1. Introduction; Elisabeth A. Lloyd and Eric Winsberg.- Section 1: Confirmation and Evidence.- 2. The Scientific Consensus on Climate Change: How Do We Know We’re Not Wrong?; Naomi Oreskes.- 3. Satellite Data and Climate Models Redux.- 3a. Introduction to Chapter 3: Satellite Data and Climate Models; Elisabeth A. Lloyd.- Ch. 3b Fact Sheet to "Consistency of Modelled and Observed Temperature Trends in the Tropical Troposphere"; Benjamin D. Santer et al..- Ch. 3c Reprint of "Consistency of Modelled and Observed (...) Temperature Trends in the Tropical Troposphere"; Benjamin D. Santer et al..- 4. The Role of ’Complex’ Empiricism in the Debates about Satellite Data and Climate Models; Elisabeth A. Lloyd.- 5. Reconciling Climate Model/Data Discrepancies: The Case of the Trees That Didn’t Bark; Michael Mann.- 6. Downscaling of Climate Information; Linda O. Mearns et al..- Section 2: Uncertainties and Robustness.- 7. The Significance of Robust Model Projections; Wendy S. Parker.- 8. Building Trust, Removing Doubt? Robustness Analysis and Climate Modeling; Jay Odenbaugh.- Section 3: Climate Models as Guides to Policy.- 9. Climate Model Confirmation: From Philosophy to Predicting Climate in the Real World; Reto Knutti.- 10. Uncertainty in Climate Science and Climate Policy; Jonathan Rougier and Michel Crucifix.- 11. Communicating Uncertainty to Policy Makers: The Ineliminable Role of Values; Eric Winsberg.- 12. Modeling Climate Policies: A Critical Look at Integrated Assessment Models; Mathias Frisch.- 13. Modelling Mitigation and Adaptation Policies to Predict their Effectiveness: The Limits of Randomized Controlled Trials; Alexandre Marcellesi and Nancy D. Cartwright. (shrink)

Since the fundamental challenge that I laid at the doorstep of the pluralists was to defend, with nonderivative models, a strong notion of genic cause, it is fatal that Waters has failed to meet that challenge. Waters agrees with me that there is only a single cause operating in these models, but he argues for a notion of causal `parsing' to sustain the viability of some form of pluralism. Waters and his colleagues have some very interesting and important ideas about (...) the sciences, involving pluralism and parsing or partitioning causes, but they are ideas in search of an example. He thinks he has found an example in the case of hierarchical and genic selection. I think he has not. (shrink)

There are a number of grounds for criticizing what the state requires of one, and for thinking that one no longer has an obligation to obey it. I will begin by attempting to locate liberalism amongst such grounds. It is useful for this purpose to contrast two headings under which these grounds may fall. Firstly, there are criticisms concerning the content of the requirements of the state. In this case exception is taken to what it is that the law requires (...) quite apart from the process by which it was arrived at. If Jews are legally prevented from practising certain professions, and objection is taken because no state should make laws debarring persons from certain professions on religious grounds, the objection is one of content. Secondly, there are grounds concerning the procedure by which a decision was reached. If it is thought that the British Government ought not to have signed the Treaty of Rome because no referendum was taken on whether the electorate wanted Britain to join, exception is taken to the procedure by which this decision was made. The objection could be made by one who thought that British entry was the best policy. liberalism lays down principles concerning the permissible content of what is required by the state. (shrink)

