Imagine a society of fisherfolk, who, in the state of nature, fish on a lake of finite size. Fishing on the lake is characterized by decreasing returns to scale in labor, because the lake's finite size imply that each successive hour of fishing labor is less effective than the previous one, as the remaining fish become less dense in the lake. In the state of nature, the lake is commonly owned: each fishes as much as he pleases, and, we might (...) suppose, calculates his fishing plan by taking the labor of the others as given, as he sees it. Each knows that the distribution of fish will be proportional to labor expended among the fisherfolk: if I fish twice as long as you, I will end up with twice as much fish as you. This is not due to some kind of concern with equity among the fisherfolk; it is a technological fact, implied by the assumption that fishing labor is homogeneous, and all are equally likely to catch a fish in a unit of time. An equilibrium under common ownership can be thought of as a Nash equilibrium of the game where each computes his optimal fishing plan, given the labor of the others and knowing what the consequent distribution of fish would be. (shrink)

The theory of equal opportunity as I have expounded it in Roemer uses a language comprising five words: objective, circumstance, type, effort, and policy. The objective is the kind of outcome or well-being or advantage for whose acquisition one wishes to equalize opportunities, in a given population. Circumstances are the set of environmental influences, beyond the individual’s control, that affect his or her chances of acquiring the objective. A type is the group of individuals in the population with a given (...) set of circumstances. Effort is autonomously chosen action—within the individual’s control—which, if expended in greater amounts, will increase the degree to which the individual acquires the objective. A policy is a social intervention that is used to influence the degree to which individuals acquire the objective. The equal-opportunity policy is the one from the set of feasible policies that will make it the case that the degree to which individuals acquire the objective is independent of their circumstances, and sensitive only to their effort. I propose a way of computing the equal-opportunity policy in any given situation, given the appropriate data, and a decision as to what environmental aspects should be taken to constitute circumstances. This quick summary leaves out many details, which will be focused upon in what follows. (shrink)

All advanced societies maintain a commitment to equal educational opportunity, which they claim to implement through a public school system that is charged toprovide all children with an education up to a state-enforced standard. Indeed, what public schools do, even in the best of circumstances, is to provide all children with a more or less equal exposure to educational inputs, rather than to guarantee them equal educational attainment. Children, as the schools receive them, differ markedly in their docility — due (...) in part to innate ability, but perhaps due more to the economic status and cultural practices of their families. Many, including myself, believe that the task of schools should be to provide some measure of equal educational attainment among students of heterogeneous talent and background. Schools should devote more educational resources to students who require them in order that they be educated to an acceptable standard. (shrink)

If one is an egalitarian, what should one want to equalize? Opportunities or outcomes? Resources or welfare? These positions are usually conceived to be very different. I argue in this paper that the distinction is misconceived: the only coherent conception of resource equality implies welfare equality, in an appropriately abstract description of the problem. In this section, I motivate the program which the rest of the paper carries out.

Radical and liberal theories of egalitarianism are distinguished, in large part, by the differing degrees to which they hold people responsible for their own well-being. The most liberal or individualistic theory calls for equality of opportunity. Once such “starting gate equality,” as Dworkin calls it, is guaranteed, then any final outcome is justified, provided certain rules, such as voluntary trading, are observed. At the other pole, the most radical egalitarianism calls for equality of welfare. In between these two extremes are (...) egalitarian proposals that equalize more than conventional opportunities, yet less than full welfare. Sen speaks of equality of basic capabilities as a goal; implementing that requires more than starting gate equality, because some will require more resources than others to attain the same capabilities. Meeting basic needs is another objective. Equality of needs fulfillment is perhaps less radical than equality of basic capabilities and more radical than equality of opportunity. Rawls takes equality of primary goods as a benchmark; he distinguishes primary goods from welfare, but includes among them goods that are more complicated than conventional resources and opportunities, all of which are supposed inputs into any conception of welfare. One could imagine proposing an egalitarianism that equalized some quite measurable outcome across populations, such as infant mortality. That would be an outcome-equalizing theory where the rate of infant mortality is a proxy, presumably, for some more complicated maximand, such as the degree of wellbeing of a population. (shrink)

