The central thesis of Dooyeweerd's book concerns this point. He insists that a religiously neutral, objective, and in this sense scientific philosophy is an inner and intrinsic impossibility. Modern philosophy was mistaken in its assumption that it was merely "theoretical" and therefore as valid in its methods, principles, theories and doctrines as mathematics or physics. It was rather the result of a kind of religious conviction, although this conviction was humanistic and secular: a belief in the sovereignty of the human (...) personality and in the possibility of dominating nature by means of scientific discovery of nature's processes and energies. These quasi-religious convictions were not theoretically demonstrable but presuppositions guiding man's labour and all his cultural purposes and procedures. (shrink)

Faith versus knowledge and knowledge versus faith.--Experience and experiment in theology.--Religious and philosophical knowledge of God.--Doubt and certainty in the knowledge of God.--The historical character of the knowledge of God.

All subsequent English Hegelians were more or less influenced by this eloquent and enthusiastic manifesto. Although later generations were sometimes repulsed by the romanticism of this first adept, they were persuaded that something great could be recognized in Hegel's rational theology. Indeed, I believe this theology attracted the English mind much more than did Kant's critical and negative attitude towards "natural theology." Stirling with his alarming and agitating proselytism awakened Hegelianism on the foreign soil; indeed, he eventually created a new (...) type of English thought, more metaphysically minded than any of the typically English philosophers of modern times. (shrink)

This "New Critical Edition" of Hegel's writings fulfills all requirements of scholarly precision and completeness, in contrast to the so-called "Complete Edition" of Hegel's works, compiled by "an association of friends of the deceased" soon after the death of the great thinker, which was neither complete nor critical at all. In fact, the best authorities are unanimous in their agreement that this new edition is now the only one which should be used for scholarly purposes. There is also the Jubiläumsausgabe (...) which appeared on the occasion of the centenary of Hegel's death, but this was merely a photographic reprint of the edition by the "friends.". (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

The Critique of Pure Reason had appeared in 1781; almost twenty years later it was completely forgotten and pushed aside by a movement that though originating from Kant's important work nevertheless came to results extremely alien to the intentions and the spirit of its initiator. How could this happen in such a short time? How could the epoch-making philosophic revolution brought about by Kant take such a strange turn? How could the critical principles be perverted to such a degree as (...) to be completely denied eventually? (shrink)

This distinction between something that is really real and something that is seemingly real is of great moment. It cannot be dismissed, even though the Platonic scheme in its historical form might be abandoned. There are degrees of reality in the contents of our experience. Fleeting impressions or emotions are less real than the eternal nature of things. Errors, falsities, illusions and deceptions are less real than truth. And yet it cannot be denied that the fleeting impressions and emotions, that (...) even erroneous statements, illusions and deceptions have their own mode of reality, though on a lower level. (shrink)