Theory of illness causation is an important issue in all biomedical sciences, and solid etiological explanations are needed in order to develop therapeutic approaches in medicine and preventive interventions in public health. Until now, the literature about the theoretical underpinnings of illness causation research has been scarce and fragmented, and lacking a convenient summary. This interdisciplinary book provides a convenient and accessible distillation of the current status of research into this developing field, and adds a personal flavor to the discussion (...) by proposing the etiological stance as a comprehensive approach to identify modifiable causes of illness. (shrink)

The search for causes of perinatal brain damage needs a solid theoretical foundation. Current theory apparently does not offer a unanimously accepted view of what constitutes a cause, and how it can be identified. We discuss nine potential theoretical misconceptions: (1) too narrow a view of what is a cause (causal production vs. facilitation), (2) extrapolating from possibility to fact (potential vs. factual causation), (3) if X, then invariably Y (determinism vs. probabilism), (4) co-occurrence in individuals vs. association in populations, (...) (5) one cause is all that is needed (single cause attribution vs. multicausal constellations), (6) drawing causal inferences from very small numbers of observations (the tendency to generalize), (7) unstated causal inferences, (8) ignoring heterogeneity, and (9) failing to consider alternative explanations for what is observed. We hope that our critical discussion will contribute to fruitful research and help reduce the burden of perinatal brain damage. (shrink)

In this essay, I argue that Ted Poston's theory of explanatory coherentism is well-suited as a tool for causal explanation in the health sciences, particularly in epidemiology. Coherence has not only played a role in epidemiology for more than half a century as one of Hill's viewpoints, it can also provide background theory for the development of explanatory systems by integrating epidemiologic evidence with a diversity of other error-independent data. I propose that computational formalization of Hill's viewpoints in an explanatory (...) coherentist framework would provide an excellent starting point for a formal epistemological (knowledge-theoretical) project designed to improve causal explanation in the health sciences. As an example, I briefly introduce Paul Thagard's ECHO system and offer my responses to possible objections to my proposal. (shrink)

Bradford Hill (1965) highlighted nine aspects of the complex evidential situation a medical researcher faces when determining whether a causal relation exists between a disease and various conditions associated with it. These aspects are widely cited in the literature on epidemiological inference as justifying an inference to a causal claim, but the epistemological basis of the Hill aspects is not understood. We offer an explanatory coherentist interpretation, explicated by Thagard's ECHO model of explanatory coherence. The ECHO model captures the complexity (...) of epidemiological inference and provides a tractable model for inferring disease causation. We apply this model to three cases: the inference of a causal connection between the Zika virus and birth defects, the classic inference that smoking causes cancer, and John Snow’s inference about the cause of cholera. (shrink)

Models of illness causation play a crucial role in medicine and public health. In their recent paper on this topic, Michael Kelly, Rachel Kelly, and Federica Russo state that the integration of social, biological, and behavioral causes in one and the same etiologic mechanism remains to be clarified. In particular, they think that current models of illness causation do not appreciate "the truly integrated nature of bio-social-behavioral pathogenesis". In brief, Kelly, Kelly, and Russo suggest that two levels of explanation are (...) at work in medicine and public health, biological and social; that integration is difficult because of resistance to including social determinants of disease in both the... (shrink)

According to the Russo-Williamson Thesis, causal claims in the health sciences need to be supported by both difference-making and mechanistic evidence. In this article, we attempt to determine whether Evidence-based Medicine can be improved through the consideration of mechanistic evidence. We discuss the practical composition and function of each RWT evidence type and propose that exposure-outcome evidence provides associations that can be explained through a hypothesis of causation, while mechanistic evidence provides finer-grained associations and knowledge of entities that ultimately explains (...) a causal hypothesis. We suggest that mechanistic evidence holds untapped potential to add value to the assessment of evidence quality in EBM and propose initial recommendations for the integration of mechanistic and exposure-outcome evidence to improve EBM by robustly leveraging available evidence in support of good medical decisions. (shrink)

In this chapter, I first outline the public health workflow from assessment via goal definition and intervention to evaluation. Further, I discuss the types and subtypes of explanation used in public health research and practice: scientific, justificatory, methodological, and prospective. In doing this, I take the discussion far beyond the usual focus in philosophy of science as answers to “why?”-questions. The chapter ends with a few comments on my proposal.

