RESUMENEl trabajo examina críticamente la afirmación central de la hermenéutica de Paul Ricoeur, a saber, que el soporte material de la escritura es el rasgo determinante para que una secuencia discursiva sea considerada como un texto. La escritura cancela las condiciones fácticas de la enunciación y crea, de este modo, un ámbito de sentido estable en el que se puede validar una concepción de la subjetividad que está implicada en las dos estrategias de lecturas (el análisis estructural y la apropiación), (...) esto es, un sujeto pasivo que se constituye por la idealidad del significado. Asimismo, el trabajo intentará precisar una serie de ambigüedades en el uso que Ricoeur hace del «ser en el mundo» para sostener la referencialidad del discurso.PALABRAS CLAVETEXTO, ESCRITURA, REFERENCIA, SUBJETIVIDAD, MUNDOABSTRACTThis paper critically examines the main assertion of Paul Ricoeur´s hermeneutics, i.e., that the material base of writing is the determining feature to consider a discursive sequence as a text. Writing cancels the factual conditions of enunciation and creates, in this way, a background of stable meaning where it is possible to validate a conception of subjectivity implicated in the two reading strategies (the structural analysis and the appropriation), i.e., a passive subject constituted by the ideality of meaning. Likewise, this paper aims to clarify some ambiguities in the way Ricoeur uses the «beings in the world» to support the discourse referentiality.KEY WORDSTEXT, WRITING, REFERENCE, SUBJECTIVITY, WORLD. (shrink)

El objetivo de este trabajo es determinar la posición domintante de Heideggerfrente a la relación entre teoría y modalidad impropia de la existencia. Partiendo de la ambivalencia frente a esta cuestión en Sein und Zeit, el trabajo recorre distintas lecciones del periodo de Marburg donde Heidegger aborda la misma problemática. El texto examina la explicación heideggeriana de la noción fenomenológica de conciencia y de los conceptos aristotélicos “sofía”, “dóxa” y “episteme” a fin de establecer la posición dominante de Heidegger respecto (...) del origen impropio de estos conceptos teóricos.The purpose of this study is to determine Heidegger’s dominant position in frontof the relationship between existence improper modality and theory. From theambivalence of this issue in Sein und Zeit, the study goes through the different lectures of the Marburg period where Heidegger talks about this same issue. The text examines Heidegger’s explanation of the phenomenological notion of conscience and the Aristotelian concepts “sofía”, “dóxa” and “episteme” in order to establish Heidegger’s dominant position in relation to the improper origin of these theoretical concepts. (shrink)

La diferencia semántica entre la disposición afectiva y la comprensión en Sein und Zeit radica en que el sentido inherente a la afectividad es del orden de lo continuo. En cambio, el sentido de la comprensión es del orden de lo discreto. El régimen de lo continuo se caracteriza por ser un campo de fuerzas que organiza el sentido de acuerdo a una continuidad gradiente. El régimen de lo discreto, por el contrario, organiza el sentido de acuerdo a una articulación (...) de unidades significativas pragmáticas diferenciables que no se identifican con el lenguaje. De esta manera lo continuo y lo discreto puede ser reinterpretado como la fuerza y el significado. Así, entonces, el sentido de la disposición afectiva y el de la comprensión se distinguen por pertenecer a regímenes semánticos distintos. Los afectos pertenecen al dominio de la fuerza y la comprensión pertenece al campo del significado. The semantic distinction between Disposedness and Understanding on Sein und Zeit can be described as the difference between the continuous and the discrete. The continuous domain organizes the space of meaning as strength field and a gradient polarization. In contrast the discrete domain organizes the space of meaning as an articulation of pragmatic meaningful and differential units. These units on Sein und Zeit don´t identify with the language. So, the continuous and the discrete can be reinterpreted as strength and meaning. In this way, the space of meaning has two diverse domains: Disposedness belongs to the strength regime and Understanding to meaning field. (shrink)

This paper aims to show that the K-O Apel's Project of Anthropology of Knowledge belongs to the tradition of hermeneutics logic, developed by the Logic of Göttigen. This statement can be proved by the fact that Apel conceives the relationship between das Leibapriori and das Erkenntnisapriori. In two text of sixties Apel shapes the relationship between human body and knowledge as a polarization of opposite strengths. The logic of exclusive disjunction rules this polarization. Forty years later he changes his perspective (...) and presents them as tensive relation of rivalry. In this way Apel takes in his own argumentation a central topic of the hermeneutics logic, namely, the life conception as a mediation between strength and meaning. (shrink)

