ABSTRACT This paper argues that generosity as a moral virtue is only consistently and fully possible to practise in the kind of polity that upholds natural individual human rights, including the basic negative right to private property. The paper sketches a characterisation of generosity and explains the sense in which it can be a moral virtue. Some of the assumptions underlying the concept of moral virtue are considered and it is argued that contrary to some recent claims, it is possible (...) to conceptualise as well as to practise moral virtues in our age. Yet it is also shown that certain political prerequisites are necessary for practising generosity. Furthermore, it is shown that there cannot be any generosity involved in a polity in which one is forced to share one's wealth with those who might be the beneficiaries of generous conduct. Finally, it is argued that even in a polity with a very limited government some acts of official generosity are possible. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper argues that the sort of liberty associated with a capitalist economic system is of particular value because it ensures moral self‐responsibility. Two conceptions of freedom are considered but only one is invoked. It is contended that one, namely, positive freedom, is actually a kind of ability or power. One's positive freedom may be lost as a result of events not initiated by other human beings. Negative freedom, by contrast, is a distinctively normative notion. It is a social (...) condition that members of a community ought to maintain out of respect for human dignity, that is, each person's responsibility to choose to live rightly. It is argued that since ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, persons can only be morally responsible for what they can choose to do. If they lack negative freedom, then in addition to natural limitations, they will also be limited by the voluntary conduct of others. Yet this limitation could be prevented by the choices of others, including governments, to secure for all persons their negative freedom. Because of the universality of the requirement that each person be left free, such negative freedom is the quintessential public good. Finally, the concrete expression of negative freedom is the right to private property— one's sphere of moral authority. This makes the capitalist economic system an essential aspect of the society that secures negative freedom. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Is free will a necessity or a luxury for an understanding of applied ethics? This paper offers an argument for why it is the former. First some reasons are offered why applied ethics, under the influence of Rawls's metaethics, has eschewed the topic of free will. It is shown why this is a mistake — namely, how applied ethics will falter without such a theory. The paper then argues for a conception of free will and indicates what ethical and (...) public policy implications may flow from this theory. (shrink)

In James P. Sterba's new collection of papers on justice, one of the contributions comes from Alison Jaggar. It is an essay written in the tradition of sociolinguistic theorizing, whereby a major problem with the relationship between men and women concerns their different uses of language, their distinctive ways of communicating, arguing, and talking.

There have been a number of attacks on the idea of human rights recently, both in the course of political and diplomatic encounters across the globe, as well as in the more systematic literature of political philosophy. These attacks do not always distinguish between the Lockean, negative and the more recent positive rights traditions. For example, at the 1993 summer conference on Human Rights in Vienna, Austria, many diplomats from different regions of the world raised such questions as 'When we (...) speak of human rights, are these conditions that everyone everywhere ought to enjoy?’Is it perhaps the case that human rights are one thing for people in one part of the globe and another for those in another part?' These questions were raised in large part about the rights spelled out in the United Nations Declaration of Universal Human Rights, including both negative and positive rights–e.g., the rights to freedom of expression and to public education, respectively. (shrink)

Richard Schmitt's case against the psychological defense of capitalism (Inquiry, Vol. 16, No. 2) has merit, but in stating it he attributes to a defender of capitalism the argument that capitalism suits people's innate selfishness. The position more plausibly attributed to the author in question is not only resistant to Schmitt's own arguments but is worth consideration in itself.

The first part of this project deals with the more recent historical discussions of the topic, Most of which focus on the views of aristotle and j s mill. These two authors turn out to be the focus of attention of most writers who wish to consider the major historical reflections on happiness, Ones that have shaped our thinking on the topic. The second part of this project deals with contemporary original thinking about happiness. Yet here, Too, The major themes (...) on the topic tend to hark back to either the aristotelian or the millian line of analysis. In this section various putative components of happiness or philosophical topics and methods related to understanding happiness are discussed one by one. The paper concludes with some reflections of the authors about the merits of a eudaimonistic conception of happiness. (shrink)

Among classical liberals and libertarians a serious debate has been afoot about whether any sort of government is justified. Murray N. Rothbard, Jan Narveson, Bruce Benson and Randy Barnett are usually listed as the main skeptics, while Ayn Rand, Robert Nozick, John Hospers, among others, are listed as defenders of the morality of limited government. In this paper I argue that once properly understood, the two sides aren’t in fundamental disagreement. Anarcho-libertarians do embrace the idea that men and women in (...) a free society are justified in establishing a legal order in defense of their basic and derivative rights, and this is also what limited government proponents advance as the basis for the system they deem to be just. I argue that no fundamental difference exists between these two legal orders. The monopoly anarcho-libertarians claim limited government proponents wrongfully sanction is, in fact, not a coercive monopoly and the legal order proposed by anarchists would also have this monopolistic characteristic. This should put an end to this fruitless dispute and free the energies on both sides to mount a really important and henceforth united defense of the free society with its just legal order.Parmi les libéraux classiques et les libertariens un important débat concerne la question de savoir si une quelconque forme de gouvernement est justifiée. Murray N. Rothbard, Jan Narveson, Bruce Benson et Randy Barnett sont habituellement classés parmi les principaux sceptiques, alors qu’Ayn Rand, Robert Nozick, John Hospers, entre autres, sont plutôt classés en tant que défenseurs de la moralité d’un gouvernement limité. Dans cet article, je soutiens qu’une fois correctement compris, les deux clans ne sont pas fondamentalement en désaccord. Les anarcho-libertariens soutiennent l’idée que les hommes et les femmes dans une société libre sont en droit d’établir un ordre législatif pour défendre leurs droits fondamentaux et leurs droits dérivés, et c’est aussi ce que les partisans du gouvernement limité proposent comme fondement du système qu’ils considèrent être juste. Je soutiens qu’il n’existe pas de différence fondamentale entre ces deux ordres législatifs. Le monopole du gouvernement limité que les partisans anarcholibertariens sanctionnent à tort est, en fait, non pas un monopole coercitif, et l’ordre législatif proposé par les anarchistes aurait lui aussi cette caractéristique monopolistique.Cela devrait mettre un terme à cette dispute stérile et libérer les énergies des deux côtés pour ériger à l’avenir une défense unie réellement importante pour une société libre avec un ordre juridique juste. (shrink)

