Texting while walking is a dangerous behavior that can lead to injury and even death. While several studies have examined the relationship between smartphone use and stress, to our knowledge no studies have yet investigated the relationship between stress and TWW. The objective of the present study was to investigate this relationship by examining the effects of stress on TWW, the effects of TWW on subsequent stress, and the effect of stress on multitasking performance. A total of 80 participants completed (...) two sequential tasks in a laboratory while they walked on a treadmill and responded to a biological motion stimulus imitating the movement of another pedestrian. In the unrestricted task, participants were given the choice to use their personal phones. In the controlled task, they carried a text conversation with a research assistant while they walked and responded to the stimulus. Stress was measured via questionnaire and saliva collection for measure of cortisol before and after each task. Results show that greater psychological stress and cortisol variations were associated with a greater number of phone uses during the unrestricted task. Greater phone use during the unrestricted task was associated with lower subsequent psychological stress in women and total time of phone use was correlated with subsequent cortisol levels. Stress measured before the controlled task had no effect on multitasking performance, but participants with moderate performance were those with the highest cortisol levels. Our results suggest that stress could be a precursor to TWW and that it could affect a pedestrian’s ability to stay safe when using their smartphone. (shrink)

Passive Brain-Computer interfaces (pBCIs) are a human-computer communication tool where the computer can detect from neurophysiological signals the current mental or emotional state of the user. The system can then adjust itself to guide the user towards a desired state. One challenge facing developers of pBCIs is that the system's parameters are generally set at the onset of the interaction and remain stable throughout, not adapting to potential changes over time such as fatigue. The goal of this paper is to (...) investigate the improvement of pBCIs with settings adjusted according to the information provided by a second neurophysiological signal. With the use of a second signal, making the system a hybrid pBCI, those parameters can be continuously adjusted with dynamic thresholding to respond to variations such as fatigue or learning. In this experiment, we hypothesize that the adaptive system with dynamic thresholding will improve perceived game experience and objective game performance compared to two other conditions: an adaptive system with single primary signal biocybernetic loop and a control non-adaptive game. A within-subject experiment was conducted with 16 participants using three versions of the game Tetris. Each participant plays 15 minutes of Tetris under three experimental conditions. The control condition is the traditional game of Tetris with a progressive increase in speed. The second condition is a cognitive load only biocybernetic loop with the parameters presented in Ewing et al. (2016). The third condition is our proposed biocybernetic loop using dynamic threshold selection. Electroencephalography was used as the primary signal and automatic facial expression analysis as the secondary signal. Our results show that, contrary to our expectations, the adaptive systems did not improve the participants' experience as participants had more negative affect from the BCI conditions than in the control condition. We endeavored to develop a system that improved upon the authentic version of the Tetris game, however, our proposed adaptive system neither improved players’ perceived experience, nor their objective performance. Nevertheless, this experience can inform developers of hybrid passive BCIs on a novel way to employ various neurophysiological features simultaneously. (shrink)

Le posé-sol, Dans mes installations, touche à l'origine du mouvement qui me porte. Si je puis rêver un détail achevé, c'est bien celui de ce délicat contact. Mâture : le touché Elle pèse et appuie, mais sans bruire Un touché sans blesser Un posé, mais léger De bambous, infondés Non encastrés, enfoncés, enterrés La surface n'est ni creusée, ni troublée Le mat est creux Sa trace est — moins qu'un disque — un anneau A sa disparition, sur le gazon, ce (...) seul signe Griffe d'un visiteur fugace - Résidence numérique — François Villais. (shrink)

A defence of the 'pragmatic' theory of anaphora (which stresses the analogy between anaphora and deixis) against an argument put forward by Gareth Evans.

A discussion of Frege's views concerning the meaning of 'I' and his distinction between the 'I' of soliloquy and the 'I' of conversation.

The issues addressed in philosophical papers on quotation generally concern only a particular type of quotation, which I call ‘closed quotation’. The other main type, ‘open quotation’, is ignored, and this neglect leads to bad theorizing. Not only is a general theory of quotation out of reach: the specific phenomenon of closed quotation itself cannot be properly understood if it is not appropriately situated within the kind to which it belongs. Once the distinction between open and closed quotation has been (...) drawn and properly appreciated, it is tempting to consider that only closed quotation is relevant to semantics. Open quotation is more a matter of pragmatics: it is a matter of what people do with words, rather than a matter of content and truth-conditions. In this way one can provide the beginning of a justification for the neglect of open quotation in current semantic theorizing. There is some truth in this view, yet the phenomenon of ‘mixed quotation’, investigated at length in this paper, is interesting precisely because it shows that things are not so simple. Important issues concerning the interface between semantics and pragmatics will thus be raised. (shrink)

Review of Insensitive Semantics, by H. Cappelen and E. Lepore.