ResumenEl trabajo se propone, por un lado, presentar los argumentos que M. Shapiro y J. M. Schaffer hicieron contra la interpretación heideggeriana del cuadro de van Gogh. Y, por otro, someter a un análisis crítico cada una de las objeciones. La idea central es presentar la polémica que produjo la recepción del texto de Heidegger Der Ursprung des Kusntwerkes y mostrar que dicha recepción se funda en un desconocimiento del pensamiento heideggeriano -tal como sucede en el caso de M. Shapiro- (...) y en una incorrecta descripción de la producción del sentido –tal es el caso de J. M. Schaffer-.Conceptos Clave:Significado, Referente, Obra de Arte, EstéticaThe study aims, on one hand, at submitting the objections that M. Shapiro and J.M: Schaffer made against Heidegger´s interpretation of Van Gogh´s painting, and, on the other hand, at making a critical analysis of every objection. The main idea consists in presenting the controversy created by the reception of Heidegger´s Der Ursprung des Kusntwerkes and showing that said reception is based on the ignorance of Heidegger´s thought – as in the case of M. Shapiro – and on the improper description of the production of meaning – as in the case of J.M. Schaffer.Key concepts:Meaning, Referent, Work of Art, Aesthetics. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to investigate the aporia of the epistemological status of Freudian metapsychology as represented by Ricoeur’s hermeneutics. This aporia centers on the concept of psychic nature as the ultimate target of metapsychological speculation. The question this article addresses is whether the psychic apparatus that emerges from metapsychological speculation responds to a conception of nature that belongs to a physical model or a phenomenological model. This question has an ambiguous answer in Ricoeur’s work. In order to (...) show the ambiguity, we begin by examining the transcendental reading Ricoeur makes of metapsychology. Then, we explain the aporia of Freudian naturalism, and following a suggestion by Ricoeur, we indicate a way out of it through the argumentative reconstruction of the relationship between artwork and psychic nature. (shrink)

RESUMENEl trabajo examina críticamente la afirmación central de la hermenéutica de Paul Ricoeur, a saber, que el soporte material de la escritura es el rasgo determinante para que una secuencia discursiva sea considerada como un texto. La escritura cancela las condiciones fácticas de la enunciación y crea, de este modo, un ámbito de sentido estable en el que se puede validar una concepción de la subjetividad que está implicada en las dos estrategias de lecturas (el análisis estructural y la apropiación), (...) esto es, un sujeto pasivo que se constituye por la idealidad del significado. Asimismo, el trabajo intentará precisar una serie de ambigüedades en el uso que Ricoeur hace del «ser en el mundo» para sostener la referencialidad del discurso.PALABRAS CLAVETEXTO, ESCRITURA, REFERENCIA, SUBJETIVIDAD, MUNDOABSTRACTThis paper critically examines the main assertion of Paul Ricoeur´s hermeneutics, i.e., that the material base of writing is the determining feature to consider a discursive sequence as a text. Writing cancels the factual conditions of enunciation and creates, in this way, a background of stable meaning where it is possible to validate a conception of subjectivity implicated in the two reading strategies (the structural analysis and the appropriation), i.e., a passive subject constituted by the ideality of meaning. Likewise, this paper aims to clarify some ambiguities in the way Ricoeur uses the «beings in the world» to support the discourse referentiality.KEY WORDSTEXT, WRITING, REFERENCE, SUBJECTIVITY, WORLD. (shrink)

Bultmann recurre a la filosofía de Heidegger de Sein und Zeit para ustificar una correcta comprensión del ser del hombre y así lograr una fundamentación ontológica de los conceptos teológicos. Esto se puede observar en que, cada vez que Bultmann tiene que hablar del hombre, repite los conceptos fund..