Tibor Machan responds to James Franklin's response to the problem of evil (in Think issue 5).

In response to Robert Hartford's criticisms of his Spring 2006 Journal of Ayn Rand Studies essay, "Rand and Choice," Machan reiterates the main point: Prior to the choice to live/think, a human being cannot be aware of any principle of ethics. So the choice to live/think cannot rest on such a principle. Only once that choice has been made—however incrementally, gradually, by fits and starts—can one be rationally expected to live a principled life.

A familiar teaching about Socrates, based mostly on Plato's representation of the Athenian philosopher, is that he professed not to know anything. The only thing he knew, he is reported to have said, is that he knew nothing.

Classical Iiberalism has at least two distinct strains. Its natural rights version requires extensive use of moral concepts. Some denigrate this tradition on grounds that it has been made obsolete by empiricist epistemology and materialist metaphysics. Since that tradition requires knowledge of moral truth and since empiricism precludes this, the tradition is hopeless. Since it also requires a teleological explanation of human action, and since mechanism precludes this, the hopelessness of the tradition is compounded. I argue that neither the empiricist (...) nor the mechanistic view may be taken for granted - indeed, if anything, they are obsolete, and the road is open to a philosophy which makes the natural rights tradition even more credible than it was when developed by John Locke. (shrink)

The paper argues that the idea of prima facie rights implies insurmountable difficulties in connection with the function such rights are said to have in a scheme of justice. G vlastos's version of prima facie rights theories is scrutinized as typical and more advanced than others. The paper shows that natural rights are contextually absolute; they cannot (morally) be overruled in a context of normal political circumstances but may have to be disregarded whenever politics is impossible. Vlastos's insight is preserved (...) without sacrificing the integrity of a scheme of justice based on natural rights. (shrink)

Over the years, two criticisms of free markets have been repeated over and over again, by very prominent academics. One concerns the subjective theory of values many pro-market economists embrace, the other involves the move from something being good to do to requiring the government to make – or ‘nudge’ – us do it.

The existence of predatory animals is a problem in animal ethics that is often not taken as seriously as it should be. We show that it reveals a weakness in Tom Regan's theory of animal rights that also becomes apparent in his treatment of innocent human threats. We show that there are cases in which Regan's justice-prevails-approach to morality implies a duty not to assist the jeopardized, contrary to his own moral beliefs. While a modified account of animal rights that (...) recognizes the moral patient as a kind of entity that can violate moral rights avoids this counterintuitive conclusion, it makes non-human predation a rights issue that morally ought to be subjected to human regulation. Jennifer Everett, Lori Gruen and other animal advocates base their treatment of predation in part on Regan's theory and run into similar problems, demonstrating the need to radically rethink the foundations of the animal rights movement. We suggest to those who, like us, find it less plausible to introduce morality to the wild than to reject the concept of rights that makes this move necessary to read our criticism either as a modus tollens argument and reject non-human animal rights altogether or as motivating a libertarian-ish theory of animal rights. (shrink)

This book challenges the notion that humans aren't any more important than, say, ants, and ethics and politics must be adjusted accordingly as not to rank human concerns as primary.

Libertarianism: For and Against offers dueling perspectives on the scope of legitimate government. Tibor R. Machan, a well-known libertarian philosopher, argues for a minimal government devoted solely to protecting individual rights to life, liberty, and property. Against this view, philosopher Craig Duncan defends democratic liberalism, which aims to ensure that all citizens have fair access to a life of dignity. In a dynamic exchange of arguments, the two philosophers cut to the heart of this important debate.

Are we able to make objective moral judgments? This perennial philosophical topic needs often to be revisited because it is central to human life. Judging how people conduct themselves, the institutions they devise, whether, in short, they are doing what's right or what's wrong, is ubiquitous. In this essay I defend the objectivity of ethical judgments by deploying a neo-Aristotelian naturalism by which to keep the “is-ought” gap at bay and place morality on an objective footing. I do this with (...) the aid of the ideas of Ayn Rand as well as, but only by implication and association, those of Martha Nussbaum and Philippa Foot. (shrink)

In Classical Individualism , Tibor R. Machan argues that individualism is far from being dead. Machan identifies, develops and defends what he calls classical individualism - an individualism humanised by classical philosophy, rooted in Aristotle rather than Hobbes. This book does not reject the social nature of human beings, but finds that every one has a self-directed agent who is responsible for what he or she does. Machan rejects all types of collectivism, including communitarianism, ethnic solidarity, (...) racial unity, and gender identity. The ideas expressed here have important social and political implications, and will be of interest to anyone concerned with the notion of individuality and individual responsibility. (shrink)