This book is of little interest except to those tracing back the neo-scholastic sources of such figures as Maréchal, Coreth, Rahner, et al. The introductory essay by G. Isaye, supposedly designed to give a summary description of Scheurer's method, is a masterpiece of obscure writing even for those acquainted with neoscholastic jargon. The rest of the volume consists of twelve very desultory essays by Scheurer. In these essays Scheurer struggles to pour the philosophy of the ego à la Kant (...) and his successors into scholastic molds. This synthesis is done in the name of the transcendental method, but what results is historically dubious and philosophically tortured. Though ambiguities abound, Scheurer was ahead of most of his scholastic contemporaries in that he tried to come to grips with Kant and to see in Kant someone more than the malin genie of modern philosophy. Unfortunately, the editor does not date Scheurer's essays and one, therefore, cannot determine whether Scheurer first influenced Maréchal or vice-versa--D. J. M. B. (shrink)

Neo-scholasticism is supposed to be a "creative" development of the spirit of Thomism and its application to contemporary philosophical themes. Yet its partisans as well as its adversaries largely ignore the fact that many of the neo-scholastic thinkers are increasingly applying the transcendental method to reach the major ideas of Aquinas. The thesis of the present book is that the "transcendental method," viewed in a large sense as stretching from Kant to Heidegger, is an integral part of the thought of (...) several well-known neo-Thomists, and that it touches the work of many others. The author studies extensively the work of J. Maréchal, who was the first to attempt an integration of transcendental idealism into the realistic metaphysics of the school of Saint Thomas. Following a review of minor figures like Grégoire, Defever, and Isaye, short chapters investigate the critical approach of certain important contemporary Catholic thinkers to the transcendental method. A highly interesting part of the book treats the neo-scholastic "dialogue" with Heidegger, which is especially important in the work of the most powerful theological mind of contemporary Roman Catholicism, Karl Rahner. Finally, Muck shows, in the chapters on A. Marc, B. Lonergan, and E. Coreth, three examples of fully developed philosophical systems worked out by means of an extensive use of the transcendental method.—M. J. V. (shrink)

This collection, in the genre of a Festschrift presented in honor of Elizabeth G. Salmon by her colleagues at Fordham University, comprises twelve scholarly essays of uniform excellence, all of them original to this volume. They range rather broadly over the whole history of Western man’s grappling with the question of God—from Plato’s hesitancy to give ultimacy to the Forms to Dewey’s discerning a role for God in the search for human meaning. In between is Avicenna’s understanding of intellect, Descartes’ (...) Cogito, Hegel’s critique of Kant, Marcel’s intuition of being as mystery, the Transcendental Thomists: Rahner’s and Lonergan’s metaphysics of spirit and Maréchal’s argument for God, and Peirce’s neglected argument from Erkenntnislehre as instinct more basic than reasoning. Unification comes from the fact that these are all exercises in the philosophy of God, an activity viewed here as retaining a certain contiguity with theology and religious history. No one school of philosophical thought serves to unify the essays; nearly all are represented, with the exception of any explicit use of Process Thought or of the new natural theology believed to be deriving from Analytical Philosophy, beyond Flew and MacIntyre. (shrink)

This book is of little interest except to those tracing back the neo-scholastic sources of such figures as Maréchal, Coreth, Rahner, et al. The introductory essay by G. Isaye, supposedly designed to give a summary description of Scheurer's method, is a masterpiece of obscure writing even for those acquainted with neoscholastic jargon. The rest of the volume consists of twelve very desultory essays by Scheurer. In these essays Scheurer struggles to pour the philosophy of the ego à la Kant (...) and his successors into scholastic molds. This synthesis is done in the name of the transcendental method, but what results is historically dubious and philosophically tortured. Though ambiguities abound, Scheurer was ahead of most of his scholastic contemporaries in that he tried to come to grips with Kant and to see in Kant someone more than the malin genie of modern philosophy. Unfortunately, the editor does not date Scheurer's essays and one, therefore, cannot determine whether Scheurer first influenced Maréchal or vice-versa--D. J. M. B. (shrink)

