One of the twentieth century’s most brilliant and unconventional thinkers, Alexandre Kojève was a Russian émigré to France whose lectures on Hegel in the 1930s galvanized a generation of French intellectuals. Although Kojève wrote a great deal, he published very little in his lifetime, and so the ongoing rediscovery of his work continues to present new challenges to philosophy and political theory. Written in 1931 but left unfinished, Atheism is an erudite and open-ended exploration of profound questions (...) of estrangement, death, suicide, and the infinite that demonstrates the range and the provocative power of Kojève’s thought. Ranging across Heidegger, Buddhism, Christianity, German idealism, Russian literature, and mathematics, Kojève advances a novel argument about freedom and authority. He investigates the possibility that there is not any vantage point or source of authority—including philosophy, science, or God—that is outside or beyond politics and the world as we experience it. The question becomes whether atheism—or theism—is even a meaningful position since both affirmation and denial of God’s existence imply a knowledge that seems clearly outside our capacities. Masterfully translated by Jeff Love, this book offers a striking new perspective on Kojève’s work and its implications for theism, atheism, politics, and freedom. (shrink)

This text is the transcription, by Jamila Mascat and Sabina Tortorella, of an unpublished manuscript written by Alexandre Kojève in 1965, on the occasion of a conference held as part of the Theological Seminar of the Society of Jesus in Chantilly. In it, Kojève proposes a reformulation of some of his theses from the Introduction à la lecture de Hegel, taken up again in the Essai d’une histoire raisonnée de la philosophie païenne: on the one hand, he (...) identifies the fundamental features of philosophical discourse in relation to other forms of human discourse; on the other, he elaborates a dialectical and historical schema of the evolution of philosophy from its origins. The result is an examination of the status of philosophy, its relationship to time and eternity, and its possible overcoming by wisdom. (shrink)

This article aims to contextualize and problematize Alexandre Kojève’s Note on Hegel and Heidegger, written in 1936 and unpublished during his lifetime, which is being introduced into Russian-language scholarship. A translation of the Note is published in the same issue with the permission of the copyright holders. This paper provides a general introduction to Kojève’s philosophy, illustrates possible reading strategies for Kojève and the place of the translated Note in his corpus of the philosopher’s texts, and (...) describes the philosophical and historical circumstances of the text, namely that it was composed as an extension of a review on Tragische Existenz. Zur Philosophie Martin Heidegger by Alfred Delp written and published by Kojève that same year in Recherches philosophique. The article reconstructs the lines of reference that are essential to understanding Alexandre Kojève and provides a critique of certain statements. Finally, on the basis of an analysis of Kojève’s language, it offers a broader thesis on the epistemological problems of Kojève’s philosophy, the discovery of which led him to make a series of debatable statements in the philosophy of history (on the necessity for the philosopher to participate in the realization of the end of history), in anthropology (on the difference between people in their capacity to be philosophers or sages depending on a philosophical and religious attitude that is not entirely dependent on them), and in his decision to leave academia and turn to the ideological and diplomatic provision of economic integration of European states during the Cold War. (shrink)

On Tyranny is Leo Strauss's classic reading of Xenophon's dialogue, Hiero or Tyrannicus, in which the tyrant Hiero and the poet Simonides discuss the advantages and disadvantages of exercising tyranny. This edition includes a translation of the dialogue, a critique of the commentary by the French philosopher Alexandre Kojève, Strauss's restatement of his position in light of Kojève's comments, and finally, the complete Strauss-Kojève correspondence. "Through [Strauss's] interpretation Xenophon appears to us as no longer the somewhat (...) dull and flat author we know, but as a brilliant and subtle writer, an original and profound thinker. What is more, in interpreting this forgotten dialogue, Strauss lays bare great moral and political problems that are still ours." —Alexandre Kojève, Critique "On Tyranny is a complex and stimulating book with its 'parallel dialogue' made all the more striking since both participants take such unusual, highly provocative positions, and so force readers to face substantial problems in what are often wholly unfamiliar, even shocking ways." —Robert Pippin, History and Theory "Every political scientist who tries to disentangle himself from the contemporary confusion over the problems of tyranny will be much indebted to this study and inevitably use it as a starting point."—Eric Voegelin, The Review of Politics Leo Strauss (1899-1973) was the Robert Maynard Hutchins Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. (shrink)

Alexandre Koj_ve offers a systematic discussion of key themes such as right, justice, law, equality, and autonomy in which he presages our contemporary world of economic globalization and international law. Edited and translated by Bryan-Paul Frost, this is the authoritative English language edition of a monumental work in political philosophy.

