It will be recalled that Aristotle cites two examples of relations of this type: relations of knowledge and of vision, both of which are internal to the knower and seer, but external to the objects seen and known. However, neither of these relations can be the ones which exist between God and world for they are in a sense cul-de-sacs. Action is involved in their establishment, but they do not necessarily lead to further action, and so they cannot account for (...) the eternal movement of the universe. Only when their objects become desiderata do they result in additional activity. (shrink)

Yet we must stick with our original judgment; this is a study of quite extraordinary merits. In order to appreciate them properly, it is necessary to know something of the difficulties which confront the researcher in this field. I shall mention some of these, in order to provide the background against which Gilson's contribution should be evaluated. A discussion of this contribution will follow, after which I shall raise some questions regarding Gilson's historical methodology, and conclude with some suggestions about (...) the kind of book about Duns Scotus which needs to be written next. (shrink)

However, from another point of view, these books contradict each other, for Wolfson's work gives not the slightest sign that he recognizes anything in even the first phase of Christian history which resembles the "new understanding of human existence" which Bultmann considers its essence. Anyone whose understanding of the New Testament has room for the aspects Bultmann emphasizes will doubt that these vanished as swiftly and completely as Wolfson's silence suggests. He will therefore wonder whether the treatment of the Church (...) Fathers does not omit so many factors that it seriously misrepresents even those features of the doctrines of faith, Scripture, Trinity and Incarnation which are discussed. (shrink)

Interreligious dialogue and conversion are two contentious foci for understanding how religion operates. An interpretation of George Lindbeck serves as a starting point for discussion in this paper. The dominant reading is that Lindbeck claims that traditions absorb the world. Religious traditions are isolated, and the one with a greater capacity to assimilate others’ concerns emerges the strongest – implying what is called exclusivism. My proposal is that a different reading of Lindbeck is possible; I am not (...) so much questioning Lindbeck as highlighting another aspect of his oeuvre. If grammar, framework and structure – and not propositional first‐order ontological contents – are given first place, dialogue and conversion appear differently. Questions must be raised, however; isn't it true that there is always some content and substance – even if hidden or disguised? (shrink)

Interreligious dialogue and conversion are two contentious foci for understanding how religion operates. An interpretation of George Lindbeck serves as a starting point for discussion in this paper. The dominant reading is that Lindbeck claims that traditions absorb the world. Religious traditions are isolated, and the one with a greater capacity to assimilate others’ concerns emerges the strongest – implying what is called exclusivism. My proposal is that a different reading of Lindbeck is possible; I am not (...) so much questioning Lindbeck as highlighting another aspect of his oeuvre. If grammar, framework and structure – and not propositional first-order ontological contents – are given first place, dialogue and conversion appear differently. Questions must be raised, however; isn't it true that there is always some content and substance – even if hidden or disguised? (shrink)

Was kann eine Rezeption Wittgensteinscher Philosophie für die Theologie leisten? Dieser Frage geht die Autorin anhand zweier prominenter Beispiele nach: des walisischen Religionsphilosophen D. Z. Phillips und des amerikanischen Theologen George A. Lindbeck. Dadurch werden zwei bedeutende Beiträge anglo-amerikanischer Wittgensteinrezeption für den deutschsprachigen Raum zugänglich gemacht. Als Ansatzpunkt einer «Theologie nach Wittgenstein» steht der Grammatikbegriff Wittgensteins im zweiten Teil der Arbeit im Zentrum. Vor dem Hintergrund des Wittgensteinschen Theologieverständnisses (unter Einbeziehung der Versuche Phillips' und Lindbecks) beschreibt die Autorin, wie (...) eine «Theologie als Grammatik» von Wittgenstein her gedacht werden kann. (shrink)

In a brilliant series of essays, the distinguished philosopher D. Z. Phillips explores the alternatives for faith after foundationalism. A significant exploration of post-foundationalist thought in its own right, Faith After Foundationalism is also an important evaluation and critique of the theological implications of the views of Alvin Plantinga, Richard Rorty, George Lindbeck, and Peter Berger.Phillips’s own position is that one must resist the philosopher’s tendency to turn religious mystery into epistemological mystery. To understand how religious concepts are formed (...) is to understand that to speak of God as “beyond mortal telling” is not to confess a failure of language. God’s hiddenness is part of our concept of him—a reflection of the mystery of human life as it is lived. Faith After Foundationalism will be essential reading for philosophers of religion and theologians, as well as for students of contemporary epistemology. (shrink)

