent discoveries, but how is one to proceed within the framework of the university, once one has obtained patent protection? Can one pursue a policy of using these protected intellectual rights to secure the fruits of knowledge for financially weaker groups, or do circumstances compel the universities to be exclusively driven by market forces?Those are the kinds of questions that Gilles Capart and Geertrui Van Overwalle of the KU Leuven will deal with.Sigrid Sterckx of the university of Ghent will answer the question: can patents be morally justified?Paul Belleflamme of the Université Catholique de Louvan La Neuve writes concerning the economic evidence of patents, and the real effect of incentives. Are there any economic facts that can demonstrate the effectiveness of patenting?Then we give the floor to Christopher May of the University of Lancaster, who looks at the question of how universities have to deal with the global information society. (shrink)

The intention of this paper is to relate the various standpoints regarding anxiety and uncertainty. Within the humanities and social sciences, research is pursued in many different disciplines without much interaction between them. Everyone's thinking is based on concepts which are domain-specific, and the distinctions, methods and arguments used are the ones that are generally accepted within the discipline. The divergent conclusions constitute pieces of a puzzle that are seldom if ever put together. There are even doubts about whether such (...) a puzzle can be put together. It can hardly be denied, however, that inspiration is to be found in a consideration of the views and findings of colleagues from other disciplines who are working on the same problems. Now that we have as our guests two prominent academics, each with specific views about our subject, we should take this opportunity to discuss together some of the sociological, anthropological, economic, philosophical and theological approaches to anxiety and uncertainty.If a number of well-known authors are to be believed, lack of trust, uncertainty and insecurity affect the most affluent and modern societies. In French one speaks of précarité , in German of Unsicherheit and Risikogesellschaft , and in English of “fear”, “risk” and “insecurity” . All modern Western societies seem to be afflicted with the same dismal and frustrating human experience.Belgian society is no exception to this. In recent years we have regularly been subjected to the emotional reactions provoked by sensational events in the areas of politics , justice and public health . Less spectacular but no less real were the results of opinion polls which showed that confidence in public institutions in general, and politics in particular, is at an all-time low. (shrink)

Analyse van de crisis in de normen, waarden en gebruiken in het oude Griekenland, zoals beschreven door Plato.

In the world of academia, clearly written texts are more the exception than the rule. This is why it is so refreshing to read the work of Harry Frankfurt. His analyses of what motivates people are uncommonly clear, forthright and discerning. We all know of course that an idea does not derive its force from the fact that other wellknown academics have also formulated it, or that it can be ascribed to one or another great thinker whose authority cannot be (...) disputed; an idea is only meaningful because it reveals some meaningful phenomenon. Yet confidence in this is often lacking, and many authors feel the need to supply additional justification, as if they had doubts that a candid and lucid reasoning would testify to its own quality. In the case of Frankfurt, this supposed need for external strategies of justification is entirely absent. His ideas speak for themselves.It may seem surprising that this issue of Ethical Perspectives focuses on the ideas of Harry Frankfurt. He himself has said that he is not ultimately concerned with morality in the strict sense of the term. What interests him is rather the structure of human desire, love, care and commitment, whatever the ethical consequences of this may be. And yet, these consequences will not leave ethicists indifferent. While Frankfurt’s analyses may not be ethical in the strict sense, they open new ways of thinking about responsibility, freedom, commitment, love, altruism — concepts that can hardly be excluded from the moral universe.Since it is perhaps unlikely that everyone is familiar with Frankfurt’s work, what follows is a brief introduction to his thought by the guest editor of this issue, Stefaan E. Cuypers. (shrink)

What is the meaning of tradition and community for ethical reflection in specific situations? Can ethical decisions be deduced from a theory of norms and ideals isolated from traditionrelated meaning systems? Given a multiform world, with what valid arguments can a particular meaning system, e.g. the Christian tradition, participate in current debates on matters of applied ethics? These are the questions addressed in this issue.

Not all classically trained philosophers are enchanted by the success of ‘applied ethics’. Many among them are somewhat suspicious that the tendency toward further specialization will divert attention away from more fundamental ethical problems. This suspicion is reinforced by the fact that the world of medicine, technology, politics and economics demands ready made ethical answers, not to mention the fact that the sponsoring, subsidies and grants for research in areas which respond to this demand are significantly larger than for research (...) in classical moral philosophy. Such external influences on the ethical agenda are seen by many ethicists and philosophers as an encroachment on a more objective determination of academically relevant concerns. (shrink)