La finalidad del presente trabajo es determinar el marco teórico dentro del cual se puede desarrollar una hermenéutica de los mass media a partir de los presupuestos de la filosofía de Heidegger. La tesis que se propone es que ese marco teórico es la fenomenología del espacio.Por ello, en primer lugar, se expone el sentido que tiene la expresión "medio". Luego se presentan los conceptos fundamentales de la espacialidad del Dasein. Y, por ultimo, se extraen dos consecuencias sobre la relación (...) entre el espacio y los mass media a partir de una lectura narrativa de la espacialidad.This paper aims at determining the theoretical framework where a mass media hermeneutics can be developed from Heidegger's philosophical presumptions. The thesis proposed says that that theoretical framework represents the phenomenology of the space. Therefore, first it is exposed the meaning of "media". Then, the main concepts of the Dasein spatiality are presented.And, finally, two consequences about the relation between space and mass media from a narrative reading of the spatiality are extracted. (shrink)

En este trabajo nos propondremos desarrollar tres tesis fundamentales: a) Mostrar que Heidegger concibe al mundo como una trama semántica de corte pragmático, anterior a la fijación en cualquier material fonético codificado culturalmente; b) Señalar que el fenómeno que Winnicott indica con el término transicionalidad puede ser equiparado al mundo de Heidegger; y c) En la medida en que ese espacio potencial se constituye como un mecanismo de frontera que posibilita el tránsito de lo exterior a lo interior, puede ser (...) comprendido como una estructura intencional. Así, el carácter de mediación del mundo se considera desde el punto de vista del correlato objetivo, es decir, desde el útil y la obra de arte. Ambos tipos de “objetos” son dispositivos que se sitúan en la frontera del sentido y posibilitan la transición de aquello que está por fuera del espacio semántico. (shrink)

Resumen: En la novela Nadie nada nunca, Juan José Saer narra la desarticulación de la instancia de la enunciación. Uno de los motivos en los que se anuncia esta temática es la relación intersubjetiva de intimidad. Entre otros temas, la novela narra la imposibilidad de establecer un vínculo de intimidad entre los cuerpos. De allí es que se pueda hablar de un modelo narrativo antifenomenológico. El cuerpo propio como instancia fundamental de la enunciación no se instituye en la sede originaria (...) de la significación. Para reconstruir el motivo de la intimidad corporal en el universo ficcional de Nadie nada nunca el trabajo usa como criterio de lectura el concepto de intimidad de Martin Heidegger.: Juan José Saer tells in the novel Nadie nada nunca the dissolution of the Enunciation instance. One of the narrative motive in that this topic reveals is the intersubjective relationship of intimacy. Among other topics, the novel tells the impossibility to set an intimacy bound between the bodies. Hence, it is possible to talk about an antiphenomenological narrative model. The own body as fundamental Enunciation instance doesn´t show itself as the original place of meaning. To bring to light this motive of corporal intimacy in the fictional universe of Nadie nada nunca this paper uses, as lecture criterion, the Heideggerian Concept of intimacy. (shrink)

El texto aborda una de las cuestiones metodológicas fundamentales que Heidegger se planteaba en las Frühe Freiburger Vorlesungen (1919-1923), a saber, el problema de la indicación formal. En efecto, si la vida misma (Dasein) es un acontecimiento de sentido cerrado en sí mismo es necesario establecer un punto de vista que exprese conceptualmente la vida sin objetivarla. El gran problema con el que Heidegger se enfrenta es encontrar un metalenguaje no objetivante. El concepto de indicación formal es lo que le (...) permite elaborar un discurso sobre el origen. (shrink)

El propósito de este trabajo es doble: por un lado, intentaremos exponer el vínculo entre sublimación y ciencia en Freud y la relación entre la desmundanización y el discurso teórico en Heidegger con el fin de establecer sus similitudes y diferencias. Y, por el otro, el trabajo propone una lectura crítica de la concepción heideggeriana de la ciencia a partir de la noción freudiana de sublimación. La idea es mostrar que Heidegger no lograría ver un significado positivo de los discursos (...) objetivantes en la constitución de la propiedad del Dasein, es decir, en la modalidad auténtica de la subjetividad. Asimismo, se afirma que la interpretación enunciativa de la segunda tópica de Freud posibilita una crítica a su epistemología naturalista.The purpose of this paper is double: at one side we tried to expose the link between sublimation and science in Freud and the relationship between unworlding and the theoretical discourse of Heidegger with the aim of establishing similarities and differences. And on the other side, the paperintends a critical reading of Heidegger’s conception of science by means of Freud’s conception of sublimatization. The idea is to show that Heidegger fails to see a positive meaning in the objectivizing discourses in the constitution of the property of Dasein, that is, in the authentic mode of subjectivity. In additionthe article maintains that the enunciative interpretation of Freud’s second topic makes possible an criticism of his naturalistic epistemology. (shrink)

