This review deals with the condensation–decondensation cycle of chromatin. This cycle can be analysed in increasing detail because of the availability of well‐characterized temperature‐sensitive cell‐cycle mutants in which the control for condensation is aberrant at the non‐permissive temperature. DNA transfection and gene cloning techniques using one such mutant have resulted in the identification of a gene involved in the normal regulation of entry into mitosis.

I consider a situation in which workers have present-biased preferences and tend to procrastinate their tasks, but underestimate the degree of self-control problems that they will face in the future. Brocas and Carrillo show that a form of competition always mitigates delay in a setting where agents are perfectly aware of their future self-control problems. However, I show that the introduction of the competition considered in their paper does not necessarily mitigate delay in a setting where agents underestimate the magnitude (...) of their future self-control problems. The intuition is that competition reinforces their belief that they will complete earlier, which undermines their incentive to complete now. This result holds even when there is only one worker who severely underestimates the degree of his or her future self-control problem, suggesting that the mere existence of a single “irrational” agent can undermine the overall performance of organizations. Moreover, the intuition behind my result implies that, to mitigate procrastination, it is important to design schemes in which workers believe that they will not complete early in the future, e.g., reducing competition over time, increasing cost over time, or even enforcing no work day tomorrow. (shrink)

近代日本が抱える「文明」と「独立」の矛盾を、最も鋭く直視した福沢。彼の原点=蘭学に着目し、新しい思想が誕生する瞬間を描く。.

This article aims to defend Locke against Quine’s charge, made in his famous “two dogmas” paper, that Locke’s theory of knowledge is badly flawed, not only for assuming the dogmas, but also for adopting an “in-tolerably restrictive” version of the dogma of reductionism. It is shown here that, in his analysis of the epistemological status of scientific laws, Locke has effectively transcended the narrow idea-empiricism which un-derlies this version of reductionism. First, in order to escape idealism, he introduced the notion (...) of “sensitive knowledge of the particular existence of finite beings without us,” broadening thus his initial definition of knowledge in terms of the “perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas” — a definition compatible with Quine’s interpretation. Sec-ondly, after showing that we can have virtually no a priori knowledge of universal truths about substances, Locke extended the notion of “sensi-tive knowledge” to the particular propositions of “coexistence” in sub-stances, appealing to the notion of “probability” for treating their induc-tive generalizations and, in particular, the phenomenological laws of sci-ence. Finally, acknowledging the essential presence of hypothetical, non-phenomenological laws in science, he anticipated much of the contempo-rary views on their role and nature, including, remarkably, a mild ver-sion of the epistemological holism championed by Quine. (shrink)

In his influential criticism of scientific realism, Bas van Fraassen assumes that this doctrine is incompatible with empiricism, according to which the sole ultimate basis of knowledge is experience. This claim has been generally accepted in the contemporary literature in philosophy of science. Thus, the very distinction between scientific realism and empiricism is often forgotten, the term 'empiricism' being now widely used to designate a range of anti-realist positions, such as van Fraassen's "construct ive empiricism". In this paper it is (...) argued, first, that empiricism, in the traditional and proper sense of the word, is a thesis about the problem of the foundations of knowledge, and should therefore be clearly distinguished from anti-realism, which concerns the issue of the extension of knowledge. It is then conceded that the main arguments for scientific realism do indeed require that extra-empirical characteristics of scientific theories, such as simplicity and explanatory power, should be ascribed epistemic weight. Although this point lends support to van Fraassen's claim, it is indicated here that his constructive empiricism is threatened by the same kind of epistemological objections which he raises against his opponents. Like some other scientific anti-realists, van Fraassen avowedly embraces realism concerning ordinary material objects; but it is not clear that this form of anti-realism remains tenable when explanatory power, simplicity, etc. are regarded as merely pragmatic, non-epistemic virtues. (shrink)