On Thursday, May 7th, The European Centre for Ethics organized the first ‘Politeia-conference’, whose aim is to reflect on responsible policy and civic sensibility. The title was ‘Courageous or Indifferent Individualism’ and the guest speaker was Robert Bellah, Eliot Professor of Sociology, University of California. In this issue, you will find Bellah’s lecture, the position papers and the discussion.Individualism can be seen as a gift or a curse, depending on the context in which it occurs. Alongside ideals such as maturity, (...) autonomy and emancipation, ‘individualism’ appears as one of modern culture’s most cherished acquisitions. An individualist is considered to be someone with personality and character, someone who is not easily intimidated by social pressure or customs, someone with a personal opinion and a singular view of the world. Because modern society finds it important that people think independently, decide autonomously and take personal initiatives, the concept of individualism has acquired a positive connotation.However, individualism is also linked with the tendency to withdraw from social life and turn in towards oneself. Alexis de Tocqueville described individualism as the cool and considered attitude which drives people to withdraw into a small, enclosed world consisting of their family and a few select friends, leaving the rest of society to its own devices.This dual connotation of individualism is reflected in the title of the conference by the qualifiers ‘courageous’ and ‘indifferent’. Courageous individualism refers to the dedication shown by people who have independently chosen for something or someone and work energetically for its sake in spite of opposition from family or society; indifferent individualism refers to people who have either lost all hope in their fellow human beings or are no longer interested in initiatives of a social nature, with the result that they are prepared to withdraw from society at all costs. (shrink)

Ethicists tend to enjoy an extraordinary status in the scientific world, in spite of the fact that their knowledge is not based on empirical facts or logical principles. When they philosophise, they appear to be intervening in a discussion that started long before they existed and will probably continue long after they have disappeared. They are inclined, after all, to base their arguments on convictions. If you point this out, most people will more than likely admit that their ethical principles (...) are indeed based on convictions that have acquired a self-evident character in our actual day-to-day relations although they cannot be solidly founded. It is virtually impossible to strengthen or weaken the capacity of moral convictions by trying to justify them.In our everyday interactions, discussions intended to justify or defend something never start from absolute zero. All sorts of authoritative points of departure established in the course of history inevitably insinuate themselves from the very outset. Empirical scientists often believe that what they introduce into the debate is based on bare, unadulterated facts. But even here questions can be raised. Empirical scientists use language and participate in discussions in which unspoken presuppositions are just about everywhere. The very act of speaking presupposes that we already have a notion of what our addressee understands by the expressions we use. Without a perspective on what the other can be generally presumed to understand, none of us will be able to picture the kind of impression our interventions will have on others or understand their interventions in the way they are expected to be understood. Those who are unable to distinguish the items relevant for discussion from the endless stream of fragmented experiences because they have no idea of the frame of reference within which associations are ultimately established, will likewise have no idea what is going on. Without this frame of reference we are lost.One of the problems that would appear to be confronting the humanities today is the exponential numerical growth of frames of reference, which has resulted in an inevitable decline in the existence of broad-based debate. Modern methods of communication have made it possible to find enough dialogue partners within every specialised frame of reference to maintain group-specific discussions that interest no one in the external forum. This sort of compartmentalisation of academic potential tends to result in a situation in which the theoreticians and those endowed with more practical common sense are no longer on the same wavelength and no longer understand one another. It is clear to one and all that the humanities are in need of interdisciplinary debate, but are there enough scholars willing to dismantle their technical jargon in order to facilitate such debate?Theoretical and methodological plurality would appear to be even greater in the domain of ethics. The debate concerning the relationship between fundamental and applied ethics has a long history. The same discussion will no doubt have to be pursued today within the context of the fragmentation of the humanities and the social sciences, a theme that certainly deserves further reflection. (shrink)

From 18 to 20 September 1997, the European Ethics Network held its second annual meeting. The theme this year was ‘Toward a Transdisciplinary Approach to Professional Ethics: Dialogue with the World of the Professions’. In attendance were some eighty participants from diverse European countries.The most important aspect of the second annual meeting was the presentation and discussion about the core materials project for the development of courses in professional ethics. This project involves the writing of European-based learning materials which instructors (...) can use as they develop their own courses and class presentation materials. The core materials project covers four areas: professional ethics in general, business ethics, medical ethics and engineering ethics. In the course of the discussions about the projects, ethicists were joined by non-ethicists, i.e. by representatives from the world of the professions. The presence and feedback from these professionals were welcome additions to this year’s meeting. A complete report and the proceedings from the second annual meeting will be published in an upcoming issue of Ethical Perspectives. (shrink)

While some enthusiastically applaud, some look on suspiciously, and still others remain indifferent, whatever one’s attitude may be, Europe is gradually taking shape. Its shape, however, is not yet the one dreamt of by the politicians nor the one desired by business people. It is clearly not yet a social Europe or the Europe hoped for by the lawyers or the police. In other words, there is still a long way to go. This process over which no one has control (...) is irreversible. Whether Europe will grow into a federation in which life is good for everyone will depend on the extent to which its citizens take Europe to heart. Hopefully they will see Europe as a community for which they can muster respect rather than as an artificial superstructure which one encounters only when one makes use of its services or confronts its rules.The fact that a strong individualistic tendency has developed in various European countries sometimes makes one fear the worst. As Jacques Delors remarked, what Europe mainly needs is a soul. If it is unable to find one, there will be too many lobbyists and too few idealists involved in the economic, administrative and legislative tasks, and private interests will take precedence over communal welfare. European institutions will become bureaucratic monoliths with abstract, Kafkaesque features. (shrink)

