This book focuses on African metaphysics and epistemology, and is an exercise in decoloniality. The authors describe their approach to "decoloniality" as an intellectual repudiation of coloniality, using the method of conversational thinking grounded in Ezumezu logic. Focusing specifically on both African metaphysics and African epistemology, the authors put forward theories formulated to stimulate fresh debates and extend the frontiers of learning in the field. They emphasize that this book is not a project in comparative philosophy, nor is it geared (...) towards making Africa/ns the object/subjects of philosophy. Rather, the book highlights and discusses philosophical insights that have been produced from the African perspective, which the authors argue must be further developed in order to achieve decoloniality in the field of philosophy more broadly. (shrink)

What is the constituent nature of God? Most scholars project the idea that God is an absolute, pure spirit devoid of matter. In this paper, I engage this position from the African philosophical place. First, I contend that the postulation that God is pure spirit stems from an ontological system known as dualism. This system bifurcates reality into spirit and matter and sees spirit as good, and matter as evil. Therefore, scholars who subscribe to this theory of dualism, posit that (...) God, the Supreme Being is the ultimate good that is, and is pure spirit. Secondly, I disagree with this position. Using the African theory of duality, I argue that everything that is has both spirit and matter, and that spirit and matter are good. Thus, God as an existent reality consists of spirit and matter. I will support my argument using Asouzu’s Ibuanyidanda ontology and Ijiomah’s Harmonious Monism, two African culture-inspired philosophical systems. In this paper, I employ conversationalism as my philosophical method. (shrink)

What is the constituent nature of God? Most scholars project the idea that God is an absolute, pure spirit devoid of matter. In this paper, I engage this position from the African philosophical place. First, I contend that the postulation that God is pure spirit stems from an ontological system known as dualism. This system bifurcates reality into spirit and matter and sees spirit as good, and matter as evil. Therefore, scholars who subscribe to this theory of dualism, posit that (...) God, the Supreme Being is the ultimate good that is, and is pure spirit. Secondly, I disagree with this position. Using the African theory of duality, I argue that everything that is has both spirit and matter, and that spirit and matter are good. Thus, God as an existent reality consists of spirit and matter. I will support my argument using Asouzu’s Ibuanyidanda ontology and Ijiomah’s Harmonious Monism, two African culture-inspired philosophical systems. In this paper, I employ conversationalism as my philosophical method. (shrink)

In this chapter, I contend that conversational philosophy has benefited immensely from the particularist and universalist projects in African philosophy tradition. As a result, it has been able to overcome the lapses inherent in particularism, universalism and eclecticism/pluralism. I argue that conversational philosophy is a more robust approach than the above-mentioned approaches, which have the problems of uniqueness, aping of Western philosophy and vagueness, respectively. I claim that conversational philosophy conceives African philosophy not as a tradition peculiar to a given (...) place, nor as one that apes Western tradition, nor as an eclectic discipline enshrouded in vagueness; but as a philosophical tradition that is both selectively particular and universal in nature in which ideas are conceptualized using linguistic resources from African worldviews but with universal applicability. I conclude by demonstrating that the mechanism of conversational philosophy is one that carefully approaches discourse on African philosophy by borrowing a leaf from both the particularist vision and the universalist vision in order to establish the discipline of African philosophy as a tradition in its own right. (shrink)

One of the most debated issues in African philosophy concerns the question of ethnophilosophy. While most Particularists equate it to African philosophy, the Universalists reject it as philosophy let alone being African philosophy. The rationale behind the second position is that ethnophilosophy is said to be descriptive and lacks argumentation, criticality, rigor and systematicity, which are the hallmarks of philosophy. What these two views revolve around is the question of the place of ethnophilosophy in African philosophy. Here, I focus on (...) two scholars who have sought to address this question. The first is Ada Agada, who opines that ethnophilosophy plays a foundational role to African philosophy. The other is Aribiah Attoe, who sees this view as a myth that must be done away with. In this paper, I show two things: first, I show that these two conflicting views arose due to both scholars’ failure to clarify their ideas of what makes a philosophy African. Second, I converse with Attoe on his critique of the foundational role of ethnophilosophy as a myth. Here, I contend that Attoe’s view is a misreading of Agada’s views and that Attoe’s position that critical rigor instead of ethnophilosophy should be the foundation of African philosophy is unfounded. My argument is that criticality is just one among other tools of philosophy; and a tool of philosophy cannot be its foundation. Keywords: Agada, African Philosophy, Attoe, criticality, ethnophilosophy, Ezin’ulo Ontology. (shrink)

