I first present a conception of the relata involved in the dialogic relation. I and thou are persons endowed with a first-person perspective and concepts through which they can represent themselves as distinct of anyone or anything else. Then I briefly discuss the epistemology and metaphysics of persons as agents. I adopt a realist view against any epistemological projects denying (or feigning to deny) the existence of the second person. Then I expose the complementary view of the secondperson perspective, which (...) close the gap between the first- and third-person perspectives. I expose some historical milestones recognizing the importance of the second-person perspective in dialogue. After an examination of the conditions for the use of mental terms, I propose an analysis of dialogue in sequences of illocutionary acts, stressing the importance of perlocutionary plans. Any dialogue worthy of the name involves mutual understanding. In my reconstruction, I use distinctions proposed by Burge, Dummett and Austin. There are degrees of understanding in dialogue. In the highest degree, we have a real “meeting of minds.” Finally, a genuine dialogue is different from a fictional dialogue. I also suggest, taking side with Descartes, that the interaction man-machine cannot be classified as genuine dialogue. (shrink)

The account of the death of Patroklos occupies a strategic position in the narrative economy of the Iliad: before this event, Achilles has withdrawn from combat out of indignation against Agamemnon; afterwards, his anger turns against Hector, whom he holds responsible for his friend's death. Achilles returns to battle and kills Hector in an act of vengeance that, as we have known from the beginning of the poem, will lead to his own demise, which is not actually recounted in the (...) Iliad. This episode stands out because it is atypical both in the contents of the narration and in the means of expression used (what are generally termed “formulas”). I will give some examples of these oddities and then propose an interpretation. Here is the text, in the translation by Richmond Lattimore:So long as the sun was climbing still to the middle heaven, so long the thrown weapons of both took hold, and men dropped under them; but when the sun had gone to the time for unyoking of cattle, then beyond their very destiny the Achaians were stronger and dragged the hero Kebriones from under the weapons and the clamour of the Trojans, and stripped the armour from his shoulders. And Patroklos charged with evil intention in on the Trojans. Three times he charged in with the force of the running war god, screaming a terrible cry, and three times he cut down nine men; but as for the fourth time he swept in, like something greater than human, there, Patroklos, the end of your life was shown forth, since Phoibos came against you there in the strong encounter dangerously, nor did Patroklos see him as he moved through the battle, and shrouded in a deep mist came in against him and stood behind him, and struck his back and his broad shoulders with a flat stroke of the hand so that his eyes spun. Phoibos Apollo now struck away from his head the helmet four-horned and hollow-eyed, and under the feet of the horses it rolled clattering, and the plumes above it were defiled by blood and dust. Before this time it had not been permitted to defile in the dust this great helmet crested in horse-hair; rather it guarded the hear and the gracious brow a godlike man, Achilleus; but now Zeus gave it over to Hektor to wear on his head, Hektor whose own death was close to him. And in his hands was splintered all the huge, great, heavy, iron-shod, far-shadowing spear, and away from his shoulders dropped to the ground the shield with its shield sling and its tassels. The lord Apollo, son of Zeus, broke the corselet upon him. Disaster caught his wits, and his shining body went nerveless. He stood stupidly, and from close behind his back a Dardanian man hit him between the shoulders with a sharp javelin: Euphorbos, son of Pantho(s, who surpassed all men of his own age with the throwing spear, and in horsemanship and the speed of his feet. He had already brought down twenty men from their horses since first coming, with his chariot and his learning in warfare. He first hit you with a thrown spear, o rider Patroklos, nor broke you, but ran away again, snatching out the ash spear from your body, and lost himself in the crowd, not enduring to face Patroklos, naked as he was, in close combat. (shrink)

