Within this paper, we adopt a qualitative process approach to explore how ethical judgments are influenced by spatio-cultural meanings applied to social entrepreneurship in the context of Mozambique. We analyse how such ethical judgments emerged using data gathered over a 4 year period in Maputo. Our findings illustrate three modes used to inform ethical judgments: embracing, rejecting and integrating. These describe how ethical judgments transpire as participants evaluate social entrepreneurship drawing upon related global normative meanings and those embedded within the (...) local context. This analysis offers a critical contribution regarding how ethical judgments regarding social entrepreneurship evolve from negotiation and interaction within a context of multiple spatio-cultural meanings. (shrink)

Although Whitehead did not develop a general theory of meaning, his most systematic account of topics related to meaning is found in his discussion of ‘symbolic reference’,. But these latter discussions, however basic they might be in terms of Whitehead's theory of symbolism, yet constitute but a small part of the general theory of meaning that is implicit in the philosophy of organism, as a whole.

The article explores the influence of unproven specificity of pathogenesis manifested in clinical psychiatry and research. A selected literature review of studies attempting to identify a biological marker is presented. To date, the search for a biological marker to establish a psychiatric diagnosis has been unsuccessful. Clinical settings and programs are described which seem to be driven by psychological issues, one such example being the search for villains. Thus, specific assumptions about etiology affect therapy technique and treatment planning and may (...) be disadvantageous to patient care. Biological and psychological development in all of its phases is subject to a diverse range of perturbations, intrinsic as well as extrinsic. A flexible, balanced view is called for before specificity is extended to general theories, which, in turn, affect therapy and treatment settings. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that it is Foucault's conception of Socratic erotics, presented in Volume 2 of the History of Sexuality series, which provides him with a theoretical ground in the history of philosophy for his notions of political activism, power and government. Once we understand this, it is possible to understand how Foucault, rather than using a mixture of demonstration and diplomacy to oppose the idealization of revolution that eventually leads to the 'permanent revolution' of Stalinism, opposes it (...) instead with a philosophical mutation of it - that is, with a permanent revolution of his own: the ceaseless self-transgression of/by the citizen. It is a conception that is finally unsuccessful for grounding an effective theory of political activism. Key Words: activism • erotics • Foucault • freedom • government • Greece • politics • sexuality • Socrates • subject. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:A Report from the Front Lines: Conversations on Public Theology. A Festschrift in Honor of Robert Benne, and: Explorations in Christian Theology and Ethics: Essays in Conversation with Paul L. LehmannJeffrey P. GreenmanA Report from the Front Lines: Conversations on Public Theology. A Festschrift in Honor of Robert Benne Edited by Michael Shahan Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2009. 184 pp. $30.00.Explorations in Christian Theology and Ethics: Essays in (...) Conversation with Paul L. Lehmann Edited by Philip G. Ziegler and Michelle J. Bartel Farnham, Surrey, UK: Ashgate, 2009. 206 pp. $99.95.The volumes reviewed here each recognize an important thinker in Christian social ethics in America: Robert Benne, emeritus professor of religion at Roanoke College, a Lutheran social ethicist; and Paul L. Lehmann (1906–94), a Presbyterian who was an influential teacher associated with Princeton Theological Seminary, Harvard University Divinity School, and Union Theological Seminary in New York.The first volume honors Benne’s seventieth birthday. His major writings include The Ethic of Democratic Capitalism: A Moral Reassessment (1981), Ordinary Saints: An Introduction to the Christian Life (1988), The Paradoxical Vision: A Public Theology for the Twenty-First Century (1995), Quality with Soul: How Six Premier Colleges and Universities Keep Faith with Their Religious Traditions (2001), and most recently, Good and Bad Ways to Think about Religion and Politics (2010). Since Benne is known for his traditionalist moral views, some unmistakably conservative voices, including a number of prominent Lutherans and neoconservative political thinkers, are represented in this book. The broad theme is public theology, working from Benne’s definition of public theology as “the engagement of a living religious tradition with its public environment—the economic, political, and cultural spheres of our common life.”The book has three parts. The first section, “The Imperative of a Public Theology,” includes essays by editor Michael Shahan, Carl Braaten, Jean Bethke Elshtain, and Richard John Neuhaus. Shahan’s essay provides a helpful exposition of Benne’s intellectual trajectory. Braaten offers a defense of the historic, bodily resurrection of Jesus as the “crux of Christianity’s case.” Elshtain takes [End Page 206] up C. S. Lewis’s concerns in his Abolition of Man (1944) as she diagnoses the “cultural disorder” reflected in current debates about euthanasia and abortion. Neuhaus’s wistful essay looks back over his efforts in the public square, stating that he and Benne have shared a common concern: “A renewal of Christian confidence in providing a morally informed philosophy for a more just and virtuous society in the tradition of liberal democracy” (47). Taken together, these four chapters sketch the assumed intellectual and cultural landscape that sets the context for the volume as a whole.The second section, “The Lutheran Necessity in Public Theology,” begins with a largely autobiographical essay by James Nuechterlein about his journey in Lutheranism and the value of its theological distinctives, especially the famous simul. Next is Gilbert Meilaender’s account (exploring an insight from Kierkegaard) of the place for a Lutheran “corrective” within the wider normative tradition, then Mark Noll’s chapter that underscores the value of robust Lutheran social thinking against the backdrop of the more revivalist and pietist tendencies of Protestant evangelicalism.The final section, “Contested Issues in Public Theology,” includes chapters by Paul Hinlicky, Ronald Thiemann, Gerald McDermott, Donald Schmeltekopf and Michael Beaty, and Joseph Swanson. The chapters by Hinlicky on Luther’s relation to liberal political theory, and by Thiemann on the idea of the public theologian’s prophetic role as “connected critic,” are the most densely argued material in the book. These two essays will probably be of the most interest for scholars in theological ethics. The chapter by McDermott deals with Lutheran church-related colleges. A coauthored essay by Schmeltekopf and Beaty champions the vocation of Christian university education. Swanson situates Benne’s economic writings within neo-conservative thought.The book takes up some of Benne’s favorite themes and interest areas, but only rarely do the authors engage Benne’s own thought. Virtually nowhere do they prod Benne to become clearer, to strengthen his arguments, or to modify his conclusions. I would have preferred a deeper engagement with Benne’s ideas; in several... (shrink)

