In the original publication of the article, the corresponding author used pseudonym as ‘M. Lisagor’. The correct name is given in this correction.

The paper notices that different readings have been provided as for the connections between Wittgenstein and pragmatism, such as for example H. Putnam’s picture as opposed to R. Rorty’s description that packages Wittgenstein and Dewey together as ‘postmodern’ pragmatists. Joseph Margolis tries to broaden the discussion by including an examination of Wilfrid Sellars, Gottlob Frege, Robert Brandom, and Huw Price. His aim it to review the newer challenges of naturalism and deflationism, which, by their own instruction, should bring us (...) to the decisive contest between the ‘pragmatism’ of the Investigations and that of Brandom’s Between Saying and Doing. The larger purpose of this exercise is to assess pragmatism’s best prospects currently, in meeting the gathering challenges of the day. (shrink)

The doctrine that there are “languages of art”, that works of fine art are to be construed somehow as utterances in a language, is an attractive doctrine, judging from the steady inclination of interested theorists to revive it in one way or another. For instance, in a fairly early publication of contemporary aesthetics, T. M. Greene argued that a work of art, in expressing something about the world, could be taken as a proposition, whether or not linguistically paraphrasable. Interestingly enough, (...) Greene did not linger to articulate sufficiently clearly the sense in which works of art could be said to be propositions; though in ascribing truth to them, in a respect proper to explicit statements, it is clear that he meant what he said to be taken quite literally. Again, Susanne Langer has sustained a notably unsuccessful effort to explicate the defensible sense of her muchdebated thesis that “Art is the creation of forms symbolic of human feeling”. In a relatively late adjustment, she concedes that “artistic import is expressed, somewhat as meaning is expressed in a genuine symbol, yet not exactly so. The analogy is strong enough to make it legitimate, even though easily misleading, to call the work of art the art symbol”. What Langer’s thesis comes to, then, is the denial that works of art may be construed literally as linguistic utterances or as symbolic utterances that behave in ways formally similar to the uses of language. The analogy between art symbols and “genuine” symbols may, of course, be conceded benignly enough, once the ulterior philosophical claim is dismissed. (shrink)

“The important point about a rule of thumb,” says E. D. Hirsch, “is that it is not a rule.” That depends very much on what a rule is or is said to be. Hirsch does not give an explicit answer to the question. Presumably, he means that a rule is criterially determinate and exceptionless; or, that it allows only a notably limited range of indeterminacy within an acknowledged space of application. Explicit and exceptionless rules are almost unheard of in ordinary (...) life—certainly they are quite rare in the practice of interpreting literature: they tend to sacrifice their usefulness in direct proportion to their insisting on fixity. But if the severe requirement were softened, it would be hard to say that a rule of thumb was not a rule; for, clearly, there cannot be a fixed rule for settling the acceptable indeterminacy of some prior rule. (shrink)

Donnellan's distinction between the referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions is shown not to cover exhaustive and exclusive alternatives but to fix the termini of a continuum of cases. in fact, donnellan's distinction rests on a mixed classification: the referential use, concerned with intended referents regardless of what speakers may say about them; the attributive use, concerned with definite descriptions used in using sentences, that something or other may satisfy. given this feature of his account, it is easy to (...) construct counterexamples of a hybrid nature. related views (stalnaker's, kaplan's, stampe's) are briefly canvassed. (shrink)

After-images, I believe, hold the key to certain much-debated issues regarding meaning and verification. In particular, an analysis of the relevant features of our discourse shows that views often held to be untenable or unintelligible or avoidable regarding our discourse about pain and similar sensations are not so easily escaped in the context of after-images.