Politicians attach great importance to the way in which they are portrayed in the media. Word choice and timing are carefully weighed. Corporations, social institutions and public services often appeal to communications experts. Under the motto `better communication', advertising agencies promote not only consumer goods but also ideas, lifestyles, beliefs and even blunders.At precisely the same moment, social scientists and philosophers are reaching an agreement that moral beliefs and social objectives are purified and legitimated when they are the object of (...) a wide-ranging dialogue. Views and ideals cannot simply be derived from individual reflections, abstract theories or tradition. Whoever wants to discover which social principles are legitimate and respectable must take part in the discussion about concrete social choices with all parties concerned.These tendencies are in conflict with each other. On the one hand, it is to be hoped that public opinion acquires a critical sense on the basis of fair social debates in which the various facets of prevailing social problems can be carefully examined. On the other hand, there is a fear that the slick, mediagenic style used by public relations experts leads more often to blindness than insight. The media play an important role in this game of power.In selecting news items and in their method of presenting these items, the media create metaphors, images and stereotypes that guide our perception of social reality. Their guiding motives in this are not selfless. In their competitive commercial atmosphere, a broad interest is essential.Around that subject the European Centre for Ethics organized the biannual Politeia Conference on “Modern Media and Social Dialogue”. The conference was well attended, and its strong international focus was reflected in the presence of speakers, workshop presenters and conference participants from throughout Europe as well as from across the Atlantic. Major speakers were: Zygmunt Bauman, Elihu Katz, Johan Galtung, Serge Moscovici, Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe, Stephen K. White, Harry Kunneman, Gilles Lipovetsky, and Clifford Christians. The central question dealt with by this conference was how the media can make a contribution, in the present context, to a high-quality social dialogue. (shrink)

In the present issue of Ethical Perspectives, the reader will find two articles discussing universal justice. These articles were delivered as lectures to a conference on “debt reduction for the Third World” in February of last year in Louvain-la-Neuve. The contribution by Jef Van Gerwen and Toon Vandevelde argues that justice seldom implies uncomplicated and univocal positions. Johan Verstraeten's contribution illustrates some of the metaphors with which the Christian tradition understands universal justice and expresses its sense of responsibility to other (...) people. Within moral philosophy, it is primarily Kant who is seen as the defender of universal justice. Tore Nordenstam from the University of Bergen points out that, in their exposition of Kantianism and utilitarianism, the classic textbooks often misinterpret Kant's original intentions. At a time when a great deal of attention is focused on teaching schemes and slick presentation, Nordenstam reminds us of the importance of a close reading and a thoughtful commentary. (shrink)