I shall examine Quine’s conception of logic, of propositional attitudes, and of the unity of knowledge in order to show that there are some tensions in Quine’s system. I first propose a conception of the use or application of logic, stating that logic strictly speaking applies to intentional phenomena or to things that presuppose the existence of intentional phenomena. Then, I consider briefly Quine’s philosophy of logic and discuss some issues. In Quine’s philosophy, logic stays at the very center of (...) the web of our beliefs; it is central in science and ordinary knowledge as well. Then I examine Quine’s tendency to “quine” the mental, given his own maxim of minimum mutilation. Finally, I consider Quine’s thesis of the unity of knowledge, the thesis that there is continuity from ordinary to scientific knowledge. If I am right about the use of logic and the presence of the propositional attitude idiom in ordinary knowledge and social sciences and humanities, I think there is a problem of consistency in Quine’s system, and that Quine himself pointed to a part of the solution. (shrink)

In what follows, I present only part of a program that consists in developing a version of actualism as an adequate framework for the metaphysics of intentionality. I will try to accommodate in that framework suggestions found in Kripke’s works and some positions developed by Amie Thomasson. What should we change if we accept “fictional entities” in the domain of the actual world? Actualism is the thesis that everything that exists belongs to the domain of the actual world and that (...) there are no possibilia. I shall defend that there are abstract artefacts, like fictional characters, and institutions. My argument could be seen as a version of Moore’s paradox: it is paradoxical to say: “I made it, but I do not believe it exists”. Moreover, there are true sentences about them. I will examine what it means to include abstract artefacts in the domain of the actual world. I favour a use of “exist” that includes beings with no concrete occupation of tri-dimensional space; to exist, it is enough to have been introduced at some moment in history.artefacts, like fictional characters, exist in that sense. I argue that it is important to distinguish two perspectives in order to clarify the kind of knowledge we have of fictional characters. However, their existence presupposes a relation of dependence to a material basis and the mental activities of many people. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show that the plasticity of sense, the fact that tokens of the same type frequently express different Sinne, does not constitute a threat to human linguistic communication. The first part presents the phenomenon. I try to make clear that the appropriate notion of meaning for natural languages is not the one developed in logical semantics; meanings in natural languages are not fixed once and for all, stable. Consequently, What Is Said by an utterance (...) is not something determined exclusively by literal meaning. The second part shows that the plasticity of sense was known in the ideational theories of language, especially that of Arnauld & Nicole. The third part introduces the notions of Plan and Mindreading and show how they contribute to the success of communication.O objetivo deste artigo é mostrar que a plasticidade do sentido, o fato de que os exemplares de um tipo, freqüentemente, não expressam o mesmo Sinn, não constitui uma ameaça para a comunicação lingüística humana. A primeira parte apresenta o fenômeno da plasticidade do sentido. Tentarei mostrar que a noção de significado apropriada para as línguas naturais não é aquela desenvolvida na semântica lógica; o significado, nas línguas naturais, não é estável, fixado de uma vez por todas. Conseqüentemente, o que é dito em uma enunciação não é algo determinado exclusivamente pelo significado literal. A segunda parte mostra que a plasticidade do sentido era conhecida nas teorias ideacionais da linguagem, particularmente a de Arnauld & Nicole. A terceira parte introduz as noções de Plano e Leitura de mente e mostra como elas contribuem a explicar o sucesso da comunicação. (shrink)

Thomas Reid introduced the notion of social operation of mind in the theory of mind and language. Hhis friend James Gregory developed this notion and gave it a meaningful role in classical Uuniversal Grammar, especially in the General Theory of the Mmoods of Vverbs. Bbefore Reid and Gregory, the classical Philosophical Grammar presupposes, inter alia, that the mind is self-contained; in other words, that mental contents and operations are all independent from the natural and social environment. Ssome of these operations (...) have a modus/dictum structure corresponding, grosso modo, to the actual distinction between psychological mode and conceptual mental content, also analogous to the distinction between illocutionary force and propositional content, which is partially reflected in the system of verbal moods of natural languages. The famous Grammaire de Port-Royal already pointed to a serious limitation of this model. Arnauld & Lancelot wrote: “Oon ne se commande pas proprement à soi-même” (“Oone does not command properly to oneself”). I will try to show that Reid realized clearly that what we call today “individualism” does not allow us to characterize adequately the social aspects of language, and consequently headed for a different conception of the mind, an anti-individualist one. The notion of social operation of the mind is the cornerstone of that reform undertaken by Reid in the philosophy of mind. Furthermore, he and Gregory defended that natural languages were created especially to expresses those social aspects of language and mind. (shrink)

