But how is is that thought (viz., sense, imagination, and thought proper) is sometimes followed by action, sometimes not; sometimes by movement, sometimes not? What happens seems parallel to the case of thinking and inferring about the immovable objects of science. There the end is the truth seen (for, when one conceives the two premises, one at once conceives and comprehends the conclusion), but here the two premises result in a conclusion which is an action…Now that the action is the (...) conclusion is clear. But the premises of action are of two kinds, of the good and of the possible. Aristotle, De Motu Animalium, 701a, 6–10, 23–25. (shrink)

A textbook intended for undergraduates. Develops an overview of approaches to the philosophy of man (human beings) by presenting representative examples of major areas of emphasis. Drawing on the social sciences as well as philosophical works, the book presents the human phenomenon as a product of both heredity and environment (the "facticity" of man) and a source of new realities (the "transcendence" of man). Considered under the heading of man's facticity are aspects of corporeality and consciousness; under the heading of (...) man's transcendence, aspects of personal and societal development. Multicultural bibliographies provided. Regrettably, writing style of book is dated by use of male-only terminology. (shrink)

This is a conjecture about the conditions and operating structures that are required for the phenomenality of certain mental states. Specifically, full-blown phenomenality is assumed, as contrasted with constrained examples of phenomenal experience such as sensations of color and pain. Propositional attitudes and content, while not phenomenal per se, are standardly concurrent and may condition phenomenal states (e.g., when tied to false beliefs). It is conjectured that full phenomenality natively arises in coherent processes of situated sensory synthesis and representation (with (...) conceptual content) that are looped, mereologically whole and multi-dimensional. And that phenomenal states are typically phase-states within a parameterized conjoint structure of world and experiencer processes that are causally modulated across Markov blankets (which are conditionally independent and may be nested: cf. M. Kirchoff, et. al., 2017, 2018; and T. Burge, 2010, re: anti-individualism). Though they may, it is not accepted that phenomenally conscious states must be targets of higher-order representations (cf. A. Byrne, 2004). (shrink)

The theme of this series is given a human touch in Medieval Masters. All of the contributors in this memorial volume are paying tribute to their mentor, former University of Toronto (St. Michael's College) professor, Rev. Edward A. Synan. These essays provide ample proof that Synan's legacy of excellence will continue to influence students of philosophy for decades to come. In addition to ten essays, the volume contains a Synan bibliography and a very heartfelt opening remembrance from M. Jean (...) Kitchel. The essays are wide ranging, exploring Bonaventure, John Duns Scotus, Averroes, and Albert the Great, as well as the Thomistic themes of essence and existence; creation, numbers, and natures; and friendship and Christology. There is also a discussion of the treatment of the problem of universals in Boethius, Porphyry, and Abelard. Anyone who studies philosophy, whether a Thomist or not, will find this a valuable volume. That is as much a tribute to Father Synan as it is to the contributors, who were the grateful recipients of his generous and sage teaching. (shrink)