While ethicists reflect on specific political and biomedical problems such as euthanasia, the international political context is becoming grim. A number of the articles in this issue, such as the one by Vasti Roodt, make implicit reference to this. It is quite naïve to think that ethicists can exert any influence on the prevailing interpretations of political conflicts, but at the same time it would be inappropriate to take that fact as a reason for no longer being concerned. No one (...) should be indifferent to the international context.There can be no doubt that modern industrial societies provide exceptional opportunities. Modernization creates an ideal environment for economic development whereby painful shortcomings can be eliminated and various public services, such as safe water, education and health care, can be financed. Ideally, modernization leads to greater freedom of expression, more democracy and more institutional transparency.Unfortunately, however, this link is not always in evidence, for a fundamental precondition must be fulfilled: the members of a society must be concerned about the general welfare of their state and that of the international community. A state in which the dominant mentality is “everyone for himself” will not evolve into a society where all citizens feel accepted and integrated. Both in rich western countries and in the wider international community, fault lines have emerged between groups that support liberal modernization and groups that are frustrated by it and wonder whether a strong leader, a simplified religious fundamentalism or a collectively imposed morality might offer better prospects. How has this come about?Dissatisfaction with modernization is often put down to material lack: on this view, people in difficult economic circumstances are more likely to endorse extreme political parties or protest movements. This interpretation rests on the assumption that when basic human needs cannot be met, people become frustrated; conversely, material well-being will give rise to optimism and solidarity. There are many obvious analogies to represent this: dangerous animals are docile and approachable after having eaten, and young children cease crying when they are cared for and nourished. Although these and similar analogies lend support to the assumption, they only apply to beings for whom social integration is not relevant. They do not correspond to the observed facts: the frustrations I spoke of above occur among people who lack nothing in a material sense. As an independent factor, a person’s socio-economic position has no influence on extreme voting behaviour. Let us see whether a different paradigm might be of more help.One could make the assumption that everyone lives with the idea that they lead a more or less enviable life, or at least that they are moving steadily towards such a life. This seems fundamental since everyone appears to share this idea, except for two sorts of people: in the first place, those suffering from depression. The problem they have is precisely that they do not feel their life is an enviable one; they consider themselves to be unattractive or arrogant failures, not at all amiable. I usually add that the second sort of people are philosophers, since they sometimes think that their life is a flash in eternity or an absurd mutation in an amorphous physical process. But this is misleading since even the most pessimistic philosophers would find it enviable that they are allowed to think, speak and write such things.This view differs from the model of needs satisfaction on one essential point: it requires a public if frustration is to be avoided. The current paradigm of homo economicus claims that only isolated consumers and products exist. This overlooks the fact that consumption is communication. Except in cases of extremely rudimentary urges or discomforts, it is not the fulfilment of a preference that brings us satisfaction; it is the feeling of appreciation that we experience with a purchase or a successful achievement. Appreciation is what stabilizes our desire: it gives us the feeling that we have what is essential, it liberates us from the compulsive idea that we must always aim for what is higher, more important, more intense or more outrageous. When appreciation is lacking, then people begin to suffer from what Durkheim called le mal de l'infini, the feeling that we need to have and to do more and more, the feeling that we must always climb higher.Modernization is often accompanied by the disappearance of traditional patterns of expectation. Individuals acquire more freedom to carry out their plans. But this does not alter the fact that they still depend on the people that surround them for their feelings of self-esteem. In today's meritocracy, it is primarily people who have been well educated and who have a bright future who appear to lead an enviable life. Many traditional positions and functions have lost their status and become less attractive. For this reason, modernization is experienced by many groups as humiliating and destructive. Those who are unable to succeed according to the official standards of appreciation often feel deceived and tend to move in the direction of enclaves, opting for a sort of subculture with clearly defined boundaries between 'us' and 'them', an idealization of the in group and demonization of the out group. The result of this is all too familiar.It seems obvious to use religious signifiers to draw the enclavistic boundaries between us and those in Islamic countries, which is not to say that the boundary is drawn for religious reasons. Religious psychologists came to the discovery that religion is only accompanied by intolerance when its intrinsic message remains subordinated to the external reasons for adopting a religious attitude, and when people interpret the religious message literally instead of symbolically. This agrees with the observation that, within Islam, there exists an opposition between the fundamental dimension of Islam — which urges us to give up complacency and leave ourselves behind — and the fundamentalistic extremism of political Islam.The consequences of political Islam's enclavistic ideology are terrible and the damage is causes can be compared with the fascist and communist totalitarian regimes in Europe and Russia. In such enclaves, any non-conformist behaviour is mercilessly punished and any critical reflection can be life-threatening. Human rights are trampled on and women are often humiliated and repressed. Strangely enough, the United States remained blind to these offences as long as it was not threatened by them.The construction of peace in a globalized world is impossible as long as the international political agenda remains dominated by the public opinion of groups moving in the direction of an enclave mentality. A politics driven by collective hate, such as the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, only leads to ever more misery. It is irresponsible for a head of state in a crisis situation to be led by the irrational whims of local public opinion, ignoring international commitments.Military action to curb terrorist violence is one option that might prevent even more damaging forms of extremism from developing. But much more is needed to ensure stability, peace and international security. More should be done to offset the culture shock caused in many countries by the collapse of old social structures. The decline of traditional cultures is not only a problem in non-western countries: the rise of right-wing extremism in Europe and extremist groups in the United States are symptoms of the same ill. (shrink)

External pressure to determine the agenda of universities has systematically increased in the preceding decades. The content of university research and teaching is no longer established by the universities themselves but by the state, by patrons, by sponsors and by client. The authorities view universities as a means to advance regional competitiveness because they are capable of contributing to innovative technological development and because they form young people into creative and enterprising workers. Major companies see universities as centres to which (...) they can outsource research at relatively low cost. Students see universities as training centres that provide them with the competencies necessary to further their personal careers.But how do universities see themselves? Do they have their own vision of the kind of knowledge that ought to be developed and passed on? The days in which universities saw themselves unashamedly as Bildungscentra in which the elite enjoyed a humanist formation via critical confrontation with literature, art and science would appear to have passed.Universities have come to see themselves as players on a market. They have started to advertise their ‘products’ and ‘wares’, angling for students and research investments and pumping up their ‘public relations’ budgets to hitherto unknown levels. This market mentality explains the enormous fuss created by the appearance of the first university rankings.The lecture delivered by Ben Sowter during the 7th Ethical Forum that took place last year in Brussels continues to attract my attention.Sowter testified to the fact that the first report was put together in haste and was unprofessional. Everyone could see that it lacked cohesion, and even its creators presumed it was unlikely to cause a stir. Against every expectation, however, the commotion initiated by the report bordered on mass hysteria. Media attention and university interest was overwhelming. While later editions of the product demonstrated improvement, the scientific quality of such rankings continues to be the subject of discussion. One might ask, for example, what inspires universities to make such a fool of themselves why they are supposed to provide their students with a critical education and teach them to be careful when it comes to statistical research?The rankings case serves to illustrate that an uncritical belief in progress has found its way into our reflection on what universities ought to be today, couple with the idea that quality will find its way to the surface in a free market. Universities will improve, it is claimed, to the extent that they are able to perform better than other universities on the basis of all sorts of verifiable criteria.Mutual competition will force them to invest more and be more goal oriented. When this conviction is shared, it becomes more difficult to distinguish the language of the academic authorities from that of managers and politicians. It goes without saying that many an organisational technique and policy instrument that has proven itself of value in the business world has the potential to lead to thriftier and more streamlined universities, but the idea that competence based on verifiable criteria will lead to an improvement in qualitative output is a presupposition that can be called into question. It is not unequivocally clear that a university committed to a solicitous, honest and functional production and transfer of knowledge, attuned to the needs of society, will prosper.Our experience of the media suggests the contrary. In a commercial environment, the quality of news coverage, for example, appears to be under threat. The reasons for this also hold true for the universities. Ideas that are truthful and prudent ideas are vulnerable, costly, complex and difficult for the general public to distinguish from lies. Instant ideas are much more successful, cheaper and more attractive to the general public.Only specialists can see the difference, but the number of specialists is dwindling. The problems facing academics can be compared with those facing the other trades: those who take their professionalism seriously are never going to be rich. Doing so calls for enormous amount of time, energy and practice for relatively inconspicuous results. As is the case with a fully-fledged academic, the courage to take your professionalism seriously depends on the awareness that the end product is authentic. If academics are expected to achieve target figures, it won’t be long before this intrinsic motivation is exhausted to the point of extinction. If academics are forced to focus on quantity, all we can expect in the future will be researchers who can play it smart and skilled in pretending.The present edition of Ethical Perspectives contains two contributions on rankings that were initially presented during the 7th Ethical Forum: Patrick Loobuyck’s position and the conclusion offered by Philippe Van Parijs.The edition also contains a contribution on the question of consensus with respect to egalitarian liberal conviction that moral consensus no longer exists together with an article on moral disagreement. Ethics is a broad discipline in which more wide-ranging reflection is interspersed with particular discussions on often very concrete practices.Per Sandin’s introduction to the “ethics of firefighting” is an excellent example of just such a discussion. (shrink)