Hierdie boek is n inleiding tot moderne denkrigtings wat alle fasette van die staat betref. Dit verduidelik die verbintenis tussen die huidige proses van staatsvorming in Suid-Afrika en die tradisionele faktore wat dit elders in die w reld aangehelp het.

In a recent BioEssays paper [W. F. Martin, BioEssays 2017, 39, 1700115], William Martin sharply criticizes evolutionary interpretations that involve lateral gene transfer into eukaryotic genomes. Most published examples of LGTs in eukaryotes, he suggests, are in fact contaminants, ancestral genes that have been lost from other extant lineages, or the result of artefactual phylogenetic inferences. Martin argues that, except for transfers that occurred from endosymbiotic organelles, eukaryote LGT is insignificant. Here, in reviewing this field, we seek to correct some (...) of the misconceptions presented therein with regard to the evidence for LGT in eukaryotes. A recent paper dismisses claims of lateral gene transfer into eukaryotic genomes. We counter the arguments made in that paper and discuss the extensive evidence for LGT in eukaryotes. (shrink)

What is it to share the same concept? The question is an important one since sharing the same concept explains our ability to non-accidentally coordinate on the same topic over time and between individuals. Moreover, concept identity grounds key logical relations among thought contents such as samesaying, contradiction, validity, and entailment. Finally, an account of concept identity is crucial to explaining and justifying epistemic efforts to better understand the precise contents of our thoughts. The key question, then, is what psychological (...) and social facts could play these roles? Elsewhere, we have argued for a specific relational model of concept identity, the connectedness model (e.g. Schroeter 2012, Schroeter and Schroeter 2014, 2015). Our aim in this chapter is to further explain the motivations behind that account, to address worries about transitivity and vagueness, and to contrast our approach with closely related accounts of concept identity developed by François Recanati and Simon Prosser. -/- What’s distinctive of our approach is that we seek to vindicate the first-person epistemic perspective of concept users. Concepts, on our account, play a crucial normative role in setting regulative ideals for the representational practices in which individual subjects participate. This focus on the normative role of concepts – as opposed to a purely causal explanatory role – motivates our approach to concept identity and our toleration of vagueness and borderline cases. (shrink)

Author Marc James Léger responds to Elias Khoury’s review of his book _Bernie Bros Gone Woke: Class, Identity, Neoliberalism_, which was published in volume 17 of the _International Journal of __Žižek Studies_. While Léger accepts the one mistake in the book that Khoury correctly identifies, he takes issue with nearly everything else in Khoury’s review, which involves fallacies, misquotations, reductive arguments, misdirection and failure to mention anything that would contradict Khoury’s generally false claims. Léger describes the possibility of academic foul (...) play in the context of a public secret directed against him and that he has been struggling against since the late 1990s. (shrink)

BackgroundYouth are increasingly aware of the negative effects of climate change on the planet and human health, but this knowledge can often come with significant affective responses, such as psychological distress, anger, or despair. Experiencing major “negative” emotions, like worry, guilt, and hopelessness in anticipation of climate change has been identified with the term eco-anxiety. Emerging literature focuses on adults' experience; however, little is known about the ways in which children and youth experience eco-anxiety.ObjectivesThe aim of this review was to: (...) identify the available evidence on the topic of eco-anxiety in children, clarify the mental health consequences brought by the awareness of climate change in this population, and identify knowledge gaps in the literature and considerations for future research.MethodsGiven that the research on the topic of eco-anxiety in children is limited, that there are very few randomized controlled trials, and that the goal is not to analyze individual studies in-depth, a scoping review was used. Keywords pertaining to the themes of eco-anxiety, climate change and children were used as search terms in five databases. Journal articles using qualitative and quantitative methods, as well as gray literature were examined by two independent reviewers. A descriptive-analytical method was used to chart the data that emerged from the literature. Eighteen articles were considered in the final analysis.ResultsEvidence confirms that children experience affective responses and eco-anxiety in reaction to then awareness of climate change. Mental health outcomes include depression, anxiety, and extreme emotions like sadness, anger, and fear. Youth from vulnerable communities, like indigenous communities, or those who have strong ties to the land are often identified as being emotionally impacted by climate change. The literature analyzed also describes how children and youth are coping with eco-anxiety, including maladaptive and adaptive responses. Preliminary considerations for parents, teachers and educators, mental health care providers, school systems, adults and people of power include adding age-appropriate climate education to the school curriculum, considering youth's emotions, and promoting healthy coping through empowerment. Important gaps exist in the definition of eco-anxiety in youth, as various characterizations of this emerging concept are found across articles. (shrink)