Martin's undertaking is thus a re-examination of what it is that metaphysics is seeking, what the problem is which is basically at issue. He has chosen to do this through an analysis of the emergence of the metaphysical problem in Greek thought--coincidentally a very fine piece of scholarship in Greek philosophy--interpreting the fundamental Greek insights and their significance for present-day advance in metaphysical thought. Here I shall be able to touch on only some of the most important points.

ONTOLOGY, as a special field of philosophical inquiry, has been considerably neglected in modern times, and it is thus not surprising that little attention has been paid to Descartes in respect of ontology, especially since he himself did not bring it into prominence in his writings. His not having done so is quite in line with his characteristic procedure, which was not to engage head-on the fundamental positions or presuppositions which he was disputing, but rather to distract attention from them (...) so as to secure an unantagonistic hearing for his own theories. I shall argue that Descartes had an ontology, which was not merely implicit, and that when we discern his ontology we can see his position in the basic areas—metaphysics, epistemology and methodology, philosophical psychology or theory of mind-to have been consistently determined by his ontology. (shrink)

My aim is to provide an analysis of cognitive experience from the point of view of philosophy of mind, by identifying and describing different components or features present in it. But different things are called ‘experience’ and some are more complex than other. I will first examine different uses of the word ‘experience’ to clear the way and to avoid cases of circularity. Then I try to restrict the investigation and introduce the mode and content of experience, and take BonJour’s (...) suggestion of what cognitive experience is as a starting point. In my view, the two main features of experience are Horizontal Intentionality and Vertical Intentionality. The first is the most striking and fundamental; it constitutes the continuity of experience. Vertical Intentionality selects objects of experience, so that our experience is always experience of something. In Perception, something is identified and recognized by the application of concepts. Attention is required, especially when we get involved in complicated operations or manipulations. Finally, the last feature is constituted by a huge set of dispositions, particularly abilities to keep track our thoughts and former experiences. Cognitive Experience in the full sense is the result of the interaction and mutual support of these features. (shrink)

My aim in this programmatic paper is to explore the relationship among three important notions: intentionality, disposition and artefact. There wouldn’t be artefacts without what I call “intentional work,” a sustained activity directed to the production of some good. I first present contextualism as a method. Then I use it to delimit the problematic concept ARTEFACT, with the intention to apply it to repertoires of mental dispositions that affect directly our personal identity. The unavoidable but loose criterion of human intervention (...) is used, at least to some degree. Attitudes are intentional states with conceptual content, and concepts are dispositions. We acquire concepts during our lives, sometimes unconsciously, sometimes explicitly through definition of some kind, and each cognitive agent has a unique repertoire of concepts and a unique idiolect as well. The idea that our mental representations are artefacts might sound strange at first sight, but I shall try to show that it makes full sense. Most of our mental dispositions –those provided with a conceptual content– are themselves artefacts. At the end, we are all different psychologically and culturally because our idiolects and repertoires of concepts are different. For a large part, what makes our species so special is an ongoing process through which homo sapiens makes itself what it is.Keywords: Intentionality, disposition, artefact, contextualism, repertoire. (shrink)

