Research misconduct is harmful because it threatens public health and public safety, and also undermines public confidence in science. Efforts to eradicate ongoing and prevent future misconduct are numerous and varied, yet the question of “what works” remains largely unanswered. To shed light on this issue, this study used data from both mail and online surveys administered to a stratified random sample of tenured and tenure-track faculty members (N = 613) in the social, natural, and applied sciences at America’s top (...) 100 research universities. Participants were asked to gauge the effectiveness of various intervention strategies: formal sanctions (professional and legal), informal sanctions (peers), prevention efforts (ethics and professional training), and reducing the pressures associated with working in research-intensive units. Results indicated that (1) formal sanctions received the highest level of support, (2) female scholars and researchers working in the applied sciences favored formal sanctions, and (3) a nontrivial portion of the sample supported an integrated approach that combined elements of different strategies. A key takeaway for university administrators is that a multifaceted approach to dealing with the problem of research misconduct, which prominently features enhanced formal sanctions, will be met with the support of university faculty. (shrink)

This paper presents a calculus for mereotopological reasoning in which two-dimensional spatial regions are treated as primitive entities. A first order predicate language ℒ with a distinguished unary predicate c(x), function-symbols +, · and - and constants 0 and 1 is defined. An interpretation ℜ for ℒ is provided in which polygonal open subsets of the real plane serve as elements of the domain. Under this interpretation the predicate c(x) is read as 'region x is connected' and the function-symbols and (...) constants are given their meaning in terms of a Boolean algebra of polygons. We give an alternative interpretation ������ base on the real closed plane which turns out to be isomorphic to ℜ. A set of axioms and a rule of inference are introduced. We prove the soundness and completeness of the calculus with respect to the given interpretation. (shrink)

_An enlightening introduction to the study of logic: its history, philosophical foundations, and formal structures_ _Logic: Inquiry, Argument, and Order_ is the first book of its kind to frame the study of introductory logic in terms of problems connected to wider issues of knowledge and judgment that arise in the context of racial, cultural, and religious diversity. With its accessible style and integration of philosophical inquiry and real-life concerns, this book offers a novel approach to the theory of logic and (...) its relevance to questions of meaning and value that arise in the world around us. The book poses four problems for logic: Is logic separate from experience? Does logic require dualisms? Can logic reconcile opposed ways of understanding the world? And when things are divided, does the boundary have a logic? The author begins the exploration of these questions with a discussion of the process of analyzing and constructing arguments. Using the logical theories of C. S. Peirce, John Dewey, and Josiah Royce to frame the investigation, subsequent chapters outline the process of inquiry, the concept of communicative action, the nature of validity, categorical reasoning through the theory of the syllogism, and inductive reasoning and probability. The book concludes with a presentation of modal logic, propositional logic, and quantification. Logic is presented as emerging from the activities of inquiry and communication, allowing readers to understand even the most difficult aspects of formal logic as straightforward developments of the process of anticipating and taking action. Numerous practice problems use arguments related to issues of diversity and social theory, and the book introduces methods of proving validity that include Venn diagrams, natural deduction, and the method of tableaux. _Logic: Inquiry, Argument, and Order_ is an ideal book for courses on philosophical methods and critical reasoning at the upper-undergraduate and graduate levels. It is also an insightful reference for anyone who would like to explore a cross-cultural approach to the topic of logic. (shrink)

We study the fluted fragment, a decidable fragment of first-order logic with an unbounded number of variables, motivated by the work of W. V. Quine. We show that the satisfiability problem for this fragment has nonelementary complexity, thus refuting an earlier published claim by W. C. Purdy that it is in NExpTime. More precisely, we consider ${\cal F}{{\cal L}^m}$, the intersection of the fluted fragment and the m-variable fragment of first-order logic, for all $m \ge 1$. We show that, for (...) $m \ge 2$, this subfragment forces $\left\lfloor {m/2} \right\rfloor$-tuply exponentially large models, and that its satisfiability problem is $\left\lfloor {m/2} \right\rfloor$-NExpTime-hard. We further establish that, for $m \ge 3$, any satisfiable ${\cal F}{{\cal L}^m}$-formula has a model of at most -tuply exponential size, whence the satisfiability problem for this fragment is in -NExpTime. Together with other, known, complexity results, this provides tight complexity bounds for ${\cal F}{{\cal L}^m}$ for all $m \le 4$. (shrink)

A region-based model of physical space is one in which the primitive spatial entities are regions, rather than points, and in which the primitive spatial relations take regions, rather than points, as their relata. Historically, the most intensively investigated region-based models are those whose primitive relations are topological in character; and the study of the topology of physical space from a region-based perspective has come to be called mereotopology. This paper concentrates on a mereotopological formalism originally introduced by Whitehead, which (...) employs a single primitive binary relation C(x, y) (read: "x is in contact with y"). Thus, in this formalism, all topological facts supervene on facts about contact. Because of its potential application to theories of qualitative spatial reasoning, Whitehead's primitive has recently been the subject of scrutiny from within the Artificial Intelligence community. Various results regarding the mereotopology of the Euclidean plane have been obtained, settling such issues as expressive power, axiomatization and the existence of alternative models. The contribution of the present paper is to extend some of these results to the mereotopology of three-dimensional Euclidean space. Specifically, we show that, in a first-order setting where variables range over tame subsets of ℝ³, Whitehead's primitive is maximally expressive for topological relations; and we deduce a corollary constraining the possible region-based models of the space we inhabit. (shrink)

A memorial collection of essays with a bibliography of Pratt's works, a biography by the editor, and some personal notes by W. E. Hocking. Of special interest are Myers' paper on the self and introspection, Kaufmann's provocative, if heated, criticism of theologians for defending their traditions, and R. W. Sellars' commentary on the history of American Realism.--R. C. N.

Mr. E. J. Nelson, in “The Inductive Argument for an External World,” treats of fundamental topics with erudition and urbanity, but his essay remains inconclusive, I believe, with respect to its purpose of discrediting the argument. He agrees with Mr. Savery, Mr. Pratt, and me, as against the positivists, that the question of the existence of an external world is meaningful and indeed of paramount importance for both metaphysics and logic. But he argues against us that it cannot be (...) inductively established by its supposed power of “saving the appearances.” He is not sure that any induction is valid; but even if other inductions are valid, he thinks this one can not be, for the following reasons. By the multiplicative axiom of probability-theory, evidence for a hypothesis can only multiply its antecedent probability, and can increase the probability only when the latter is finite, while the hypothesis of an external world has and can have no finite antecedent probability. By the same axiom, even granted an antecedent probability for the hypothesis itself, no experience can act as evidence to increase the probability of a hypothesis except in so far as the hypothesis implies, makes probable, or “explains” the evidence, and this the hypothesis of an external world cannot do. (shrink)

This note relates to two recent papers in the journal. The main point was to highlight Kempe's theory of multisets (as we now call them), especially in the background to the start of Peirce's theory of existential graphs.