The paper examines the interplays between logic and politics in the Polish School of Logic starting from 1914. The Polish School of Logic flourished between 1920 and 1939. Philosophically, it was influenced by Kazimierz Twardowski (1866–1938). For Twardowski logic is fundamental for every kind of human activity, professional and private and this means that every argument should be formulated and proceed by correct inferential rules. These rules involve semiotics, formal logic and methodology of science. The paper shows how this position (...) was shared by Twardowski’s students, including Jan Łukasiewicz, Stanisław Leśniewski, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz and Tadeusz Kotrabiński, as well as by the next generation of logicians and philosophers and especially by Alfred Tarski. These authors considered logic, philosophy and science as completely neutral with respect to politics and ideology but they also considered logical skills as indispensable in political activities. (shrink)

In 1930 Otto Neurath asked Alfred Tarski for information about Polish philosophers of science and their work. Tarski answered on 24 April, 1930, saying in one of the first sentences that.

This paper investigates the distinction between determining and modifying expressions that played an important role in the Brentano School. The focus lies on how the distinction is applied to adjectives by Anton Marty and Kazimierz Twardowski. In ‘heavy gun’, ‘heavy’ plays a determining role: heavy guns are guns; in ‘fake gun’, ‘fake’ plays a modifying role: fake guns are no guns at all. According to Marty and Twardowski, when a modifying adjective is combined with a noun, it shifts the meaning (...) of the noun. This paper rejects this proposal and proposes a better account which was developed by Bernard Bolzano: the difference between determining and modifying adjectives must be understood in terms of how their meanings figure in meaning analyses of adjective-noun combinations. (shrink)

This paper comments Susan Haack’s remarks about Twardowski’s criticism of relativism in the theory of truth. The author summarizes Twardowski’s arguments for truth-absolutism and tries to show that that their presentation by Haack is incomplete. The defense of Twardowski’s position in the paper uses ideas developed by Tarski and Kokoszyñska.

One can often encounter an opinion that Polish scientific philosophy deserves to be much better known than actually is. This book is thought as a response to such a claim. The papers collected in this volume are divided into two parts: Background and Influence and History and Systematics. However, there is no sharp borderline between themes which are touched in both parts. Generally speaking, all papers of the first part relate the Lvov-Warsaw School to some philosophical movements external to it (...) whereas the papers collected in the second one focus on internal issues connected with the school . Since the Polish school of mathematical logic is much better known than the Polish analytic philosophy we decided to omit here any treatment of the former. Thus, this collection centers on purely philosophical matters. We projected this volume not as an exhaustive panorama of Polish analytic philosophy but rather as a series of essays on particular persons or topic. As a result one can find here papers on Twardowski. Ajdukiewicz, Kotarbinski, Tarski and Lukasiewicz as well as on ethics on science, nominalism, and the methodology of psychology. We hope that this book will contribute to a better knowledge and evaluation of Polish achievements in analytic philosophy. We would like to express our gratitude to Professor Leszek Nowak, the editor-in-chief of Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, who initiated the idea of the collection and helped in its preparation. (shrink)

Kazimierz Twardowski is most commonly known as the teacher of great philosophers and the founder of the Lvov-Warsaw School. As a philosopher however, he is primarily remembered for his famous comparison of the contents and objects of various kinds of representations, a comparison that remains enshrined in European thought.In fact, he attained important results in many other branches of philosophy as well. For instance, in ontology, he laid the foundations for the modern theory of formal structure of objects, and he (...) introduced the theoretically fruitful pair of terms, action-product. In epistemology, he developed a profound analysis of the notion and criteria of truth; and he provided a forceful account of the errors underlying relativist theories of truth. In methodology, he drew an explicit distinction between the processes of discovering, systematising, and grounding in science, and he offered accurate descriptions of the nature of psychology and other humanities. In logic, he offered decisive arguments on behalf of the idiogenetic conception of judgement, and he improved the traditional typology of adjectives.These achievements are of significance that is not only historical. Kazimierz Twardowski's work, formulated in plain, precise language, are instructive and inspiring for contemporary students of philosophy. (shrink)