At the core of medicine is the idea to help fellow human beings by improving or even restoring their health. Let us call this the auxiliary stance of medicine—the motivation of medical intervention by reference to a moral obligation to guide our peers in their attempt to live a healthy and productive life. In parallel, the auxiliary stance is also central to public health, with a focus on prevention and health promotion. Taken together, we can view medicine and public health (...) as the two main human auxiliary endeavors to protect individuals and populations from health risks and help them to heal when sick. (shrink)

Agent-based models (ABMs) are one type of simulation model used in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. In contrast to equation-based models, ABMs are algorithms that use individual agents and attribute changing characteristics to each one, multiple times during multiple iterations over time. This paper focuses on three philosophical aspects of ABMs as models of causal mechanisms, as generators of emergent phenomena, and as providers of explanation. Based on my discussion, I conclude that while ABMs cannot help much with causal (...) inference, they can be viewed as etio-prognostic explanations of illness occurrence and outcome. (shrink)

My goal in this paper is twofold. First, I want to analyze two early texts by Vilém Flusser in order to explore what may have been his conceptualization of the relationship between science and philosophy. My analysis suggests that Flusser thought of both as tools to analyze reality by analyzing language. While he saw science as a (sometimes too vigorous) force forward, he viewed philosophy as what can prevent some of the negative consequences of such progress. In direct comparison, Flusser (...) thought of science as a discourse with the purpose to provide novel information and of philosophy as what can keep objective science in check by moving the discourse into the realm of the subjective. It remains to be explored whether these results also apply to Flusser’s later writings. My second goal is to show the relationship between three aspects of modern science (crisis, contrast, and trying out) and what I see as Flusser’s early (mid 1960s) view of science in relation to philosophy and poetry. -/- . (shrink)

Dieser Aufsatz beschreibt und erörtert fünf Aspekte der gegenwärtigen Wissenschaft: Verfahren, Zwiespalt, Schweigen, Hoffnung, und Probieren.

This book covers the overlap between informatics, computer science, philosophy of causation, and causal inference in epidemiology and population health research. Key concepts covered include how data are generated and interpreted, and how and why concepts in health informatics and the philosophy of science should be integrated in a systems-thinking approach. Furthermore, a formal epistemology for the health sciences and public health is suggested. -/- Causation in Population Health Informatics and Data Science provides a detailed guide of the latest thinking (...) on causal inference in population health informatics. It is therefore a critical resource for all informaticians and epidemiologists interested in the potential benefits of utilising a systems-based approach to causal inference in health informatics. (shrink)

Retinopathy of prematurity (ROP) is a complex neonatal disorder with multiple contributing factors. In this paper we have mounted the evidence in support of the proposal that neonatal sepsis meets all requirements for being a cause of ROP (not a condition, mechanism, or even innocent bystander) by means of initiating the early stages of the pathomechanism of ROP occurrence, systemic inflammation. We use the model of etiological explanation, which distinguishes between two overlapping processes in ROP causation. It can be shown (...) that sepsis can initiate the early stages of the pathomechanism via systemic inflammation (causation process) and that systemic inflammation can contribute to growth factor aberrations and the retinal characteristics of ROP (disease process). The combined contribution of these factors with immaturity at birth (as intrinsic risk modifier) and prenatal inflammation (as extrinsic facilitator) seems to provide a cogent functional framework of ROP occurrence. Finally, we apply the Bradford Hill heuristics to the available evidence. Taken together, the above suggests that neonatal sepsis is a causal inducer of ROP. (shrink)

In order to support health interventions, biomedical and population health researchers need to collect solid evidence. This article asks what type of evidence this should be and expands on previous work that focused on etiological explanations, or causal-mechanical explanations of why and how illness occurs. The article proposes adding predictive evidence to the explanatory evidence, in order to form a joint evidence set, or JES = [A,B,C,D], which consists of four different types of evidence: association [A], biology [B], confirmation [C], (...) and difference-making [D]. The article discusses explanatory coherence as a backbone for this proposal, suggests criteria for each type of evidence, and offers a rubric for multi-evidence mapping. (shrink)

