Why does time appear to run in only one direction? We remember the past- but why not the future? We can influence the future- but could we, even theoretically, influence the past? Generations of philosophers and theologians, physicists and mathematicians have puzzles and speculated about these and the many other questions that surround the concept of time. Recent scientific work is said to explain the directionality of time. But time still contains many mysteries- black holes and big bangs, asymmetries and (...) relativities, arrows and loops - that will doubtless continue to occupy us for centuries to come. In this impressive collection of original articles ten internationally known scholars explore and explains the nature of time, apace and now space-time. Founded on the latest developments in thermodynamics, quantum theory and cosmology, their ideas will fascinate anyone interested in Einstein's theory of relativity. (shrink)

From Ancient Greek times, music has been seen as a mathematical art, and the relationship between mathematics and music has fascinated generations. This collection of wide ranging, comprehensive and fully-illustrated papers, authored by leading scholars, presents the link between these two subjects in a lucid manner that is suitable for students of both subjects, as well as the general reader with an interest in music. Physical, theoretical, physiological, acoustic, compositional, and analytical relationships between mathematics and music are unfolded and explored (...) with focus on tuning and temperament, the mathematics of sound, bell-ringing and modern compositional techniques. (shrink)

In a devastating critique Raymond Tallis exposes the exaggerated claims made for the ability of neuroscience and evolutionary theory to explain human consciousness, behaviour, culture and society. While readily acknowledging the astounding progress neuroscience has made in helping us understand how the brain works, Tallis directs his guns at neuroscience’s dark companion – "Neuromania" as he describes it – the belief that brain activity is not merely a necessary but a sufficient condition for human consciousness and that consequently our (...) everyday behaviour can be entirely understood in neural terms. With the formidable acuity and precision of both clinician and philosopher, Tallis dismantles the idea that "we are our brains", which has given rise to a plethora of neuro-prefixed pseudo-disciplines laying claim to explain everything from art and literature to criminality and religious belief, and shows it to be confused and fallacious, and an abuse of the prestige of science, one that sidesteps a whole range of mind–body problems. The belief that human beings can be understood essentially in biological terms is a serious obstacle, argues Tallis, to clear thinking about what human beings are and what they might become. To explain everyday behaviour in Darwinian terms and to identify human consciousness with the activity of the evolved brain denies human uniqueness, and by minimising the differences between us and our nearest animal kin, misrepresents what we are, offering a grotesquely simplified and degrading account of humanity. We are, shows Tallis, infinitely more interesting and complex than we appear in the mirror of biologism. Combative, fearless and always thought-provoking, _Aping Mankind _is an important book, one that scientists, cultural commentators and policy-makers cannot ignore. (shrink)

A stimulating introduction to central issues of political theory, including liberty, rights and the state, and the claims of need and politics.

Raymond Geuss is a critic of liberalism, a politics so pervasive in the West that it goes unnoticed. His attention sharpened by his own unorthodox intellectual journey, Geuss locates what we fail to see in the status quo: its shallowness and futility. Rejecting both authoritarian horror and liberal complacency, Geuss looks to genuinely new ideas.

Introduction. During the past two decades philosophers of psychology have considered a large variety of computational models for philosophy of mind and more recently for cognitive science. Among the suggested models are computer programs, Turing machines, pushdown automata, linear bounded automata, finite state automata and sequential machines. Many philosophers have found finite state automata models to be the most appealing, for various reasons, although there has been no shortage of defenders of programs and Turing machines. A paper by Arthur Burks (...) convinced me long ago that “all natural human functions” are, or can be fruitfully modeled to be, finite state automata with output. Further work in the field has reinforced this conviction. There is room, however, for the use of any of the above models in philosophy of mind and in the ongoing development of cognitive science. (shrink)

These are the very scholars that were involved in initiating the revolution in personal identity theory.