We argue that narratives are central to the success of historical reconstruction. Narrative explanation involves tracing causal trajectories across time. The construction of narrative, then, often involves postulating relatively speculative causal connections between comparatively well-established events. But speculation is not always idle or harmful: it also aids in overcoming local underdetermination by forming scaffolds from which new evidence becomes relevant. Moreover, as our understanding of the past’s causal milieus become richer, the constraints on narrative plausibility become increasingly strict: a narrative’s (...) admissibility does not turn on mere logical consistency with background data. Finally, narrative explanation and explanation generated by simple, formal models complement one another. Where models often achieve isolation and precision at the cost of simplification and abstraction, narratives can track complex changes in a trajectory over time at the cost of simplicity and precision. In combination both allow us to understand and explain highly complex historical sequences. (shrink)

Historical scientists frequently face incomplete data, and lack direct experimental access to their targets. This has led some philosophers and scientists to be pessimistic about the epistemic potential of the historical sciences. And yet, historical science often produces plausible, sophisticated hypotheses. I explain this capacity to generate knowledge in the face of apparent evidential scarcity by examining recent work on Thylacoleo carnifex, the ‘marsupial lion’. Here, we see two important methodological features. First, historical scientists are methodological omnivores, that is, they (...) construct purpose-built epistemic tools tailored to generate evidence about highly specific targets. This allows them to produce multiple streams of independent evidence and thus maximize their epistemic reach. Second, investigative scaffolding: research proceeds in a piece-meal fashion, information only gaining evidential relevance once certain hypotheses are well supported. I illustrate scaffolding in a discussion of the nature of functional ascription in paleobiology. Frequently, different senses of ‘function’ are not discriminated during paleobiological investigation—something which can mar adaptationist investigations of extant organisms. However, I argue that, due to scaffolding, conflating senses of ‘function’ can be the right thing to do. Coarse-grained functional hypotheses are required before it is clear what evidence could discriminate between more fine-grained ones. I draw on omnivory and scaffolding to argue that pessimists make a bad empirical bet. It is a bad idea to bet against the epistemic fortunes of such opportunistic and resourceful scientists, especially when we have reason to think we will systematically underestimate the amount of evidence ultimately available to them. (shrink)

Cognitive archaeologists infer from material remains to the cognitive features of past societies. We characterize cognitive archaeology in terms of trace-based reasoning, which in the case of cognitive archaeology involves inferences drawing upon background theory linking objects from the archaeological record to cognitive features. We analyse such practices, examining work on cognitive evolution, language, and musicality. We argue that the central epistemic challenge for cognitive archaeology is often not a paucity of material remains, but insufficient constraint from cognitive theories. However, (...) we also argue that the success of cognitive archaeology does not necessarily require well-developed cognitive theories: Success might instead lead to them. (shrink)

Many accounts of scientific modeling conceive of models as fictions: scientists interact with models in ways analogous to various aesthetic objects. Fictionalists follow most other accounts of modeling by taking them to be revelatory of the actual world in virtue of bearing some resemblance relation to a target system. While such fictionalist accounts capture crucial aspects of modelling practice, they are ill-suited to some design and engineering contexts. Here, models sometimes serve to underwrite design projects whereby real-world targets are constructed. (...) In such circumstances, it is unclear what the model is supposed to resemble. Further, while fictionalists often require that models qua models have their content in virtue of construal or interpretation, in some engineering and design contexts success-conditions do not require such content—all that is required is that the model generates the required outputs. I take these points to motivate a view which accommodates fictionalism, but is broader. I articulate and defend an account of models as tools: specifically, material objects which are put to particular uses in particular contexts. (shrink)