One of the most debated issues in African philosophy concerns the question of ethnophilosophy. While most Particularists equate it to African philosophy, theUniversalists reject it as philosophy let alone being African philosophy. The rationale behind the second position is that ethnophilosophy is said to be descriptive and lacks argumentation, criticality, rigor and systematicity, which are the hallmarks of philosophy. What these two views revolve around is the question of the place of ethnophilosophy in African philosophy. Here, I focus on two (...) scholars who have sought to address this question. The first is Ada Agada, who opines that ethnophilosophy plays a foundational role to African philosophy. The other is Aribiah Attoe, who sees this view as a myth that must be done away with. In this paper, I show two things: first, I show that these two conflicting views arose due to both scholars’ failure to clarify their ideas of what makes a philosophy African. Second, I converse with Attoe on his critique of the foundational role of ethnophilosophy as a myth. Here, I contend that Attoe’s view is a misreading of Agada’s views and that Attoe’s position that critical rigor instead of ethnophilosophy should be the foundation of African philosophy is unfounded. My argument is that criticality is just one among other tools of philosophy; and a tool of philosophy cannot be its foundation. (shrink)

The reality and severity of the COVID-19 pandemic question God’s omnibenevolence and omnipotence. Two questions that stare us in the face are a) is God omnibenevolent given the current reality? b) is God omnipotent? This paper addresses these questions from the African place using the African theory of duality and its underlying logic, Ezumezu. We argue that the reality of the COVID-19 pandemic and its adverse effects (such as death, hardship and social isolation) do not negate God’s benevolence and powerfulness. (...) We assert that while the current reality cannot sustain a defence of the traditional theistic qualities of omnipotence and omnibenevolence, the notions of a powerful and benevolent God are not necessarily undermined by the reality of Covid-19. In the light of the African theory of duality and Ezumezu logic, we contend that the COVID-19 pandemic brings out the argument that inherent in God’s benevolence is wickedness and inherent in God’s powerfulness is weakness. (shrink)

This article investigates whether Conversational Thinking can suitably serve as a pedagogical approach for philosophy education in African schools (primary and secondary levels). We argue that there is a need to introduce and teach philosophy in schools in Africa. Additionally, we argue that it would be apropos to adopt a decolonial approach in developing such curricula, which, amongst others, could accommodate African approaches to philosophy. We contend that African homegrown frameworks, such as Conversational Thinking, can serve as appropriate decolonial strategies (...) for philosophy education in parts of Africa. Our reason is that the proposed approach can train the emerging young generations in Africa, not only to be critical, creative, and innovative, but also to view reality from African epistemic perspectives. This stems from the fact that Conversational Thinking is one strategy amongst others that can promote African culture-inspired approaches to knowledge that combine with basic thinking skills to offer truly African forms of epistemic liberation. (shrink)

In line with the tradition of the Conversational School of Philosophy, this essay provides a rare and unique space of discourse for the authors to converse about the place of the ‘ethno’ in African philosophy. This conversation is a revisit, a renewal of the key positions that have coloured the ethnophilosophy debate by the conversers who themselves are notable contributors to arguments for and against the importance of ethnophilosophy in the unfolding of African philosophy particularly in the last decade or (...) so. There are four key positions that have been argued for in the pages of this paper: ethnophilosophy is not African philosophy and it is useless and inimical to the growth of African philosophy and should thus be jettisoned – Matolino; ethnophilosophy is the foundation for African philosophy as it provides the raw materials for African philosophical discourse – Ogbonnaya and Agada; ethnophilosophy has some value for African philosophy but it is definitely not the foundation for genuine African philosophy the way criticism and rigours are – Attoe; and ethnophilosophy can be adequately conceived as African philosophy particularly in terms of its etymology as culture or race philosophy, dealing with a philosophical or critical reflections on, and exposition of, immanent principles in African thought – Mangena and Etieyibo. These conversers provide good arguments for the positions they hold, arguments that are of course, open for further interrogation. Two points can be concluded from the ethnophilosophy debate provided in this essay: the disparities in views among conversers it seems, stem ultimately from the understanding of ethnophilosophy that each converser holds, which varies from the notion of a method used at some point in the history of African philosophy, to an etymological understanding as culture philosophy; and the debate about ethnophilosophy in the spirit of any philosophical tradition remains a perennial one that is yet to be concluded. This essay certainly concretises what is on ground and paves the way for further discussions. Keywords: Ethno, African philosophy, Foundationalist, Universalist, Particularist, The common moral position, Ethnophilosophy. (shrink)