Je présente d’abord quelques notions de base de la sémantique philosophique, en particulier celles de signification linguistique, compré-hension linguistique, conditions de vérité, et “ce qui est dit”. La signi-fication linguistique ne doit pas être confondue avec “ce qui est dit” par l’énonciation littérale d’une phrase en contexte, cette dernière notion, centrale dans le contextualisme actuel, pouvant être reconstruite comme sémantique ou pragmatique selon le rôle que l’on fait jouer à la notion de signification du locuteur. J’examine ensuite de quelle façon (...) ces notions se combinent dans diverses approches ou “figures historiques”, en insistant sur la relation langage-pensée. La première est la théorie idéationnelle du langage, défendue par Arnauld et Locke. La seconde est la sémantique philosophique classique, qui se développe dans la première moitié du XXe siècle. La troisième est le contextualisme actuel, développé en parti-culier par Travis et Récanati. La comparaison révèle ceci: quant à la façon dont est reconstruite la notion de “ce qui est dit”: l’idéisme et le contex-tualisme s’accordent pour en faire une notion pragmatique, en opposition à la sémantique philosophique classique assortie de l’appareil gricéen.I first present a few basic notions of philosophical semantics, namely that of linguistic meaning, linguistic understanding, truth-con-ditions, and What Is Said. I try to show, like contextualists today urge us to, that the distinction between linguistic meaning and What Is Said by a literal utterance of a sentence in a context should not be blurred. The notion of What Is Said, of central importance for contextualism, can be construed as a semantic or a pragmatic notion according to the role played by the notion of speaker meaning in one’s favorite theory. Then I present an overview of three historical approaches in the history of the sciences of language, focusing on the language-thought relation and showing how these notions combine differently. The first is the ideational theory of language, defended by Arnauld and Locke. The sec-ond is the classical philosophical semantics developed in the first half of XXth century. The third is today’s contextualism, developed mainly by Travis and Recanati. Here is what the comparison reveals: the “way of ideas” and contextualism agree that the notion of What Is Said should be construed as a pragmatic notion, in opposition to classical philosophical semantics cum the Gricean apparatus. (shrink)

Russellian or singular propositions are very useful in semantics to specify "what has been said" by a literal and serious utterance of a sentence containing a proper name, an indexical or a demonstrative, or for modeling demonstrative thoughts. I3ased on an example given by S. Guttenplan, I construct a case showing that if our only option for modeling demonstrative thoughts is a singular proposition à la Russell, we run the risk of admitting infallible empirical (existential) beliefs. I defend the principle (...) of the fallibility of our (first order) representations by appealing to Perry's notion of a relational mode of presentation that allows us to generalize the proposition which is the content of the perceptual belief in cases of hallucination or misidentification, so that there is no "immunity to error through misidentification" in the province of demonstrative thought. (shrink)

C'est dans leur théorie générale des modes verbaux que les grammairiens philosophes classiques ont essayé de rendre compte de ce que nous appelons aujourd'hui les « aspects illocutoires de la signification », et de formuler les principes d'une sémantique des énoncés non déclaratifs. Je voudrais montrer, dans cette étude, ce qui fait l'originalité de la position adoptée par les grammairiens philosophes dans le cadre de leur théorie « idéationnelle » du langage : tout en reconnaissant la nécessité de recourir à (...) des critères formels pour identifier un mode particulier dans une langue particulière, ils estimaient que les peuples auraient pu, s'ils l'avaient jugé utile, marquer et distinguer formellement toute la variété des types d'illocution par des flexions verbales caractéristiques. Je distingue deux approches dans la théorie générale des modes verbaux de la Grammaire Générale classique : l'une est réductionniste, parce qu'elle réduit toutes nos énonciations à des expressions de jugements ; l'autre conçoit les modes comme des marqueurs d'actes de pensée. La première rappelle les tentatives de ceux qui, comme D. Lewis et D. Davidson, cherchent à interpréter les énoncés non déclaratifs en leur assignant des conditions de vérité ; la seconde s'apparente plutôt à la Théorie des Actes de Discours ou à l'approche proposée par E. Stenius. La première partie de cette étude présente, en s'inspirant de la méthodologie de I. Lakatos, la Grammaire Générale classique comme un programme de recherche scientifique. La seconde partie présente les deux approches mentionnées et examine leurs dévelop- pements respectifs.The Grammairiens philosophes of the classical period {circa 1660-1800) tried to accommodate, in their general theory of the moods of verbs, what we call today the " illocutionary aspects of meaning ", and to set the principles of a semantics for non-declarative sentences. I would like to show in this study in what consists the distinctive character of the approach proposed by the grammairiens philosophes in the framework of their " ideational " theory of language : they accept the necessity of formal criteria to identify a particular mood in a particular language, but they also held up the following position : the nations could have, if they had found it useful, marked and distinguished formally all the variety of illocution types by the use of characteristic verbal inflexions. I distinguish two approaches in the general theory of the verbal moods of classical Universal Grammar : one of them is reductionist, because it analyses all kinds of illocution as an expression of a judgment ; the other one conceives the moods as markers of the acts of the mind. The first one recalls the approach of those who, like D. Lewis and D. Davidson, try to interprète non-declarative sentences by assigning them truth- conditions ; and the second one bears more resemblances with the Theory of Speech Acts, or with the position defended by E. Stenius. The first part of this study exposes the framework of the classical Universal Grammar as a scientific research programme, following the methodology of I. Lakatos. The second part deals with the two approaches just mentioned and examine their respective developments. (shrink)