The neo-Lockean justification of the highly unequal distribution of income in capitalist societies is based upon two key premises: that people are the rightful owners of their labor and talents, and that the external world was, in the state of nature, unowned, and therefore up for grabs by people, who could rightfully appropriate parts of it subject to a ‘Lockean proviso.’ The argument is presented by Nozick. Counter-proposals to Nozick’s, for the most part, have either denied the premise that people (...) should morally be viewed as the owners of their talents, or have challenged Nozick’s Lockean proviso.Rawls, and to a more limited extent Ronald Dworkin, deny self-ownership. As Rawls writes: ‘…the difference principle represents, in effect, an agreement to regard the distribution of natural talents as a common asset … The naturally advantaged are not to gain merely because they are more gifted, but only to cover the costs of training and education and for using their endowments in ways that help the less fortunate as well. No one deserves his greater natural capacity nor merits a more favorable starting place in society.’ Behind the Rawlsian veil of ignorance, those who deliberate about justice are deprived of knowledge about characteristics whose distribution is morally arbitrary. In Dworkin’s proposal for resource egalitarianism, agents calculate the insurance policy they would hypothetically ask for, were they denied knowledge of what talents they will draw in the birth lottery. Compensation for unequal talents is, according to Dworkin, properly made by taxing and transferring income according to the way it would have been distributed as a consequence of such insurance. Dworkin’s veil of ignorance is thin, because agents in the appropriate posture for deliberating about income distribution know their preferences and attitudes toward risk, but not their talents. For both Rawls and Dworkin, the self-ownership premise is challenged by constructing a veil of ignorance in which people are deprived of knowledge of certain personal characteristics, knowledge of which would bias their opinions, from a moral viewpoint. (shrink)

John E. Roemer, one of the founders of analytical Marxism, draws on contemporary mathematical economics to put forward a refined extension of the Marxian theory of exploitation, labour value and class.

On reflecting about the prospects of advancing the egalitarian cause in the United States, John Roemer makes the case for more traditional strategies than the coupon socialism model he advocated in earlier work. First of all, he suggests, an ethos of solidarity must be developed and the super-rich be subjected to higher taxation. This comment assesses this proposal. On the one hand it is discussed whether the ethos of solidarity Roemer calls for in order to counteract the culture of (...) greed among American elites requires nurturing an undesirable culture of envy among the rest of the population. On the other hand it is considered whether the neoclassical principal-agent model - that Roemer believes must be contested in order to popularize a steep progressive income tax - might be one of the more promising tools to restructure the incentives of economic elites and curb casino capitalism. (shrink)

On reflecting about the prospects of advancing the egalitarian cause in the United States, John Roemer makes the case for more traditional strategies than the coupon socialism model he advocated in earlier work. First of all, he suggests, an ethos of solidarity must be developed and the super-rich be subjected to higher taxation. This comment assesses this proposal. On the one hand it is discussed whether the ethos of solidarity Roemer calls for in order to counteract the culture of (...) greed among American elites requires nurturing an undesirable culture of envy among the rest of the population. On the other hand it is considered whether the neoclassical principal-agent model—that Roemer believes must be contested in order to popularize a steep progressive income tax—might be one of the more promising tools to restructure the incentives of economic elites and curb casino capitalism. (shrink)

This paper argues that exploitation is a central and non-redundant concept in a Marxian understanding of capitalism. This finding runs counter to John Roemer’s conclusion in his critical reexamination of exploitation. For a static setting with perfectly competitive markets, Roemer shows that exploitation is a property of agents which derives from unequal wealth endowments, that is, from differential ownership of productive assets, not a social relation between capitalists and workers. Further, he shows that DOPA suffices in this setting to (...) generate core phenomena in Marxian theory-accumulation, domination, alienation, and inequality-with no reference to an independent notion of exploitation. Roemer concludes that DOPA is the central analytical category in Marxian theory, and exploitation a redundant, indeed incorrect, concept therein. A direct implication is that distributive justice should be Marxism’s central ethical concern. The basis for Roemer’s sweeping conclusion is that his model is general, incorporating no special institutional assumptions and abstracting from any impediments to market equilibria. That is, his conclusion rests on an ahistorical, timeless economic model. (shrink)

review of two similar collections on well-being.