Our epistemic access to the past is infamously patchy: historical information degrades and disappears and bygone eras are often beyond the reach of repeatable experiments. However, historical scientists have been remarkably successful at uncovering and explaining the past. I argue that part of this success is explained by the exploitation of dependencies between historical events, entities, and processes. For instance, if sauropod dinosaurs were hot blooded, they must have been gluttons; the high-energy demands of endothermy restrict sauropod grazing strategies. Understanding (...) such dependencies extends our reach into the past in spite of incomplete data. In addition, this serves as a counterexample to two accounts of method in the historical sciences. By one, historical science proceeds by identifying ‘smoking guns’: traces that discriminate between live hypotheses. By the other, historical hypotheses are supported by consilience: the convergence of independent lines of evidence. However, testing for ‘coherency’ between past hypotheses also plays a critical role in historical confirmation. Just as historical scientists exploit dependencies between past entities and present entities to infer what the past was like, they also exploit dependencies between past entities themselves. I do not suggest that archetypical historical science proceeds in this manner. Rather, the lesson I draw is that historical methodology cannot be characterized as archetypically relying on one method or another. Historical science is at base opportunistic, and is resistant to unitary analyses. 1 Introduction2 Snowballs and Explosions: The Basic Idea3 Were Sauropods Endothermic?4 Dependent Entities and Interdependent Explanations5 Smoking Guns and Consilience. (shrink)

I develop an account of the relationship between aesthetics and knowledge, focusing on scientific practice. Cognitivists infer from ‘partial sensitivity’—aesthetic appreciation partly depends on doxastic states—to ‘factivity’, the idea that the truth or otherwise of those beliefs makes a difference to aesthetic appreciation. Rejecting factivity, I develop a notion of ‘epistemic engagement’: partaking genuinely in a knowledge-directed process of coming to epistemic judgements, and suggest that this better accommodates the relationship between the aesthetic and the epistemic. Scientific training (and other (...) knowledge-directed activities), I argue, involves ‘attunement’: the co-option of aesthetic judgements towards epistemic ends. Thus, the connection between aesthetic appreciation and knowledge is psychological and contingent. This view has consequences for the warrant of aesthetic judgement in science, namely, the locus of justification is those processes of attunement, not the aesthetic judgements themselves. (shrink)

Many accounts of scientific modeling conceive of models as fictions: scientists interact with models in ways analogous to various aesthetic objects. Fictionalists follow most other accounts of modeling by taking them to be revelatory of the actual world in virtue of bearing some resemblance relation to a target system. While such fictionalist accounts capture crucial aspects of modelling practice, they are ill-suited to some design and engineering contexts. Here, models sometimes serve to underwrite design projects whereby real-world targets are constructed. (...) In such circumstances, it is unclear what the model is supposed to resemble. Further, while fictionalists often require that models qua models have their content in virtue of construal or interpretation, in some engineering and design contexts success-conditions do not require such content—all that is required is that the model generates the required outputs. I take these points to motivate a view which accommodates fictionalism, but is broader. I articulate and defend an account of models as tools: specifically, material objects which are put to particular uses in particular contexts. (shrink)

Pluralism about scientific method is more-or-less accepted, but the consequences have yet to be drawn out. Scientists adopt different methods in response to different epistemic situations: depending on the system they are interested in, the resources at their disposal, and so forth. If it is right that different methods are appropriate in different situations, then mismatches between methods and situations are possible. This is most likely to occur due to method bias: when we prefer a particular kind of method, despite (...) that method clashing with evidential context or our aims. To explore these ideas, we sketch a kind of method pluralism which turns on two properties of evidence, before using agent-based models to examine the relationship between methods, epistemic situations, and bias. Based on our results, we suggest that although method bias can undermine the efficiency of a scientific community, it can also be productive through preserving a diversity of evidence. We consider circumstances where method bias could be particularly egregious, and those where it is a potential virtue, and argue that consideration of method bias reveals that community standards deserve a central place in the epistemology of science. (shrink)

Biologists often study living systems in light of their having evolved, of their being the products of various processes of heredity, adaptation, ancestry, and so on. In their investigations, then, biologists think comparatively: they situate lineages into models of those evolutionary processes, comparing their targets with ancestral relatives and with analogous evolutionary outcomes. This element characterizes this mode of investigation - 'comparative thinking' - and puts it to work in understanding why biological science takes the shape it does. Importantly, comparative (...) thinking is local: what we can do with knowledge of a lineage is limited by the evolutionary processes into which it fits. In light of this analysis, the Element examines the experimental study of animal cognition, and macroevolutionary investigation of the 'shape of life', demonstrating the importance of comparative thinking in understanding both the power and limitations of biological knowledge. (shrink)