In line with the tradition of the Conversational School of Philosophy, this essay provides a rare and unique space of discourse for the authors to converse about the place of the ‘ethno’ in African philosophy. This conversation is a revisit, a renewal of the key positions that have coloured the ethnophilosophy debate by the conversers who themselves are notable contributors to arguments for and against the importance of ethnophilosophy in the unfolding of African philosophy particularly in the last decade or (...) so. There are four key positions that have been argued for in the pages of this paper: ethnophilosophy is not African philosophy and it is useless and inimical to the growth of African philosophy and should thus be jettisoned – Matolino; ethnophilosophy is the foundation for African philosophy as it provides the raw materials for African philosophical discourse – Ogbonnaya and Agada; ethnophilosophy has some value for African philosophy but it is definitely not the foundation for genuine African philosophy the way criticism and rigours are – Attoe; and ethnophilosophy can be adequately conceived as African philosophy particularly in terms of its etymology as culture or race philosophy, dealing with a philosophical or critical reflections on, and exposition of, immanent principles in African thought – Mangena and Etieyibo. These conversers provide good arguments for the positions they hold, arguments that are of course, open for further interrogation. Two points can be concluded from the ethnophilosophy debate provided in this essay: the disparities in views among conversers it seems, stem ultimately from the understanding of ethnophilosophy that each converser holds, which varies from the notion of a method used at some point in the history of African philosophy, to an etymological understanding as culture philosophy; and the debate about ethnophilosophy in the spirit of any philosophical tradition remains a perennial one that is yet to be concluded. This essay certainly concretises what is on ground and paves the way for further discussions. (shrink)

We reject the concept of a default option of withdrawal as proposed by Syltern and colleagues, and will outline here potential consequences on parental trust, particularly in historically marginali...

This work is of the view that the question of being is not only a problem in Western philosophy but also in African philosophy. It, therefore, posits that being is that which is and has both abstract and concrete aspect. The work arrives at this conclusion by critically analyzing and evaluating the views of some key African philosophers with respect to being. With this, it discovers that the way that these African philosophers have postulated the idea of being is in (...) the same manner like their Western philosophers whom they tried to criticize. This work tries to synthesize the notions of beings of these African philosophers in order to reach at a better understanding of being. This notion of being leans heavily on Asouzu’s ibuanyidanda ontology which does not bifurcate or polarize being, but harmonizes entities or realities that seem to be contrary or opposing in being. (shrink)

This critique engages with the article titled "The Question of the Nature of God from the African Place," by L. Uchenna OGBONNAYA published in Vol. 11. No.1 of this journal. This critique will employ a focused argumentative methodology to assess its contributions to the discourse on African Philosophy of Religion. It will also evaluate the article's strengths and weaknesses, emphasizing the articulation and support of key arguments. Through a systematic examination of the presented evidence and methodological approach, the (...) critique aims to shed light on the nuanced perspectives on the nature of God within the African philosophical framework. Further, this assessment will provide a comprehensive understanding of the article's implications for contemporary religious studies and intercultural dialogue, contributing to the ongoing conversation surrounding diverse perspectives on divinity. (shrink)

Berger and Miller argue that cultural competency as an educational tool for physicians-in-training fails to address structural inequality and systemic oppression. Instead, it focuses on “cul...

Francis Fukuyama postulated that there are two powerful forces at work in human history. One, he calls, ‘the logic of modern science’ and the other, ‘the struggle for recognition’. I agree with Fukuyama that human developmental progression is propelled by these twin principles. It is my position that these principles have been the drivers of geopolitics. In this paper, I argue that, in addition, knowledge production is a major factor in geopolitics and that the Euro-American worldview has occupied the place (...) of hegemony by reason of knowledge production. Africa has been denied having any form of epistemic tradition by the Euro-American world to sustain itself in the position of hegemony. In the era of Fourth Industrial Revolution, it will be antithetical for Africa to continue to adopt or consume technologies driven by Eurocentrism without projecting its contribution to the global space. Hence, using a critical hermeneutical approach, I contend that Africa needs to make a unique African contribution in the era of Fourth Industrial Revolution. It is Africa’s unique contribution that will guarantee Africa a place in geopolitics. (shrink)

This case raises questions of what “trauma-informed care” (TIC) means to the medical team caring for Maurice and how they embrace a TIC approach. There are established principles of trauma-informed...

