This essay treats the problems, which appear at the present years in the relations of our common society and the communities of Christs, Mohammedians, Buddhists and groups of philosophical believers. This problem has rised when our state - in consequence of an decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht - had given up his christian character and tries living in social connex with all groups of believers. We have no to discuss the requirements which are connected with tis relations.

Inhalt: Vorwort von H.-M. Pawlowski / S. Smid / R. Specht - H.-M. Pawlowski: Probleme der Rechtsbegrundung im Staat der Glaubensfreiheit - V. Gerhardt: Selbstandigkeit und Selbstbestimmung. Freiheit bei Kant und Schelling - H. Folkers: Die durch Freiheit gebaute Stadt Gottes - W. E. Ehrhardt: Mythologie und Offenbarung der Freiheit - W. Bartuschat: Uber Spinozismus und menschliche Freiheit beim fruhen Schelling - C. Cesa: Schellings Kritik des Naturrechts - H. J. Sandkuhler: F. W. J. Schelling - Philosophie als (...) Seinsgeschichte und Anti-Politik - D. Losurdo: Von Louis Philippe bis Louis Bonaparte - R. Pettoello: Die Dialektik der menschlichen Freiheit als Emanzipation und als Abfall von Gott - H. Klenner: Schelling und die Rechtsphilosophie - S. Smid: Freiheit als Keim des Rechts - W. Schmied-Kowarzik: Freiheit - Recht - Geschichte - J. Simon: Die Wirklichkeit der Freiheit (Kant, Schelling, Hegel) - W. Schild: Die verstandlichen Schwierigkeiten des Rechtsdenkens mit dem Freiheitsbegriff - Personenregister. (shrink)

To answer the question about the Christian foundation of the law, we first have to look for the foundation of the law in general. The reason why we follow the law voluntarily is not the law and its legal sanctions, but our religion or philosophy of life. »Grundwerte« or human rights offer no alternative foundation. Either they are part of the law - and not its foundation, or they are a particular philosophy of life beside others. The law of a (...) pluralistic state that guarantees freedom of religion and belief, and, consequently, is religiously and ideologically neutral, cannot be based on a particular philosophy of life, religion, or denomination. Thus, this law has to be »right« in the eyes of every religious community living in this state. It is, therefore, not a Christian law with respect to its foundation, but the Christians have been leaving their mark on its contents. (shrink)

Hans-Martin Sass, Honorary Professor of Philosophy. Founder and board member of the Centre for Medical Ethics, Bochum, Germany. Honorary Senior Research Fellow at Kennedy Institute of Ethics at Georgetown University, Washington, DC. Honorary Professor of the Bioethics Research Centre, Beijing. He has written more than 60 books and pamphlets, more than 250 articles in professional journals. Editor of the Ethik in der Praxis/ Practical ethics, Muenster: Lit. Founder and co-editor of the brochures “Medizinethische Materialien”, Bochum: ZME. He has (...) lectured in Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Brazil, Canada, Croatia, the Chech Republic, India, Iran, Israel, Italy, Japan, France, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Switzerland and Taiwan. The interview devoted to exposition of the concept of bioethics in America and Germany, as well as the professor`s attitude to the idea of the integrative concept of bioethics. The concept of integrative bioethics has been developed in different countries, a component of this concept is the idea of the need for discussion on bioethics in various sectors of society. Equally important in this concept are the definitions of bioethics and the bioethical imperative proposed by Fritz Jahr in 1926. The scientist`s article, which was discovered in 1997, contains a new format of bioethical ideas, as well as a valuable opportunity to enhance understanding the term of bioethics as an integrative science. Interview has been conducted by Hanna Hubenko as a part of the joint international course «Integrative Bioethics». At the meeting it was discussed the experience of cooperation and plans for the future. Cooperation and feedback between scientists remains an unconditional prerogative, also in a pandemic situation. (shrink)