Thinking about illness causation has a long and rich history in medicine. After a hiatus in the 1990s, the last one-and-a-half decades have seen a surge of publications on causality in the biomedical sciences. Interestingly, this surge is visible not only in the medical, epidemiological, bioinformatics, and public health literatures, but also among philosophical publications. In this essay, I review and discuss one most recent addition to the literature, "Causality: Philosophical Theory Meets Scientific Practice" written by philosophers Phyllis Illari and (...) Federica Russo about causality in the sciences, and particularly about the health sciences. (shrink)

In this paper, we build upon the model of authenticity proposed by Lehman and colleagues, which includes the dimensions consistency, conformity, and connection. We expand this “3C-view” by adding a fourth dimension, continuity, which results in what we have come to call “4C-view of authenticity.” We discuss our proposal from a process perspective and emphasize that congruence might be a reasonable candidate for a concept that unifies the four dimensions of authenticity.

Biomedical research and study design have recently been examined in detail by philosophers of science, who, like biomedical researchers, are concerned with the ability to accurately represent causal relationships through scientific study and apply these relationships to improve the health of individuals and populations. Epistemology—defined by the OED as "the theory of knowledge, especially with regard to its methods, validity, and scope, and the distinction between justified belief and opinion"—is fundamental to these concerns. In particular, philosophers of science and biomedical (...) researchers have discussed the epistemological value of randomized-controlled trials in regards to their individual components.... (shrink)

Explaining the causal mechanisms that contribute to autism spectrum disorder occurrence remains a conundrum in developmental medicine, neuroscience, and child psychiatry. Recent research has resulted in agreement on behavioral definitions and their underlying cognitive processes, early diagnosis and standardized assessments, evidence-based interventions, systems-level approaches to neurobiology, and identification of genetic variants and their interaction with epigenetic and environmental factors. However, an explanatory model of autism causation remains elusive.Perhaps..

Goethe's objections to Newton's theory of light and colours are better than often acknowledged. You can accept the most important elements of these objections without disagreeing with Newton about light and colours. As I will argue, Goethe exposed a crucial weakness of Newton's methodological self-assessment. Newton believed that with the help of his prism experiments, he could prove that sunlight was composed of variously coloured rays of light. Goethe showed that this step from observation to theory is more problematic than (...) Newton wanted to admit. By insisting that the step to theory is not forced upon us by the phenomena, Goethe revealed our own free, creative contribution to theory construction. And Goethe's insight is surprisingly significant, because he correctly claimed that all of the results of Newton's prism experiments fit a theoretical alternative equally well. If this is correct, then by suggesting an alternative to a well-established physical theory, Goethe developed the problem of underdete... (shrink)

The book is an introductory exposition of the development of the physical and astronomical notions of the universe. It covers the period from Greek antiquity to the Copernican revolution and the Renaissance, half of the text being devoted to medieval science within both the Aristotelian and the Archimedean traditions. The book is intended for a general audience interested in intellectual and scientific developments, but should also be useful as a guide to further studies. Thus it has an extensive bibliography classifying (...) much of the secondary literature on the subject, and also a sixty page 'dictionary' of all the scientists and philosophers mentioned in the text. This contains references to printed editions of the sources and to a selection of books and periodicals. (shrink)

Pacifists and their opponents disagree not only about moral questions, but rather often about factual questions as well—as seen when looking at the controversy surrounding the crisis in Kosovo. According to my reconstruction of pacifism, this is not surprising since the pacifist,legitimately, looks at the facts in the light of her system of value. Her opponent, in turn, looks at the facts in the light of an alternative value system, and the quarrel between the two parties about supposedly descriptive matters (...) never ceases, as there is no objective reality about the war in question that could settle the issue.In my view, the pacifist's value-laden way of looking at reality implicitly obeys three epistemic imperatives. First, the Epistemic Imperative concerning Human Nature ("Resist demonizing the other side; always try to understand the case from the other point of view"). Second, the Epistemic Imperative concerning Non-Violent Alternatives ("Always search for non-violent alternatives to military action"). Third, the Epistemic Imperative concerning Uncontrolled Escalation ("Hone your senses to the uncontrolled, irreversible side effects of military action, particularly to the danger of military escalation leading to another world war"). Objective reality has no way of telling us how far we should go in following these imperatives. Rather, we have to make the decision about how far we are going to take them ourselves. In this way, the pacifist's epistemic imperatives are comparable to Kant's regulative principles. (shrink)