In Working Virtue: Virtue Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems, leading figures in the fields of virtue ethics and ethics come together to present the first ...

We argue for the addition of trauma informed awareness, training, and skill in clinical ethics consultation by proposing a novel framework for Trauma Informed Ethics Consultation (TIEC). This approach expands on the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities (ASBH) framework for, and key insights from feminist approaches to, ethics consultation, and the literature on trauma informed care (TIC). TIEC keeps ethics consultation in line with the provision of TIC in other clinical settings. Most crucially, TIEC (like TIC) is systematically sensitive (...) to culture, history, difference, power, social exclusion, oppression, and marginalization. By engaging a neonatal intensive care ethics consult example, we define our TIEC approach and illustrate its application. Through TIEC we argue it is the role of ethics consultants to not only hold open moral spaces, but to furnish them in morally habitable ways for all stakeholders involved in the ethics consultation process, including patients, surrogates, and practitioners. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In Billionaires in World Politics Peter Hägel considers how the experience of wealth accumulation shapes billionaires’ political agency. To understand the agentic power billionaires exercise in world politics, he proposes that we should examine (1) personality traits that dispose people to participate in politics and (2) connections between capacity and intentions. In this paper, I argue that Hägel’s account of billionaires’ agency in world politics depends on two assumptions. The first is an implied meaning of world politics and the (...) second is the imagination that billionaires have equal access to social and cultural goods that guarantee meaningful engagement in world politics. I analyze these assumptions to argue that Hägel’s account of billionaire agency fails to take adequate notice of the dialectical relationship between corporate power and billionaire agency. A robust account of the agency of billionaires in world politics, I argue, must take this dialectical relationship as its foundation. (shrink)

Public deliberation, highly valued by many African societies, becomes the cornerstone of a new system of African political philosophy in this brilliant, highly original study. In Deliberative Agency, philosopher Uchenna Okeja offers a way to construct a new political center by building it around the ubiquitous African practice of public deliberation, a widely accepted means to resolve legal matters, reconcile feuding groups, and reestablish harmony. In cities, hometown associations and voluntary organizations carry out the task of fostering deliberation among (...) African groups for different reasons. In some instances, the deliberation aims to settle disputes. In others, the aim is to decide the best action to take to address unfortunate incidents such as death. Through a measured, comparative analysis, Deliberative Agency argues that the best way to reimagine and harness the idea of public deliberation, based on current experiences in Africa, is to see it as performance of agency. Building a new political center around the practice places agency at the core of a new political life in Africa. (shrink)

The central issue addressed in this paper is the demand for improvements in the space granted to African philosophy in African universities. I offer and elaborate on the most basic reasons for this demand, which includes amongst others: 1) the obsoleteness of the reasons given for the current trend of focusing on Western philosophy 2) the fact that very few teachers of philosophy in Africa are focused mainly or only on Western philosophy in their academic productivity and 3) the disparity (...) between the premises and the conclusion of the arguments in favour of the current pride of place accorded to Western philosophy. These, and some other reasons of practical and strategic nature, make the maintenance of the current status quo of philosophy education in African universities either hypocritical or unjustified in their unwillingness to face the challenge that the evidence on the ground points to. (shrink)

The invention of development as public discourse began with US President Truman’s 1949 speech that trumped up an illusion of global material prosperity based on a total restructuring of the ‘developing’ world on the model of development and material achievement of the West. Truman argued that this painful process was the only recipe for world prosperity. After decades of serious engagement on development discourse and multiple implementations of successive theories, the situation of the developing countries has not improved as rapidly (...) as expected. At the same time, the developed countries are experiencing various forms of financial crises. This article acknowledges the professionalisation of development discourse, and proposes humanising development discourse in Africa in the light of Christian anthropology. This vision of integral development promotes the common good on the basis of God’s love and respect for the uniqueness of the human person. (shrink)

