Machine models for cognitive science

Philosophy of Science 54 (September):391-408 (1987)
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Introduction. During the past two decades philosophers of psychology have considered a large variety of computational models for philosophy of mind and more recently for cognitive science. Among the suggested models are computer programs, Turing machines, pushdown automata, linear bounded automata, finite state automata and sequential machines. Many philosophers have found finite state automata models to be the most appealing, for various reasons, although there has been no shortage of defenders of programs and Turing machines. A paper by Arthur Burks convinced me long ago that “all natural human functions” are, or can be fruitfully modeled to be, finite state automata with output. Further work in the field has reinforced this conviction. There is room, however, for the use of any of the above models in philosophy of mind and in the ongoing development of cognitive science.



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References found in this work

Computing machinery and intelligence.Alan M. Turing - 1950 - Mind 59 (October):433-60.
What psychological states are not.Ned Block & Jerry A. Fodor - 1972 - Philosophical Review 81 (April):159-81.
Physical symbol systems.Allen Newell - 1980 - Cognitive Science 4 (2):135-83.
Behaviorism is false.Raymond J. Nelson - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (14):417-52.
Logic, computers, and men.Arthur W. Burks - 1972 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 46:39-57.

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