En proposant une histoire de la philosophie pré-chrétienne, de Thalès aux Néo-platoniciens, Kojève développe en fait une réflexion sur la philosophie elle-même, et il jette les bases d'une reconstruction générale et systématique des discours philosophiques. Il affirme de manière provocatrice, d'une part que la philosophie, en tant que discours systématique, s'est achevée avec le Système du Savoir de Hegel, d'autre part qu'il est donc possible de présenter logiquement un développement cohérent (du point de vue historique également) de tous les (...) discours philosophiques décisifs. Il faut donc d'abord les présenter en fonction de la place logique qu'ils occupent ; Thalès, Parménide, Héraclite, Socrate, Platon, Aristote, les Sceptiques, les Stoïciens, Plotin et Proclus. (shrink)

Le noyau de cet ouvrage est formé par les notes prises de janvier 1933 à mai 1939 au cours que fit Alexandre Kojève à l'Ecole pratique des Hautes Etudes, sous le titre La philosophie religieuse de Hegel, et qui était en réalité une lecture commentée de la Phénoménologie de l'Esprit. Chaque année de cours est complétée par le résumé publié dans l'Annuaire de l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes. De plus, les trois premières leçons de l'année 1937-1938 et toute l'année (...) 1938-1939 sont données dans leur texte intégral. Enfin, en guise d'introduction, on trouvera la traduction commentée de la section A du chapitre IV de la Phénoménologie de l'Esprit, parue dans Mesures (14 janvier 1939). (shrink)

t. 1. Les présocratiques.--t. 2. Platon-Aristote.--t. 3. La philosophie hellénistique. Les n éo-platoniciens.

Dans les années 1930, la phénoménologie est en France un courant philosophique encore relativement confidentiel. Il est vrai que certains jeunes philosophes gravitant autour de la revue philosophique d’avant- garde Recherches philosophiques s’y intéressent (Kojève, Sartre, Gurwitsch, Merleau-Ponty, Aron, etc.), que l’œuvre publiée de Husserl est connue des grands universitaires français, et qu’elle fait l’objet de lectures théologiques (Héring, Chestov, etc.), mais cela est sans commune mesur...

Alexandre Kojève not infrequently claimed that he was a Stalinist. While many have ignored his claim, this paper takes it seriously and outlines several aspects of Kojève’s thought that allow one to read Kojève as a philosopher of Stalinism, as one who articulates the self-consciousness of Stalinism. These aspects are three: Kojève’s association of finality and freedom with the overcoming of individuality; the attempt to achieve finality and freedom so defined in the universal homogeneous state, (...) and the structure of that state as an essentially juridical administrative system. The question remains, however, whether one can truly overcome individuality while one is still living, the conflict between individual material existence and the overarching state being irresolvable. (shrink)

This article examines Alexandre Kojève’s attempts to differentiate between philosophy and wisdom; he thought of the two, particularly later on in his career, but also earlier, as distinctly non-identical. I trace Kojève’s transition from philosophy to practice in the corridors of power, motivated by his quest for wisdom, by outlining in some detail his stance on globalisation and the role of the state in his post-war dialogue with Carl Schmitt.

The brilliant Hegelian philosopher Alexandre Kojève remains among the most enigmatic figures of twentieth-century philosophy. Although a highly systematic thinker, he left no systematic presentation of his thought. His most important book deceptively appears to be a mere secondary work on Hegel's Phenomenology of the Spirit; most of his nine books and many essays have not even appeared in English. This brief, lucid study takes the reader to the heart of Kojève's philosophical project.