This article argues that the power of religion to shape experience presupposes the mobilization of religious identity through social opposition. This thesis is developed through a critique of George Lindbeck's The Nature of Doctrine. The article first examines Lindbeck's thesis that religion shapes experience in light of Talal Asad's critique of Geertz's concept of religion. It argues that in order to understand how ‘religion’ shapes experience we must look outside the immanent sphere of cultural‐religious meaning that Lindbeck, (...) following Geertz, identifies with ‘religion’. Religious authority ultimately derives from the recognition of a social group. Next, looking at the nature of doctrine in light of Kathryn Tanner's thesis that Christian identity is essentially relational, it argues that church doctrines function to mobilize group identity through social opposition. In this respect they resemble the mobilizing slogans of political discourse more than, as Lindbeck's theory proposes, the grammatical rules governing Wittgensteinian language games. (shrink)

In this essay I analyse and criticize George Lindbeck's treatment of truth and meaning in his book "The Nature of Doctrine." On truth, his theory is riddled with conceptual problems, fails as an adequate theoretical description of our pretheoretic intuition of truth, and is finally parasitic on this intuition. On meaning, his reduction of meaning (and sometimes truth) to use or usefulness leads him to an incorrect categorization of doctrines as (essentially) performative utterances and second-order, non-assertive discourse, rather than (...) as propositional attitude statements. Finally, I suggest the inadequacy of his treatment of truth and meaning redounds to the failure of his theory of religion and doctrine as a whole. (shrink)

The philosopher Michael Dummett has argued that a commitment to realism in a given domain must display the following marks: a conception of reality as determinate and mind-independent, the correspondence theory of truth, and a truth conditions theory of meaning. In his own and others' philosophy we see a series of arguments at work in the theory of meaning, in epistemology and in the philosophy of science which converge upon a common rejection of such realism. It is not surprising that (...) in such an intellectual climate we see a rise in non-realist theories of religion. Religious realities are here recognised as projected; theological truth is fixed by pragmatic criteria; and meaning is handled in terms of assertibility conditions. This rise of regulative religion has met with a variety of reactions ranging from a horror of being imprisoned by an alien philosophy to a delight that the true nature of religion has at last been brought into sharper focus. (shrink)

The problem of speaking about God arises from the presumed notion that God is utterly transcendent and is "wholly other" from human existence. Moreover, a profound sense of mystery is held to surround God's being. Even so, Not Beyond Language maintains that it is still possible for human beings to express and describe God in words--that language can bring genuine disclosure and understanding of the divine. However, given that religious language is problematic because inadequate, those who engage in speaking about (...) God must accept that the words they use cannot be pressed to yield precise definitions or complete explanations of the divine. The author proposes a nuanced approach to the use of religious language which revolves more around meaning and relevance of the discourse about divine reality, than objective claims about who or what God is. (shrink)

Lindbeck's difficulties with Lonergan's account of religion stem from his radical methodological option in which he draws on Wittgenstein. I revisit ‘the dialectic of methods,’ by examining children's mistakes. I use Lonergan's distinction between ordinary and originary meaningfulness to argue that in Wittgenstein's account of rule-following such mistakes highlight the publicity of norms in ordinary meaningfulness, but I show how alternatives can be cited in which originary meaningfulness is not obscured. I explain the core of Lonergan's foundational methodology and (...) show how for Lonergan the desire to understand is an exigence which, as retorsion indicates, is difficult to deny. I conclude that in his account of religion Lonergan has an answer to a question posed by Wittgenstein on the purpose of thinking. (shrink)

Lindbeck's difficulties with Lonergan's account of religion stem from his radical methodological option in which he draws on Wittgenstein. I revisit ‘the dialectic of methods,’ by examining children's mistakes. I use Lonergan's distinction between ordinary and originary meaningfulness to argue that in Wittgenstein's account of rule-following such mistakes highlight the publicity of norms in ordinary meaningfulness, but I show how alternatives can be cited in which originary meaningfulness is not obscured. I explain the core of Lonergan's foundational methodology and (...) show how for Lonergan the desire to understand is an exigence which, as retorsion indicates, is difficult to deny. I conclude that in his account of religion Lonergan has an answer to a question posed by Wittgenstein on the purpose of thinking. (shrink)

