Simplicius reports that Xenocrates and Andronicus reproached Aristotle for positing an excessive number of categories, which can conveniently be reduced to two: τὰ καθ᾽αὑτά and τὰ πρός τι. Simplicius, followed by several modern commentators, interprets this move as being equivalent to a division into substance and accidents. I aim to show that, as far as Xenocrates is concerned, this interpretation is untenable and that the substance-accidents contrast cannot be equivalent to Xenocrates’ per se-relative one. Rather, Xenocrates aimed to stress the (...) primacy of Plato’s binary distinction of beings, as presented at Sophist 255c13–4, over Aristotle’s list of the categories. (shrink)

I re-examine the starting point of the Philebus’ description of the ‘divine method’ and argue that the vexed phrase τῶν ἀεὶ λεγομένων εἶναι at 16c9 refers to sensibles only. In doing so, I especially stress the significance of the phrase τούτων οὕτω διακεκοσμημένων at 16d1. The proposed interpretation fits the rest of the description of the ‘divine method’, preserves the Forms’ unmixed nature and the consistency of the Philebus.

In the Sophist, Plato claims that the philosopher is always engaged through reasonings with the idea tou ontos (254a4–b1). I argue that, contrary to appearances and to what various commentators believe, this phrase does not refer to the Kind Being singled out in the Sophist as one of the so-called ‘greatest’ or ‘most important’ Kinds, but to the whole intelligible realm. The proposed reading better accounts for Plato’s exact wording at Sophist 254a4–b1 and preserves the consistency of Plato’s view on (...) the object of philosophical knowledge. I conclude with some broader considerations on the relationship between this passage, Platonic dialectic and Aristotle’s conception of a science of being qua being. (shrink)

In this paper I investigate Aristotle’s account of predication in Topics I 9. I argue for the following interpretation. In this chapter Aristotle (i) presents two systems of predication cutting across each other, the system of the so-called four ‘predicables’ and of the ten ‘categories’, in order to distinguish them and explore their mutual relationship. I propose a semantic interpretation of the relationship between them. According to this reading, every proposition formed through a predicable constitutes at the same time a (...) predication according to one of the ten categories, and, consequently, signifies one of them, expressing one of the predicative relationship conveyed by them. Further, Aristotle (ii) explains the predicative connection between these two systems and the ten items signified by the ‘things said without any combination’ enumerated in Chapter 4 of the Categories, whose list is almost identical with that of categories in Top. I 9, with the only exception of their first members. (shrink)

At De Principiis II, p. 75.10-11 Westerink, Damascius states that ‘Being will be that which provides being itself to each thing, καὶ καθ’ ὅ τι ὄν ἐστι’. The modern reference translation of the De Principiis, that of Joseph Combès for the Collection des Universités de France, renders the phrase left here in Greek as ‘et selon ce qu’elle est comme être’. Combès interprets it by stating that being is here conceived of as the constitutive unity of each form, at once (...) responsible for both its essence and existence. I argue that both a translation and an interpretation of καθ’ ὅ τι ὄν ἐστι of the type suggested by Combès are untenable and I defend an alternative construal. The two other main modern translations, those of Ahbel-Rappe and Galpérine, are also critically assessed. The translation of the relevant phrase I propose is: ‘and in virtue of which something is a being’. I argue that being – that is the property bestowed by the Kind or Form of Being, a notion that Damascius draws from Plato’s Sophist – is here conceived of as that which is metaphysically responsible only for the fact that something is (or is a being), not also for what something is. This construal does justice to the grammar of Damascius’ text and fits better with the argument of De Principiis II, pp. 56-99 Westerink. (shrink)

In explicating a passage from Physics A 3, Simplicius reports a criticism by Alexander of Aphrodisias against Plato’s conception of not-being in the Sophist. Alexander deems this conception contradictory, because it posits that unqualified not-being is. Simplicius defends Plato and gives a diagnosis of what he regards as Alexander’s interpretative mistake in raising his objection. I unpack this debate and bring out ways in which it sheds light on important aspects of Plato’s project in the Sophist and of Simplicius’ own (...) philosophical background, notably in Damascius’ De principiis. (shrink)

In Metaphysics B 3 Aristotle sets out a famous argument for the thesis that being is not a genus. In his commentary on Metaphysics B, Syrianus criticizes this argument and explains in what sense being is to be regarded as a genus. I reconstruct both Syrianus’ criticisms and his own view. I bring out ways in which they can help us rethink key assumptions of Aristotle’s ontology and shed light both on Syrianus’ critical attitude towards Aristotle and on some of (...) Syrianus’ main views in metaphysics. (shrink)