In spite of the fact that people spontaneously presuppose that moral consensus does not exist in today’s world, modern societies tend nevertheless to be characterised by an egalitarian liberal engagement that is sustained by a broadly upheld collective concern: the rejection or neutralisation of any kind of public justification. The failure of this neutralisation is apparent for all to see, however, leading modern societies with problems the existence of which they are forced to deny. The resulting situation thus obliges egalitarian (...) liberal societies to review many of their moral presuppositions. (shrink)

The traditional concern universities have had with public, universal knowledge seems to be waning, with an ever-greater stress upon privatised knowledge. Nevertheless, this is an old quarrel. Since Plato saw knowledge as in service of society, he scorned the Sophists for commercialising knowledge. For the mediaeval university, which continued and developed certain strands of Plato’s thinking, the privatisation of knowledge was also unthinkable, since all knowledge ultimately belonged to God.The success of the mediaeval university lay in its autonomy, and its (...) freedom from commercial pressure. As such, the university’s mission was the cultivation of a global, philosophical worldview in function of a broader social mission, and not in function of surplus economic value. The shift to modernity meant that scientific knowledge could lead to commercial products and techniques.With the cooling of the Enlightenment and its optimism in the scientific project, knowledge increasingly became a neutral resource used and applied in any way possible. Today, the close connection between entrepreneurs and scientists seems to reflect an official policy that the commercialisation of university knowledge is in the best interest of society.However, the university offers more than commercial knowledge – its orienting function also helps ensure that knowledge is won honestly and used responsibly, a double loyalty stretching back to Plato. It would not be wise to attempt to rail against the commercialisation of knowledge, but it would be just as foolish to think that knowledge is only something to be commercialised. The question is to forge an understanding between financial partners and academics that respects and works according to this double loyalty. The credibility of research – and the academy – depends on this. (shrink)

Neo-conservative talk about authority, tradition and ritual must have come as a surprise to all those enlightened ethicists who had to struggle in order to emancipate themselves from authority and traditional morality — all the more since the representatives of the neo-conservative tendencies are obviously not trying to obey any official authority, but are mostly independent academics.Invoking the image of a pendulum to describe this ethical turnaround, would neglect a significant feature by which the ‘new’ conservative philosophers and theologians might (...) be distinguished from ‘classical’ conservative thinkers. Though both encourage greater respect for tradition and authority, the reasons for choosing such conservative virtues rest on quite different epistemological presuppositions. If this is not taken into account, then the question how it is possible that philosophers and theologians such as Hauerwas could be tempted by such apparently conservative language, will be unanswerable.It goes without saying that epistemological presuppositions are seldom made explicit, and when they are, they often prove to be extremely complicated. Nor is it possible to fit them into clearly circumscribed categories without paying a certain price. Nevertheless, in order to shed at least some light on the current epistemological alternatives and their consequences, I would like to describe two positions which, for the sake of convenience, I will denote by the terms ‘classical’ and ‘new’. (shrink)

