In Systčme d'Epicure, La Mettrie presents a hypothesis on the origin and evolution of animals which owes much both to the fifth book of Lucretius's poem and to Montaigne's Apologie de Raimond Sebond. Claiming that Nature's operations are as unintentional and as amoral as the play of children, the French physician argues against all teleological explanations of the physical constitution of living beings. Nature's first attempts at creating individual beings must therefore have been characterized by frequent mistakes, some of which (...) are still to be seen in a few monstruous cases. Evolution is assured only through a process of trial and error, where the elimination of "unfit" combinations is due to the inability of specific animals to reach adulthood and give birth to offspring. The perfection of a living being is not to be evaluated by means of comparisons to a preexisting model but depends instead on the intensity of this being's sexual needs, which compel it to seek pleasure and to develop its mental skills. (shrink)

Kant’s critique/doctrine distinction tracks the difference between a canon for the understanding’s proper use and an organon for its dialectical misuse. The latter reflects the dogmatic use of reason to attain a doctrine of knowledge with no antecedent critique. In the 1790s, Fichte collapses Kant’s distinction and redefines dogmatism. He argues that deriving a canon is essentially dialectical and thus yields an organon: critical idealism is properly a doctrine of science or Wissenschaftslehre. Criticism is furthermore said to refute dogmatism, by (...) which Fichte means Spinozism. Schelling repudiates Fichte’s position in his Philosophical Letters by reviving Kant’s distinction. First, ‘critique’ for Schelling names a canon that is valid for all systems—including Spinozism—and thus favours none—not even the Wissenschaftslehre. Second, Schelling coins ‘dogmaticism’ to refer to what Kant calls ‘dogmatism’: reason’s uncritical claim to doctrine. Hence, he says all systems—even Fichte’s—are susceptible to the ‘enthusiasm’ of mistaking themselves for doctrines or ‘objects of knowledge’, instead of subjectively valid ‘objects of freedom’. I reconstruct Schelling’s argument for reviving Kant’s distinction, while noting two consequences for German idealism. First, if criticism favours no system, a system’s origin cannot be an act of knowledge, e.g., intellectual intuition, but only an act of endorsement. Second, if dogmaticism entails enthusiasm, a system’s goal cannot be absolute knowledge, but only infinite striving. Hence, by retrieving Schelling’s notion of dogmaticism, we can both gain a better understanding of the Letters and register the impact of a core Kantian distinction on the German idealist project. (shrink)

Meillassoux seeks knowledge of transcendental reality, blaming Kant for the ‘correlationist’ proscription of independent access to either thought or being. For Meillassoux, correlationism blocks an account of the meaning of ‘ancestral statements’ regarding reality prior to humans. I examine three charges on which Meillassoux’s argument depends: (1) Kant distorts ancestral statements’ meaning; (2) Kant fallaciously infers causality’s necessity; (3) Kant’s transcendental idealism cannot grasp ‘the great outdoors’. I reject these charges: (1) imposes a Cartesian misreading, hence Meillassoux’s false assumption that, (...) for Kant, objects don’t exist without subjects; (2) misreads Kant, who infers causality’s necessity from the possibility of experience; (3) casts Kant’s idealism as subjective, ignoring his perspectival portrayal of it. (shrink)

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume 25, Issue 2, Page 191-194, June 2011.

Le riflessioni di Leibniz intorno ai problemi della teodicea sono caratterizzate, negli anni che precedono la Confessio philosophi, dall’influenza del pensiero di Valla, Lutero, Bisterfeld e Hobbes. Ad un iniziale atteggiamento volontaristico, secondo il quale l’onnipotenza di Dio è sufficiente a garantire la giustizia del governo del mondo, succede un primo ripensamento, evidenziato soprattutto nel Von der Allmacht und Allwissenheit Gottes und der Freiheit des Menschen. In questo scritto del 1671 Leibniz riconosce la drammaticità del problema del male e attribuisce (...) agli abusi linguistici dei filosofi la responsabilità dello stato di discordia nel quale si trova la cristianità; in particolare egli ritiene che le nozioni di possibilità e necessità possano essere riportate al loro vero significato attraverso l’analisi del linguaggio comune, che rivela la fallacia del fatalismo. Contro la riduzione del peccato a semplice “non-ente” e la pretesa della scienza media di sottrarre l’uomo alla predeterminazione, Leibniz afferma che Dio non si limita a permettere i peccati ma ne vuole positivamente l’esistenza, ricondotta però ad armonia attraverso la proporzione tra colpa e pena. (shrink)