The Polish School of Logic flourished in the period 1920-1939. Philosophically, it was influenced by Kazimierz Twardowski, professor at the University of Lwow (now Lviv in Ukraine), who established the Lwow-Warsaw School, to which the mentioned logical group belonged. Twardowski claimed that logic is very important in every kind of human activity, professional as well as private. Hence, every argument should be clearly formulated and proceed by correct inferential rules. These postulates involved semiotics, formal logic, and methodology of science — (...) that is, logica sensu largo. This position was accepted by Twardowski’s most distinguished students, such as Jan Łukasiewicz, Stanisław Leśniewski, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, and Tadeusz Kotarbiński, who graduated before 1914, as well as the next generation of logicians and philosophers, particularly by Alfred Tarski. Although all these people considered logic, philosophy, and science as completely neutral with respect to politics and ideology, they treated logical skills as indispensable in political activities. In philosophical specialized terminology, Polish logicians regarded logic as a weapon against irrationalism. This position was also represented by Polish logicians who did not belong to the group of Twardowski’s students. (shrink)

Ancien etudiant de Brentano et de Zimmerman, Kazimierz Twardowski, apres son election a la chaire de philosophie a Lvov en 1895, crea autour de lui un cercle d'etudiants et de collaborateurs exceptionnel, connu aujourd'hui sous le nom d'Ecole de Lvov-Varsovie. A mi-chemin entre Vienne et Cambridge, c'est a Lvov, et puis partiellement a Varsovie, que Jan Lukasiewicz, Stanislaw Lesniewski, Alfred Tarski, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, Tadeusz Kotarbinski et bien d'autres encore, repenserent dans un esprit d'analyse les questions fondamentales de la philosophie du (...) langage, de la logique, de la philosophie des sciences et des mathematiques. Plus qu'une simple traduction, ce livre est une version revisee de la monographie desormais classique que Jan Wolenski, connu pour ses travaux non seulement en histoire de la philosophie analytique, mais aussi en epistemologie et en theorie de la verite, a consacree a l'Ecole de Lvov-Varsovie. (shrink)

Analytical philosophy begins with the first mathematical and philosophical works of Bolzano published between 1804 and 1817. There, Bolzano set out a project for the global reform of mathematics by means of the axiomatic method. Having completed the Wissenschaftslehre, Bolzano wrote a summary of his logic for the Größenlehre, which he sent to Exner in 1833. The correspondence between Bolzano and Exner covered some of the main subjects treated by analytical philosophy: the status of abstract objects (propositions and objective ideas), (...) intuitions, objectless ideas, the concept of object and many others. While Bolzano argued in favor of abstract entities independent of mind and of language, Exner considered them as abstractions obtained from the subjective judgments and representations. During the XlXth century, Bolzano's philosophy spread over Bohemia and Austria through manuscripts and through the first edition of Zimmermann's textbook of philosophy. The most important Brentanians, Kerry, Twardowski, Meinong and Husserl, discussed his doctrines which may also have influenced Wittgenstein and the Polish school. (shrink)

Analytical philosophy begins with the first mathematical and philosophical works of Bolzano published between 1804 and 1817. There, Bolzano set out a project for the global reform of mathematics by means of the axiomatic method. Having completed the Wissenschaftslehre, Bolzano wrote a summary of his logic for the Größenlehre, which he sent to Exner in 1833. The correspondence between Bolzano and Exner covered some of the main subjects treated by analytical philosophy: the status of abstract objects (propositions and objective ideas), (...) intuitions, objectless ideas, the concept of object and many others. While Bolzano argued in favor of abstract entities independent of mind and of language, Exner considered them as abstractions obtained from the subjective judgments and representations. During the XlXth century, Bolzano's philosophy spread over Bohemia and Austria through manuscripts and through the first edition of Zimmermann's textbook of philosophy. The most important Brentanians, Kerry, Twardowski, Meinong and Husserl, discussed his doctrines which may also have influenced Wittgenstein and the Polish school. (shrink)

