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Erich Rothacker (1888–1965) was a key figure in early-twentieth-century philosophy in Germany. In this paper, I examine the development of Rothacker’s philosophy of culture from 1907 to 1945. Rothacker began his philosophical career with a völkerpsychological dissertation on history, outlining his early biologistic conception of culture (1907–1913). In his mid-career work, he then turned to Wilhelm Dilthey’s (1833–1911) Lebensphilosophie (philosophy of life), advancing a hermeneutic approach to culture (1919–1928). In his later work (1929–1945), Rothacker developed (...) a cultural anthropology. I shall argue that Rothacker’s later theory of culture retained key motifs of his earlier works. In this way, I trace central aspects of Rothacker’s reception of both Völkerpsychologie and Lebensphilosophie. The paper focuses on two aspects of Rothacker’s philosophical development that deserve more attention than they have received to date: his reception of Völkerpsychologie and the political character of his theories of culture. Rothacker’s theoretical work was closely connected to his political conservatism, which culminated in his engagement with National Socialism. The paper unearths problematic aspects of the legacy of Völkerpsychologie and Lebensphilosophie in early twentieth-century German thought. (shrink)

Rothacker’s concept of humanities is based on the cohesive idea of participation (»Teilhabe«; by perception, in tradition, in community) which is not modified in his works all over the years. His texts offer dimensions of ›characteristic form‹ (»geprägte Form«: J. W. Goethe, »Urworte. Orphisch«), which bind the style of life (»Lebensstil«) of individuals and nations. The structure of Rothacker’s approach allows modifications (for example in adressing national socialistic thought) without the necessity to rearrange the concept itself. Rothacker’s (...) interpretation of ›characteristic form‹ is founded on values concerning worthy cultural developments. (shrink)

After National Socialism had destroyed any tradition in the history of thought, humanities in post-war Germany answered by criticizing this tradition, initiating a number of projects in the field of the history of concept. Erich Rothacker and Carl Schmitt, both compromised by National Socialism, can be seen here as predecessors of Joachim Ritter and also of Hans-Georg Gadamer. The letters, of which there are only a few, display consensus as well as dissent between the writers.

This article examines the history of Erich Auerbach’s relationship with the DVjs, in which science and politics intersect. In the early phase of his career, Auerbach attributed great importance to the DVjs and developed a special relationship with Rothacker in particular. This is evident from his letters to the journal’s editors, which are the focus of this study. When Rothacker began to take sides with National Socialism, Auerbach turned his back on the DVjs. After the Second World (...) War, he was one of the emigrated academics whose cooperation the journal sought. The effects of the political upheavals of 1933/45 on the DVjs can be exemplified by the relationship Auerbach had with it. (shrink)

The aim of this chapter is to clarify the use and meaning of the concept of relativism in the context of National Socialism (NS). Section 1 examines the critical reproach that NS is a form of relativism. I analyze and criticize the common core of this widespread argument which has dominated discussions about the topic up to the present. Section 2 sketches the general debates on relativism before and during NS. I show that fascist thought could be associated with both (...) relativism and anti-relativism. In contrast to the received view, I argue that Nazi intellectuals regarded relativism as problem, and presented NS as the overcoming of relativism. Subsequently I turn to two major philosophers who connected their philosophy with NS. Section 3 investigates Bruno Bauch’s (1887–1942) nationalist philosophy. I show that he linked his concept of the nation with an objectivist value theory intended to oppose all kinds of relativism. Section 4 turns to Erich Rothacker’s (1888–1965) cultural anthropology. I argue that the revision of his philosophical views in the 1930s was accompanied by a political turn towards NS and a withdrawal from relativism. The brief conclusion (Section 5) summarizes the findings of the chapter. I conclude that, in the context of NS, relativism is mostly used in a pejorative sense. (shrink)

'Philosophische Anthropologie' meint in dieser Studie nicht eine philosophische Subdisziplin, sondern eine besondere Theorierichtung in der deutschsprachigen Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts, die mit den Namen Max Scheler, Helmuth Plessner, Erich Rothacker, Arnold Gehlen, Adolf Portmann u.v.a. mehr verbunden ist. Der erste Teil erzählt die verwickelte, teils abenteuerliche Entstehungs-, Aufstiegs- und Entfaltungsgeschichte dieser Denkergruppe von 1919 bis 1975 - einschließlich ihrer beachtlichen Wirkungsgeschichte in verschiedenen Disziplinen wie der Soziologie, Psychologie, Biologie und der Philosophie selbst. Im zweiten Teil wird der (...) philosophische Identitätskern dieser Philosophischen Anthropologie als Denkansatz präzisiert. (shrink)