G. A. Cohen and John Roemer, two of the most influential of the ‘Analytic Marxists,’ have argued convincingly that the Marxian concept of exploitation must include injustice as part of its definition. ‘Exploitation’ is more like ‘murder’ which includes injustice in its very meaning, than like ‘killing’ which describes a fact which is often unjust but need not be. ‘Forced extraction of unpaid or surplus labor,’ then, is not sufficient for exploitation. The extraction must be unjust to be exploitative. (...) Otherwise we would have to call it exploitation if people were forced to labor without pay as just punishment, or if people-selected by lottery-were drafted to fight a defensive war and provided no more than subsistence for their trouble, or if initiators of an unjust war were forced to labor to repair the damages they had caused. (shrink)

G. A. Cohen and John Roemer, two of the most influential of the ‘Analytic Marxists,’ have argued convincingly that the Marxian concept of exploitation must include injustice as part of its definition. ‘Exploitation’ is more like ‘murder’ which includes injustice in its very meaning, than like ‘killing’ which describes a fact which is often unjust but need not be. ‘Forced extraction of unpaid or surplus labor,’ then, is not sufficient for exploitation. The extraction must be unjust to be exploitative. (...) Otherwise we would have to call it exploitation if people were forced to labor without pay as just punishment, or if people-selected by lottery-were drafted to fight a defensive war and provided no more than subsistence for their trouble, or if initiators of an unjust war were forced to labor to repair the damages they had caused. (shrink)

In his book A General Theory of Exploitation and Class, John Roemer employs the tools of mainstream general equilibrium and game-theoretic analysis to develop a fundamental critique and broadbased reformulation of Marxian economic theory. Perhaps Roemer's most striking departure from traditional Marxian tenets lies in his explanation of the material basis of exploitation in capitalist economies. Roemer argues that capitalist exploitation must be understood as essentially the consequence of exchange given differential ownership of relatively scarce productive assets. In particular, (...) Roemer concludes that capitalist exploitation does not fundamentally depend on capitalist domination of production, or what Marx termed the subsumption of labor under capital. (shrink)

John Roemer and G.A. Cohen made seminal contributions to the reconstruction of the Marxian theory of exploitation. However, both came to doubt the importance of the Marxian theory of exploitation for the socialist project. This paper defends the Marxian theory of exploitation against their skeptical conclusions. In so doing, it explicates Marxian exploitation’s distributive and relational dimensions, normative and explanatory roles, and complex normative and causal structure.

Roemer's attempt to undermine the normative reasons that Marxists have thought exploitation important (domination, alienation, and inequality) is vitiated by several crucial errors. First, Roemer ignores the dimension of freedom which is Marx's main concern and replaces it with an interest in justice, which Marx rejected. This leads him to misconstrue the nature of exploitation as Marx understands it. Second, his procedure for disconnecting these evils from exploitation, or denying their importance, involves the methodological assumption that exploitation must strictly imply (...) these evils. He thus fails to see that exploitation may 'cause' domination, alienation, and inequality; this assumption and the focus on justice also lead him to overlook the sort of alienation that is most important to Marx and the way exploitation, as Marx understands it, does imply coercion. Roemer's alternative conception of exploitation thus fails to capture basic Marxist normative and explanatory concerns. But Roemer's insistence on the importance of justice and the need for an articulated alternative to capitalism are a necessary supplement to a Marxist account. (shrink)