Władysław Witwicki was first of all a psychologist, but he graduated in philosophy from Lvov University, being one of the earliest pupils of Kazimierz Twardowski. He was a representative of the descriptivistic branch of the Lvov-Warsaw School. In the area of phsychology he put into practice the important postulate of his teacher, who persuaded his students to write original handbooks, giving Polish scholar contributions their due: it is how the work on Witwicki's Psychology began. In the area of philosophy he (...) was particularly interested in the foundations of (descriptive) psychology. Witwicki's ontological and epistemological views are close to realism. In ethics he defended the absolute character of moral norms against scepticism and relativism. In general, Witwicki subscribed to anti-irrationalism, the common standpoint in his School. (shrink)

This volume portrays the Polish or Lvov-Warsaw School, one of the most influential schools in analytic philosophy, which, as discussed in the thorough introduction, presented an alternative working picture of the unity of science.

Firstly, disregarding multiethnicity, it can refer to a philosophy cultivated in a feature of a nation, for instance, its religion or character. This meaning can be illustrated by ext of the distinction between philosophical superpowers and philosophical provinces. Poland is taken as an example. The paper discusses the views of Kazimierz Twardowski, the founding father of the Polish analytic school. He expressed interesting views concerning how philosophy of provinces should be done in order keep its originality.

This collection celebrates the centenary of the Lvov-Warsaw school, established by Kazimierz Twardowski in Lvov in 1895.

This book presents the heritage of the Lvov-Warsaw School from both the historical and the philosophical perspective. The historical view focuses on the beginnings and the dramatic end of the School brought about by the outbreak of World War II. The philosophical view, on the other hand, encompasses a broad spectrum of issues, including logical, epistemological, axiological, and psychological problems, revealing the interdisciplinary nature of studies carried out by Kazimierz Twardowski and his students. With thirteen diverse and original essays this (...) volume is split into three parts: History, Culture and Axiology; Psychology; and Logic and Methodology. Exploring not only the history of philosophy represented by the Lvov-Warsaw school, the book also reflects on the condition of contemporary philosophy from the perspective of concepts developed by its representatives. Furthermore, the studies presented in this book delve into problems of contemporary science and its distinctive interdisciplinary character. This volume is, therefore, not only a collection of analyses of the Lvov-Warsaw School philosophy, but also an investigation into the interdisciplinarity of science and philosophy itself. (shrink)

Kazimierz Twardowski was the founder of the Lvov-Warsaw School, one of the greatest phenomena in the European culture. The School had its representatives in all scientific disciplines, logic and mathematics including. Among his pupils are such great figures of European philosophy like: Jan Łukasiewicz, Stanisław Leśniewski, Tadeusz Kotarbiński, Władysław Tatarkiewicz and Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz. The paper presents his life and various fields of his rich activity, as well as the list of his main works and the greatest achievements in philosophy. He (...) is best known in the world as the author of the distinction presentation-object-content, act-product, as well as the supporter of the postulate of clarity of thought and speech and the critic of psychologism, relativity of truth, symbolomania and pragmatophobia in science. (shrink)