Toute une génération de penseurs catholiques allemands du xxe siècle a cru pouvoir se rattacher à la pensée de la finitude développée par M. Heidegger pour la faire dialoguer avec, d’une part l’idéalisme allemand, et d’autre part surtout, la métaphysique de Thomas d’Aquin et l’ouverture à Dieu Ipsum esse per se subsistens qu’elle semblait ménager via la différence ontologique. À cet égard, ils effectuaient bon gré mal gré une tentative de conciliation toute kantienne en ses origines, entre le thomisme transcendantal (...) du jésuite belge J. Maréchal et la pensée de Heidegger. Przywara, en dépit d’un apparent souci commun de concilier métaphysiques de la « finitude » et de l’« infinitude », n’épargne pas ce qu’il appelle « école heideggerienne catholique ». Nous tâcherons de comprendre ici précisément pourquoi, en donnant un aperçu de la lecture effectuée par le jésuite allemand, tant des entreprises maréchalienne et heideggerienne pour elles-mêmes que de quelques tentatives de leurs confrontations. (shrink)

The European Legacy, Volume 17, Issue 5, Page 705-706, August 2012.

The paper was read at the Colloquium ‘Après Maréchal’ , organised in memory of the philosopher J. Maréchal. In the first half of the paper the author develops the fundamental tenet of Maréchal’s philosophy: an attempt to go beyond the philosophy of Kant by using the transcendental method. The author bears witness of this attempt by criticising and transforming the transcendental method itself. For unavoidably the question arises in what way transcendental philosophy can justify a philosophical reflection. (...) In the second half of the paper experiences are described which suggest that other ways than the transcendental method and reflection are to be explored if philosophical research is to be fruitful: the experiences of faith, evil, culture, art and of the individual person. A new kind of reflection seems necessary, less intellectual and more “biological”, where thinking and life are linked together, allowing us to talk about such a thing as a “physical faith”. (shrink)

The paper was read at the Colloquium ‘Après Maréchal’ , organised in memory of the philosopher J. Maréchal. In the first half of the paper the author develops the fundamental tenet of Maréchal’s philosophy: an attempt to go beyond the philosophy of Kant by using the transcendental method. The author bears witness of this attempt by criticising and transforming the transcendental method itself. For unavoidably the question arises in what way transcendental philosophy can justify a philosophical reflection. (...) In the second half of the paper experiences are described which suggest that other ways than the transcendental method and reflection are to be explored if philosophical research is to be fruitful: the experiences of faith, evil, culture, art and of the individual person. A new kind of reflection seems necessary, less intellectual and more “biological”, where thinking and life are linked together, allowing us to talk about such a thing as a “physical faith”. (shrink)

In this paper, we run a laboratory experiment to compare two mechanisms in a procurement setting: Right-of-First-Refusal where the incumbent supplier is granted a privileged position versus standard First-Price-Auction. To this end, we have subjects compete against a computerized agent programmed to behave in a risk-neutral way in a FPA, and in a ROFR auction where the “incumbent” bidder is the computer. In contrast with theory, we observe that on average bidders are slightly but significantly more aggressive under the ROFR (...) when their costs are such that they are predicted to behave identically under both auction procedures. For the sub-sample of subjects for whom we can estimate a CRRA parameter, we confirm the theoretical prediction that the buyer’s expected cost is larger in the ROFR if the newcomer is not sufficiently risk-averse. (shrink)

Recent studies indicate that mammalian chromosomes contain discretecis‐acting loci that control replication timing, mitotic condensation, and stability of entire chromosomes. Disruption of the large non‐coding RNA gene ASAR6 results in late replication, an under‐condensed appearance during mitosis, and structural instability of human chromosome 6. Similarly, disruption of the mouse Xist gene in adult somatic cells results in a late replication and instability phenotype on the X chromosome. ASAR6 shares many characteristics with Xist, including random mono‐allelic expression and asynchronous replication timing. (...) Additional “chromosome engineering” studies indicate that certain chromosome rearrangements affecting many different chromosomes display this abnormal replication and instability phenotype. These observations suggest that all mammalian chromosomes contain “inactivation/stability centers” that control proper replication, condensation, and stability of individual chromosomes. Therefore, mammalian chromosomes contain four types ofcis‐acting elements, origins, telomeres, centromeres, and “inactivation/stability centers”, all functioning to ensure proper replication, condensation, segregation, and stability of individual chromosomes. (shrink)