You ask if metaphysics is possible after modernity, or after Barth and Wittgenstein and Derrida and the critique of foundationalism? May I invite you, by way of response, to listen in on a conversation? It is a dialogue between what I will call a postcritical philosopher ("P") and a postcritical scriptural theologian —— I'll label the latter a "textualist" ("T"). What I mean by "postcritical" would be displayed as the pattern of inquiry traced by this dialogue. I take the term (...) "postcritical" from George Lindbeck, whose theological work is described by his commentators as more properly "textualist" rather than "philosophic." I believe my usage is, however, true to Lindbeck's discourse. This means that one of the arguments of this essay is that there is a mode of philosophic inquiry proper to the postcritical orientation in theology that we may associate with such Christian theologians as Hans Frei, etc., as well as Lindbeck. A second argument, offered indirectly, is that there is a family of Jewish thinkers whose work may also be labeled "postcritical" on the model of these Christian thinkers, and that this Jewish postcritical theology would also be displayed in dialogues between philosophic and textualist tendencies. A third argument is that, if we listen in on the philosophic side of any of these dialogues, we will hear a postcritical philosophy. By philosophy, I mean primarily logic, defined as an inquiry that examines problematic rules of reasoning and recommends testable ways of correcting them. Secondarily, philosophy includes metaphysics, defined as an inquiry that, for the sake of assuring people about the reliability of a given logic, constructs pictures of the world whose existence would warrant this logic. We need not assume either that logic and metaphysics can be conducted only in the manner of modern and scholastic foundationalism, or that non-foundationalist theology must be "textualist" in a manner that excludes any philosophic generalization. I will argue that there are, indeed, non-foundationalist ways of conceiving of both logical and metaphysical inquiry and that these ways contribute to the dialogic activity of postcritical inquiry. (shrink)

How is Jewish-Christian theological dialogue possible today? Assuming that the possibility of dialogue is not something to be envisioned by any individual thinker a priori, I offer here a study of two examples of successful Jewish-Christian theological dialogue: George Lindbeck's dialogue with Jewish sources and Michael Wyschogrod's dialogue with Christian sources. To garner some general lessons from these examples, I try to reconstruct the general conditions of dialogue which they appear to share. Discovering that the two dialogues may share (...) identifiable conditions of problem-solving, I label these "pragmatic" conditions, after Charles Peirce's definition of pragmatism as the claim that the purpose of rational inquiry is to solve the problems that stimulate it. I conclude that these are the conditions that may underlie theological dialogue among the specific group of Jewish and Christian theologians to which I believe Lindbeck and Wyschogrod belong. These conditions may underlie dialogues typical of other groups, too, but there is no way to know this a priori. (shrink)

There are several tensions present in George Lindbeckís postliberal theology. One of these is between realist intuitions and a non-epistemic account of truth, on the one hand, and a social- constructivist non-realism with regard to theological statements. Theology is relegated to the status of second-order discourse, while first order language comprises the practices, rituals, vocabulary of a religion. I am challenging this intermediary status of religion with the help of Donald Davidsonís critique of the dualism between scheme and content. Since (...) there isnít much to be made of the notion of epistemic intermediaries (either as ëcontentí or as ëschemeí) it does not make sense to continue to speak either in terms of realism or of non-realism. This clears the way for treating theology as cognitive. (shrink)

Taking a new look at the language of ‘religious experience’, the authors in this contribution take into review this aspect in the current theological discussion, and in the church pew, asking the question: Does George Lindbeck’s criticism of the experiential-expressive model of religion still have something to say to us? Firstly, Lindbeck is reviewed and recouped. Then, religious experience and its commodification are discussed, at the hand also of the heritage from Schleiermacher onwards on experience. Taking a position (...) within the post-modern, relativist, critical realist and pragmatist possibilities, a community-embedded sense of truth is concluded to without sacrificing the possibility of universalising claims. Is it possible, though, within the cultural reflex towards psychologised faith to retain a historically oriented depth? (shrink)

This book explores some issues on the borderland between moral philosophy and Christian theology. Particular attention is paid to the issues at stake between liberals and communitarians and the dispute between realists, non-realists and quasi-realists. In the course of the discussion the writings of Alasdair MacIntyre, George Lindbeck and Stanley Hauerwas are examined. While sympathetic to many of the typical features of post-liberalism, the argument is critical at selected points in seeking to defend realism and accommodate some aspects of (...) liberalism. The position that emerges is more neo-Barthian than post-liberal. In maintaining the distinctiveness of Christian ethics and community, the book also seeks to acknowledge common moral ground held by those within and without the church. (shrink)