Martin's undertaking is thus a re-examination of what it is that metaphysics is seeking, what the problem is which is basically at issue. He has chosen to do this through an analysis of the emergence of the metaphysical problem in Greek thought--coincidentally a very fine piece of scholarship in Greek philosophy--interpreting the fundamental Greek insights and their significance for present-day advance in metaphysical thought. Here I shall be able to touch on only some of the most important points.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.1 (2001) 146-149 [Access article in PDF] Gianluca Mori. Bayle philosophe. Paris: Champion, 1999. Pp. 416. Paper, N.P. Stefano Brogi. Teologia senza verità: Bayle contro i "rationaux." Milan: FrancoAngeli, 1998. Pp. 306. Paper, N.P. Why do professional philosophers spend so much time on Descartes and so little time on Pierre Bayle, when Bayle was clearly the better philosopher? I hope that the real (...) answer is not that Bayle wrote too much that is too hard to survey and synthesize, whereas Descartes wrote short works that are easy to teach to undergraduates. Of course, part of any answer will turn on what is meant by "the better philosopher," and [End Page 146] we will return to this issue. If the two books reviewed here get the attention they deserve, Bayle may begin to get more of the attention he deserves.Bayle is well-known for his attacks on Pierre Jurieu, but less well-known are his fights with the 'rationalist' theologian-philosophers Jean LeClerc, Jacques Bernard, and Isaac Jaquelot. They reveal that Bayle was not the automatic supporter of "Enlightenment" of later legend. Stefano Brogi explores these attacks in three of Bayle's last works, the Continuation of the Diverse Thoughts on the Comet (1705; very different from the Diverse Thoughts on the Comet of 1683), Response to Questions of a Provincial (1704-1707), and Conversations between Maxime and Thémiste (1707). Regrettably, none of these—nor any of the works of LeClerc, Bernard, and Jaquelot—have been translated. Greater attention to Descartes may derive from the excellent translations of his work, contrasted with the absence of translations of much of Bayle.Brogi begins with Bayle's reconstruction of "Pyrrho's theology." Faith, in Bayle's hands, is almost completely non-cognitive, accepting the Scripture without understanding it. Rationality, to Bayle, is a second Penelope, unraveling all that it makes. Then Brogi explores what Bayle could have meant by praising Simonides, the ancient Greek who, asked to define God, always asked for more time. He also reviews Bayle's views on euhemerism and the theory of impostorship, and cannot believe Bayle's pretended unawareness of some of the implications of his arguments.The third section, "Ethics against religion," tackles the paradox that Bayle fiercely attacked reason and the argument from consensus for the existence of God, but then invoked reason and consensus as proof of moral claims. In ethics, Bayle's skepticism evaporates. That leads to the further paradox that his rigorous moral evaluation of religion leads to atheism. The ostensible argument is that pagan religions have such immoral gods that it is better not to believe in them; the implication is that the same goes for Judeo-Christianity.It all comes together in Brogi's discussion of "Theology without morality." In his controversies with LeClerc about Origenism (universal salvation) and evil, Bayle brings out the dubious moral consequences of both Origenism and Augustinianism. There is no rational way of saving God's goodness. Then Bayle simply declares his faith in revelation. LeClerc thinks this is bad faith, but he ends up relying on blind faith. Jaquelot argues that God's glory requires the world as it is, but when Bayle asks what glory could come from human suffering, Jaquelot also takes refuge in the inscrutability of God. If anyone thinks these were insignificant controversies, remember that they provoked Leibniz's Theodicy (1710). Austin Farrar once pronounced, exignorantia, that Bayle was "hopelessly confused" ("Introduction," Routledge edition of Leibniz's Theodicy, 1951; now Open Court edition, 35), but Leibniz knew better.Gianluca Mori's book ranges far more widely than Brogi's. It is the best all-around book on Bayle's philosophy in twenty years. Mori begins with a chapter on interpretation, pointing out that everything that Leo Strauss said about encoded language can be found in Bayle. Using Bayle's own claims about such artifices to interpret his work, he explores the writer's ironies, dissimulation, self-censorship, and implied meanings. The interior thoughts of Bayle are unreachable... (shrink)