In summary, the creation and maintenance of the Wistar Rats as standardized animals can be attributed to the breeding work of Helen Dean King, coupled with the management and husbandry methods of Milton Greenman and Louise Duhring, and with supporting documentation provided by Henry Donaldson. The widespread use of the Wistar Rats, however, is a function of the ingenuity of Milton Greenman who saw in them a way for a small institution to provide service to science. Greenman's (...) rhetoric, as captured in his Director's Reports, prepared annually from 1905 until his death in 1937, shows that he was unusually sensitive to his times and to the economics of science and of society. In the era when biology was being defined, he recognized in the rat the potential to be a living analog to the pure chemicals that legitimated experimental science. From management literature he extracted the ideals of uniformity of product, standards of quality, and efficiency of production, applying them to scientific practice to generate an animal model that thrives as standard equipment in laboratories throughout the world today.I will close with a quote from Frederick W. Taylor that is a cogent statement of the contribution to science and scientific progress made by standardized tools and their creators. Equating the surgeon and the workman, Taylor wrote: [He is given] the finest implements, each one of which has been the subject of special study and development ... [and] the very best knowledge of his predecessors; and, provided with standard implements and methods which represent the best knowledge of the world up to date, he is able to use his own originality and ingenuity to make real additions to the world's knowledge, instead of reinventing things which are old.Standardized tools, whether surgeons' implements or laboratory-bred rats, are one of the vehicles for carrying scientific knowledge forward from generation to generation. In this sense, Greenman's Wistar Rats have done their job, in his words, of “providing service to science.”. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:EMOTION AND GOD: A REPLY TO MARCEL SAROT* DANIEL WESTBERG University of Virginia Charlottesville, Virginia M ARCEL SAROT has helpfully drawn attention to the question of St. Thomas's treatment of divine emotion; and in my view he rightly protests against the widely fashionable approach of rejecting the classical doctrine of impassibility in favor of a suffering and passible God. Nevertheless, I disagree sharply with his contentions (1) that emotion (...) is restricted to corporeal creatures,' and therefore (2) that emotion cannot be ascribed to God. What kind of moral agent would God be without emotion? Sarot is not helpful here, and in this respect the critics of impassibility have a legitimate point; for, if we eliminate emotion from God, then we have to treat the Scriptures as "embodying primitive anthropomorphic conceptions of God," so that God's love, wrath, mercy, justice, and even his "serious concern for the welfare of His people are meaningless."2 To dismiss the biblical picture of God as anthropomorphic, maintaining not only that "anger" and "joy" are symbolic, but that even the notions of care and concern are not applicable to the divine being, seems unfaithful to revelation. It also calls into question the nature of God's personality and agency.' *See Marcel Sarot, "God, Emotion, and Corporeality," The Thomist 58 (1994): 61-92. Much of this paper was prepared for a theological discussion group at the University of Virginia, before the appearance of Sarot's article. I am grateful for the points raised by Robert Wilken, Jamie Ferreira, Eugene Rogers, David Hart, and others in the discussion, and for the helpful comments of Jeff Greenman on this version. 1 Sarot, 82: "without corporeality, no emotion." 2 T. E. Pollard, "The Impassibility of God," Scottish Journal ofTheology 8 (1955): 360..1 R. E. Creel thinks that emotional impassibility is compatible with caring about and acting for the welfare of another person, but that such a being could not be "rejoiced by the good fortunes of its beloved and distressed by its misfortunes" (Divine Impassibility: An Essay in Philosophical Theology [Cambridge: Cambridge, University Press, 1986], 117). I do not think this is close enough to the biblical presentation. 109 110 DANIEL WESTBERG The burden of my response, and what I explain below, is this: Being a rational agent implies emotion of a kind. If we can speak of God having intellect and will, which St. Thomas does (STh I, qq. 14 & 19), so that God is an intelligent being with powers to act, then we should be able to speak (with similar qualifications) about emotion in God. In other words, agency by intellect and will implies emotion, which means that emotion should be ascribed to God, as the Bible does, but in a way that does not attribute passibility. The two basic mistakes I see in Sarot's account are these: (1) to rely on physicalist definitions of the nature of emotion; (2) to assume that the Latin passio is the same as the contemporary English term "emotion." Thus I agree that Aquinas understood the relevant meaning of passio to refer to a person undergoing some bodily change (a transmutatio corporalis), but deny that this extended in Aquinas's account over the entire range of even human emotion. Much of the recent work in the field of emotion, amongst both philosophers and psychologists, suggests that bodily sensation is only sometimes an aspect of emotion, and not essential in its definition. I shall attempt to show the parallels between the distinctions made by Aquinas and the framework of some of this contemporary research. I. EMOTION AND MORAL AGENCY The essence of emotion has to do with being a moral agent, not with bodily existence. Any moral being (including angels and other spirits, God and human beings) has emotion. This is the implication of any moral psychology (especially, though not necessarily, Aristotelian) that analyzes moral action as a result of choice combining reason and desire in reference to an end to be obtained. Beings that have intellect and will (or rational appetite) have emotion; that is, they are capable of being "moved" towards (or away from) an object by appetite. For human beings, the paradigm experience of emotion is... (shrink)