Cette méditation en première personne tourne autour de l’antique et grande question : Que faire? et s’appuie sur le texte des Essais de Montaigne. La question du « faire » y est interrogée et relancée par-delà le « produire » et la production qui, aujourd’hui, plus que jamais, risquent de l’emporter et de l’engloutir tandis qu’est brossé un portrait chinois (taoïste!) de celui dont Nietzsche disait si bien : « c’est à lui que je m’attacherais si l’on me donnait pour (...) tâche de faire de cette terre une patrie ». (shrink)

Du temps du confinement et de la dévastation qui affectent si profondément notre sens de la temporalité, la philosophie aurait-elle quelque chose à dire? L’occasion en tout cas de relire quelques textes d’Aristote et d’Augustin et d’essayer de nous orienter dans Être et temps de Heidegger en nous interrogeant sur l’expression avoir le temps au moment où, pour chacun, s’amenuise le temps qui reste.

Comment écrire sur Bataille sans s’épargner et se mettre soi-même hors jeu sinon en entrant dans le jeu de ce qu’on appellera, en un sens majeur, la parodie ? Dans ce retour, dans cet éternel retour des pensées et des mots – dans cette déconstruction créatrice qu’est la réécriture – Bataille n’y entra-t-il pas lui même en écrivant sur Nietzsche ?

In this paper I compare my account of IEM to another one, the Simple View, according to which a judgment is IEM just in case its grounds do not include an identity. The Simple View does not say why no identity assumption is needed to ground the singular judgment in the IEM cases; my account is meant to complement it by providing an answer to that question. According to my account, the judgments that are IEM are based on a certain (...) experience, and what they are about is pre-determined by the mode of that experience, by the type of experience it is, in a way that leaves no room for an alternative. (shrink)

This enlarged edition of Mario Bunge's Dictionary of Philosophy is a superb reference work for both students and professional philosophers.

In 1754 Véron Duverger de Forbonnais published the two books of his Élemens du Commerce which, as the Avertissement stated, collected together some of the chapters the author had written for the Encyclopédie. The second edition was published in the same year with ‘quelques légères additions’. In 1765, Carlos Lemaur, a French engineer who worked in Spain from 1750 until 1785, translated the text into Spanish. The probable reason for the translation was the importance that Forbonnais attributed to the construction (...) of roads and infrastructure that enabled improved communication between the markets and an increased distribution of money to the small cities located far from big centres. The translator worked as an engineer in a number of remarkable constructions designed to enhance logistics in Spain, and shared Forbonnais’ perspective on Enlightenment principles. My analysis will focus on the translation strategies adopted by Lemaur, and on the adaptation of the source text to the target culture, following the approach taken by Theo Hermans. I will examine the equivalence between the source text and the translation, which was the result of the functionality and dynamism of the translator's technique. (shrink)

The prevalent view in animal ethics is that speciesism is wrong: we should weigh the interests of humans and non-humans equally. Shelly Kagan has recently questioned this claim, defending speciesism against Peter Singer’s seminal argument based on the principle of equal consideration of interests. This critique is most charitably construed as a dilemma. The principle of equal consideration can be interpreted in either of two ways. While it faces counterexamples on the first reading, it makes Singer’s argument question-begging on the (...) second. In response, Singer has grasped the first horn of this dilemma and tried to accommodate Kagan’s apparent counterexamples. In my opinion, this attempt is unpersuasive: the principle of equal consideration is inconsistent with common-sense intuitions on Kagan’s cases. Worse, Singer’s argument begs the question anyway. It therefore faces two serious objections. This is not to say that there is nothing wrong with speciesism, however. In the second half of the paper, I propose another, better argument against speciesism, which I argue is immune to both objections. According to this other argument, speciesism is wrong because it involves discriminating on the basis of a merely biological property. (shrink)

Animal ethicists have been debating the morality of speciesism for over forty years. Despite rather persuasive arguments against this form of discrimination, many philosophers continue to assign humans a higher moral status than nonhuman animals. The primary source of evidence for this position is our intuition that humans’ interests matter more than the similar interests of other animals. And it must be acknowledged that this intuition is both powerful and widespread. But should we trust it for all that? The present (...) paper defends a negative answer to that question, based on a debunking argument. The intuitive belief that humans matter more than other animals is unjustified because it results from an epistemically defective process. It is largely shaped by tribalism, our tendency to favor ingroup members as opposed to outgroup members. And this influence is distortive for two reasons. First, tribalism evolved for reasons unrelated to moral truths; hence, it would at best produce true moral beliefs accidentally. Second, tribalism generates a vast quantity of false moral beliefs, starting with racist beliefs. Once this intuition is discarded, little evidence remains that speciesism is morally acceptable. (shrink)