The Aesthetic Mind breaks new ground in bringing together empirical sciences and philosophy to enhance our understanding of aesthetics and the experience of art.

Nach Morton White können wir die holistische Quine/Duhem-These auf ethische Sätze genauso anwenden wie auf wissenschaftliche. Demzufolge mögen sich die meisten ethische Sätze zwar nicht einzeln testen lassen, wohl aber im Zusammenhang einer kompletten Theorie, die sowohl deskriptive als auch normative Sätze enthält. Ich diskutiere zwei Vorschläge dafür, wie dieser Vergleich durchbuchstabiert werden könnte. Laut Whites eigenem Vorschlag lassen sich einige normative Konsequenzen des Gesamtsystems durch Konfrontation mit den emotionalen Reaktionen des Sprechers testen. Laut meinem Vorschlag sind einige normative Konsequenzen (...) des Systems bereits Beobachtungssätze in Quines Sinn und können genauso getestet werden wie naturwissenschaftliche Beobachtungssätze, nämlich durch Sinneserfahrung. Kurzum, es gibt moralische Beobachtungssätze. Quine bezeichnet diejenigen Sätze als Beobachtungssätze, die alle anwesenden Sprecher einer Gemeinschaft stets gleich beurteilen und die der einzelne Sprecher ausschließlich aufgrund momentaner Sinnesreizung bejaht oder verneint (also unabhängig von Hintergrund-Informationen). In Quines Argument gegen moralische Beobachtungssätze steckt folgender Fehler: Quine glaubt, dass sich moralische Fragen immer nur angesichts von Hintergrund-Informationen beurteilen lassen. Bei vielen moralischen Sätzen mag das so sein; aber es gibt Gegenbeispiele, in denen Hintergrund-Informationen ausgeschaltet sind, z.B. "Dies ist sichtbares Unrecht". (shrink)

Quine claims that holism (i.e., the Quine-Duhem thesis) prevents us from defining synonymy and analyticity (section 2). In "Word and Object," he dismisses a notion of synonymy which works well even if holism is true. The notion goes back to a proposal from Grice and Strawson and runs thus: R and S are synonymous iff for all sentences T we have that the logical conjunction of R and T is stimulus-synonymous to that of S and T. Whereas Grice and Strawson (...) did not attempt to defend this definition, I try to show that it indeed gives us a satisfactory account of synonymy. Contrary to Quine, the notion is tighter than stimulus-synonymy -- particularly when applied to sentences with less than critical semantic mass (section 3). Now according to Quine, analyticity could be defined in terms of synonymy, if synonymy were to make sense: A sentence is analytic iff synonymous to self-conditionals. This leads us to the following notion of analyticity: S is analytic iff, for all sentences T, the logical conjunction of S and T is stimulus-synonymous to T; an analytic sentence does not change the semantic mass of any theory to which it may be conjoined (section 4). This notion is tighter than Quine's stimulus-analyticity; unlike stimulus-analyticity, it does not apply to those sentences from the very center of our theories which can be assented to come what may, even though they are not synthetic in the intuitive sense (section 5). (shrink)

In this article the authors focus on the emergence, or disappearance, of notions of responsibility in social dynamic processes. Hence, the starting point in this article is concrete behavior within organisational settings. This article presents a systematic overview of mechanisms related to acting upon a sense of moral responsibility. Some of these mechanisms are based on individual characteristics, others are embedded in the social context wherein responsible behaviour emerges or disappears. In this article, various mechanisms are identified and labelled in (...) order to analyse what types of processes are behind the mechanisms. In this way, the article yields important understandings for the conscious use of these mechanisms to strengthen responsible behavior within organisations. (shrink)