In this book I have attempted to give an account of some of the most im­ portant of Whitehead's philosophical writings - his writings on the philoso­ phy of science as well as his metaphysics. I have tried to show that although there are novelties in Whitehead's later philosophy there are also continuities with his earlier work in the philosophy of science. For a more detailed account of Whitehead's metaphysics, I would refer the reader to my book The Philosophy of (...) Whitehead (The Muirhead Library of Philosophy), Allen and Unwin, London 1959 (Collier Books, New York 1962). On the whole I believe my view of Whitehead in that work, at least as far as his metaphysics is concerned, is not materially different from that held in the present one, although there are some differences in emphasis and interpretation. I wish to thank the administrateur delegue of the Revue Internationale de Philosophie, Brussels; the publishers Allen and Unwin, London; and Sprin­ ger-Verlag, Heidelberg, for kindly giving me permission to publish amended versions of the following papers which I originally published with them: "Whitehead and the Idea of Equivalence" Revue Internationale de Philoso­ phie, No. 56-57, 1961, pp. 167-184; "The Relevance of "On Mathematical Concepts of the Material World" to Whitehead's Philosophy", in The Relevance of Whitehead. Ed. Ivor Leclerc (The Muirhead Library of Philo­ sophy) Allen and Unwin 1961, pp. 235-260; "Whitehead and the Philosophy of Time". Studium Generale. Springer-Verlag 1970, pp. (shrink)

In this paper I distinguish four methods of empirical inquiry in eighteenth century natural philosophy. In particular, I distinguish among what I call, the mathematical-experimental method; the method of experimental series; the method of inspecting ideas; the method of natural history. While such a list is not exhaustive of the methods of inquiry available, even so, focusing on these four methods will help in diagnosing a set of debates within what has come to be known as ‘empiricism’; throughout the eighteenth (...) century there was a methodological reaction against the hegemonic aspirations of mathematical natural philosophy associated with the authority of Newton.In particular, I argue that the methods of inspecting ideas and natural history remained attractive to ‘empiricist’ thinkers with reservations about aspects of Newtonianism. Moreover, I show that the language of experimentalism meant different things to researchers with different attitudes toward Newton’s legacy. In order to illustrate and make more precise these claims, I embed my taxonomic treatment of the four methods within a narrative in which I primarily focus on Colin Maclaurin, Isaac Newton, David Hume, and Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon. (shrink)