In this paper, we demonstrate (1) how harnessing stochasticity can be the basis of creative agency; (2) that such harnessing can resolve the apparent conflict between reductionist (micro-level) accounts of behaviour and behaviour as the outcome of rational and value-driven (macro-level) decisions; (3) how neurophysiological processes can instantiate such behaviour; (4) The processes involved depend on three features of living organisms: (a) they are necessarily open systems; (b) micro-level systems therefore nest within higher-level systems; (c) causal interactions must occur across (...) all the boundaries between the levels of organization. The higher levels constrain the dynamics of lower levels. The experimental evidence and theoretical arguments are shown to be consistent with previous research on the neuronal mechanisms of conscious choice, and with the interconnected multi-level processes by which organisms harness stochasticity, whether conscious or unconscious. (shrink)

This book reviews the work of prominent psychologists and philosophers on conditional reasoning. It provides empirical research on how people deal with conditional arguments and examines how conditional statements are used and interpreted in everyday communication.

Exploration of the fundamental motivations for attributing moral responsibility to various kinds of collectives serves as the basis for understanding the meaning of such attributions. Such attributions have a mid-range, limited justification. The analysis has broad implications for a wide variety of writings on aspects of collective moral responsibility, revealing serious deficiencies of any theory of corporate moral personhood.

ABSTRACTTreating conditionals as probabilistic statements has been referred to as a defining feature of the “new paradigm” in cognitive psychology. Doing so is attractive for several reasons, but it complicates the problem of assessing the merits of conditional arguments. We consider several variables that relate to judging the persuasiveness of conditional arguments with uncertain premises. We also explore ways of judging the consistency of people's beliefs as represented by components of conditional arguments. Experimental results provide evidence that inconsistencies in beliefs (...) are more prevalent if the arguments’ components are spatially and temporally dispersed than if they are contiguous in space and time. This supports the idea that assuring the consistency among even a small number of beliefs is difficult to do, especially if the beliefs in question are not brought into consciousness at the same time; but consistency can be enhanced when beliefs are considered simultaneously or nea... (shrink)

First published in 1973 this volume demonstrates the interconnection between Hegel's political and metaphysical writings. This book provides a point of entry into Hegel's system of ideas. Condemned unread, and when read far too often misunderstood, Hegel's thought has once more begun to make its impact on contemporary ideas with many of today's most important social and political thinkers.

The book proceeds by investigating theism, atheism, pantheism, and panentheism as descriptions of Hegel's concept.

This_classic undergraduate text_elegantly acquaints students with the_fundamental concepts and methods of mathematics. In addition to introducing_many noteworthy historical figures_from the 18th through the mid-20th centuries, it examines_the axiomatic method, set theory, infinite sets, the linear continuum and the real number system, groups, intuitionism,_formal systems, mathematical logic, and other topics.

This paper argues that humans possess unique cognitive abilities due to the presence of a functional system that exists in the human brain that is absent in the non-human brain. This system, the frontal feedback system, was born in the hominin brain when the great phylogenetic expansion of the prefrontal cortex relative to posterior sensory regions surpassed a critical threshold. Surpassing that threshold effectively reversed the preferred direction of information flow in the highest association regions of the neocortex, producing the (...) frontal feedback system. This reversal was from the caudo-rostral bias characteristic of non-human, or pre-human, brain dynamics to a rostro-caudal bias characteristic of modern human brain dynamics. The frontal feedback system works through frontal motor routines, or action schemes, manipulating the release and reconstruction of stored sensory memories in posterior sensory areas. As an obligatory feature of frontal feedback, a central character, or self, emerges within this cortical network that manifests itself as agent in these reconstructions as well as in the experience of sensory perceptions. Dynamical-systems modeling of cortical interactions is combined in the paper with recent neuroimaging studies of “resting-state” brain activity to bridge the gap between microscopic and macroscopic levels of cortical behavior. This synthesis is used to support the proposal of an information flow reversal occurring in the hominin brain and also to explain how such a reversal generates the wide variety of cognitive and experiential phenomena that many consider to be uniquely human. (shrink)