English summary: Jan Lukasiewicz (1878-1956) was one of the most important members of the Lwow-Warsaw school of logic. The thirteen translated articles in this volume demonstrate the protean form of Lukasiewiczs work, from his texts on Aristotle and the principle of non-contradiction and syllogistics to modal logic, intuitionism, and multivalent logics. The articles show in particular his preoccupations with logical precision and the problem of human liberty. French description: Avec Kazimierz Twardowski, Stanislaw Lesniewski et Alfred Tarski, le logicien et philosophe (...) polonais Jan Lukasiewicz (1878-1956) est l'un des membres les plus importants de l'Ecole de Lvov-Varsovie. Celebre pour ses ouvrages consacres a Aristote, notamment sur le principe de non-contradiction et sur la syllogistique, il a egalement publie des articles majeurs sur la logique propositionnelle, la logique modale, l'intuitionnisme et les logiques multivalentes, dont il fut l'un des fondateurs. Enfin, il a contribue a faire reconnaitre l'importance des travaux en logique de l'ecole megarico-stoicienne, trop longtemps eclipses par ceux d'Aristote sur la syllogistique. Mais Lukasiewicz ne fut pas seulement un logicien et un historien brillant, il s'engagea aussi dans les polemiques philosophiques de son temps. Il defendit ainsi la methode logique en philosophie. Proche sur ce point des membres du Cercle de Vienne, il ne rejetait pas pour autant les questions metaphysiques, commecelle du determinisme qui l'occupa toute sa vie. Les treize articles de ce recueil, fruit d'un travail collectif de traduction, ont pour ambition de montrer le caractere proteiforme de l'oeuvre de Lukasiewicz, preoccupe autant par la precision logique que par le probleme de la liberte humaine. (shrink)

Between 11–14 February 2021 the first international Philosophical Workshop organized by The Lvov–Warsaw School Research Center and Kazimierz Twardowski Philosophical Society of Lviv took place in the on–line version due to the ongoing COVID–19 pandemic. The working languages of the event were Polish, Ukrainian and English. The coordinators’ goal was to refer to the tradition of seminar of Kazimierz Twardowski, who was not only a distinguished philosopher but also a great educator, to stimulate interest and support for the young generation (...) of researchers into the heritage of the Lvov–Warsaw School. It is claimed that due to Twardowski’s unprecedented didactical engagement he managed to upbring dozens of Professors like Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, Stefan Baley, Leopold Blaustein, Tadeusz Czeżowski, Izydora Dąmbska, Tadeusz Kotarbiński, tanisław Leśniewski, Jan Łukasiewicz, Władysław Witwicki. (shrink)

Stephenson (2022) has argued that Kant’s thesis that all transcendental truths are transcendentally a priori knowable leads to omniscience of all transcendental truths. His arguments depend on luminosity principles and closure principles for transcendental knowability. We will argue that one pair of a luminosity and a closure principle should not be used, because the closure principle is too strong, while the other pair of a luminosity and a closure principle should not be used, because the luminosity principle is too strong. (...) Stephenson’s argument also depends on a factivity principle for transcendental knowability, which we will argue to be false. (shrink)

1. Die erste Hälfte des Kommentars, mit Ausnahme der Kapitel über die Weltseele.

'What is real?' has been one of the key questions of philosophy since its beginning in antiquity. But it is not just a question that philosophers ask. This Very Short Introduction discusses what reality is by looking at a variety of arguments, theories, and thought-experiments from philosophy, physics, and cognitive science.

A number of well-developed theories shed light on the question, under what circumstances our beliefs enjoy epistemic justification. Yet, comparatively little is known about epistemic defeat--when new information causes the loss of epistemic justification. This book proposes and defends a detailed account of epistemic defeaters. The main kinds of defeaters are analyzed in detail and integrated into a general framework that aims to explain how beliefs lose justification. It is argued that defeaters introduce incompatibilities into a noetic system and thereby (...) prompt a structured re-evaluation process that makes a justified reinstatement of the defeated belief impossible. The account is then applied to the topic of disagreement, where it is used in an argument for conciliationism, as well as a new explanation for higher-order defeat. Throughout the book, the notion of defeat is the center of attention, while a number of new issues are discussed at the intersections of defeat and justification. Specifically, new problems are raised for broadly internalist accounts of defeat, a fully descriptive reliabilist account of defeat is provided, and the case for normative defeat is revisited. (shrink)

