The objectives of this paper are twofold. The first is to present a differentiation between two kinds of deferred uses of indexicals: those in which indexical utterances express singular propositions (I term them deferred reference proper) and those where they express general propositions (called descriptive uses of indexicals). The second objective is the analysis of the descriptive uses of indexicals. In contrast to Nunberg, who treats descriptive uses as a special case of deferred reference in which a property contributes to (...) the proposition expressed, I argue that examples in which a general proposition is indeed expressed by an indexical cannot be treated by assuming that the property is a deferred referent of the pronoun. I propose an analysis of descriptive uses of indexicals by means of a pragmatic mechanism of ‘descriptive anaphora’, which attempts to explain the special kind of contribution of the property retrieved from the context to the proposition that is characteristic of the descriptive interpretation. (shrink)

Paul Horwich is aware of the fact that his theory as stated in his works is directly applicable only to a language in which a word, understood as a syntactic type, is connected with exactly one literal meaning. Yet he claims that the theory is expandable to include homonymy and indexicality and thus may be considered as applicable to natural language. My concern in this paper is with yet another kind of ambiguity—systematic polysemy—that assigns multiple meanings to one linguistic type. (...) I want to combine the characteristics of systematic polysemy with the Kaplanian insight that meanings of expressions may be defined by semantic rules which assign content in context and to ask the question if minimalism about truth and meaning is compatible with such rule-based systematic polysemy. I will first explain why the expressions that exhibit rule-based systematic polysemy are difficult to combine with a truth theory that is based on a use theory of meaning before proceeding to argue that indexicals and proper names are such expressions. (shrink)

The thesis advanced in this paper is that the proper names of cities or countries inherit the linguistic types of the nouns which denote the basic category of the objects the names refer to. As a result, in the case of the proper names of cities or countries, a reference by those names may select particular aspects of those objects, in the same way that book or newspaper selects the physical or informational aspects of objects in the extension of the (...) nouns. This view is based on Asher’s and Pustejovsky’s conception of dot type semantics. (shrink)

In this paper I argue for a non-referential interpretation of some uses of indexicals embedded under epistemic modals. The so-called descriptive uses of indexicals come in several types and it is argued that those embedded within the scope of modal operators do not require non-referential interpretation, provided the modality is interpreted as epistemic. I endeavor to show that even if we allow an epistemic interpretation of modalities, the resulting interpretation will still be inadequate as long as we retain a referential (...) interpretation of indexicals. I then propose an analysis of descriptive indexicals that combines an epistemic interpretation of modality with a non-referential interpretation of indexicals. (shrink)

This collection celebrates the centenary of the Lvov-Warsaw school, established by Kazimierz Twardowski in Lvov in 1895.

This paper offers an analysis of indexical expressions and proper names as they are used in proverbs. Both indexicals and proper names contribute properties rather than objects to the propositions expressed when they are used in sentences interpreted as proverbs. According to the proposal, their contribution is accounted for by the mechanism of descriptive anaphora. Indexicals with rich linguistic meaning, such as ‘I’, ‘you’ or ‘today’, turn out to be cases of the attributive uses of indexicals, i.e. uses whose contribution (...) relies on the linguistic meaning of the word. Third person pronouns, names of locations as well as surnames are analyzed as non-attributive descriptive uses. (shrink)

Proper names are usually considered devices of singular reference but, when considered as word-types, they also exhibit other kinds of uses. In this paper I intend to show that systematic kinds of uses of proper names considered as word-types can be accounted for by a generalized rule-based conception of systematic polysemy, one which not only postulates a multiplicity of stable senses for an expression, but also a multiplicity of content generating rules, each of which determines potentially different contents in different (...) contexts. In contrast to the currently extant polysemous conceptions of proper names (Leckie in Philos Stud 165:1139–1160, 2013), which only encompass individual and predicative uses, the presented proposal concerns all systematic uses of proper names considered in the literature, i.e., individual, predicative, deferred, descriptive, anaphoric, and bound uses of proper names. The resulting conception accommodates referential intuition about the default individual uses of proper names while also admitting other kinds of uses without generating homonymy. It transpires that proper names are semantically underdetermined and context-sensitive expressions. (shrink)

Descriptive uses of indexicals result in expressing a general proposition instead of a singular proposition, which is typical for indexicals. In contrast to Nunberg's and Recanati's proposals, who treat such uses of indexicals as referring, the conception developed in the paper is a quasi-anaphoric interpretation of descriptive uses of indexicals. In the quasi-anaphoric mechanism an indexical expression inherits its semantic properties from its antecedent, but - in contrast to classical anaphora - that antecedent comes from extra-linguistic context: it is a (...) salient property of the individual in question. Since indexicals are quasi-anaphoric with respect to properties instead of being anaphoric with respect to referring expressions, the propositions generated are general. Three types of descriptive uses of indexicals are distinguished. In the first type the quasi-anaphoric mechanism is triggered by the conflict at the semantic level between the singularity of an indexical and the generality of a quantifier. In the second type (luck of reference in the context) the proposition is generated at the level of primary pragmatic processes. In both cases the propositions in question are the propositions expressed. In the third type the quasi-anaphoric mechanism is triggered by the conflict between the proposition expressed and the purpose of expressing it. As a result the proposition generated quasi-anaphorically is the Gricean proposition implicated. (shrink)

Contains papers from a November 1995 conference held in Eastern Europe, celebrating the centenary of the Lvov-Warsaw school of analytic philosophy. Papers deal with all directions of research undertaken by Polish analytic philosophers. Special attention is paid to logic and comparisons with other philosophical movements, particularly with brentanism. Contains sections on history and comparisons, the ideas of Lesniewski, philosophy of language, logic and the foundations of mathematics, logic and philosophy, and the ontology, epistemology, and philosophy of science. No index. Annotation (...) copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR. (shrink)