The term and concept of bioethics (Bio-Ethik) originally were developed by Fritz Jahr, a Protestant Pastor in Halle an der Saale in 1927, long before in the 1970ties bioethics in the modern sense was recreated in the US and since has spread globally. Jahr’s bioethical imperative, influenced by Christian and humanist traditions from Assisi to Schopenhauer and by Buddhist philosophy holds its own position against Kant’s anthropological imperative and against dogmatic Buddhist reasoning: ‘Respect each living being as an end in (...) itself and treat it, if possible, as such’. Jahr interprets the 5th Commandment ‘Thou shalt not kill’ offensively and liberally as ‘common morality’ which includes the obligation of caring for one’s own health, public health and health education within the wider framework of a universal bioethical Sittengesetz. Pastor Fritz Jahr, who had no immediate influence during his times, built a strong first Protestant foundation for contemporary theological and ethical concepts in medical ethics, bioethics, and environmental ethics. (shrink)

: In 1927, Fritz Jahr, a Protestant pastor, philosopher, and educator in Halle an der Saale, published an article entitled "Bio-Ethics: A Review of the Ethical Relationships of Humans to Animals and Plants" and proposed a "Bioethical Imperative," extending Kant's moral imperative to all forms of life. Reviewing new physiological knowledge of his times and moral challenges associated with the development of secular and pluralistic societies, Jahr redefines moral obligations towards human and nonhuman forms of life, outlining the concept of (...) bioethics as an academic discipline, principle, and virtue. Although he had no immediate long-lasting influence during politically and morally turbulent times, his argument that new science and technology requires new ethical and philosophical reflection and resolve may contribute toward clarification of terminology and of normative and practical visions of bioethics, including understanding of the geoethical dimensions of bioethics. (shrink)

This is the first re-publication and first English translation of regulations concerning Human Experimentation which were binding law prior to and during the Third Reich, 1931 to 1945. The introduction briefly describes the duties of the Reichsgesundheitsamt, which formulated these regulations. It then outlines the basic concept of the Richtlinien for protecting subjects and patients on the one hand and for encouraging New Therapy and Human Experimentation on the other hand. Major issues, like personal responsibility of the physician or researcher, (...) teaching of ethics of research and therapy, and research and therapy on vulnerable populations, are compared with the regulations in the Nuremberg Code and subsequent regulations influenced by the Nuremberg Code. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

This paper reviews the usefulness of bioethical instruments such as the informed consent principle to handle ethical and political challenges of clinical trials in genotyping and DNA-banking and discusses an informed request model as well as other contractual relations between research institutions, patients, and their families.

Nach der Meinung das Verfassers bezieht sich heute der Streit zwischen der Philosophie und der Theologie auf den Menschen und nicht - wie in der Yergaxgenheit - auf Gott. Aufgrund dieser These wird die späte Abhandlung von Luther “Disputatio de homine" erörtert. An Hand de Vernunft ist die philosophische Anthropologie nur imstande eine Bestimmung des Menschen als einer weltlichen Ezietans zu geben. In der theologischen Anthropologie wird der Mensch als "pura materis Dei" verstanden. Es ist auch keine Begriffsbestimmung des menschlichen (...) Seins; es wird darin nur die Abhängigkeit des Menschen von Gott ausgedrückt. Die leitende Stelle wird der theologischen Anthropologie zugeteilt und nicht der Wissenschaft, die unfähig ist, Grundprobleme das menschlichen Seins zu lósen. (shrink)