When speakers utter metaphors, such as "Lawyers are also sharks," they often intend to communicate messages beyond those expressed by the metaphorical meaning of these expressions. For instance, in some circumstances, a speaker may state "Lawyers are also sharks" to strengthen a previous speaker's negative beliefs about lawyers, to add new information about lawyers to listeners to some context, or even to contradict a previous speaker's positive assertions about lawyers. In each case, speaking metaphorically communicates one of these three social (...) messages that are relevant to the ongoing discourse. At the same time, speaking metaphorically may express other social and affective information that is more difficult to convey using non-metaphorical speech, such as "Lawyers are also aggressive." We report the results of three experiments demonstrating that people infer different pragmatic messages from metaphors in varying social situations and that many metaphors can express additional pragmatic and rhetorical meanings beyond those conveyed by non-metaphorical language. These findings demonstrate the importance of trade-offs between cognitive effort and cognitive effects in pragmatic theories of metaphor use and understanding. (shrink)

Blockchain’s language and terminology is confusing, contested, and rapidly changing. As a hype-driven technology, Blockchain is critical to an increasing number of projects that exist in a space of regulatory uncertainty. As communities of blockchain develop and evolve, the language they use to describe these functions changes. This causes concerns when attempting to have global regulatory certainty and clarity. Regulators and communities have different approaches to blockchain language, and this causes problems because of the translation between practical use in a (...) community, and the legal effects created by regulators. Of particular concern is the lack of clear expression amongst the broader community regarding the concept of blockchain-related assets as these ‘tokens’, ‘coins’, and ‘assets’ form a key part of financial regulation. This project uses semiotics to study the diverse language associated with blockchain. This analyzes a series of self-proclaimed ‘dictionaries of blockchain’ to assess key definitions, themes, perceptions, and misconceptions present in these communities. The study involved a case analysis of the terminology used in Australia’s proposed response to blockchain in comparison with that of wider communities. When comparing this to regulatory definitions and approaches, it becomes clear that this is an area that requires further attention. This project highlights the need for regulators to understand and use common terms in blockchain regulation. It is argued that this approach facilitates a better understanding of poorly understood concepts and clearly connects the law with those it intends to target. (shrink)

In his response to my article, “Historicism and Science: Thoughts on Quine” , Paul Bernays distinguishes between two aspects of the article: my criticism of Quine's theory of knowledge and my contention that the epistemological foundations of modern science lead to historicism. Bernays substantially accepts my criticism of Quine, particularly insofar as I reject Quine's behaviorism and “physicalism”. He opposes, however, my claim that historicism is implicit in the presuppositions of modern science. I argued that the historicism inherent in modern (...) science is due to the essentially changeable character of modern science. Quine's theory of knowledge tacitly takes account of this changeable character a) through his view of sense experience as being constituted by posits, b) through his recognition that individual scientific statements are dependent upon a broad linguistic‐conceptual framework that is itself subject to change, and c) through his pragmatic conception of reason and the concomitant emphasis upon the criterion of simplicity. (shrink)

In his response to my article, “Historicism and Science: Thoughts on Quine”, Paul Bernays distinguishes between two aspects of the article: my criticism of Quine's theory of knowledge and my contention that the epistemological foundations of modern science lead to historicism. Bernays substantially accepts my criticism of Quine, particularly insofar as I reject Quine's behaviorism and “physicalism”. He opposes, however, my claim that historicism is implicit in the presuppositions of modern science. I argued that the historicism inherent in modern science (...) is due to the essentially changeable character of modern science. Quine's theory of knowledge tacitly takes account of this changeable character a) through his view of sense experience as being constituted by posits, b) through his recognition that individual scientific statements are dependent upon a broad linguistic‐conceptual framework that is itself subject to change, and c) through his pragmatic conception of reason and the concomitant emphasis upon the criterion of simplicity. (shrink)