D. A. Lloyd Thomas; VIII—Political Decision Procedures1, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 70, Issue 1, 1 June 1970, Pages 141–160, https://doi.or.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Bad, the Ugly, and the Need for a Position by PsychiatryLloyd A. Wells (bio)Keywordsvice, psychiatric education, psychiatry-law interface, medicalizationSadler’s paper is thought provoking and will resonate with many psychiatrists who deal with the interface of vice and psychiatric syndromes. This interface and the dilemmas it poses are perhaps most discussed by residents, who are dealing with the issue for the first time and who often debate what is (...) “psychiatric” about these cases. Many residents have their own informal systems of classifying vice, often with a divide between the criminal population and those perceived as avoiding work and responsibility. These unofficial classifications are usually judgmental and often pejorative, but the residents rarely get much help from faculty in this area. Indeed, many of the faculty have equally judgmental and pejorative views, which are neither systematized nor subject to systematic analysis.By clarifying the importance of the issue of the vice–mental disorder relationship (VMDR) to psychiatry, Sadler may move this topic to one that receives Socratic discourse in our training programs and serious consideration in the training of psychiatrists rather than an idiosyncratic lumping of these patients into the broad category of “patients I don’t like.”Sadler asks for comments in several categories: historical intractability, goals of psychiatry, taxonomy, implications for the criminal justice system, implications for the law, and ethical/political implications.Issues of historical intractability are long standing. In A Tour of the Whole Island of Great Britain, written in the early eighteenth century, Daniel Defoe (1724–1727) describes many asylums, often with the comment, “as it is a madhouse, so is it also a house of correction.” Some of the great public hospitals of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were built at least as much to get antisocial and homeless people off the streets as to provide care for the mentally ill. The moral treatment of France and Great Britain, which added much to the practice of psychiatry, clearly had punitive “treatments” for patients with vice-laden behaviors, and this was very explicit in the American moral model of treatment of the late nineteenth century with its obsessive need to prevent patients from masturbating. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there was great debate about the inclusion of Pritchard’s “moral insanity”—now sanitized into “personality disorders”—into the psychiatric domain, and Kraepelin referred to this group as “enemies of society.”Sadler next asks us to consider the goals of psychiatry in regard to “a proper VMDR.” He wonders [End Page 43] whether a strict medicalization account can be defended. I think it is clear from a large literature and from clinical experience that it cannot be defended —now. But it may become defensible in this century, which will pose enormous challenges to psychiatry, lawmakers, and the courts (vide infra). A strict moralization model is defended by many in society, including some psychiatrists, but has severe limitations and seems illogical. It is hard to make a case (though juries have done so) that, for example, a very delusional young woman with postpartum psychosis who murders her children because of the belief that far worse things than death will happen to them imminently if they live, fits the moralization approach. The Dahmer case is especially instructive. Although there was enormous “vice” (and perhaps “evil”), it is hard to make a case that a sane man would make temples out of the body parts of victims and would attempt to commune with the dead through them.He wonders whether a “mixed” version of medicalization/moralization can be developed and defended. I would argue for both a mixed approach and a “shared” approach. A middle adolescent with bipolar disorder burned his house to the ground. (Fortunately, he and family members were injured but not killed.) He was wildly manic at the time and set the fire because he wanted to prove that he was immortal and totally impervious to flames. He was delusional, extraordinarily impulsive, and completely without judgment, and it would be extraordinarily difficult to exclude the medical frame in any consideration of the vice involved. The vice, indeed, may be more involved in his decision while euthymic to stop taking... (shrink)

It has been claimed that decisions reached democratically have the consent of those subject to them. It will be shown that arguments for this view rest on either a Kantian or a utilitarian conception of consent. When the distinct nature of these arguments is kept clearly in mind, it becomes apparent that little remains of any of them. Nothing remains of the argument based on the Kantian conception, at least in so far as it is used to support the view (...) that democratic government rests on the consent of the governed. Though something remains of the arguments based on the utilitarian conception, what remains is not what they often are thought to establish. The spurious plausibility of consent arguments for democracy is due to switches between the Kantian conception of consent and the utilitarian. (shrink)

Mill says that the object of his essay On Liberty is to defend a certain principle, which I will call the ‘liberty principle’, and will take to say the following: ‘It is permissible, in principle, for the state or society to control the actions of individuals “only in respect to those actions of each, which concern the interest of other people”’. The liberty principle is a prescription of intermediate generality. Mill intends it to support more specific political prescriptions, such as (...) liberty of conscience, of expressing and publishing opinions, of framing a plan of life to suit our own character, and of combination for any purpose not involving harm to others . The liberty principle is more general than these prescriptions but less general than its possible moral foundations, such as utilitarianism. My concern will be with attempts to defend the liberty principle by showing it to be supported by an acceptable moral position. (shrink)

Mill says that the object of his essay On Liberty is to defend a certain principle, which I will call the ‘liberty principle’, and will take to say the following: ‘It is permissible, in principle, for the state or society to control the actions of individuals “only in respect to those actions of each, which concern the interest of other people”’. The liberty principle is a prescription of intermediate generality. Mill intends it to support more specific political prescriptions, such as (...) liberty of conscience, of expressing and publishing opinions, of framing a plan of life to suit our own character, and of combination for any purpose not involving harm to others. The liberty principle is more general than these prescriptions but less general than its possible moral foundations, such as utilitarianism. My concern will be with attempts to defend the liberty principle by showing it to be supported by an acceptable moral position. (shrink)

