The question I wish to raise, which in my opinion is fundamental, concerns the conception Mr. Blanshard has of what, in his words, he is "trying to do in his philosophizing." Wittgenstein declared, in emphatic disagreement with many philosophers, that philosophical problems "are, of course, not empirical problems," which implies that philosophical views are not factual, not accounts of the existence or nature of things and occurrences. And this conception, which is so evidently in collision with Mr. Blanshard's, seems to (...) me correct. There are various ways of supporting it, as regards the doctrine that all relations are internal, but I call attention to one consideration which seems to me to carry great weight: that the metaphysician who holds this view cannot cite any conceivable case of things being externally related. The relations with which everyone is familiar are all alike counted as internal: no relation which we can bring forward would be accepted as constituting a counter instance. Nor can anyone who holds the view that all relations are internal describe a relation which he could count as being external. For in addition to such relations as north of and a mile from, what could be cited? A philosopher who declares that north of penetrates the being of its terms, and thus is as much an internal relation as entails, debars himself from saying what it would be like for things to be externally related. This shows that his view has, in principle, no falsification. For this reason I shall suppose that the proposition, "All things are internally related," is put forward as a priori, since it has what is the most characteristic feature of an a priori proposition, namely, that one cannot say what a confuting instance would be like. The following comments will be in part directed toward showing that the view that things are internally related is not about how things are related, but primarily the comments will be directed toward bringing out the linguistic character of the view. (shrink)

The problem of necessity remains one of the central issues in modern philosophy. The authors of this volume, originally published in 1985, developed a new approach to the problem, which focusses on the logical grammar of necessary propositions. This volume gathers their seminal essays on the problem of necessity, together with new material at the original time publication.

The problem of necessity remains one of the central issues in modern philosophy. The authors of this volume, originally published in 1985, developed a new approach to the problem, which focusses on the logical grammar of necessary propositions. This volume gathers their seminal essays on the problem of necessity, together with new material at the original time publication.

Philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein had an enormous influence on twentieth-century philosophy even though only one of his works, the famous Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, was published in his lifetime. Beyond this publication the impact of his thought was mainly conveyed to a small circle of students through his lectures at Cambridge University. Fortunately, many of his ideas have survived in both the dictations that were subsequently published, and the notes taken by his students, among them Alice Ambrose and the late Margaret (...) Macdonald, from 1932 to 1935. These notes, now edited by Professor Ambrose, are here published, and they shed much light on Wittgenstein's philosophical development. Among the topics considered are the meaning of a word and its relation to common usage, rules of grammar and their relation to fact, the grammar of first person statements, language games, and the nature of philosophy. This volume is indispensable to any serious discussion of Wittgenstein's work. (shrink)

G e moore and ludwig wittgenstein were very different teachers, both because of their differing views on the nature and aims of philosophical investigation, and because of the differences in the way they thought, their educational backgrounds, and the kind of persons they were. this paper records experiences of the two philosophers as teachers and as personalities, and indicates the features of their teaching which stemmed from their views and from their personalities.

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

I did something yesterday, so it was true a thousand years ago that I was going to do it. Could I help it, then? Professor Ryle shows that I could; he also shows that a dilemma like this starts with a slender base - the question whether statements in the future can be true - and opens out before one notices it into questions like 'is it worthwhile learning to swim?' In his second demonstration Professor Ryle proves that Achilles will (...) after all overtake his tortoise and will not have to pursue it through all eternity. These two puzzles were classic if academic examples of the dilemmas Professor Ryle is concerned with. Common sense tells me that I can to some extent control my life; should I then, faced with an apparently logical argument for fatalism, reject common sense? Again, because I enjoy or dislike things, are all my actions due to the seeking of pleasure and the avoidance of pain? Because my eyes and ears tell me one set of things about the world and science tels me another, am I to think my senses less reliable or accurate than science? Professor Ryle's aim is to arbitrate between these pairs of theories which compete for our allegiance, and to show that the either/or which they seem to insist on is a false dilemma. It may lead to mere muddle, or to a more subtle confusion; either way these tugs-of-war between conflicting theories may bring the ordinary man either to confused or wrong action or to intellectual apathy. (shrink)

The essays collected in this volume, appearing between the years 1939 and 1958, include all of the late Professor J. L. Austin's published papers, and in addition two unpublished papers, ‘The Meaning of a Word’ and ‘Unfair to Facts’, as well as an unscripted talk, ‘Performative Utterances’, given in the Third Programme of the B.B.C. in 1956. The editors, J. O. Urmson and G. J. Warnock, have performed a real service in making these papers available in one volume; for the (...) cumulative impact of the method Austin pursued in doing philosophy, and the questions this method raises, can be felt and appreciated more fully when a considerable assemblage of illustrative papers is brought together. The debt Austin owes to the tradition to which G. E. Moore and Wittgenstein contributed is quite clear, and the divergences from them are equally clear. In reviewing the contents of the ten articles in this volume I shall try to single out what is unique about his contribution, in particular what features of his procedure, falling as it does under the general classification ‘linguistic analysis’, were so distinctive as to win for it the attention accorded to a new departure. (shrink)