Ao defender, nos Princípios matemáticos de filosofia natural, a existência de uma força de gravitação universal, Newton desencadeou uma onda de dúvidas e objeções filosóficas. Suas próprias declarações sobre a natureza da gravitação não são facilmente interpretáveis como formando um conjunto consistente de opiniões. Por um lado, logo após fornecer as três definições de "quantidades de forças centrípetas" (Defs. 6-8), Newton observa que está tratando tais forças "matematicamente", sem se pronunciar sobre sua realidade física. Mas, por outro lado, no Escólio (...) Geral inserido no final da segunda edição do livro, Newton diz que foi capaz de "explicar" vários fenômenos de movimento por meio da força de gravidade - que ele mostrou ser um tipo de força centrípeta -, embora não tivesse ainda conseguido explicar a causa dessa força. Uma interpretação plausível dessas últimas afirmações é que Newton acreditava que pôde inferir, a partir dos fenômenos, a existência da força de gravidade, enquanto agente causal real de certos movimentos, mas que ainda não havia tido sucesso em descobrir a causa dessa causa. O objetivo principal do presente artigo não é aprofundar a análise histórica das declarações de Newton, mas examinar como essa questão se insere no debate mais geral sobre o estatuto epistemológico das hipóteses científicas que transcendem a experiência imediata. Segundo a posição defendida, entre muitos outros, por John Locke, tais hipóteses devem ser interpretadas como tentativas legítimas de descrever aspectos inobserváveis da realidade. Em contraste com isso, no caso específico das hipóteses sobre forças - de gravitação ou quaisquer outras -, George Berkeley argumentou vigorosamente a favor de sua interpretação como meros artifícios teóricos úteis às "demonstrações matemáticas" na ciência da mecânica. Ao longo da análise das vantagens e desvantagens filosóficas dessas posições opostas, indica-se aqui que, embora a interpretação realista pareça fazer mais justiça ao desenvolvimento real da física após os Princípios matemáticos, a interpretação instrumentalista de Berkeley tem o mérito filosófico inegável de representar uma adesão mais firme ao empirismo, que é, de um modo ou de outro, valorizado por ambas as partes envolvidas na disputa sobre a natureza da gravitação. Newton's defence, in the Principia, of the existence of a universal force of gravity immediately gave rise to a wave of philosophical doubts and objections. His own remarks on the nature of gravitation are not easily amenable of a consistent, uniform interpretation. This paper begins by reviewing briefly these remarks. Its primary objective is, however, to examine how this important scientific issue contributed to demarcate two main epistemological positions on the status of scientific hypotheses transcending immediate experience. In Newton's time, two exponents of these positions were, respectively, Locke and Berkeley. Intriguingly, Newton fuelled both the Berkeleyan, instrumentalist interpretation, and the Lockean, realist interpretation. On the one hand, immediately after offering the definitions of "quantities of centripetal forces" (Definitions 6-8), he warned that he was treating these forces "mathematically", without pronouncing on its physical status. This remark lends support to Berkeley's anti-realist interpretation of forces, as Berkeley himself was keen to point out. But in the General Scholium, at the end of the book, Newton declared that he could "explain" certain important phenomena of motion by the force of gravity, although he had not yet been able to explain the cause of this force, adding, famously, that he would "feign no hypotheses" about this issue. A natural, realist interpretation of this statement is that Newton believed that he could infer, from the phenomena, the existence of gravity, as a real, causal physical agent, but that he had not yet succeeded in discovering the cause of this cause. In discussing the shortcomings and advantages of these opposing views, we indicate that although the realist interpretation appears to do more justice to the actual development of physics after the Principia, Berkeley's interpretation has the philosophical merit of representing a firmer adherence to empiricism, a position valued, in one way or another, by all parties involved in the dispute on the nature of gravitation. (shrink)

http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2008v12n1p49 The aim of this article is to offer a rejoinder to an argument against scientific realism put forward by van Fraassen, based on theoretical considerations regarding microphysics. At a certain stage of his general attack to scientific realism, van Fraassen argues, in contrast to what realists typically hold, that empirical regularities should sometimes be regarded as “brute facts”, which do not ask for explanation in terms of deeper, unobservable mechanisms. The argument from microphysics formulated by van Fraassen is based (...) on the claim that in microphysics the demand for explanation leads to a demand for the so-called hidden-variable theories, which “runs contrary to at least one major school of thought in twentieth-century physics”. It is shown here that this argument does not represent an insurmountable obstacle to scientific realism, not even when a series of important theoretical and experimental results against hidden-variable theories — and not merely a conflict with a certain school of thought—is taken into account. (shrink)