In the Phaedo, Socrates offers recommendations for living a philosophical life. We argue that those recommendations can be properly understood only in light of Socrates’ account of the soul’s true nature, considered separately from the body. Embodiment causes the soul to diverge from its proper end, the pursuit of knowledge. Bodily pleasures, pains, and desires divert the soul to other ends, distract its attention away from knowledge, and deceive it about what is true. Socrates’ recommended solutions to these obstacles are (...) diverse, reflecting the complexities of human psychology. He recommends avoidance of bodily experiences in many cases as well as reevaluation of the importance of the body, but he doesn’t recommend either the wholesale rejection or embrace of the bodily. We are our souls but, like it or not, we are temporarily embodied, and what happens to the body is thereby experienced by us. Socrates thus exhorts us to live in a way that recognizes both our temporary humanity and our lasting, true nature. Only so can we best pursue knowledge. (shrink)

In the Philebus, Socrates argues that pleasures can be false in the same way that beliefs can be false. On the basis of Socrates' analysis of malicious pleasure, a mixed pleasure of the soul and a passion, I defend the view that, according to Socrates, pleasures can be false when they represent as pleasant something that is not worthy of our enjoyment, where that means that they represent as pleasant something that is not pleasant in its own right because it (...) is not fine. Since these pleasures misrepresent the value of their objects, they involve an evaluative error. In contrast, a pleasure is true when it correctly represents the actual value of things. (shrink)

In Nicomachean Ethics 7.7 (= Eudemian Ethics 6.7), Aristotle distinguishes softness (malakia) from lack of self-control (akrasia) and endurance (karteria) from self-control (enkrateia). This paper argues that unqualified softness consists of a disposition to give up acting to avoid the painful toil (ponos) required to execute practical resolutions, and (coincidentally) to enjoy the pleasures of rest and relaxation. The enduring person, in contrast, persists in her commitments despite the painful effort required to enact them. Along the way, I argue that (...) this interpretation qualifies our understanding of the pleasures and pains with which temperance and intemperance are concerned. (shrink)

In Quod animi mores, Galen says both that there is an identity between the capacities of the soul and the mixtures of the body, and that the soul’s capacities ‘follow upon’ the bodily mixtures. The seeming tension in this text can be resolved by noting that the soul’s capacities are constituted by, and hence are nothing over and above, bodily mixtures, but bodily mixtures explain the soul’s capacities and not the other way around. Galen’s proposal represents a distinctive position in (...) the Ancient debate on the relationship between soul and body. (shrink)

Vaesen infers unique properties of mind from the appearance of specific cultural innovation – a correlation without causal direction. Shifts in habitat, population density, and group dynamics are the only independently verifiable incentives for changes in cultural practices. The transition from Acheulean to Late Stone Age technologies requires that we consider how population and social dynamics affect cultural innovation and mental function.

This paper argues that Aristotelian practical wisdom (phronêsis) is a state of conviction (pistis) in the goodness of our goals based on proper grounds. This state of conviction can only be achieved if rational arguments and principles agree with how things appear to us. Since, for Aristotle, passions influence appearances, they can support or undermine our conviction in the goodness of ends that are worth pursuing. For this reason, we cannot be practically wise without virtuous dispositions to experience appropriate passions. (...) Along the way, I argue that this reading allows us to explain the shortcomings of self-controlled and akratic agents. -/- . (shrink)

Orthologic is defined by weakening the axioms and rules of inference of the classical propositional calculus. The resulting Lindenbaum-Tarski quotient algebra is an orthoimplication algebra which generalizes the author's implication algebra. The associated order structure is a semi-orthomodular lattice. The theory of orthomodular lattices is obtained by adjoining a falsity symbol to the underlying orthologic or a least element to the orthoimplication algebra.