This paper examines some of the moral panics around hyperactive children, the construction of Attention Deficit-Hyperactivity Disorder, and the lure of Ritalin in turning kids identified as “at risk” into successful, productive individuals. Through a historicization of the child as a psychiatric subject, we try to demonstrate Ritalin's part in the uneven development of modern trends towards the pathologization of everyday life, a developing continuum between normality and abnormality, and an emphasis on the malleability of children and the importance of (...) environment in their upbringing. We conclude that Ritalin is a part of modernity's project of turning people into individuals—in this case, a kind of US transcendence fantasy—which, along with discourses and institutions, promises to transform young subjects and biocosmetically alter their futures. (shrink)

Until recently, the ocular surface is thought by many to be sterile and devoid of living microbes. It is now becoming clear that this may not be the case. Recent and sophisticated PCR analyses have shown that microbial DNA‐based “signatures” are present within various ethnic, geographic, and contact lens wearing communities. Furthermore, using a mouse model of ocular surface disease, we have shown that the microbe, Corynebacterium mastitidis (C. mast), can stably colonize the ocular mucosa and that a causal relationship (...) exists between ocular C. mast colonization and beneficial local immunity. While this constitutes proof‐of‐concept that a bona fide ocular microbiome that tunes immunity can exist at the ocular surface, there remain numerous unanswered questions to be addressed before microbiome‐modulating therapies may be successfully developed. Here, the authors will briefly outline what is currently known about the local ocular microbiome as well as microbiomes associated with other sites, and how those sites may play a role in ocular surface immunity. Understanding how commensal microbes affect the ocular surface immune homeostasis has the potential revolutionize how we think about treating ocular surface disease. (shrink)

Debates in radical cultural praxis reflect conflicting viewpoints on the left. While one might assume that the enormity of the challenges facing the left would lead to a common front this is rarely the case as communist and horizontalist viewpoints clash. This essay addresses new possibilities for thinking about avant-garde art and vanguard politics by considering the recent debates between Slavoj Žižek and McKenzie Wark and further, by looking at the limits of the cultural revolution as we have known it (...) since the late 1960s. The impasse of Occupy Wall Street, Strike Debt, and similar protest movements has led Žižek to shift from a view of the party in terms of the Lacanain Discourse of the Analysis to more general reflections on the Discourse of the Master. The consequent critiques of Žižek that are examined are shown to have evaded his ideas, failing to advance radical cultural praxis beyond postmodernism. On the other hand, one finds that Žižek’s renewal of radical thought is challenging others on the progressive left to do the same. (shrink)

Recent scholarship on the idea of communism leads to questions of organization and what Michael Hardt refers to as “the problem of leadership.” Beyond the critical assessment of the crises of contemporary capitalism, and beyond the existing social democratic solutions, a psychoanalytically-informed Žižekian notion of the party offers solutions to ultra-left theories of networked horizontalism as well as versions of the party that repeat the problems of communist modernism. If the context of climate change, economic inequality and political authoritarianism require (...) that we reconsider “what is to be done” about global neoliberal capitalism, then the idea of the political party, understood in terms of Jacques Lacan’s Discourse of the Analyst, can provisionally occupy the place of a neutral knowledge of the objective demands of history that is premised on the experiences of the emancipatory left. Like the Analyst, the party does not stand in for or represent the people. However, through the fetishistic aspect of representation, as opposed to materially or ontologically-grounded guarantees for political power, the party registers a minimal difference from a technocratic University Discourse and an ultra-left Discourse of the Hysteric. (shrink)

In May 1968, Gilles Deleuze was an established philosopher teaching at the innovative Vincennes University, just outside of Paris. Félix Guattari was a political militant and the director of an unusual psychiatric clinic at La Borde. Their meeting was quite unlikely, yet the two were introduced in an arranged encounter of epic consequence. From that moment on, Deleuze and Guattari engaged in a surprising, productive partnership, collaborating on several groundbreaking works, including _Anti-Oedipus_, _What Is Philosophy?_ and _A Thousand Plateaus_. (...) class='Hi'>François Dosse, a prominent French intellectual known for his work on the Annales School, structuralism, and biographies of the pivotal intellectuals Paul Ricoeur, Pierre Chaunu, and Michel de Certeau, examines the prolific if improbable relationship between two men of distinct and differing sensibilities. Drawing on unpublished archives and hundreds of personal interviews, Dosse elucidates a collaboration that lasted more than two decades, underscoring the role that family and history—particularly the turbulent time of May 1968—play in their monumental work. He also takes the measure of Deleuze and Guattari's posthumous fortunes and the impact of their thought on intellectual, academic, and professional circles. (shrink)