The Diuisio Aristotelea 67M/32DL draws a distinction between two categories of beings, per se and relatives. I defend three main theses. First, that the relation of dependence characterizing the members of the latter category is modal and symmetrical in nature and, accordingly, the per se-relatives contrast cannot be equivalent to the substance-accidents contrast. Second, that the type of relativity relevant to this diuisio is both ontological and semantic in nature (but with different emphases depending on the version of the diuisio (...) considered). Third, I argue, against a widespread opinion, that the last line of the DL version of the diuisio does not concern metaphysical principles. Here I also compare the diuisio to other Early Academic bicategorial schemes and show that they differ from one another significantly, especially as far as the alleged connection between categories and metaphysical principles is concerned. (shrink)

Hermodorus of Syracuse, a Sicilian disciple of Plato, is reported by Simplicius to have set out a classification of beings, which is of a piece with an argument for principle monism (in Ph. 247.30–248.18 > F 5 IP2; 256.28–257.4 = F 6 IP2). A similar classification appears in Sextus Empiricus’ Aduersus mathematicos X (262–75), where it is officially ascribed to some ‘Pythagoreans’ (Πυθαγορικοί) or ‘children of the Pythagoreans’ (Πυθαγορικῶν παῖδες), but seems ultimately based on Early Academic material. Virtually all commentators (...) have read these classifications conjointly. More radically, both have been taken to record Plato's oral teaching and to give essentially the same categorial scheme, which is regarded as the most developed instance of a so-called ‘Academic doctrine of the categories’. This article re-examines these texts and provides an alternative reading. Section 1 focusses on Hermodorus and defends three theses: (1) there was never such a thing as an ‘Academic doctrine of the categories’; (2) Hermodorus does not seem to recount what Plato said, but to propose an integrated interpretation and defence of aspects of his thought; (3) Hermodorus’ pronouncements about principles are incompatible with other testimonies on Plato's unwritten teaching, notably Aristotle's. Section 2 moves to Sextus and defends a fourth thesis: (4) despite their similarities, the classifications of Hermodorus and Sextus’ Pyrhagoreans are considerably different, though perhaps originated from the same debate. (shrink)

Dans cet article on se propose d’examiner les fondements ontologiques de l’argument anti-hédoniste de Philèbe 53c4-55a1. On soutiendra que l’usage des notions de γένεσις et οὐσία dans cet argument ne montre ni un abandon de la thèse de l’opposition du sensible à l’intelligible, ni, pour autant, une application mécanique de cette thèse. On souhaite montrer, en revanche, que ces notions jouissent d’une relativité sémantique telle que leurs significations varient en fonction des contextes argumentatifs, dont le passage retenu du Philèbe est (...) un exemple particulièrement représentatif. Dans ce passage, en effet, elles désignent, principalement, pour la première un processus génétique et pour la seconde un tout qui est constitué par l’imposition causale d’une limite à ce qui est en soi illimité. Sur la base de cette première proposition, on défendra une nouvelle lecture de la relation entre Phlb. 53c4-55a1 et les caractérisations de chaque membre du « troisième genre » comme γένεσις εἰς οὐσίαν (26d8) et γεγενημένη οὐσία (27b8-9). (shrink)

This paper examines the fifth deduction (160b4-163b5) of the second part of the Parmenides and its connection with the Sophist. I argue that, far from providing us with clear formulations of arguments and theses developed in the Sophist, D5 aims to stimulate us to reflect on two main problems, which are relevant for the ontology and the theory of predication of the Sophist. First, the ontological requirements of the extra-linguistic correlates of contentful thought and meaningful speech. Second, the function of (...) being in the mechanism of the relation of participation. (shrink)