ne important class of actions concerns tasks. Questions may be raised about whether we have succeeded or failed to do what we were trying to do. Not all the things we call actions are open to considerations of such success or failure. And questions of succeeding or failing are not raised solely about what we may have been trying to do. The paper attempts to classify various ways in which one may fail in an action; the array that results is (...) explored in terms of evaluations rendered, responsibility, character, deliberate decision, and the like. The analysis of failing in what one has tried to do is made central. To be said to be trying to do something, one must have done the requisite things that constitute trying to do something and not to have succeeded yet in doing what one may have tried to do. “Trying to succeed”; in doing something is a redundant expression except for special cases; and though one may decide to try to do something, one cannot decide to succeed in this. One may actually succeed in doing what one has tried to do but one cannot deliberately succeed. Further distinctions are made between trying to do something and wishing to do something and believing that one is trying to do something; also, between failing in what one has tried to do, failing to try, failing to do something without failing in what one has tried to do, and failing to do something in respects in which one could never be said to have tried to do it. (shrink)

The analysis of the concept of knowledge is understandably regarded as central to the development of an adequate philosophical system. And yet, as is also apparent, no proposal of recent date has succeeded in meeting certain well-known objections, counterinstances, anomalies. It is reasonable, therefore, to step back from these would-be direct contributions to review the principal strategies by which the relevant puzzles may be supposed to be managed.Undoubtedly, it was Roderick Chisholm's recovery and revision of the account of the Theaetetus (...) that encouraged a sustained effort, by various hands, to formulate a definition of knowledge in terms of its necessary and sufficient conditions. (shrink)

1. A partire dagli anni Ottanta, Arthur Danto ha raccolto una meravigliosa concatenazione di rompicapi tra loro collegati sulla natura dell’opera d’arte e sulla storia di movimenti artistici - che coinvolgono principalmente la pittura - appartenenti ad anni relativamente recenti. Tali rompicapi possono senza dubbio venire annoverati tra gli argomenti più dibattuti in estetica analitica nel periodo, lungo più di vent’anni, tra l’uscita de La destituzione filosofica dell’arte (1986) e il presen...

The propositionEsseest percipiplays an instructively ambiguous role in Berkeley's philosophy—as well as in the history of the theory of knowledge in general. It has, for instance, been construed as a false synthetic proposition by G. E. Moore and as a convention regarding sense-data by A. J. Ayer. And it is of course incompatible with the admission of material objects existing unperceived. I cannot myself see that Berkeley's account of the formula allows us to say that he regards it exc lusively (...) as a proposition or as a convention, and I think that to grasp the mixed way in which Berkeley employs the formula is to under-stand much about the strategy of disputes regarding perception. I base my remarks entirely on theDialogues. (shrink)

I begin with a kind of phenomenological reporting of the recent war between Israel and the Hezbollah in Lebanon, in order to explain the meaning of the thesis that "historicity is predication" - meaning by that to clarify the sense in which predication is a kind of political act (for good and sufficient philosophical reasons) and how the "objective" description of an evolving war illuminates such a philosophical reading of history.

_The Arts and the Definition of the Human_ introduces a novel theory that our selves—our thoughts, perceptions, creativity, and other qualities that make us human—are determined by our place in history, and more particularly by our culture and language. Margolis rejects the idea that any concepts or truths remain fixed and objective through the flow of history and reveals that this theory of the human being as culturally determined and changing is necessary to make sense of art. He shows that (...) a painting, sculpture, or poem cannot have a single correct interpretation because our creation and perception of art will always be mitigated by our historical and cultural contexts. Calling upon philosophers ranging from Parmenides and Plato to Kant, Hegel, and Wittgenstein, art historians from Damisch to Elkins, artists from Van Eyck to Michelangelo to Wordsworth to Duchamp, Margolis creates a philosophy of art interwoven with his philosophical anthropology which pointedly challenges prevailing views of the fine arts and the nature of personhood. (shrink)

EJPAP – This is going to be an informal conversation about the history of American philosophy, about yourself in the history of American Philosophy. Basically, we have four parts of the interview. When and how you encountered pragmatism and what interested you in it, if you think there is an American tradition of philosophy, and then about yourself in this tradition. And then your view about the prospect of the future, your prophecies. It is part of your profile to have (...) a clear view of the fu... (shrink)