The communication of first person thoughts

In Petr Kotatko & John Biro (eds.), Frege: Sense and Reference One Hundred Years Later. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 95-102 (1995)
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Abstract

A discussion of Frege's views concerning the meaning of 'I' and his distinction between the 'I' of soliloquy and the 'I' of conversation.

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Francois Recanati
Institut Jean Nicod

Citations of this work

Mental Files.François Récanati - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
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Quasi-Singular Propositions: The Semantics of Belief Reports.François Récanati & Mark Crimmins - 1995 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 69 (1):175 - 209.
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