To preserve postoperative brain function, it is important for neurosurgeons to fully understand the brain's structure, vasculature, and function. Intraoperative high-frequency electrical stimulation during awake craniotomy is the gold standard for mapping the function of the cortices and white matter; however, this method can only map the “focal” functions and cannot monitor large-scale cortical networks in real-time. Recently, an in vivo electrophysiological method using cortico-cortical evoked potentials induced by single-pulse electrical cortical stimulation has been developed in an extraoperative setting. By (...) using the CCEP connectivity pattern intraoperatively, mapping and real-time monitoring of the dorsal language pathway is available. This intraoperative CCEP method also allows for mapping of the frontal aslant tract, another language pathway, and detection of connectivity between the primary and supplementary motor areas in the frontal lobe network. Intraoperative CCEP mapping has also demonstrated connectivity between the frontal and temporal lobes, likely via the ventral language pathway. Establishing intraoperative electrophysiological monitoring is clinically useful for preserving brain function, even under general anesthesia. This CCEP technique demonstrates potential clinical applications for mapping and monitoring large-scale cortical networks. (shrink)

This paper discusses an argument for scientific realism put forward by Anthony Quinton in The Nature of Things. The argument – here called the controlled continuity argument – seems to have received no attention in the literature, apparently because it may easily be mistaken for a better-known argument, Grover Maxwell’s “argument from the continuum”. It is argued here that, in point of fact, the two are quite distinct and that Quinton’s argument has several advantages over Maxwell’s. The controlled continuity argument (...) is also compared to Ian Hacking’s “argument from coincidence”. It is pointed out that both arguments are to a large extent independent from considerations about high-level scientific theories, and that both are abductive arguments at the core. But these similarities do not dilute an important difference related to the fact that Quinton’s argument cleverly seeks to anchor belief in unobservable entities in realism about ordinary objects, which is a position shared by most contemporary scientific anti-realists. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to offer a rejoinder to an argument against scientific realism put forward by van Fraassen, based on theoretical considerations regarding microphysics. At a certain stage of his general attack to scientific realism, van Fraassen argues, in contrast to what realists typically hold, that empirical regularities should sometimes be regarded as “brute facts”, which do not ask for explanation in terms of deeper, unobservable mechanisms. The argument from microphysics formulated by van Fraassen is based on (...) the claim that in microphysics the demand for explanation leads to a demand for the so-called hidden-variable theories, which “runs contrary to at least one major school of thought in twentieth-century physics”. It is shown here that this argument does not represent an insurmountable obstacle to scientific realism, not even when a series of important theoretical and experimental results against hidden-variable theories — and not merely a conflict with a certain school of thought—is taken into account. (shrink)

http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2012v16n2p229 Tanto no Tratado da Natureza Humana como na Investigação sobre o Entendimento Humano , Hume mostra-se convencido de que “não há acaso no mundo”, e que “aquilo que o vulgo chama de acaso não passa de uma causa secreta e escondida”. Essa tese desempenha papel crucial em sua análise do livre-arbítrio e, conseguintemente, da responsabilidade moral; é também um elemento importante em sua discussão sobre os milagres. No entanto, o próprio Hume ofereceu, no Tratado , um argumento convincente para (...) mostrar que o princípio de causalidade, segundo o qual tudo o que começa a existir tem uma causa, não pode ser conhecido a priori , por intuição ou demonstração. Logo, essa “opinião tem necessariamente de provir da observação e experiência”. O presente trabalho examina essa tese, mostrando, inicialmente, qual era a proposta de Hume para fundar na experiência o princípio de causalidade, e depois qual, de fato, teria sido o mais robusto fundamento para esse princípio: a mecânica newtoniana. Explica-se, por fim, como esse fundamento empírico indireto e o próprio argumento de Hume foram solapados pela física quântica, no século XX. (shrink)

Both in the Treatise of Human Nature and in the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, Hume defends that “there is no chance in the world”, and that “what the vulgar call chance is nothing but a secret and conceal’d cause”. This view plays a crucial role in Hume’s influential analysis of free will and moral responsibility. It functions also as a central presupposition in his discussion of miracles. However, Hume himself argued convincingly that the “maxim of causality”, according to which “whatever (...) begins to exist, must have a cause of existence” cannot be established a priori, by either intuition or demonstration. He concludes, then, that such “opinion must necessarily arise from observation and experience”. In the present article I analyse this latter statement, showing, first, what was Hume detailed proposal for funding the principle of causality on experience. Given the apparent weakness of this proposal, I then speculate on what kind of firmer empirical foundation could, instead, have been given, in Hume’s time, to the principle of causality, namely, the indirect support offered by Newtonian mechanics. Finally, I show how this theoretical link between experience and the principle, and also Hume’s straightforward, inductive argument, were undermined by the inception of quantum physics, at the beginning of the 20th century. (shrink)