ZUSAMMENFASSUNGRudolf Otto hat sich – was weithin unbekannt geblieben ist – mehrfach mit »Darwinismus« auseinandergesetzt. Er sah in ihm eine Gefahr für Geist und Frömmigkeit, lehnte ihn aber keineswegs in Bausch und Bogen ab. Er hielt ihn für begrenzt und wenig plausibel; ihm gegenüber sei auf der Eigenständigkeit des Geistigen zu bestehen. Otto wendet sich gegen Naturalismus und Supranaturalismus. Der Religion gehe es um »Teleologie«; ohne »Teleologie« hänge die Deszendenztheorie sozusagen in der Luft. Er wirbt für eine Doppelperspektive, ohne zu (...) berücksichtigen, dass Teleologie als solche kein theologisches Argument sein kann. Angesichts der heute verschärften Fragestellung eines »neuronalen Darwinismus« muss die Verhältnisbestimmung zur Religion innerhalb des Evolutionsdenkens gesucht werden: Religion als Schutz der biologischen und kulturellen Evolution vor sich selbst.SUMMARYAlthough it has generally gone unremarked, Rudolf Otto several times took up the discussion about “Darwinism”. He saw in it a danger for spiritual life and piety while at the same time he by no means rejected it altogether. Regarding it as plausible to a certain, limited extent, he considered it necessary at the same time to insist on the autonomy of the spiritual. Otto takes a position against naturalism and supernaturalism. In religion, he argues, it is a question of “teleology”, and without teleology the theory of descent hangs, so to speak, in the air. He calls for a double perspective, while overlooking that teleology as such cannot be a theological argument. In view of today's increasingly sharply focused “neuronal Darwinism” we need to seek to position religion within evolutionary thought: i.e. religion as the protection of biological and cultural evolution from itself. (shrink)

This paper reviews moral and cultural assessments which led to the definition of brain death and calls for a similar normative consensus regarding the moral recognition and legal protection of embryonal life related to criteria of brain life. This paper differentiates between cortical brain life I, i.e., the first existence of post-mitotic stationary neurons forming the early cortical plate (54th day post conception), and cortical brain life II, i.e., the beginning of cortical neuro-neuronal synapses (after the 70th day p.c.). The (...) latter are preconditional for establishing the communicative network within the cortex and with subcortical structures. The paper conservatively calls for a tentative moral consensus that could recognize brain life I, i.e., the 54th day p.c., as a stage prior to which embryo research generally would be acceptable in accordance with principles similar to those which led to the acceptance of brain death. Other developmental stages such as fertilization, nidation, viability, as well as the ‘potentiality’ principle are less significant for the moral recognition of early human life. Keywords: brain death, brain life, embryo research, embryonal tissue CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Summary Language games can be opening and narrowing. On the base of this double sense my paper compares the language game of divine love according to Franz Rosenzweig and Karl Barth. They were contemporaries not only regarding their early publications. Both discovered revelation in the face of liberal theology which regarded it as a problematic, mythological concept. However, this similarity is contradicted by difference, based in the Christological dogma which can have a tendency to narrow the common basis of the (...) two authors’ theological language game. There is also an anachronism, brought about by Rosenzweig’s anticipation of the concept of analogy which Barth came to years later. The emphasis of my paper lies on the question how the opening function of theological language games can be promoted. In Rosenzweig’s “speaking thinking” there can be found a trace to an answer. (shrink)