CONCLUSION :Whoever wants to pursue just social reforms, breathe new life into political democracy, and improve the welfare of the weak will have to do more than convince people to speak differently about themselves. The first ailment that must be cured is not an improper use of language, but the anxiety that gives rise to that language.Anxiety cannot be removed by socially uninspired philosophies. Anxiety is not a problem of individuals but of society’s consciousness. The individualistic attitude of the dominant (...) group of Anglo-Saxon thinkers has hitherto hindered any consideration of group mentality. There is too little known about the processes at work in this trans-individual domain.If people felt that they were being respected concerning their meaning, then they would probably be easier to reconcile with their finitude and the finitude of those around them. They would be more willing to think about the welfare of the community. Respect, however, is not manipulable like an object that one can give and take. Respect only exists in a context of participation. Improving the quality of that context implies not only that people pay more attention to an honest use of language, but also to craftsmanship, art and culture. If there is anything that allows people to go on in spite of anxiety, it is their participation in the community that gives them courage, whose patterns of expectation give everyone a feeling of self-respect and whose internal solidarity curbs the economic sufferings of backward social groups.I had the impression while writing this that Bellah would agree with many points. Although some of his texts argue that social change will only be achieved through a return to biblical and republican narratives, others seem to indicate that he has a better sense than most Americans of how strong the pre-reflexive influence of the social temperament can be. (shrink)

Much thought is being given nowadays to the ways in which society might continue to substantiate the principle of solidarity in the economic sphere. Predictable cost increases in the social security system stand at the root of a number of problems that have arisen. While those concerned look for solutions, a discussion is emerging concerning the communal scope of solidarity. People are not only asking themselves how they are to remain in solidarity, but also with whom they should share the (...) means at their disposal. The concomitant question ‘with whom?’ is not always as evident as it might seem, since the ethical scope of solidarity appears, in principle at least, to be unlimited.De facto, however, the limits of solidarity tend to coincide with those of the political community. The ongoing unification of Europe should broaden matters in this regard, but whether this process will also broaden our perspective on world-wide solidarity remains to be seen. At the same time, certain groups are calling for a stricter delimitation of our solidarity. The elections in Europe during the past ten years have made it clear that a number of emotional factors play a role in this context, factors which are not infrequently expressed in the slogan ‘our own first’.The intention of this article is to confront, with the Christian principle of solidarity, certain spontaneous and emotional motivating forces which call for a limitation of our solidarity. Solidarity implies both a feeling and a rational decision. In line with any other emotion, the feeling of solidarity is rooted in motivating factors of which we are not always consciously aware. Such factors are rarely thematised in an explicit fashion, partly because they are as such difficult to discuss and partly because they are difficult to make operational at the ‘scientific’ level. As a rule, our attention tends to be focused on the ethical desirability and practical-economical achievabilty of solidarity.As a starting point, I would like to broaden our vision of the emotional and subconscious motivating factors of solidarity. As a means to this end I will call upon a number of theories concerning the processes of social influence which go beyond the individual’s capacity to decide in the context of realising concrete initiatives. Having done this our second step will be to relate the problem of the emotional limitation of solidarity to the Christian concept of solidarity. (shrink)

It would seem obvious to assume that nothing enters our consciousness that does not have a `meaning'. Feelings, customs, prescriptions, gestures — all these are involuntarily interpreted and valued in function of various historical, social and cultural conceptions and circumstances. This is why philosophical considerations about justice, ethics and rights nowadays are linked with the concrete `meaning' of goods, customs, institutions and persons. Walzer is no exception when he situates his moral and political reflections in the `meaning' that goods, customs (...) and institutions have in a particular culture at a particular time.Though the importance of meaning is seldom overlooked, this does not prevent there from being opposed theories about it. Two of the current theories about how meaning is created give rise to quite divergent views about what founds ethics. Because I am curious about which of the currents Walzer would subscribe to, I will briefly sketch both of them.In contemporary philosophy we see, on the one hand, those who assume that the meaning of a person or a thing is the result of an interpretation based on reference narratives, ideologies, novels, articles of faith, cultural patterns of expectation, scientific models, and other sorts of interpretative frameworks. Alongside their attention to linguistic expressions and narratives, and contextual, historical circumstances, these thinkers also take into account something which, in their opinion, escapes reference, something that appears more in a negative than a positive experience. On this view, it is assumed, when speaking for example about human rights, that although there exist various cultural modes of interpretation, phenomena such as `human dignity' refer in one way or another to something that various cultures aim at. In every culture, the infringement of this underlying principle gives rise to some form of outrage which is expressed in an original way within the particular cultural context.Others claim that customs, narratives, practices, etc., cannot be considered as media that make meanings `interpretable' and communicable, but rather they should be seen as signs that establish meaning by virtue of their relationship with each other. Sometimes the structuralists who defend this notion are accused of giving the impression that we are all wanderers in a Kafkaesque dictionary labyrinth, moving from one entry to another without ever seeing the light of day. The critics say that language and signs play an important role, but ultimately reality consists of concrete people, concrete landscapes with houses, trees and roads, populated by plants, animals and various sorts of objects. (shrink)