The globalization in business and tourism becomes crucial more and more for the economical sustainability of local communities. In the presence of an epidemic outbreak, there must be such a decision on the policy by the host community as whether to accept visitors or not, the number of acceptable visitors, or the condition for acceptable visitors. Making use of an SIRI type of mathematical model, we consider the influence of visitors on the spread of a reinfectious disease in a community, (...) especially assuming that a certain proportion of accepted visitors are immune. The reinfectivity of disease here means that the immunity gained by either vaccination or recovery is imperfect. With the mathematical results obtained by our analysis on the model for such an epidemic dynamics of resident and visitor populations, we find that the acceptance of visitors could have a significant influence on the disease’s endemicity in the community, either suppressive or supportive. (shrink)

En el seno de la historia es el resultado de no pocas horas de reflexión de dos amigos que comparten algunas pasiones, como son -y por este orden- la historia y la universidad. Hartos de oír hablar de crisis en las dos, salieron de su cubículum y vieron, primero, que nunca como ahora había habido tantos libros buenos de historia, algunos verdaderos best-seller, segundo, que jamás en la universidad española había habido tantos estudiantes -y estudiosos- y nunca se había (...) investigado más y mejor que ahora. ¿Dónde está, pues, la crisis? La intentaron buscar en el impacto producido por las novedades, desde lo postmoderno a la historia basura, pero acabaron por ver que incluso en los más rabiosos rupturistas afloraba la solidez de la historia y la fortaleza de algunas grandes tradiciones científicas. Sin embargo, notaron que ni así se consuelan los defensores de una Clío amenazada por mil peligros. Sospachando alguna razón inconfesable -externa al oficio, queremos decir- que explique la paradoja, los dos amigos se contentan por ahora con poner por escrito lo que tienen más seguro: lo que está probado en la mejor tradición clásica y lo que de bueno aporta la novedad. Siempre,... en el seno de la historia. (shrink)

In christian experience, the flesh of Christ is not only a theological concept relating to Church or Eucharisty, but a place where spiritual an psychological desires establish themselves. In this essay we would illustrate the artistic and visionary access to an essential section of Christ's body, his protective and nourishing breast.

: La moderna fenomenología del cuerpo del hombre en su condición subjetiva se revela hoy como interlocutor fructífero de una antropología cristiana interesada en redefinir la condición teologal del hombre en su especificidad cristológica. Este artículo se interesa por la aportación de la condición corporal del hombre a su realización personal-trascendente; concebida ésta como gramática antropológica sobre la que el Dios que es comunión traza el camino de la redención como participación en la filiación del Hijo hecho carne.

Partiendo del análisis de una fetua en la que se plantea la posibilidad de condenar a la lapidación a una mujer acusada de haber mantenido relaciones sexuales ilícitas con un hombre, se analiza la doctrina legal sobre zinā de Ibn Rušd el abuelo , uno de los juristas mālikíes más relevantes de todos los tiempos. El análisis de esta doctrina conduce a una reflexión acerca de tres cuestiones: 1) la escasez de referencias a la aplicación del castigo de lapidación en (...) el período pre-moderno, 2) la actitud contradictoria de los juristas musulmanes de ese mismo período, los cuales, por una parte sostienen la vigencia del castigo y por otra parte insisten en el respeto escrupuloso de una doctrina que hace que sea prácticamente imposible aplicarlo y 3) la vigencia del corpus de opiniones creado por estos juristas en los debates contemporáneos acerca de la práctica de la lapidación. (shrink)

El presente trabajo es un estudio del libro de Martin Kusch acerca den las tesis sostenidas en "Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language" (WRPL) por Saul Kripke examinado a la luz de la controversia desatada por la publicación del mismo en 1982, una de las más intensas que han ocurrido en los últimos 25 años en el seno de la filosofía analítica. En nuestro estudio procedemos en tres etapas. En la primera, presentaremos el desafío del Wittgenstein de Kripke de (...) una manera lo más neutral que podemos. En la segunda, presentaremos las características más notables trabajo de Kusch. En la tercera parte rebasamos los límites más estrictos de un comentario crítico para proponer una hipótesis propia acerca de la manera en la que la interpretación de Kusch permite comprender el vínculo de la propuesta de Kripke con la discusión clásica acerca del lenguaje privado como así también la discusión clásica permite realizar algunas observaciones críticas acerca de la propuesta de Kusch. (shrink)