This is a review of Alexandre Kojève, The Religious Metaphysics of Vladimir Solovyov, translated by Ilya Merlin and Mikhail Pozdniakov, Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018. This slim book is a translation of Kojève’s essay “La métaphysique religieuse de Vladimir Soloviev,” which was first published in two installments in the Revue d’histoire et de philosophie religieuses in 1934. The French text was itself based on Kojève’s doctoral dissertation, Die religiöse Philosophie Wladimir Solowjews, defended in Heidelberg under the (...) direction of Karl Jaspers in 1926. The translation is accompanied by an introduction from the translators discussing translation issues. In this review, I summarize Kojève’s essay and editorialize on the issue of the principal influences on Solovyov’s metaphysics. Kojève claims that most of Solovyov’s metaphysics was in fact borrowed from Schelling and perhaps also to some extent from Jakob Böhme. If that is the case, then what is usually considered the prototypical Russian metaphysics is... not Russian. (shrink)

The article critically addresses Boris Groys’ interpretation of photographs by Alexandre Kojève. In 2012, Groys organized the exhibition After History: Alexandre Kojève as a Photographer, which intended to demonstrate the “posthistorical” dimension in Kojève’s artistic output. The article questions the adequacy of that perspective, given the somewhat tendentious curatorial presentation of the photos as showing an empty, dehumanized world. Considering the aesthetic and ontological aspects of the analysis of visual images that were central to (...) class='Hi'>Kojève’s brief account of his 1920 visit to the Borghese Gallery in Rome and to his 1936 article on Kandinsky, Groys’ reading of Kojève’s photographic stance is subject to revision. The notion of aura, as proposed by Walter Benjamin, is operative in a comparative treatment of the photos by Kojève and Eugène Atget. (shrink)

Nichols examines the major writings of Alexandre Kojève, and clarifies the character and brings to light the importance of his political philosophy. This is an essential assessment of Kojève which considers the works that preceded his turn to Hegel, seeks to articulate the character of his Hegelianism, and reflects in detail on the two different meanings that the end of history had in two different periods of his thought.

A translation from Russian into English of Alexandre Kojève's narrative article, taken from his diary of 1920. Foremost, it is a literary piece. Descartes and Buddha appear to the narrator as part of a reverie or dream. They engage in dialogue. Soon, their exchange and the dream itself are disrupted, and the narrative ends. An articulation of historical difference is not the aim of this piece; rather, the dialogue stages through its characters the procession of dialectical reasoning. As (...) a document of intellectual history, it shows clearly the beginnings in the manner of thought of the philosopher who later became so instrumental for the interpretation of Hegel in the 20th century. (shrink)

When discussing the French Revolution and Napoleon in his lectures from 1933 to 1939, Alexandre Kojève had in mind events in Russia. The clash between the “old order,” with its Masters, and the worker Slaves corresponded for him more with the images of pre-revolutionary Russian journalism than with the wigged aristocrats and French bourgeoisie of the end of the eighteenth century. In his lectures, behind Napoleon, as a revolutionary emperor, there exists, however secretly or openly, the figure of (...) Stalin, with his plans for the “building of socialism in one country,” his five-year plans, collectivization, and terror. Kojève’s ontology and anthropology diverge both from Hegel’s version of the two as well as with Marxism, incorporating different theses from Nietzsche and Heidegger’s Daseinanalytik. Just as in The Phenomenology of Spirit, terror plays a central role in interpreting revolution, yet it is conceived in the spirit of a Heideggerian “being-toward-death.” The relation between Master and Slave begins with fear of death, and it is destroyed by fear of death in the face of revolutionary terror. In this article, Kojève’s philosophy converges with the various versions of “left Nietzscheanism,” which were particularly widespread in prerevolutionary Russia. (shrink)

This paper analyzes Russian-French philosopher Alexandre Kojève’s dialogue with proponents of Hegelianism and phenomenology in Soviet Russia of the 1920–30s. Considering works by Dmytro Chyzhevsky, Ivan Ilyin, Gustav Shpet, and Alexandre Koyré, I retrace Hegelian themes in Kojève, focusing on the relation between method and time. I argue that original reflections on method played a key role in both Russian Hegelianism and Kojève’s work, from his famous Hegel lectures to the late fragments of a system. (...) As I demonstrate, Kojève’s Hegelianism was significantly shaped by his encounter with Ilyin’s 1918 commentary on Hegel, a detailed study of the relation between method and the experience of time. However, in Kojève’s hands, Ilyin’s ideas were transformed, some radicalized, others abandoned. Comparatively reading texts by these thinkers in their respective contexts, I resituate and evaluate claims that Hegel’s method was less dialectical than phenomenological. I finally argue that early Soviet Hegelian discourses not only shaped the trajectory of Kojève’s Hegelianism but also radically anticipated concepts of time in French post-structuralism. (shrink)