The long 19th century was a period of many developments and technical innovations in agriculture and animal biology, during which actors sought to incorporate new practices in light of new information. By the middle of the century, however, while heredity steadily became the dominant concept in animal husbandry, some policies related to livestock improvement in Brazil seemed to have been tailored following a climate-deterministic concept established in the mid-18th century by the French naturalist Georges-Louis Leclerc, the Comte de Buffon. (...) His theory of animal degeneration posited, among other things, the necessity of recurrent crossbreeding to preserve animal species living in nonnative environments from climate-induced degeneration. Although largely discredited by the early 19th century, the teachings of the French naturalist seem to have found supporters in a Brazilian program to modernize national agriculture through the application of the natural sciences. Herein I examine the revival of Buffon’s theories in that government-sponsored program to improve animal husbandry and breeding techniques, including actual applications of this theory in the real world. Ultimately, I argue that Buffon’s theory of degeneration was used to tailor public policies and funding for the improvement of domesticated animals in Brazil between 1856 and 1860. (shrink)

According to a classic periodization in the history of science, biological thought as it emerged in France from the last decades of the seventeenth century to the 1740s was strongly committed to the doctrine of the preexistence of germs. Nicolas Malebranche’s role in disseminating this paradigm, particularly in the milieu of the Académie Royale des Sciences during the years when Bernard Le Bouyer de Fontenelle was its secretary, has been studied in detail, especially by Jacques Roger. However, much less has (...) been said about the authors who argued against this doctrine prior to the appearance of the relevant pieces by Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis, Georges-Louis Leclerc, Comte de Buffon, and Denis Diderot. I aim to examine a series of French medical treatises and clandestine manuscripts that outlined a mechanist theory of epigenesis, between the end of the seventeenth century and the 1720s, to bring to light the strategies—often quite original—that allowed them to achieve this result. One interesting case is the heterodox readers of Malebranche, which use some of his own arguments (notably on the physiology of brain traces and the laws of nature) both against preexistence and to support epigenesis. I inquire into the historical worth of the positions defended by these authors as well as into the connections existing between the history of epigenesis and that of materialism in the early modern era. (shrink)

Posthumanist and New Materialist thought attempts to undo the supremacy and distinction of the human being through accounting for the agential capacities of the animal and material world. New Materialism in particular constructs a vision of a vital natural world in order to turn us away from humanism and toward a more holistic understanding of nature, and political actants. In this article, I argue that there can be a humanist new materialist position that sees the vitalism of the natural world (...) while maintaining the uniqueness of the human being. This position can be found in the natural science of the eighteenth century in the work of Georges-Louis LeClerc de Buffon and Charles Bonnet. Reminding ourselves of this alternative mode of thinking about a vital nature, and its vision of a self-regenerating human being in a vital and regenerative universe, is a path toward regenerating humanism itself in contemporary scholarship. (shrink)

Prior to the nineteenth century, those who are now regarded as scientists were referred to as natural philosophers. With empiricism, science was claimed to be a superior form of knowledge to philosophy, and natural philosophy was marginalized. This claim for science was challenged by defenders of natural philosophy, and this debate has continued up to the present. The vast majority of mainstream scientists are comfortable in the belief that through applying the scientific method, knowledge will continue to accumulate, and that (...) claims to knowledge outside science apart from practical affairs should not be taken seriously. This is referred to as scientism. It is incumbent on those who defend natural philosophy against scientism not only to expose the illusions and incoherence of scientism, but to show that natural philosophers can make justifiable claims to advancing knowledge. By focusing on a recent characterization and defense of natural philosophy along with a reconstruction of the history of natural philosophy, showing the nature and role of Schelling’s conception of dialectical thinking, I will attempt to identify natural philosophy as a coherent tradition of thought and defend it as something different from science and as essential to it, and essential to the broader culture and to civilization. (shrink)

Machiavelli, Niccolò, 1469-1527-Criticism and interpretation ; Political science-Translating.