First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

The problem of ‘individuals’ is an age-old philosophical concern, but from time to time in the history of thought it is a problem which becomes acute. In our day the far-reaching advances in science—in physics and chemistry, in biology and bio-chemistry, in neurology and psychology—have made the philosophical attention to the problem of ‘individuals’ a matter of urgency. Yet, with some notableexceptions, philosophers have so far been displaying singularly little interest in the problem.

There is a long tradition in Western philosophical theology of conceiving God as ‘a being’. It dates back to the Hellenistic period, more particularly to the conjunction of Greek philosophy and the Hebrew religion in Alexandria with Philo, and it became orthodox in the Christian tradition through Augustine. In our time most aspects of this religious tradition have been subjected to a salutary re-examination, but in this the concept of God as ‘a being’ has been relatively neglected. After such a (...) long acceptance of so fundamental a doctrine, it is liable largely to have sunk to the status of a presupposition, entailing a loss of intellectual awareness of what precisely it implies. Even where the Augustinian philosophical argument upon which this concept is based is recognized, as it has been in the long Neoplatonic tradition, it has come to appear as essentially self-evident and thus has not been subjected to fundamental critical examination. Significant of this is that even where the personalistic conception of God has been abandoned, e.g. by the idealist philosophy of the Absolute, the conception nevertheless persists of God as ‘a being’. (shrink)

One result of this, in the present case, is Mr. Alston's failure to appreciate the distinction between the "Principle of Internal Relatedness," the "Principle of Mutual Immanence," and the "Doctrine of Relativity," which he treats as simply equivalent ; and it is upon this equivalence that his entire case rests.

This set of problems first came to light with the Eleatic criticism of Pythagorean theory, and dramatically revealed their importance in the paradoxes of Zeno, which have retained their relevance down the ages, and play a significant role, as we shall see, in the thought of Whitehead. In antiquity Aristotle had attained the clearest realization of these problems. It was in terms of them that he analyzed and rejected the theory of Leukippos and Demokritos of atoms and the void, and (...) worked out his own alternative theory. In the Renaissance these problems became crucial again, especially in the thought of Bruno and Patrizzi. Leibniz saw them as the basic issue presented by the theories of the seventeenth century, and it was in terms of these problems that he made his examination of Descartes' doctrine of res extensa, of Gassendi's revival of Democritean atomism, as well as of Newton's doctrine of space. Insufficient attention to these problems had resulted in his contemporaries getting caught in what he referred to as the "labyrinth of the composition of the continuum"-adopting this phrase from the title of a book by Libertius Fromond which had been published in 1631. Leibniz believed himself to have found the Adriadne's thread out of the labyrinth in the conception of body, as well as of space and time, as phenomenal. In Kant's view this way out was tenable only with a considerable philosophical reconstruction, which he provided with his transcendental philosophy. (shrink)

The article is an analysis of influence of science on development of modern philosophy. In first phase, Ending with kant's pre-Critical work, Occurred elaboration of philosophical implications of new conception of nature developed by science upon basis of renaissance return to neoplatonism. In its second phase, From critical kant to this century, Philosophy, Separated from science, Has remained fundamentally neoplatonic. A third phase now beginning, In which philosophy is being compelled by radical scientific developments to return to inquiry into the (...) nature of the physical. This necessitates return to essentially aristotelian basis, With far-Reaching consequences for future course of philosophy. (shrink)

IN the inquiry into this topic it is desirable at the outset to enter into some linguistic examination, for this will facilitate, not only the avoidance of possible confusions because of the diversity of senses in which the word "good" is used, but also the recognition of where exactly lie the philosophical issues with respect to the "good.".

Martin's undertaking is thus a re-examination of what it is that metaphysics is seeking, what the problem is which is basically at issue. He has chosen to do this through an analysis of the emergence of the metaphysical problem in Greek thought--coincidentally a very fine piece of scholarship in Greek philosophy--interpreting the fundamental Greek insights and their significance for present-day advance in metaphysical thought. Here I shall be able to touch on only some of the most important points.

Martin's undertaking is thus a re-examination of what it is that metaphysics is seeking, what the problem is which is basically at issue. He has chosen to do this through an analysis of the emergence of the metaphysical problem in Greek thought--coincidentally a very fine piece of scholarship in Greek philosophy--interpreting the fundamental Greek insights and their significance for present-day advance in metaphysical thought. Here I shall be able to touch on only some of the most important points.

ONTOLOGY, as a special field of philosophical inquiry, has been considerably neglected in modern times, and it is thus not surprising that little attention has been paid to Descartes in respect of ontology, especially since he himself did not bring it into prominence in his writings. His not having done so is quite in line with his characteristic procedure, which was not to engage head-on the fundamental positions or presuppositions which he was disputing, but rather to distract attention from them (...) so as to secure an unantagonistic hearing for his own theories. I shall argue that Descartes had an ontology, which was not merely implicit, and that when we discern his ontology we can see his position in the basic areas—metaphysics, epistemology and methodology, philosophical psychology or theory of mind-to have been consistently determined by his ontology. (shrink)

Reissue from the classic Muirhead Library of Philosophy series (originally published between 1890s - 1970s).

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

It is toward this task that Mr. Nathaniel Lawrence has directed his effort in the work under review. "The present essay," he writes, "has a single goal: to provide a foundation from which Whitehead's Process and Reality can be profitably studied and sympathetically approached." The question of the correct or most fruitful approach to Process and Reality, Mr. Lawrence clearly appreciates, is a crucial one. This approach must be dependent upon what are the basic and essential problems and issues with (...) which the work is concerned. There are a number of rival views concerning this, none of which has yet been satisfactorily established. Mr. Lawrence's book is a detailed and scholarly exploration of the most plausible of these alternatives. The result--and this is one aspect of the considerable value of his work--is that we are now able to assess, far more effectively than formerly, the tenability of this particular view. (shrink)