In this essay an ‘objective’ account of intrinsic value is proposed and partly defended. It is claimed that a kind of value exists which is, or may reasonably be supposed to be, a property of certain objects. The presence of such value is not to be wholly accounted for as the ‘projection’ of certain human feelings elicited by the object thought to be of value, nor by the object's meeting certain operative human conventions prescribing what is to be admired, nor (...) by its being conformable, in some way, to human needs or desires. Hume, of course, would have none of this. It is hoped to show that if one adopts Hume's account, then his attempt to show that there nevertheless will be convergence in the long run as to what is of aesthetic value is forced and unsuccessful. By contrast, on the ‘objective’ account convergence is to be expected. This, of course, only shows the superiority of the ‘objective’ account so long as there is an expectation of long-term convergence. This is not an expectation of most contemporary value ‘subjectivists’, and therefore the argument will not be directly relevant to their positions. (shrink)

If the world were wholly just, the following inductive definition would exhaustively cover the subject of justice in holdings.1. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in acquisition is entitled to that holding.2. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in transfer, from someone else entitled to the holding, is entitled to the holding.3. No one is entitled to a holding except by applications of i and 2.The complete (...) principle of distributive justice would say simply that a distribution is just if everyone is entitled to the holdings they possess under the distribution. (shrink)

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In this essay an ‘objective’ account of intrinsic value is proposed and partly defended. It is claimed that a kind of value exists which is, or may reasonably be supposed to be, a property of certain objects. The presence of such value is not to be wholly accounted for as the ‘projection’ of certain human feelings elicited by the object thought to be of value, nor by the object's meeting certain operative human conventions prescribing what is to be admired, nor (...) by its being conformable, in some way, to human needs or desires. Hume, of course, would have none of this. It is hoped to show that if one adopts Hume's account, then his attempt to show that there nevertheless will be convergence in the long run as to what is of aesthetic value is forced and unsuccessful. By contrast, on the ‘objective’ account convergence is to be expected. This, of course, only shows the superiority of the ‘objective’ account so long as there is an expectation of long-term convergence. This is not an expectation of most contemporary value ‘subjectivists’, and therefore the argument will not be directly relevant to their positions. (shrink)

If the world were wholly just, the following inductive definition would exhaustively cover the subject of justice in holdings.1. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in acquisition is entitled to that holding.2. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in transfer, from someone else entitled to the holding, is entitled to the holding.3. No one is entitled to a holding except by applications of i and 2.The complete (...) principle of distributive justice would say simply that a distribution is just if everyone is entitled to the holdings they possess under the distribution. (shrink)

It first needs to be shown that this question raises a problem, for many people think it is answered, or at least dissolved, in the following way. There are two independent ways of answering the question “Why should I do X?”; one ultimately in terms of what I want to do, the other ultimately in terms of what I morally ought to do. Thus showing that I morally ought to do something is a final justification of a course of action. (...) No answer can be given to the further question “Given that X is what I morally ought to do, why ought I to do X?”. No further moral reasons can be given as ex hypothese the final moral reasons have already been given. As it is denied that moral reasons can be reduced to reasons in terms of what I want to do, the only other possible kind of reason has been ruled out also. This, however, is said net to matter, because moral reasons are not in need cf any further justification. Moral considerations simply are reasons for action just as much as wanting to do something simply is a reason for doing it. (shrink)

In their oft-cited manifesto, the Martinican Creolists exhort Caribbean people to forego their continuing allegiances to the “mythical shores” of various old worlds, and to affirm instead the “alluvial Creoleness” that binds (or that ought to bind) them to each other, and to other communities across the globe with a similar plantation history: “Neither Europeans, nor Africans, nor Asians, we proclaim ourselves Creoles; “[the Creole language] is the initial means of communication of our deep self, or our collective unconscious, of (...) our common genius, and it remains the river of our alluvial Creoleness.” Despite their qualifications – “Creoleness is an open specificity,” for example – they have been chided for simplifying the complicated socio-political histories of the region. Maryse Condé, for example, has noted that the opposition of colonizing French language and resisting Creole language ignores the extent to which plantation heterogeneity and negotiation rendered Creole a language of both “unity and compromise.” On what terms can alluvial relationships that can undercut imperial and diasporic ties be uncovered? What does the idea of a Creole unconscious solidify, restore, revivify, and for whom? In this essay, I am interested in a Jamaican-born novelist’s use of Cuba’s second war of independence in the 1890s to critique Jamaican complacency about British colonialism after the Second World War. Cuba, and a “Creole Latin” world more generally, allows him, on my reading, to proffer hispanophone and francophone plantation histories as a model for anglophone sensibilities in the region. The “Creole Latin” affirmation of nationalism, revolutionary struggle, and strong affective ties to the land and to personal relationships, are uncontaminated by the domineering spirit, legalistic prejudices, bureaucracy and commerce, and negotiated concessions that typify anglophone Protestant modes of life. Since the scene of these ideas in this case is the nineteenth century plantation, then we might ask if the social and political inequities are not reinforced, or whether the pleasures afforded by the romance make such considerations moot. (shrink)