People behave morally and show solidarity, not so much because of well-considered individual decisions, but because of feelings of belonging. But we cannot leave it at this. There is no spontaneous, innocent loyalty that would expand of its own accord to a larger group. Our loyalty must be developed, and the standard which guides us in this effort cannot stem from our own feelings alone. For there to be justice, more is needed than the tendency to identify with people who (...) are similar to us. Seeing justice as a wider feeling of loyalty prompts the question, ‘what is a just loyalty?’ However instructive this digression may have been, we are back to the same problem and the inquiry must begin again. (shrink)

Research in political science currently utilizes a no-nonsense principle. Little time is invested in complicated theoretical constructions. Only the facts matter. What is examined is the way in which certain ideas and behaviours cohere with other ideas and behaviours, and the explanations offered for this coherenece are usually quite brief. In some cases, the tone used in an explanation can make us suspect that there are complex underlying presuppositions.Some critics seem to base their opinions on a more optimistic liberal view (...) of human nature, while others have a pessimistic view of the quality of journalism, the disappearance of social capital, the short-sightedness of the political parties and the various popular forms of information and communication. Theoretical presuppositions are seldom the immediate focus of discussion. Facts are opposed to facts, since ultimately facts are the only basis for legitimate argument.Indeed, discussions that are not about facts are of little benefit to anyone. Predictions of doom with no basis in reality can hardly lead to a constructive dialogue. Facts, however, are always interpreted facts, and in order to interpret accurately, one needs theory. When actors are considered as individual black boxes who produce a certain output when confronted with a given input, then it is impossible to explain why people who watch a lot of television also tend to believe that they are powerless politically. And it is even more difficult to provide reasons for why viewers of soaps, game shows and sitcoms are more likely to harbour feelings of insecurity than viewers of news programmes or films, particularly since the latter exhibit images of aggression and conflict.Likewise, it remains unclear why commercial broadcasters give more airtime to reports of crime, or why the presentation of political issues in black and white terms is so rewarding at the polls. In this paper, I will first of all present a broad theoretical perspective, and subsequently come back to the facts. (shrink)

People hope that their efforts will count towards the fulfilment of a fundamental duty, a just struggle, or a hopeful development. While such an affirmation will hearten them, conversely a negation will mean injury or humiliation.This is perhaps the reason why in each community, certain projects become idealised, and take the form of new dreams at every turn. These dreams give people courage and self-confidence.Where this sort of justifying project traditionally had an explicitly religious character, in latter days they often (...) stand under the sign of economic progress, or of one or another hope-giving technological development.Once a project has acquired this inspirational character in a community, it will face very little criticism and will in political addresses, or academic statements of intent often be treated with staggering solemnity. If ethicists do not wish to portray reality as more rosy than it is, they must take the critique of ideology seriously.This at least seems to be the conviction of Lars Reuter, who believes that the discourse in which biotechnology appears as a most promising science may be shown as a contemporary example of a platform used for giving meaning.Helder De Schutter's contribution places us squarely in the debate over the possibilities and limits of multicultural society.In her acticle, Yvonne Denier seeks and accurate definition of public health. She is aware of the cultural determinations of this concept, but makes plain that there are sufficient objective elements to define health in a balaced way.Professional ethics needs no intrduction. In Asa Kasher's place, we learn more about the various criteria which, in according to the author a proper professional ethics must meet. (shrink)

From 18 to 20 September 1997, the European Ethics Network held its second annual meeting. The theme this year was ‘Toward a Transdisciplinary Approach to Professional Ethics: Dialogue with the World of the Professions’. In attendance were some eighty participants from diverse European countries.The most important aspect of the second annual meeting was the presentation and discussion about the core materials project for the development of courses in professional ethics. This project involves the writing of European-based learning materials which instructors (...) can use as they develop their own courses and class presentation materials. The core materials project covers four areas: professional ethics in general, business ethics, medical ethics and engineering ethics. In the course of the discussions about the projects, ethicists were joined by non-ethicists, i.e. by representatives from the world of the professions. The presence and feedback from these professionals were welcome additions to this year’s meeting. A complete report and the proceedings from the second annual meeting will be published in an upcoming issue of Ethical Perspectives. (shrink)

A brief overview of metaethics, written for students.

Gricean pragmatics. Saying vs. implicating ; Discourse and cooperation ; Conversational implicatures ; Generalised vs. particularised ; Cancellability ; Gricean reasoning and the pragmatics of what is said -- The standard recipe for Q-implicatures. The standard recipe ; Inference to the best explanation ; Weak implicatures and competence ; Relevance ; Conclusion -- Scalar implicatures. Horn scales and the generative view ; Implicatures and downward entailing environments ; Disjunction : exclusivity and ignorance ; Conclusion -- Psychological plausibility. Charges of psychological (...) inadequacy ; Logical complexity ; Abduction ; Incremental processing ; The intentional stance ; Alternatives ; Conclusion -- Nonce inference or defaults?. True defaults ; Strong defaultism ; Weak defaultism ; Contextualism ; Conclusion -- Intentions, alternatives, and free choice. Free choice ; Problems with the standard recipe ; Intentions first ; Free choice explained ; Comparing alternatives ; Two flavours of Q-implicature ; Conclusion -- Embedded implicatures : the problems. The problems ; Varieties of conventionalism ; Against conventionalism ; Conclusion -- Embedded implicatures : a Gricean approach. Disjunction ; Belief reports ; Factives and other presupposition inducers ; Indefinites ; Contrastive construals and lexical pragmatics ; Conclusion. (shrink)