This article approaches the political mythology of authority through an interpretation of Kojève’s reading of authority. The deployment of discourses directed at the creation of common meanings arises as the central vector of authority, shared temporalities being the foremost among them. At a time of the presence of authority´s absence the master narratives that aim at bringing together that which remains apart cannot be recognized as unified. What remains as the realm of commonality is the very absence of authority.

SINCE ITS PUBLICATION IN 1981, Alexandre Kojève’s Esquisse d’une phénoménologie du droit has received scant scholarly attention. Except for a brief note on the book by Michael S. Roth, and some scattered references here and there, the Esquisse has been eclipsed by Kojève’s Introduction à la lecture de Hegel and by his debate and longstanding correspondence with Leo Strauss in the latter’s On Tyranny. Despite the renown of these two books, the Esquisse is an indispensable work in (...) Kojève’s corpus as a whole. As the Esquisse was written after the Introduction, Kojève clarifies and elaborates upon many of the themes he raises there; and as the Esquisse was written before his response to Strauss’s On Tyranny, it helps to set the stage for this important philosophic debate. Furthermore, the Esquisse is clearly Kojève’s most political work, by which I mean that he most fully articulates his understanding of right, justice, and the universal and homogeneous empire. The Esquisse is his only book that is not an interpretation of the history of philosophy and political thought, and this means that Kojève’s own voice can be heard with an unrivalled clarity: the oft asked question whether Kojève is sincerely attempting to interpret another philosopher or is masking his own thoughts behind that interpretation simply does not apply in this case. Although the title of the book states that it is a provisional exposition, the Esquisse is certainly more unified or systematic than the Introduction, and Kojève declared that he was satisfied with it. Lastly, the Esquisse is also a highly accessible work, not being as abstract as some of his other epistemological writings. All in all, it is extremely puzzling why political scientists have not paid more attention to the Esquisse. (shrink)

Eros Turannos analyzes the debates between Leo Strauss and Alexandre Kojeve. Their debates are contextualized through the Platonic notion of a likeness between the psuche and the polis . This classical notion is updated through contemporary philosopher William Desmond's linked accounts of eros and tyranny.

This paper analyzes Russian-French philosopher Alexandre Kojève’s dialogue with proponents of Hegelianism and phenomenology in Soviet Russia of the 1920–30s. Considering works by Dmytro Chyzhevsky, Ivan Ilyin, Gustav Shpet, and Alexandre Koyré, I retrace Hegelian themes in Kojève, focusing on the relation between method and time. I argue that original reflections on method played a key role in both Russian Hegelianism and Kojève’s work, from his famous Hegel lectures to the late fragments of a system. (...) As I demonstrate, Kojève’s Hegelianism was significantly shaped by his encounter with Ilyin’s 1918 commentary on Hegel, a detailed study of the relation between method and the experience of time. However, in Kojève’s hands, Ilyin’s ideas were transformed, some radicalized, others abandoned. Comparatively reading texts by these thinkers in their respective contexts, I resituate and evaluate claims that Hegel’s method was less dialectical than phenomenological. I finally argue that early Soviet Hegelian discourses not only shaped the trajectory of Kojève’s Hegelianism but also radically anticipated concepts of time in French post-structuralism. (shrink)

Given the evolution of his thought, Alexandre Kojève can be read as either the source of "engagement" and "existential Marxism" or as an early exponent of the postmodern rejection of the attempt to make meaning out of historical directionality in favor of an analysis of how history or discourse is constructed. Through the mid-1940s, Kojève was willing to accept that historical time is in the process of stopping, making it possible to grasp retrospectively, even anachronistically, the meaning (...) and direction of history. By the late 1940s, Kojève had come to believe that history is definitively over, and there is no substance left to fight about. Whereas the end of history had been a goal worth struggling for, it is now simply a description of reality in which there is nothing else to do, except perhaps to remind others that there is nothing left to do. (shrink)