Although Lorenz Oken is a classic example of Naturphilosophie as applied to biology, his views have been imperfectly understood. He is best viewed as a follower of Schelling who consistently attempted to apply Schelling's ideas to biological data. His version of Naturphilosophie, however, was strongly influenced by older pseudoscience traditions, especially alchemy and numerology as they had been presented by Robert Fludd, whose works were current in Jena and available to him. According to those influences, parts of Oken's philosophical conception (...) were communicable even in a non-idealistic scientific culture, for example in Paris, where Oken met Étienne Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire. Geoffroy however was embedded in a French intellectual tradition, and the correspondence between his views and those of Oken was only superficial. The English anatomist Richard Owen attempted to incorporate the views of Oken and Geoffroy within his own, idiosyncratic system. Although Darwin knew of Oken's ideas, it was Geoffroy who really affected his evolutionary biology, and any influence of Oken must have been attenuated to the point of triviality. (shrink)

Two decades after the publication of Clifford and Marcus' volume Writing Culture, this collection provides a fresh and diverse reassessment of the debates that ...

The intention of the article is to offer stakeholders affected by mergers a criterion from which moral arguments may be generated for the organization of each individual case. The criterion: "Any operation causing legitimate interests to suffer vital infringement should be avoided in a merger process." A vital infringement of these interests is assumed when the merger undermines unique positive opportunities or considerable impairment in the future, impossible to overcome for the person affected without an unacceptable level of difficulty. Therefore, (...) we mainly concentrate on implicit contracts – which should be based on the principle pacta sunt servanda as well. These contracts are mandatory to run an economy that produces increasingly more knowledge-based goods. (shrink)

Wenn überhaupt in einem Gebiet Wahrheit und Existenz unabhängig von unseren Erkenntnisfähigkeiten sind, dann in der Metaphysik – etwa bei der Frage, ob es Gott gibt oder eine Seele, die unseren Tod überdauert. Die metaphysica specialis schreit geradezu nach metaphysischem Realismus und dem zugehörigen Wahrheitsbegriff. Von diesem Ausgangspunkt gerät man allerdings schnell in Verlegenheit, wenn man fragt: Nach welchen Kriterien sollen wir uns richten, wenn wir uns über Gott oder Unsterblichkeit ein Urteil bilden wollen? Mit den Mitteln der Naturwissenschaft und (...) deren rationaler Methodologie (in der es um Empirie, Einfachheit, Sparsamkeit usw. geht) kommen wir bei Themen wie Gott oder Unsterblichkeit immer nur bis zum Patt. Genauso steht es bei der Frage, ob wir in unseren Entscheidungen frei sind. Urteilsenthaltung können wir uns nicht erlauben, dafür sind die metaphysischen Fragen zu wichtig; Auslosen kommt auch nicht infrage. Statt erkenntnistheoretisch zu kapitulieren, schlage ich programmatisch vor, die Erkenntnislehre auf weichere Weise weiterzubetreiben. Emotion, Intuition, Moral – das sind einige der zusätzlichen außerrationalen Hilfsmittel, mit deren Hilfe wir weiterkommen können. Ich zeige, dass diese Hilfsmittel respektabler und gewichtiger sind, als kühle, rationale Erkenntnistheoretiker zugeben wollen. Diese Hilfsmittel führen zu guten Postulaten aus Unvernunft (und zwar nicht nur in der Metaphysik). Wie schlimm es für den Realismus ist, dass diese Postulate immer noch falsch sein könnten, diese Frage werde ich im vorliegenden Aufsatz nicht mehr klären. (shrink)

A person can appropriately manifest respect toward a world heritage ruin by developing a sensitive understanding of the ruin’s cultural and historical context and significance. In this paper, we link such respectful understanding to the question of the aesthetic appreciation of world heritage ruins. Our claim is that an aesthetic appreciation of a world heritage ruin qua world heritage ruin typically involves two things: first, the responsibility not to neglect the individuality of the object, and, second, a commitment to the (...) idea that it is the object—respectfully conceived—which must be the focus of our appreciation. (shrink)