The revival of interest in the concept of essence witnessed in analytic metaphysics over the past half century has customarily been accompanied by the association of the original idea of (and of some of the main lines of thought on) essence with Aristotle. The book under review aims instead to show that Plato already ‘defends a comprehensive, coherent, and well-argued theory of essence’ (p. 11). Politis frames this claim in an overall interpretation of Plato's theory of Forms, governed by a (...) two-pronged principal thesis: (i) Platonic Forms simply are essences, not (as some believe) things that have essences—meaning by ‘essence’ specifically the entity ‘designated by an adequate and true answer to the question. ‘What is F?’ (p. 3), as opposed to an answer that accounts for what F is by merely appealing to an ‘example or exemplar’ of F (ch. 1). (ii) All chief attributes Plato ascribes to Forms follow uniquely from this basic notion, including their being non-perceptible by the senses (ch. 2), unitary, uniform, incomposite, changeless, eternal, and non-logically independent from each other (ch. 3), knowable only by reasoning (ch. 4), distinct and separate from perceptible things (chs. 5 and 9), the basis of causation and explanation (ch. 6), necessary for thought and speech (chs. 7–8). (shrink)

Posthumanism is the key to interpreting the twenty-first century and represents an international research program on the relationship with technology and the biosphere and new forms of citizenship and identity. This book clarifies the common denominators that differentiate posthumanism from other proposals.

Roberto Mangabeira Unger and Lee Smolin argue for a revolution in our cosmological ideas. Ideal for non-scientists, physicists and cosmologists.

Comment ne pas désespérer? Comment maximiser notre capacité d'agir et de penser? Comment défaire tous les efforts et les dispositifs qui visent à séparer la multitude de sa puissance?00L'urgence de ces questions traverse l'oeuvre d'Antonio Negri depuis ses commencements dans les années 1960 et 1970, alors qu'un mouvement d'insurrection ouvrière soulevait l'Italie jusqu'à ses plus récents développements avec l'altermondialisation et l'émergence dans l'espace public des questions écologiques. À travers différents ouvrages devenus des classiques de la théorie politique notamment La Classe (...) ouvrière contre l'État, Marx au-delà de Marx, L'Anomalie sauvage, Le Pouvoir constituant, mais aussi, en collaboration avec Michael Hardt, Empire, Multitude, Commonwealth et Assembly--, Antonio Negri a proposé l'une des contributions les plus marquantes à la pensée critique contemporaine. À l'heure de la contre-révolution néolibérale et du renouvellement des modalités de l'exploitation, il s'agit pour lui de prendre acte de la péremption des formes anciennes de la lutte des classes et de contribuer à l'ouverture d'un nouvel horizon révolutionnaire, à hauteur des enjeux du temps présent."--Back cover. (shrink)

Alessandro Torza argues that Ted Sider’s Lewisian argument against vague existence is insufficient to rule out the possibility of what he calls ‘super-vague existence’, that is the idea that existence is higher-order vague, for all orders. In this chapter it is argued that the possibility of super-vague existence is ineffective against the conclusion of Sider’s argument since super-vague existence cannot be consistently claimed to be a kind of linguistic vagueness. Torza’s idea of super-vague existence seems to be better suited to (...) model vague existence under the assumption that vague existence is instead a form of ontic indeterminacy, contra what Ted Sider and David Lewis assume. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy: accent. Accent is a fallacy of pragmatics. The fallacy of accent takes place when a premise in an argument seems to rely for its meaning on one possible vocal emphasis, but a conclusion is drawn that relies on an extrapolation from a different vocal emphasis of the same phrase. Such ambiguities are often the result of unacknowledged differences in background beliefs, attitudes, and expectations that people may implicitly bring (...) to the reading of a passage. The fallacy of accent can also be committed, therefore, when a passage is quoted without its original context, and erroneous inferences are drawn based on this (often deliberate) distortion. A classic example of this kind of deliberate form of quote mining is often used by creationists in their attempt to discredit Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection. (shrink)

Problems of distributive justice throughout the lifespan are not new. Yet, the increased aging rate of contemporary societies and an array of new life‐extending technologies (LETs) make these problems more and more urgent and complicated. This chapter analyzes the moral and political impact of the LET. There are three kinds of “intergenerational” justice: justice between non‐coexisting generations, justice between partially co‐existing generations, and justice between coexisting generations. The advantage of considering LETs in the light of justice between age groups is (...) that we can assume a complete‐life view. LETs significantly modify the duration and the features of each stage of life. A consideration of the specific needs and features of each stage of life in a lifespan‐enhanced society is needed to regulate policies and offer fair equality of opportunity to each age group. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy called 'amphiboly'. More formally speaking, the fallacy of amphiboly occurs when the meaning of a phrase or sentence is indeterminate or ambiguous, particularly as a result of poor syntax, and especially when further inferences are drawn based on the acceptance of an unintended meaning of the passages. Amphibolies can also have the potential to either threaten political careers or make them indefinitely memorable. The ambiguities found in cases of (...) amphiboly usually arise from mistakes in grammar but also from various forms of linguistic booby traps. It is important to note, however, that not all instances of amphiboly are trivial. The interpretation of carelessly constructed legal contracts and wills, for instance, has been known to produce unnecessary and painful conflicts. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy called 'poisoning the well' (PTW). There are some forms of ad hominem varieties that are usually a response to an interlocutor's claims. Unlike them, PTW occurs when we illegitimately prime our audience with a pre‐emptive strike against, or with adverse information about, an argumentative opponent before the latter has had a chance to say anything in her own defense, or in defense of her point of view. This has (...) the insidious effect of creating a conceptual framework according to which the audience – and maybe even the interlocutor herself – will interpret her claims as 'fulfilling' and 'confirming' the presumptions buried inside this conceptual trap. Most of the time Karl Popper's criterion of falsifiability is still quite a useful tool and one that can help us gain a firmer understanding of PTW. (shrink)