¿Cuál es el marco humano de referencia en las actividades culturales, o en las actividades humanas en general, cuando les es propio ese grado de cultivación, que nos permite hablar de cultura? Esta pregunta acerca del marco humano de referencia, no puede recibir una respuesta simple, ya que se trata necesariamente de marcos de referencia múltiples. En su actividad cultural el ser humano es a la vez heredero de valores que germinan en el seno de la familia, valores que (...) son difíciles de nombrar y de expresar directamente, ya que se alojan las más veces en el sufrido y callado bregar cotidiano, pero que son tanto más fecundas y nutrientes en sus manifestaciones indirectas; de valores ligados a la circunstancia local y al trato entre vecinos, a la vivencia de un paisaje común y al compartir los pequeños goces que son parte de la vida y del trato corrientes; igualmente de los valores ligados a un grupo social consciente de ser el portador de una vocación y de un mensaje propio, a una profesión que tiene, en forma más o menos pronunciada, una tradición de sentido de honor y de servicio, o a una ideología y corriente política que puede igualmente evocar los sueños generosos de la juventud, la fuerza de una idea, el espíritu de sacrificio y el compañerismo de una militancia. (shrink)

¿Qué es la experiencia? ¿Cómo se constituye? Una aproximación común a estas preguntas supone que el entendimiento es un epifenómeno que emerge de la percepción sensorial. Luis Miguel Isava retoma estas interrogantes y desarrolla una propuesta muy distinta: la experiencia no se produce a partir del percibir, entendido como acto originario y no mediado, sino que tiene lugar a partir de ciertas condiciones de posibilidad de tipo formal. Para Isava este requisito funciona efectivamente como un protocolo: se trata de un (...) sistema de criterios formales que efectivamente organizan y le otorgan sentido a lo percibido y así lo «sancionan» como experiencia. Los protocolos que hacen posible la experiencia están arraigados tan profundamente en la cultura que pueden resultarnos invisibles y «naturales», pero en realidad son cambiantes. Distintas culturas, en distintos momentos históricos, fundan cada una sus experiencias en base a protocolos diferentes. Esto puede resultar evidente al momento de considerar los procesos de encuentro entre culturas disímiles que han ocurrido a lo largo de la historia. Sin embargo, Isava se enfoca en un problema menos obvio y más sugerente: ¿qué ocurre cuando en el seno de una misma cultura aparecen objetos que, bajo los protocolos vigentes, no pueden ser asimilables como experiencia? Esta posibilidad, nos muestra Isava, podemos hallarla en el arte, o más exactamente, en lo que él denomina los "artefactos culturales" de la modernidad. A partir de ejemplos concretos tomados de la poesía, la pintura, el cine y la música, Isava muestra cómo el arte puede suscitar momentos extraños, reflexivos o críticos que, al enfrentarse con los protocolos de la experiencia ya establecidos, pueden suscitar nuevas formas de estar en el mundo. (shrink)

Desde tiempos inmemoriales, filosofía y teoría política han deambulado por senderos paralelos: en unas ocasiones, prestándose armas mutuamente; en otras, sin embargo, arrinconándose y asfixiándose. A causa de la complejidad de los sucesos acaecidos en el pasado siglo XX, a aquella conflictiva pero siempre enriquecedora relación se unieron compañeras como la teología, la sociología o la antropología, que desearon aportar algo de luz en el opaco contexto de las guerras mundiales, el desarrollo del nazismo, la Revolución rusa, la emergencia de (...) los fascismos, etc. En este novedoso libro, Roberto Navarrete Alonso se ocupa de dos figuras coetáneas y del todo fundamentales: Carl Schmitt (1888-1985) y Franz Rosenzweig (1886-1929). El autor se propone, a partir del estudio conjunto de estos pensadores, reflexionar sobre el Holocausto, sobre la Shoah o Catástrofe, abriendo de nuevo el insoslayable problema de la vertiente política del mal y su acaecimiento en la historia. El presente volumen se hace cargo de un nexo tan capital como inexplorado en el seno del pensamiento político-filosófico de comienzos del XX, analizando las fuentes, los cruces, los encuentros y desencuentros que tuvieron lugar entre Schmitt –referencia inexcusable de la reflexión jurídico-política del pasado siglo– y Rosenzweig –autor de la La estrella de la redención–. (shrink)