Las Disputaciones metafísicas de Francisco Suárez se presentan como una reconstrucción de la filosofía fundamental que se organiza no ya según el esquema de la metafísica aristotélica, ni problemáticamente, al estilo del comentario escolástico, sino como un edificio ordenado que expone la noción de la realidad misma. Es la elaboración de un sistema que no sólo respete el orden tradicional de las cuestiones filosóficas, sino que configure una nueva estructura mediante la cual la metafísica, lejos de ser un freno para (...) el desarrollo científico pueda transformarse en el resorte para su progreso. Estamos ante una especie de Enciclopedia del saber filosófico estructurado sistemáticamente, sobre cuya base podrá el pensamiento europeo llevar a cabo su revolución racionalista. La Europa moderna e ilustrada, de Descartes a Kant, buscará, de un modo manifiesto o implícito, en las Disputaciones metafísicas la referencia escolar que precisa para su propia construcción teórica racional y crítica. En suma, la equilibrada doctrina de Suárez constituye el fulcro a partir del que podrán alzarse las más variadas doctrinas sobre el conocimiento humano, la naturaleza, la sociedad y la legitimación del poder político, que aún hoy constituyen la base de nuestra comprensión de la realidad. (shrink)

Las obras de Sergio Rábade contenidas en el presente volumen constituyen una de las aportaciones más valiosas de su legado filosófico. En los orígenes de la edad de la crítica, la aparición de nuevos valores asociados al conocimiento impulsó una afanosa renovación de los métodos en científicos y filósofos. Método y pensamiento en la modernidad analiza las exigencias de esta demanda en pro de un cambio real en los procedimientos de búsqueda y control de las ideas. Las complejas (...) conexiones entre el método teorizado y su práctica ocupan la atención del autor en Descartes y la gnoseología moderna. El filósofo francés, «faro de la moderna Europa», inaugura un nuevo estilo de pensar que será referencia obligada tanto para sus partidarios como para sus adversarios. Spinoza, considerado por Rábade como un «cartesiano anticartesiano», es el caso más representativo de referencialidad al autor del Discurso, aunque cargada de ambivalencia. El filósofo holandés de raíces judías entendió el cumplimiento del proyecto patrocinado por Descartes precisamente como una enmendación de los tópicos de su filosofía: el método, la sustancia divina, el hombre y las pasiones humanas (Espinosa: razón y felicidad). Los artículos insertados entre las obras del volumen no ocultan las contradicciones inherentes al pensamiento de estos dos grandes filósofos. (shrink)

Rational Powers in Action presents a conception of instrumental rationality as governing actions that are extended in time with indeterminate ends. Tenenbaum argues that previous philosophical theories in this area, in focusing on momentary snapshots of the mind of idealized agents, miss central aspects of human rationality.

We discuss the axiomatization of generalized consequence relations determined by non-deterministic matrices. We show that, under reasonable expressiveness requirements, simple axiomatizations can always be obtained, using inference rules which can have more than one conclusion. Further, when the non-deterministic matrices are finite we obtain finite axiomatizations with a suitable generalized subformula property.

The idea of direction of fit has been found appealing by many philosophers. Anscombe’s famous examples have persuaded many of us that there must be some deep difference between belief and desire that is captured by the metaphor of direction of fit. Most of the aim of the paper is to try to get clear on which intuitions Anscombe’s example taps into. My view is that there is more than one intuition in play here, and I will try to show (...) that various distinctions and points are confused in the literature on direction of fit. But I also want to argue that once the proper distinctions are made, it’s not clear that the notion of direction of fit can do any of the philosophically significant work that it was supposed to do. I first argue that the best way to unpack the notion of direction of fit would indeed be by means of the constitutive relation between truth and belief. In particular, the notion of direction of fit is best understood as different ideals, or formal ends, guiding the inference, from what I call “prima-facie” attitudes to what I call “all-out” attitudes respectively in the theoretical and practical realm. However, I’ll argue that there’s no non-circular way of making this distinction. But even if no definition of “belief” and “desire” come out of the distinction between directions of fit, it does elucidate the different natures of practical and theoretical enquiry. However, understood this way, the notion of direction of fit does not seem to capture the distinction illustrated by Anscombe’s example. I try to argue in the last section that Anscombe’s compelling example is best explained not by a distinction between directions of fit, but by a distinction between two different inferential mistakes: one from general to general or particular to general, and the other from general to particular. There’s an important asymmetry between practical and theoretical endeavours in this neighbourhood. However, noticing this asymmetry will also fail to deliver the philosophical payoffs that the notion of direction of fit was supposed to have. (shrink)

Most contemporary action theorists accept – or at least find plausible – a belief condition on intention and a knowledge condition on intentional action. The belief condition says that I can only intend to ɸ if I believe that I will ɸ or am ɸ-ing, and the knowledge condition says that I am only intentionally ɸ-ing if I know that I am ɸ-ing. The belief condition in intention and the knowledge condition in action go hand in hand. After all, if (...) intending implies belief, and if ɸ-ing intentionally implies intending to ɸ, then in ɸ-ing, I intend to be ɸ-ing, and, by the belief condition, I believe that I am ɸ-ing, and if this belief is justified, and we are not in a Gettier situation, etc., then, I will also satisfy the knowledge condition. Moreover, the claim that when intentions properly result in action, the corresponding belief constitutes knowledge is a relatively safe assumption, at least as an assumption about what it is generally the case. (shrink)

In the philosophy of science, abstraction has usually been analyzed in terms of the interface between our experience and the design of our concepts. The often implicit assumption here is that such interface has a definite identifiable and universalizable structure, determining the epistemic correctness of any abstraction. Our claim is that, on the contrary, the epistemic grounding of abstraction should not be reduced to the structural norms of such interface but is also related to the constraints on the cognitive processes (...) of specific abstractions. This suggests that we should understand abstraction as embodied in different kinds of abstraction practices. (shrink)

Most philosophers working in moral psychology and practical reason think that either the notion of "good" or the notion of "desire" have central roles to play in our understanding of intentional explanations and practical reasoning. However, philosophers disagree sharply over how we are supposed to understand the notions of "desire" and "good", how these notions relate, and whether both play a significant and independent role in practical reason. In particular, the "Guise of the Good" thesis - the view that desire (...) (or perhaps intention, or intentional action) always aims at the good - has received renewed attention in the last twenty years. Can one have desire for things that the desirer does not perceive to be good in any, or form intentions to act in way that one does not deem to be good? Does the notion of good play any essential role in an account of deliberation or practical reason? Moreover, philosophers also disagree about the relevant notion of good. Is it a purely formal notion, or does it involve a substantive conception of the good? Is the primary notion, the notion of the good for a particular agent, or the notion of good simpliciter? Does the relevant notion of good make essential appeal to human nature, or would it in principle extend to all rational beings? While these questions are central in contemporary work in ethics, practical reason, and philosophy of action, they are not new; similar issues were discussed in the ancient period. This volume of essays aims to bring together "systematic" and more historically-oriented work on these issues. (shrink)