Rationality, Norms and Institutions: In Search of a Realistic Utopia The main goal of political philosophers is to search for a realistic utopia by taking individuals as they are and institutions, rules and laws as they might be. Instead of trying to change either individuals or institutions in order to improve society, this article argues that both strategies should be combined, since there are causal connections running both ways. Because individuals ultimately devise and uphold institutions, one should be optimistic about (...) the possibilities of deliberately improving society through institutional reforms. However, one should adequately model the influences that these reforms have on individuals, their identities and their motivations. From the fact that individuals can actually turn into egoists if they are treated as such, this article stresses the need to detect and maintain non-egoistic motivations. Since informal norms, for example, motivate individuals to socially desirable action, it is important to devise formal institutions that support rather than erode norm-guided behavior. (shrink)

According to the error theory, normative judgements are beliefs that ascribe normative properties, even though such properties do not exist. In this paper, I argue that we cannot believe the error theory, and that this means that there is no reason for us to believe this theory. It may be thought that this is a problem for the error theory, but I argue that it is not. Instead, I argue, our inability to believe the error theory undermines many objections that (...) have been made to this theory. (shrink)

Unbelievable Errors defends an error theory about all normative judgements: not just moral judgements, but also judgements about reasons for action, judgements about reasons for belief, and instrumental normative judgements. This theory states that normative judgements are beliefs that ascribe normative properties, but that normative properties do not exist. It therefore entails that all normative judgements are false. -/- Bart Streumer also argues, however, that we cannot believe this error theory. This may seem to be a problem for the (...) theory. But he argues that it makes this error theory more likely to be true, since it undermines objections to the theory and it makes it harder to reject the arguments for the theory. -/- He then sketches how certain other philosophical theories can be defended in a similar way. He concludes that to make philosophical progress, we need to make a sharp distinction between a theory's truth and our ability to believe it. (shrink)

In Magnolia, a 1999 movie written and directed by then 29-year-old Paul Thomas Anderson, we follow a range of characters who all try to come to terms with the things happening to them in both the present and past. This chapter interprets the movie as making a philosophical point about meaning: how and why do people find meaning in and attribute meaning to things, even if they seem to happen for no apparent reason at all? We will analyze how both (...) the movie’s characters and all of us watching the movie, living our own lives, try to make sense of the often absurd coincidences in life. More importantly, we will ask why we feel the need to “make sense” of the things that happen to and around us and what happens when our attempts fail. How should we respond to things that simply don’t make sense, even after we have tried hard? The chapter explains how (key scenes of) the movie can be interpreted as visualizing the philosophical notion of “the absurd” and inviting us to respond to absurdities in ways already articulated by the French existentialist Albert Camus. (shrink)

The reform movement in science is seemingly constructing a new moral economy of science around process and bureaucracy, in which a new scientific etiquette is emerging that prescribes the performance of reformed science as civilised, efficient and objective. Bureaucratic innovations were borne out of the reform movement that seek to prescribe specific research processes, including but not limited to preregistration and registered reports. This moral economy emerges in the form of a bureaucracy and its epistemic uniformity actively suppresses scientific plurality. (...) This paper argues that Eliasian drivers such as distinction, shame and disgust, act to pressure scientists into adopting this new etiquette. Even though the etiquette's appearance is quite new, it can be traced back to existing moral economies of science and their pursuit of efficiency and objectivity. (shrink)

This is an attempt at reviving Kneale's version of the description theory of names, which says that a proper name is synonymous with a definite description of the form ‘the individual named so-and-so’. To begin with, I adduce a wide range of observations to show that names and overt definites are alike in all relevant respects. I then turn to Kripke's main objection against Kneale's proposal, and endeavour to refute it. In the remainder of the paper I elaborate on Kneale's (...) analysis, adopting a theory of presupposition proposed by van der Sandt. (shrink)

Technological developments increasingly enable monitoring and steering the behavior of individuals. Enforcement of the law by means of technology can be much more effective and pervasive than enforcement by humans, such as law enforcement officers. However, it can also bypass legislators and courts and minimize any room for civil disobedience. This significantly reduces the options to challenge legal rules. This, in turn, can impede the development of legal systems. In this paper, an analogy is made with evolutionary biology to illustrate (...) that the possibility to deviate from legal rules and existing norms is sometimes necessary for the further development of legal systems. Some room to break the law, for instance, through civil disobedience or imperfect enforcement of the law, will ensure sufficient variation. This allows for properly evolving legal systems that can continue to provide fair solutions, even when society and concepts of fairness further develop. (shrink)

Frank Jackson has argued that, given plausible claims about supervenience, descriptive predicates and property identity, there are no irreducibly normative properties. Philosophers who think that there are such properties have made several objections to this argument. In this paper, I argue that all of these objections fail. I conclude that Jackson's argument shows that there are no irreducibly normative properties.