SummaryIn this paper I discuss two influential views in the philosophy of mind: the two‐component picture draws a distinction between ‘narrow content’ and ‘broad content’, while radical externalism denies that there is such a thing as narrow content. I argue that ‘narrow content’ is ambiguous, and that the two views can be reconciled. Instead of considering that there is only one question and three possible answers corresponding to Cartesian internalism, the two‐component picture, and radical externalism respectively, I show that there (...) are two distinct questions: ‘Are mental contents internal to the individual?’ and, ‘Are mental contents analysable in two‐components?’ Both questions can be given a positive or a negative answer, in such a way that there are four, rather than three, possible views to be distinguished. The extra view whose possibility emerges in this framework is that which mixes radical externalism with the two‐component picture. It agrees with radical externalism that there cannot be ‘solipsistic’ contents: content is not an intrinsic property of the states of an individual organism, but a relational property. It also agrees with the two‐component picture, on a certain interpretation: the broad content of a psychological state depends upon what actually causes that state, but the narrow content depends only on what normally causes this type of state to occur. In the last section of the paper, I deal with internal representation which seem to be independent even of the normal environment. I show that such contents are themselves independent of the normal environment only in a relative sense: they are locally independent of the normal environment, yet still depend on it via the concepts to which they are connected in the concept system. (shrink)

SummaryIn this paper I discuss two influential views in the philosophy of mind: the two‐component picture draws a distinction between ‘narrow content’ and ‘broad content’, while radical externalism denies that there is such a thing as narrow content. I argue that ‘narrow content’ is ambiguous, and that the two views can be reconciled. Instead of considering that there is only one question and three possible answers corresponding to Cartesian internalism, the two‐component picture, and radical externalism respectively, I show that there (...) are two distinct questions: ‘Are mental contents internal to the individual?’ and, ‘Are mental contents analysable in two‐components?’ Both questions can be given a positive or a negative answer, in such a way that there are four, rather than three, possible views to be distinguished. The extra view whose possibility emerges in this framework is that which mixes radical externalism with the two‐component picture. It agrees with radical externalism that there cannot be ‘solipsistic’ contents: content is not an intrinsic property of the states of an individual organism, but a relational property. It also agrees with the two‐component picture, on a certain interpretation: the broad content of a psychological state depends upon what actually causes that state, but the narrow content depends only on what normally causes this type of state to occur. In the last section of the paper, I deal with internal representation which seem to be independent even of the normal environment. I show that such contents are themselves independent of the normal environment only in a relative sense: they are locally independent of the normal environment, yet still depend on it via the concepts to which they are connected in the concept system. (shrink)

-- t. 2. Origines médiévales de la science.

Moral error theorists face the so-called “now-what problem”: what should we do with our moral judgments from a prudential point of view if these judgments are uniformly false? On top of abolitionism and conservationism, which respectively advise us to get rid of our moral judgments and to keep them, three revisionary solutions have been proposed in the literature: expressivism, naturalism, and fictionalism. In this paper, I argue that expressivism and naturalism do not constitute genuine alternatives to abolitionism, of which they (...) are in the end mere variants—and, even less conveniently, variants that are conform to the very spirit of abolitionism as formulated by its proponents. The main version of fictionalism, by contrast, provides us with a recommendation to which abolitionists cannot consistently subscribe. This leaves us with only one revisionary solution to the now-what problem. (shrink)

In this highly insightful analysis of Western and Chinese concepts of efficacy, François Jullien subtly delves into the metaphysical preconceptions of the two civilizations to account for diverging patterns of action in warfare, politics, and diplomacy. He shows how Western and Chinese strategies work in several domains (the battlefield, for example) and analyzes two resulting acts of war. The Chinese strategist manipulates his own troops and the enemy to win a battle without waging war and to bring about victory (...) effortlessly. Efficacity in China is thus conceived of in terms of transformation (as opposed to action) and manipulation, making it closer to what is understood as efficacy in the West. Jullien’s brilliant interpretations of an array of recondite texts are key to understanding our own conceptions of action, time, and reality in this foray into the world of Chinese thought. In its clear and penetrating characterization of two contrasting views of reality from a heretofore unexplored perspective, A Treatise on Efficacy will be of central importance in the intellectual debate between East and West. (shrink)