The Natural Philosophy of Jan Bayer The main focus of this study is a reconstruction of the natural philosophy of the early modern Prešov's scholar Jan (Johannes) Bayer (1630–1674), with special regard to its Mosaic profile. After a critical reading of the research done on Bayer up to this point, the author concludes that Bayer’s natural-philosophical work, as such, has not yet been satisfactorily analyzed, nor has its connection to its supposedly two most important sources, Francis Bacon and Jan Amos (...) Comenius, been sufficiently explored. The study therefore concentrates on a critical analysis of Bayer’s interpretation of creation and his natural history, which are then both situated in the philosophical context of their time. The author then notes that although Bayer’s project of erecting an original and on the (especially Aristotelian) tradition independent Mosaic natural philosophy ended in failure, the thinker’s work can be assessed as a valuable attempt to synthesize Baconian and Comenian motifs while at the same time reflecting broader intellectual contexts of the period. (shrink)

The correspondence between Meinong and Kazimierz Twardowski highlights the relationship between two philosophers who influenced the history of philosophy and psychology in Austria and Poland. The two correspondents discuss, among other things, their epistemological approach and the university politics of their times. In addition, there is an extensive introduction that places the correspondence in its proper historical and philosophical context.

Analogien lassen sich aus unserem vernünftigen Nachdenken und Argumentieren kaum wegdenken. Ganz zurecht stellen sie eines der klassischen Themen der Argumentationstheorie dar. Doch wie genau sollte die argumentative Rolle von Analogien in Argumentrekonstruktionen dargestellt werden? Das ist die Leitfrage dieses Beitrags. Zunächst wird mit Michael Dummetts Schach-Analogie ein prominentes Beispiel dargestellt und eine genauere Charakterisierung des Analogiebegriffs vorgeschlagen. Danach wird die gängigste Rekonstruktionsform von Analogien diskutiert, das Analogieargument, und in einigen Punkten verfeinert. Vor diesem Hintergrund schlägt der Beitrag eine zweite, (...) alternative Rekonstruktionsform vor, in der zwei analoge Argumente an die Stelle eines einzelnen Analogiearguments treten. Nachdem diese beiden Rekonstruktionsformen an einem weiteren berühmten Beispiel vorgeführt wurden, an Peter Singers Teich-Analogie, wird diskutiert, wie sich diese beiden Varianten gegenseitig ergänzen und welche Stärken und Schwächen sie haben. Es zeigt sich, dass Analogien nicht nur in Form von Analogieargumenten einen zentralen Topos eines Einzelarguments darstellen. Darüber hinaus kann die Untersuchung analoger Argumente bereits selbst als argumentationstheoretische Topik verstanden werden. (shrink)

Analogien lassen sich aus unserem vernünftigen Nachdenken und Argumentieren kaum wegdenken. Ganz zurecht stellen sie eines der klassischen Themen der Argumentationstheorie dar. Doch wie genau sollte die argumentative Rolle von Analogien in Argumentrekonstruktionen dargestellt werden? Das ist die Leitfrage dieses Beitrags. Zunächst wird mit Michael Dummetts Schach-Analogie ein prominentes Beispiel dargestellt und eine genauere Charakterisierung des Analogiebegriffs vorgeschlagen. Danach wird die gängigste Rekonstruktionsform von Analogien diskutiert, das Analogieargument, und in einigen Punkten verfeinert. Vor diesem Hintergrund schlägt der Beitrag eine zweite, (...) alternative Rekonstruktionsform vor, in der zwei analoge Argumente an die Stelle eines einzelnen Analogiearguments treten. Nachdem diese beiden Rekonstruktionsformen an einem weiteren berühmten Beispiel vorgeführt wurden, an Peter Singers Teich-Analogie, wird diskutiert, wie sich diese beiden Varianten gegenseitig ergänzen und welche Stärken und Schwächen sie haben. Es zeigt sich, dass Analogien nicht nur in Form von Analogieargumenten einen zentralen Topos eines Einzelarguments darstellen. Darüber hinaus kann die Untersuchung analoger Argumente bereits selbst als argumentationstheoretische Topik verstanden werden. (shrink)