This chapter sharpens the book’s criticism of exclusivist responsible to religious multiplicity, firstly through close critical attention to arguments which religious exclusivists provide, and secondly through the introduction of several new, formal arguments / dilemmas. Self-described ‘post-liberals’ like Paul Griffiths bid philosophers to accept exclusivist attitudes and beliefs as just one among other aspects of religious identity. They bid us to normalize the discourse Griffiths refers to as “polemical apologetics,” and to view its acceptance as the only viable form of (...) pluralism. This reasoning may seem initially plausible, but on closer examination his and other’s defence of the reasonableness of exclusivist responses to religious multiplicity fall apart. Informed by our study of luck-leaning theological explanations of religious difference and the counter-inductive thinking they exemplify, I argue that exclusivist responses to religious multiplicity are best explained by personal and group bias, and that a discourse between exclusivist authors or sects is beyond the pale of reasonable disagreement. Our study of descriptive (psychological) and prescriptive (religious) fideism in the first sections of Chapter Five suggests that we turn back to formal features of doxastic methods (i.e., of how people process), features that may be straightforwardly tested for in studies utilizing scales of religious orientation. These formal features allow us to better recognize not only the multiplicity of models of faith that religious adherents adhere to, but also that the relationship between forms of fideism is scalar: there is a spectrum of views running from rationalism to fideism, and at the fideistic end from moderate to strong forms of religious fideism. I further explain why developing tests and markers for a high degree of fideistic orientation is important to all those who study religion. The second half of the chapter turns to criticism or censure of exclusivist attitudes to religious multiplicity, in contrast to apologetic defenses of exclusivism. While we have examined the close connections between fideism and fundamentalism, and again between fundamentalism and exclusivism in earlier chapters, a sharper focus reveals an important but little-recognized distinction reflected in the literature: the distinction between religion-specific (or particularist) and mutualist exclusivism. The mutualist doesn’t talk just about the right of adherents of one specific religion to assert exclusivism, but the adherents of any and all “home” religions. I argue that some previously unrecognized problems for the reasonableness of exclusivist responses to religious multiplicity are brought to light when we make the distinction between the two basic ways to understand the claim that exclusivists are making. I put particularist (Barth, Lindbeck, Plantinga) and mutualist (Griffiths, Gellman, Margalit, D’Costa) defenses of exclusivism on the horns of a dilemma, and argue that despite the popularity it presently enjoys among post-liberal theologians, a close examination reveals that the very conceptual coherence of mutualist exclusivism is in serious doubt. (shrink)

In _Evidence and Transcendence_, Anne Inman critiques modern attempts to explain the knowability of God and points the way toward a religious epistemology that avoids their pitfalls. Christian apologetics faces two major challenges: the classic Enlightenment insistence on the need to provide evidence for anything that is put forward for belief; and the argument that all human knowledge is mediated by finite reality and thus no “knowledge” of a being interpreted as completely other than finite reality is possible. Modern Christian (...) apologists have tended to understand their task primarily, if not exclusively, in terms of one of these challenges. As examples of contemporary rationalist and postliberal approaches, Inman analyzes in depth the religious epistemologies of philosopher Richard Swinburne and theologians George Lindbeck and Ronald Theimann. She concludes that none of their positions is satisfactory, because none can uphold the notion of God’s transcendence while at the same time preserving a sound account of our claims to freedom and knowledge. The root cause of such failures, Inman argues, is an inadequate philosophy of God and of the relation of God and the finite world. Her exploration of the theologies of Karl Rahner and Friedrich Schleiermacher provides the material for the constructive work in this book. Against rationalist and postliberal epistemologies, Inman calls for an austere grounding of Christian faith in the claim that God is known in human conscious activity as such, as the “other” that grounds the finite. “An invaluable contribution to theology. It illuminates central issues of theology: the understanding of God, the demand for evidence, the rationality of Christian belief, and the relationship between philosophy and theology. It presents an excellent survey of several major theological approaches and offers a balanced proposal that seeks to incorporate the best from each approach. A must read for anyone interested in current approaches to God and Christian belief.” —_Francis Schüssler Fiorenza, Stillman Professor of Roman Catholic Theological Studies, Harvard Divinity School_ “_Evidence and Transcendence_ addresses a critically important topic: the need for evidence and the insistence on the mediation of knowledge. Anne Inman’s ambitious project makes an original contribution to the field by framing the problem very well and bringing in a variety of thinkers to analyze it. The book will be welcomed by students and scholars of systematic theology and philosophy of God.” —_Thomas M. Kelly, Creighton University_. (shrink)