Within health care systems, negative perceptions of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender persons have often translated into denial of services, denial of visitation rights to same‐sex partners, reluctance on the part of LGBT patients to share personal information, and failure of workers to assess and recognize the unique health care needs of these patients. Other bureaucratic forms of exclusion have included documents, forms, and policies that fail to acknowledge a patient's valued relationships because of, for example, a narrow definition of (...) “spouse,” “parent,” or “family.” Bureaucratic exclusion has taken a particularly prominent form in the U.S. military. Until its repeal and termination in 2011, the “Don't Ask, Don't Tell” policy had for eighteen years barred openly gay men and lesbians from serving in the military. Among the effects of DADT is a dearth of information about the number and needs of LGBT service members who transition to the Veterans Health Administration for health care at the end of their military service. The long‐standing social stigma against LGBT persons, the silence mandated by DADT, and the often unrecognized bias built into the fabric of bureaucratic systems make the task of creating a welcoming culture in the VHA urgent and challenging.The VHA has accepted a commitment to that task. Its Strategic Plan for fiscal years 2013 through 2018 stipulates that “[v]eterans will receive timely, high quality, personalized, safe, effective and equitable health care irrespective of geography, gender, race, age, culture or sexual orientation.” To achieve this goal, the VHA undertook a number of coordinated initiatives to create an environment and culture that is informed, welcoming, positive, and empowering for the LGBT veterans and families whom the agency serves. (shrink)

First published in 1962, contains the William James Lectures delivered at Harvard University in 1955. It sets out Austin's conclusions in the field to which he directed his main efforts for at least the last ten years of his life. Starting from an exhaustive examination of his already well- known distinction of performative utterances from statements, Austin here finally abandons that distinction, replacing it by a more general theory of 'illocutionary forces' of utterances which has important bearings on a wide (...) variety of philosophical problems. (shrink)

This paper responds to a proposal for an intersectional approach to the clinical encounter between patient and medical provider. We agree that an intersectional framework offers new insights and information in the clinical encounter. Intersectionality involves awareness of the physician-patient dynamic, and understanding the various privileges and disadvantages of all parties involved, at a micro and macroscopic level. Yet, this analysis alone is insufficient to aid in the clinical encounter and risks harm. We worry about a clinician making assumptions about (...) her patient’s race, gender, economic status, and how these influence the patient’s own views of her life and health. We argue that a narrative supplement is a necessary element of intersectional clinical encounters. Prioritizing patient narrative curtails assumptions, builds trust, and improves care. (shrink)

Mimesis as Make-Believe is important reading for everyone interested in the workings of representational art.

This book focuses on the normative questions raised by the postulation and declaration of a global ethic. Its scope covers the questions “why do we need a global ethic?”, “what kind of global ethic do we need and what sort of normative justification does it imply?” The book considers the imperative of global ethic to be plausible because it demands consistency in the application of the rule or standard of moral behavior.

We are grateful for the excellent and incisive commentaries on our paper “Trauma Informed Ethics Consultation” (Lanphier and Anani 2022). It is heartening to see most commentators agree with why cl...

Deliberation is central to the pursuit of justice in African societies. In practices variously called palaver, public meetings or village assembly, attempts are made to do justice through deliberation. When parties disagree during a deliberation, they may choose to go their separate ways, or they may agree to reconvene on another date. Notwithstanding the positive senses in which otherness may be conceived, in this paper I consider the challenge negative constructions of otherness pose for the pursuit of justice through deliberation. (...) Is justice realizable through deliberation, if one or more parties to the deliberation regard other parties as absolute others, that is, as embodiment of everything abhorrent or aberrant? Through consideration of two models of deliberation – irenic and agonistic deliberation – I argue that the nature of a deliberation determines whether it must contend with the challenge of otherness. More generally, I argue that deliberation as a means to justice ultimately is contin... (shrink)

Can a society, as a collective, be evaluated morally? In this paper, I attempt to answer this question against the background of the discourse on development. Specifically, I undertake three explorations. I begin with 1) discussion of the ways we attribute responsibility to collectives in relation to some problems associated with globalisation. This is followed by 2) consideration of some of the debates in philosophy regarding the nature and possibility of collective responsibility. Lastly, I examine 3) an attractive but underexplored (...) possibility in the growing literature on Ubuntu. On the basis of Ubuntu moral insights, I will attempt to defend the thesis that the collective responsibility of developing societies in relation development is grounded by the imperative to care about the humanity of other people. (shrink)

I aim in this paper to demonstrate the moral problem of expatriate employment in developing countries. To determine how best to construe the moral problem in this context, I first examine four arguments, namely, that in developing countries, expatriate employment is morally wrong because it 1) entrenches the injustice of wage discrimination; 2) produces undesirable outcomes; 3) disregards contextual aspirations and historical memory and 4) is a tool of external domination and control. I analyse these arguments to show that they (...) are insufficient frameworks for understanding the moral impropriety of expatriate employment in developing countries. To this end, I provide an outline of a plausible framework and argue that the moral problem of expatriate employment in this context is unequal or arbitrary distribution of power among employees. The moral wrong in this, I argue, consists in the failure to respect the universal moral equality of people. (shrink)