In this paper I examine the moral psychology of the Phaedo and argue that the philosophical life in this dialogue is a temperate life, and that temperance consists in exercising epistemic discernment by actively withdrawing assent from incorrect evaluations the body inclines us to make. Philosophers deal with bodily affections by taking a correct epistemic stance. Exercising temperance thus understood is a necessary condition both for developing and strengthening rational capacities, and for fixing accurate beliefs about value. The purification philosophers (...) strive for, and the purifying role of philosophy, should then be understood as a clarificatory act consisting in making one’s thoughts clear and withdrawing assent from erroneous evaluative content in our desires and pleasures. Along the way, I argue that philosophers must neither avoid situations and activities that cause bodily affections as much as possible, nor ignore or care little about them. (shrink)

Este artículo examina la manera en que el diseño específico de las casas de baños de la Antigüedad tardía en la provincia romana de la Cirenaica, base de operaciones para la conquista islámica de Ifrīqiya, influyó en el desarrollo de los hammams en el norte de África y en al-Andalus. Los restos arqueológicos de los baños bizantinos/tardoantiguos y los primeros hammams son puestos en comparación para demostrar las grandes similitudes de su trazado general y dentro de este, del diseño del (...) caldarium en particular, lo que apunta a la pervivencia de los esquemas de construcción que sobreviven hasta el día de hoy en los hammams marroquíes. La característica más distintiva era la estancia rectangular para el baño de calor, calentada por un solo horno, y flanqueada por dos exedras que albergaban sendas bañeras rectangulares. Este diseño de hammam «occidental» era marcadamente distinto de los hammams contemporáneos en Oriente, que a su vez continuaron con el diseño tradicional de los baños públicos romano-bizantinos orientales. Contrariamente a lo que se presuponía, este artículo demuestra que el diseño «occidental» no se originó en los primeros momentos del Marruecos medieval y de al-Andalus, extendiéndose posteriormente hacia el Mediterráneo oriental, sino que se originó en el norte del África romano-bizantino, extendiéndose hacia el Oeste, para regresar, a través de la circularidad cultural, al lugar de origen con nuevas adaptaciones. (shrink)

What are the passions? And what, if anything, do they have to do with our intellectual lives? I argue that, according to Aristotle, the passions are complex states that carry information about the value things have. More specifically, Aristotelian passions are constituted by fine-grained evaluative appearances—a kind of truth-apt, cognitive, yet non-rational representation that non-human animals also entertain. Given that the passions are representations of value, they can be the basis for coming to know and understand the peculiar value of (...) things. So, the passions can serve as grounds for intellectual achievements that are essential to a good life. In particular, I argue that, for Aristotle, the passions contribute substantively to three intellectual achievements that are required for a flourishing life: practical wisdom, certain instances of contemplation, and the appreciation of art. Since Aristotelian passions carry rich information and discriminate value, they are cognitive states that can shape and enrich not only our lives as agents, but also our lives as knowers. The passions can play an epistemic role by serving as warrant for intellectually discerning the normative features of the situations we inhabit, the kinds of characters that surround us, and what is good and fine in them and us. Furthermore, in virtue of their epistemic role, the passions can be the basis for the intellectual aspects of a moral education. (shrink)

This paper argues that Aristotelian thumos is a non-reducible mental phenomenon that plays a central role in Aristotle’s theory of the mind, motivation, and action. For Aristotle, thumos is not primarily, as others have argued, a desire for the noble, social appraisal, or retaliation; rather, it is an inner drive or impulse to act. More precisely, it is an executory urge to implement or enact one’s ends or goals, whatever they are. Thumos accounts for someone’s proneness to spring into action (...) and can contribute to bringing about rational or non-rational, first-order desires. It is a second-order motivation, which both human and non-human animals have and that comes in degrees: we can be more or less thumotic, which amounts to being more or less disposed to making first-order desires effective so that they issue in actions. Aristotelian thumos, then, anticipates features of the modern notion of the will. Along the way, I argue that thumos is key to Aristotle’s efforts to differentiate and hierarchically organize species, characters, genders, and peoples. (shrink)