Nel breve spazio del presente lavoro, intendo dar conto dell’“habitus teologico” che caratterizza lo stile filosofico di Alasdair MacIntyre : “religiously musical” è infatti — a mio avviso — il più insolito, e allo stesso tempo il più suadente, epiteto attribuito al filosofo scozzese dai teologi James Gustafson e Stanley Hauerwas. Tale habitus è altresì esaltato dalla diffusa propensione a saldare insieme — senza apparente soluzione di continuità — il modus philosophandi macintyriano e alcune recenti figure della teologia cristiana post–liberale (...) e post–moderna, di cui ci occuperemo in seguito: soprattutto la “teologia narrativa” di Hans Frei, George Lindbeck, et. al., ma anche la “radical orthodoxy” di John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock, Graham Ward, et. al. Sebbene MacIntyre non abbia replicato direttamente a simili tentativi di “appropriazione teologica” del suo pensiero, ritengo, comunque, che i tempi siano maturi per riconoscere — a lui e al “tomismo analitico” — un ruolo sui generis nell’evoluzione della tradizione aristotelico–tomista del XX secolo : ruolo distinto, ma non separato, rispetto a quello coevo di quanti — in ambito continentale — hanno tenacemente proseguito la ricerca filosofica e teologica nel solco di Tommaso, come ad esempio Marie–Dominique Chenu, Yves Congar, Cornelio Fabro, Etienne Gilson, Jacques Maritain, Edith Stein, et al. (shrink)

In Method, Meaning and Revelation, Ormerod examines the writings of Lonergan to ascertain his theology of revelation and to place this in the context of current theologies of revelation, Rahner, Pannenberg, and Lindbeck. Ormerod's synthesis of Lonergan's position is that of seeing revelation as the entry of divine meanings and values into human history. A valuable addition to the study of the work of Lonergan.

This paper argues that there are two camps in narrative theology, "pure" (e.g., Hans Frei) and "impure" (e.g., Paul Ricoeur) narrative theologians. Narrative theology, reflection on religious claims embedded in stories, is one of the most significant currents of late twentieth century thought. H. Richard Niebuhr initiated the conversation when he wrote in 1941 of "The Story of Our Lives." If his theme lay undeveloped for several decades, it burst onto the theological scene in the early 1970s. Demurrers followed, and (...) we now recognize the limits of the metaphor" narrative." Still, scholarly interest has not waned. Books and articles keep coming: on narrative in the Bible, narrative and theology, narrative and morality, narrative tradition, narrative practice, even narrative truth. The conversation, it appears, is as lively as ever. And if it has produced lasting contributions, it is because of the quality of the minds it has managed to attract: Paul Ricoeur, Hans Frei, David Tracy, George Lindbeck, Stanley Hauerwas, Julian Hartt, Sallie McFague, Johann Baptist Metz. (shrink)

Les religions sont-elles condamnées à s'opposer et à être source de conflits en raison de la diversité et du caractère souvent contradictoire de leurs doctrines? Lorsqu'elles sont missionnaires et prétendent détenir la vérité sur Dieu, le monde et l'homme, le caractère systématique de leurs énoncés théologiques et juridiques qui excluent les autres systèmes ne redouble-t-il pas ces conflits? Comment dans ces conditions le dialogue interreligieux pourrait-il aller au-delà des rencontres et du dialogue de vie? Peut-on penser du point de vue (...) théologique une ouverture à l'autre qui assoie l'unité entre les religions, leur communion et leur réconciliation au niveau de la doctrine sans obliger chacune à renoncer aux énoncés de sa foi?0Pour envisager ces questions fondamentales qui concernent tous les acteurs impliqués dans le dialogue interreligieux ou la théologie du pluralisme religieux, plusieurs théologiens ont interrogé George Lindbeck afin d'évaluer si les principes qu'il avance pour repenser l'oecuménisme sont transposables au niveau de l'interreligieux. En effet, conscient de l'enjeu des différences doctrinales entre les Églises chrétiennes, Lindbeck a questionné la nature d'une doctrine et a proposé un modèle post-libéral privilégiant la praxis, l'articulation entre l'action et le langage, la réactivation et la réadaptation constante des identités. Ces recherches montrent qu'en dépit de bien des limites de son modèle, on trouve chez le théologien luthérien une approche originale et féconde pour répondre à bien des défis contemporains. (shrink)