This article is supposed to be an approximation to Eduard Gans´ conception of Europe, an author considered to be the most prominent disciple of Hegel by a growing number of scholars. In those times, the idea of Europe was a highly topical subject, due to both to the influence of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, but as well to the development of German idealism. Gans is closely related to these instances and formulates an idea of Europe (...) that goes beyond the conception of his teacher Hegel. He takes into account the new instances that arise from 1830 on in Europe, while he is also receptive to the views coming from America. (shrink)

Eduard Gans, einer der unbestrittenen Führer der Hegelschen Schule, verwendet den Begriff der Anerkennung vorzugsweise in Texten seiner juristischen Spezialisierung und Disziplin. Genauer benutzt er den Begriff einerseits an der Schnittstelle von Rechts- und Geschichtsphilosophie, andererseits im Kontext seiner Ausführung zum Völkerrecht, wenn er die Frage der Anerkennung von Staaten durch andere erörtert.

Eduard Gans remains a rather neglected thinker, although he was probably the most gifted and, perhaps, in the few years that he outlived him, the most influential of Hegel’s immediate followers. In the English speaking countries in particular, the reception of Gans has been hindered, if not prevented, by the formidable obstacle that his writings, with the exception of his additions to Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, are not available in English translation. In his native Germany, too, a (...) full appreciation of Gans has not yet been achieved. Serious study of Gans has only started in the wake and as a sideline of the post–1945 Hegel renaissance. Given this belated start to the discussion, it is not very surprising that even the main tenets of Gans’ political philosophy are still subject to controversial interpretations. The most important result of Gans research to date is to be found in the editorial efforts of Horst Schröder and Manfred Riedel which, for the first time, make some of Gans’ lectures available to the scholarly community at large. A consideration of Gans’ publication record may, to some extent, explain the long neglect of this notable philosopher. It may also account for the significance of the recently published lecture notes. Though the number of his books and articles is considerable, Gans did not bring together and publish details of the aspects in which his views differ from those of Hegel. This may have been due to Gans’ untimely death. Alternatively, from personal loyalty to Hegel or respect for Hegel’s system, Gans may have thought it inappropriate to publish anything critical of his patron and friend. Or, and this seems likely from the manner and context in which he presents his arguments, Gans did not perceive these differences as amounting to any substantial disagreement or even criticism, but considered them to be no more than interpretation or application of given principles to new conditions and phenomena. Suspending descision on the plausibility of these options, the fact remains that Gans did not publish a critique of Hegel, and it is in this respect, apart from their other merits, that Gans’ lectures attract our attention, for, while they appear to be merely expounding Hegel’s doctrines, they also examine them critically. In the light of these lectures, then, the differences between the views of Hegel and Gans can now be studied in much greater detail than was previously possible. That Gans’ lectures from both the pre- and post–1830 periods are now available has the additional advantage of enabling us to perceive significant developments in his views and convictions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 62.3 (2001) 543-564 [Access article in PDF] Eduard Gans and the Crisis of Hegelianism Warren Breckman In a 1834 report on the development of economic associationism in France, Johannes Schön detected an echo in Germany, the stirrings of a debate over the "modern Associationswesen." This discussion, he believed, would be crucial to the future of the "national economy." 1 Schön was (...) an astute observer, for the German discussion of associationism in the early 1830s was indeed but a faint echo of the French; and insofar as the idea of association was addressed by prominent social writers in those years, it was generally greeted with suspicion. This was the case, for instance, with the liberal thinker Robert von Mohl, whose influential 1835 tract on the social question criticized the notion of proletarian associationism. Conversely, by the early 1840s, association was on many tongues as a panacea for the social ills of the age. By 1840 Mohl himself had embraced the "Assoziationsprinzip" as an antidote to the atomized condition of modern social life. 2Among the relatively small number of German writers who did champion association in the 1830s, the claims for its significance were already grandiose. Moses Hess's Die heilige Geschichte der Menschheit (1837) and August von Cieszkowski's Prolegomena zur Historiosophie (1838) both linked social solidarity to millenarian expectations of a new age of humanity. Even before Hess or Cieszkowski, the first German book on Charles Fourier, by one S. R. Schneider, bore the title Das Problem der Zeit und dessen Lösung durch die Assoziation (1834), while another, by Fr. Hr. Tappehorn, was headed Die vollkommene Association, als Vermittlerin der Einheit des Vernunftstaates und der Lehre Jesu (1834). Yet the enormous importance assigned to associationism [End Page 543] in these titles exposes the ambiguity of the idea itself. For if, as one historian has claimed, "free association can be regarded in principle as the central organizational form of modern or industrial society," 3 there was no agreement on its nature. Should the right of association be understood as liberal or socialist, individualistic or collectivist? Is free association the core idea and mode of interaction of a pluralistic and competitive civil society, or is it the principle of unification that will overcome pluralism and competition? These fundamental questions were to preoccupy nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century debates in areas as diverse as revolutionary theory, labor union activism, and the regulation of business cartels. However, in the 1830s, under the pressure of the newly perceived social question, the stirrings of industrialization in Germany, and the revival of democratic politics in the July Revolution, these issues first appeared with a force that drew the attention of intellectuals.Perhaps no German intellectual of the 1830s so perfectly embodies the implicit tensions of the idea of associationism as the Hegelian philosopher of law, Eduard Gans (1797-1839). A student of the Heidelberg legal scholar A. J. Thibaut, Gans later came to be considered by Hegel as one of his most brilliant followers. Once Gans became a professor in the Juristic Faculty at the University of Berlin in the mid-1820s, it was he, not Hegel, who taught a generation of students the intricacies of Hegelian political philosophy. Gans died in 1839 at the age of 42, felled at a luncheon by a stroke while in mid-sentence, a victim, according to the Hallische Jahrbücher, of his own passion for discussion. This volubility is more than evident in his oeuvre, which includes a multi-volume study of inheritance law in world history, dozens of essays on legal philosophy and political and legal issues in his native Prussia and Europe, a popular memoir, and an edition of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. He was instrumental, moreover, in creating the Society for Scientific Critique in 1826, the Hegelian "counter-academy" established in response to the Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences' decision to exclude Hegel, and he was a founder of Die Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik, the organization's journal and the main organ of Hegelianism. At... (shrink)