John Roemer’s pragmatic proposal for luck-egalitarian planners normalizes risky choices for individuals’ social “types,” such that risk takers from types where the same risky behaviors are prevalent retain their just entitlements to societal redress, and ones from types where they are rare encounter just penalties. This chapter shows, however, that risky behaviors that are prevalent in one’s type do not always intuitively retain rights to redress, and that ones that are rare in one’s type do not always intuitively deserve (...) a penalty. The chapter puts forth a pragmatic proposal that may complement and partly replace Roemer’s. (shrink)

John Roemer once described the ‘intellectual foundations’ of analytical Marxism as the recognition that, despite having a valid core, Marxism rested upon outdated social science. The solution, he believed, was to update the theory ‘using state-of-the-art methods of analytical philosophy and “positivist” social science’. If one takes this definition literally, Jürgen Habermas’ early work qualifies as that of an analytical Marxist. Yet although he developed his project in a way that was independent of the self-identified analytical Marxists, there are (...) important points of convergence in their views. In particular, in their efforts to update Marxism, both Habermas and the analytical Marxists managed to talk themselves out of being Marxists in any recognizable sense of the term. This is a noteworthy outcome, given the differences in their points of departure. This article tracks the intellectual history of these two movements, in order to identify the tendencies that pushed this rather disparate group of theorists in the same direction. (shrink)

John Roemer's comment succinctly summarizes the logical structure of his own theory of capitalist exploitation, but misunderstands the main points of our critique. He reduces his argument to two propositions. The first is an “empirical proposition”about the “root causes of exploitation”: X + Y → Z, where X is the existence of differential ownership of means of production, Y is coercion in the labor process, and Z is the capitalist class structure and exploitation. The second is the strictly theoretical (...) proposition X + not- Y -” Z, the truth of which he demonstrates, given most of the assumptions of a Walrasian economic model. He concludes that these two propositions, taken together, demonstrate the primacy of DOPA in explaining capitalist class relations. This much is true – subject to the various limitations we have indicated in our article – but only within the restricted confines of a Walrasian framework. This purely theoretical conclusion has no force as an empirical conclusion: this is the point at which Roemer's interpretation goes awry. For obviously, DOPA is a crucial element of empirical reality. But because Roemer's Walrasian framework precludes other equally crucial elements of empirical reality, an irreducible distance remains therein between the theoretical and the empirical. (shrink)

The concept of exploitation is central in social and political theory, but there is no precise, widely accepted definition. This paper analyses John Roemer’s seminal theory, which construes exploitation as a distributive injustice arising from asset inequalities, with no reference to notions of power or dominance. First, an intertemporal generalisation of Roemer’s static economies is set up and several doubts are raised on the claim that exploitation theory can be reduced to a kind of resource egalitarianism. Then, Roemer’s philosophical (...) arguments that exploitation should be defined as a merely distributive concept are also questioned and it is argued that a notion of power, or dominance, is an essential part of the definition of exploitation. (shrink)

The aim of our study was to verify relationships between individual difficulties in emotion regulation (ER), ER strategies (cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression), and compassion (to self and others) with the presence of depressive symptomatology in a sample of Slovak adolescents during the second wave of the COVID-19 pandemic. In the sample of 140 Slovak adolescents (age between 17–19 years) was administrated The Beck Depression Inventory- II. (Beck et al., 1996), The Overall Depression Severity and Impairment Scale (Bentley et al., (...) 2014), The Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (Gross & John, 2003), The Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (Gratz & Roemer, 2004), The Sussex-Oxford Compassion for the Self Scale and The Sussex-Oxford Compassion for Others Scale (Gu et al., 2019). Results revealed that difficulties in ER (all subscales) and expressive suppression were in positive relationships with depression symptoms. Cognitive reappraisal and self-compassion were in negative relationships with depression symptoms. Lack of ER strategies and cognitive reappraisal (inversely) were the strongest predictors of depressive symptoms. These findings suggest that ER strategies (mainly cognitive reappraisal) could be assumed as protective factors in adolescent depression symptoms development in stressful circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic. (shrink)

Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-being, Jon Elster and John E. Roemer The Quality of Life, Martha C. Nussbaum and Amartya Sen.