The Book of Mormon begins as missionaries Kevin Price and Arnold Cunningham eagerly await a location assignment for their two‐year mission. Religious fundamentalism is the real problem that The Book of Mormon and South Park usually have in mind when they tackle the topic of religion. Throughout this chapter, the author explains The Book of Mormon and South Park expose the way of believing for what it really is: a naive and arrogant approach to God, the world, and what it (...) means to be human. Fundamentalist thinkers have the luxury of living in a black and white world of cold absolutes. The rest of us, fortunately or unfortunately, don't. Rather, we have no choice but to live in the real world, a world of difficult questions and deep ambiguities. But the real world is also a fascinating place of brilliant color and real diversity. (shrink)

CONTENIDO: La ciencia del derecho y el lenguaje jurídico - Algunas estructuras lógicas del pensamiento jurídico - Valores, normas morales y validez del derecho - Las técnicas de control social y el derecho - El concepto de obligación jurídica y las formas de responsabilidad - Derecho subjetivo y relación jurídico - El concepto de órgano de derecho y las categorías derivadas - La personificación del sujeto de derecho - Los sistemas normativos y la idea del derecho como un orden - (...) Las fuentes del derecho - Producción, compatibilización y anulación de normas jurídicas - La interpretación de las normas y el conocimiento científico del derecho. (shrink)

This book presents the theory of anticipation, and establishes anticipation of the future as a legitimate topic of research. It examines anticipatory behavior, id est a behavior that 'uses' the future in its actual decisional process. The book shows that anticipation violates neither the ontological order of time nor causation. It explores the question of how different kinds of systems anticipate, and examines the risks and uses of such anticipatory practices. The book first summarizes the research on anticipation conducted within (...) a range of different disciplines, and describes the connection between the anticipatory point of view and futures studies. Following that, its chapters on Wholes, Time and Emergence, make explicit the ontological framework within which anticipation finds its place. It then goes on to discuss Systems, Complexity, and the Modeling Relation, and provides the scientific background supporting anticipation. It restricts formal technicalities to one chapter, and presents those technicalities twice, in formal and plain words to advance understanding. The final chapter shows that all the threads presented in the previous chapters naturally converge toward what has come to be called "Discipline of Anticipation". (shrink)

Facebook claims that it is building a “global community.” Whether this sounds utopian, dystopian, or simply self-promotional, there is no denying that social-media platforms have altered social interaction, political life, and outlooks on the world, even for people who do not regularly use them. In this book, Roberto Simanowski takes Facebook as a starting point to investigate our social-media society—and its insidious consequences for our concept of the self. Simanowski contends that while they are often denounced as outlets for (...) narcissism and self-branding, social networks and the practices they cultivate in fact remake the self in their image. Sharing is the outsourcing of one’s experiences, encouraging unreflective self-narration rather than conscious self-determination. Instead of experiencing the present, we are stuck ceaselessly documenting and archiving it. We let our lives become episodic autobiographies whose real author is the algorithm lurking behind the interface. As we go about accumulating more material for the platform to arrange for us, our sense of self becomes diminished—and Facebook shapes a subject who no longer minds. Social-media companies’ relentless pursuit of personal data for advertising purposes presents users with increasingly targeted, customized information, attenuating cultural memory and fracturing collective identity. Presenting a creative, philosophically informed perspective that speaks candidly to a shared reality, Facebook Society asks us to come to terms with the networked world for our own sake and for all those with whom we share it. (shrink)