Between Leopold Ranke and Eduard Gans - Certain circumstances and stylistic considerations lead us to believe that the manuscript MS. 114 in the Mendelssohn Archive at the Staatsbibliothek in Berlin is evidence of a course in "Contemporary History" held by Leopold Ranke at the city’s university in the summer term of 1827. The course was on the chronological history of the French Revolution. Ranke had already dealt with the same subject the year before, though in a less detailed (...) manner. And it was not until 1875 that he published a work on the period of the Revolution, but focussing solely on the war between the European powers in 1791-1792. Hence the importance of the new manuscript - in Felix Mendelssohn Bartholdy’s own hand - which, previously, had been mistakenly connected with the teaching of the Hegelian jurist Eduard Gans. Mendelssohn attended his course on the French Revolution in the summer of 1828. (shrink)

Twenty scholars from around the world assembled at the Werner Reimer Stiftung in Bad Homburg from June 29 to July 1, 1995, to discuss the life and work of Eduard Gans. There has been a surge of interest in Gans in the past few years, and the authors of all recent work on Gans attended. Books circulated at the conference included Gans’ Chroniques françaises: Un hégélien juif à Paris, trans. by Myriam Bienenstock, ed. by Norbert (...) Waszek ; Eduard Gans : Hegelianer, Jude, Europäer: Text und Dokumente, ed. by Norbert Waszek ; Gans’ Rückblicke auf Personen und Zuständ: Berlin 1836, ed. by Norbert Waszek, and my own Eduard Gans and the Hegelian Philosophy of Law. An important recent article is Reinhard Blänkner, “‘Der Absolutismus war ein Glück der doch nicht zu den Absolutisten gehört’: Eduard Gans und die hegelianischen Ursprünge der Absolutismusforschung in Deutschland,” Historische Zeitschrift, 256 : 31–66. (shrink)

Call the epistemological grounds on which we rationally should determine our ontological (or alethiological) commitments regarding an entity its arbiter of existence (or arbiter of truth). It is commonly thought that arbiters of existence and truth can be provided by our practices. This paper argues that such views have several implications: (1) the relation of arbiters to our metaphysical commitments consists in indispensability, (2) realist views about a kind of entity should take the kinds of practices providing that entity’s arbiters (...) to align with respect to their metaphysical dependencies, (3) if realists take a kind of practice to provide grounds on which to affirm the existence of a kind of entity, they should turn to those same grounds when seeking to provide an epistemology of the relevant domain. (shrink)

Semi-compatibilists intend to reconcile moral responsibility with causal determinism, even if determinism is incompatible with freedom to do otherwise. For them, moral responsibility does not require free will, which is not a necessary condition for moral responsibility. They agree with the view that causal determinism is incompatible with free will. Free will is incompatible with determinism as well as moral responsibility. Both compatibilists and semi-compatibilists argue for the compatibility between determinism and moral responsibility. However, the latter fails to prove sufficiently (...) the reason why determinism is compatible with moral responsibility. (shrink)

Fictionalists about a kind of disputed entity aim to give a face-value interpretation of our discourse about those entities without affirming their existence. The fictionalist’s commitment to non-realism leaves open three options regarding their ontological position: they may deny the existence of the disputed entities (anti-realism), remain agnostic regarding their existence (agnosticism), or deny that there are ontological facts of the matter (ontological anti-realism). This paper outlines a method of adjudicating between these options and argues that fictionalists may be expected (...) to hold preferences between them. The typical arguments and motivations for fictionalism lead naturally to a practice-based metaontological framework under which our practices regarding a kind of disputed entity might inform our ontological beliefs about those entities. When that framework is applied to fictionalism, it is found that the usual motivations for fictionalism lead naturally, though not decisively, to ontological anti-realism. And, where there are reasons against ontological anti-realism, fictionalism leans more toward anti-realism than agnosticism. (shrink)

On the concept of self; study based on Vedic literature.

For twenty-five years Eduard Fischer returned to the Trans-Himalayan region of Ladakh, enthralled by the unique culture of this ancient Buddhist kingdom, and seeking to catch just a glimpse of the elusive snow leopard. This is the tale of that quest, but also an exploration of myth, art, science, and the sacred space of high mountains.

The book makes a direct contribution to the connection between phenomenology and cognitive science.

This collection presents the English-language reader for the first time with essays that are representative of Bernstein's much-neglected revisionist period, 1901-1921. Bernstein himself suggested that this later work included significant new elements, indicating further progress in his liberal-socialist theory. Bernstein's later work acquires additional significance in light of the events of 1989, which have discredited not only Marxism-Leninism, but revolutionary Marxist theory in general, thus making the reevaluation of Bernstein's revisionism a worthwhile experience.

On the life of Mādhava, d. 1386, exponent of Dvaita philosophy.

本书包括:导论:论应用伦理学;基因超人与后现代前景;从辛格的“人”的概念看堕胎与安乐死等内容。.

Portion of Tattvacintāmaṇi dealing with syllogism (avayava); includes commentaries and supercommentary.