in Western cultures in regard to post-mortem organ donation and the termination of care for patients meeting these strict criteria. But they are of minimal use in Asian cultures and in the ethics of caring for the persistent vegetative patient. This paper introduces a formula for a global Uniform Determination of Death statute, based on the ‘entire brain including brain stem’ criteria as a default position, but allowing competent adults by means of advance directives to choose other criteria for determining (...) death during the process of dying. Keywords: euthanasia, brain death criteria, higher brain death criteria, individual choice, multicultural society, self-determination CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Clinic as Testing Ground for Moral Theory: A European ViewHans-Martin Sass (bio)A Philosopher’s View of Theory in the Clinical SettingThe clinic is a testing ground for theories. I am not clinician; I am a philosopher who has been in the clinic only as a patient or as an ethicist who never has had the final word nor was ever intended to have the final word. I have (...) learned that in the clinical setting general norms and conceptualizations in the Kantian sense must be tailored to real-life situations. From the philosophical schools of analytical reasoning, I learned the skills needed to analyze words and meanings and to dissect problems and so-called “solutions.” But even more impressive are the methodological skills of differential diagnosis, looking at medical problems from different angles and using different methods and instruments. The detail- and patient-oriented work of the clinician provides an excellent model of methodological clarity and professional devotion for a philosopher who assists those working for the “good of the patient.” That model has led to the development of what I call a theory and methodology of differential ethics. [End Page 351]Differential ethics is normative ethics, as it does not give up norms in favor of situational utility. Differential ethics does not venture out empty-handed in order to explore and find principles pre-existing in a given situation; rather it brings basic values and principles along with it and tries to discover the shape they must take and the priority they must be given in the situation at hand. Differential ethics differentiates between general norms and mid-level principles, virtues, and visions that must be introduced and protected effectively and specifically according to different scenarios (Sass 1993). From this European point of view, I shall briefly explain my position and comment on (1) the controversy between principlism and virtue theory, (2) differentiating and balancing, and (3) the importance of trust, both as a principle and as a virtue in the clinical setting.Principlism Versus Virtue Theory: A Mistaken ControversyFrom a European perspective, I find that the debate between the schools of virtue-theory and principlism in the United States is a mistaken controversy. The real conflict between the schools of thought is not methodology, but content. Tom Beauchamp (1995) gives examples of how one language or method can be translated into the other, and Edmund Pellegrino and David Thomasma (1988, p. 206) have formulated a rule for the virtuous physician that, in the language of principlism, reads “respect for autonomy,” but in the language of virtue theory reads “To assist my patients to make choices that coincide with their own values or beliefs, without coercion, deception, or duplicity.”In different situations, however, some systems of reference are more authoritative and effective than others. Appealing to professional virtues would be the most efficacious way to address an audience coherent in attitudes and concerned about personal character. Reaffirmation of personal and professional obligations in secular fraternities or religious communities works best when it includes an appeal to virtues in the language of the humanist tradition, moral theology, or professional ethics.But there are other situations in which authoritative attitudes and expectations are absent and society in general is searching for common, often dormant, principles that will hold it together whatever specific disagreements arise. Such a situation was present in 1978 when the Belmont Report (National Commission 1978) presented principles—respect for autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, justice—and not virtues to guide moral and political reflections on and reactions to the ethical, legal, and social implications of modern biomedicine in a multi-faceted and multi-cultural society.The formal difference between the systems of principlism, virtue theory, and value theory becomes even less important when clinical-ethical questionnaires are used to understand specific scenarios or cases and to assess different options for proceeding. Thus, my first thesis is: Case discussion, scenario assessment, [End Page 352] and open questionnaires, rather than definite guidelines, bridge the difference between virtue theory and principlism, since such processes can employ any one language or a combination of all three.Differentiating and BalancingMy second thesis is: Whatever system of reference is used... (shrink)

The biological impact of electromagnetic radiation on humans and other living beings still is controversial and inconclusive. In 1935 Albert Einstein called such an impact ‘fake news’, probably using the prestige of the Nobel Price as a powerful placebo. How should he and we deal with issues of electrosmog, placebo effects, and fake news today?

I will present evidence that nature does not optimize in the sense of Fermat's principle of least time, contrary to what Schoemaker's unintentionally ambiguous exposition might suggest. First, Huygens' principle, an alternative nonteleological account of Snell's law, is outlined. Second, I confront Fermat's principle with a substantive conceptual problem.

There are quite a number of rocky roads on which the old continent has embarked. There is, first, a harmonization of cultures and attitudes in the creation of a common European market of values and valuables, a harmonization undertaken in order to survive in an increasingly competitive global market. Second, there is a reactivation of specific European traditions in discourse, peaceable hermeneutics, solidarity, subsidiarity, tolerance in both conflict reduction and solution, and respect for self-determination and self-responsibility. Third, there is an (...) integration of theory and practice, of visions and reality, of national identity or pride and common European rights, and of obligations and cultural heritages. Last but not least, there is a question about the definition of European in a world which, at least in part, has been developed by successful European missionary work in the distribution of Age-of-Reason principles such as personal autonomy and social and ideational tolerance, the promotion of science-based technologies, and the creation of global markets for goods and services. (shrink)