The cross-cultural differences in epistemic intuitions reported by Weinberg, Nichols and Stich (2001; hereafter: WNS) laid the ground for the negative program of experimental philosophy. However, most of WNS’s findings were not corroborated in further studies. The exception here is the study concerning purported differences between Westerners and Indians in knowledge ascriptions concerning the Zebra Case, which was never properly replicated. Our study replicates the above-mentioned experiment on a considerably larger sample of Westerners (n = 211) and Indians (n = (...) 204). The analysis found a significant difference between the ethnic groups in question in the predicted direction: Indians were more likely to attribute knowledge in the Zebra Case than Westerners. In this paper, we offer an explanation of our result that takes into account the fact that replications of WNS’s other experiments did not find any cross-cultural differences. We argue that the Zebra Case is unique among the vignettes tested by WNS since it should not be regarded as a Gettier case but rather as a scenario exhibiting skeptical pressure concerning the reliability of sense-perception. We argue that skepticism towards perception as a means of gaining knowledge is a trope that is deeply rooted in Western epistemology but is very much absent from Classical Indian philosophical inquiry. This line of reasoning is based on a thorough examination of the skeptical scenarios discussed by philosophers of the Indian Nyaya tradition and their adversaries. (shrink)

. Philosophers and scientists often cite ontic factors when explaining the methods and success of scientific inquiry. That is, the adoption of a method or approach is explained in reference to the kind of system in which the scientist is interested: these are explanations of why scientists do what they do, that appeal to properties of their target systems. We present a framework for understanding such “Opticks to his Principia. Newton’s optical work is largely experiment-driven, while the Principia is primarily (...) mathematical, so usually, each work is taken to exemplify a different kind of science. However, Newton himself often presented them in terms of a largely consistent method. We use our framework to articulate an original and plausible position: that the differences between the Opticks and the Principia are due to the kinds of systems targeted. That is, we provide an ontic-driven explanation of methodological differences. We suspect that ontic factors should have a more prominent role in historical explanations of scientific method and development. (shrink)

Debate about the epistemic prowess of historical science has focused on local underdetermination problems generated by a lack of historical data; the prevalence of information loss over geological time, and the capacities of scientists to mitigate it. Drawing on Leonelli’s recent distinction between ‘phenomena-time’ and ‘data-time’ I argue that factors like data generation, curation and management significantly complexifies and undermines this: underdetermination is a bad way of framing the challenges historical scientists face. In doing so, I identify circumstances of epistemic (...) scarcity where underdetermination problems are particularly salient, and discuss cases where legacy data—data generated using differing technologies and systems of practice—are drawn upon to overcome underdetermination. This suggests that one source of overcoming underdetermination is our knowledge of science’s past. Further, data-time makes agnostic positions about the epistemic fortunes of scientists working under epistemic scarcity more plausible. But agnosticism seems to leave philosophers without much normative grip. So, I sketch an alternative approach: focusing on the strategies scientists adopt to maximize their epistemic power in light of the resources available to them. (shrink)

Ethnographic analogy, the use of comparative data from anthropology to inform reconstructions of past human societies, has a troubled history. Archaeologists often express concern about, or outright reject, the practice—and sometimes do so in problematically general terms. This is odd, as the use of comparative data in archaeology is the same pattern of reasoning as the ‘comparative method’ in biology, which is a well-developed and robust set of inferences which play a central role in discovering the biological past. In pointing (...) out this continuity, I argue that there is no ‘special pleading’ on the part of archaeologists in this regard: biologists must overcome analogous epistemic difficulties in their use of comparative data. I then go on to emphasize the local, empirically tractable ways in which particular ethnographic analogies may be licensed. (shrink)

Both paleobiology and investigations of ‘major evolutionary transitions’ are intimately concerned with the macroevolutionary shape of life. It is surprising, then, how little studies of major transitions are informed by paleontological perspectives and. I argue that this disconnect is partially justified because paleobiological investigation is typically ‘phenomena-led’, while investigations of major transitions are ‘theory-led’. The distinction turns on evidential relevance: in the former case, evidence is relevant in virtue of its relationship to some phenomena or hypotheses concerning those phenomena; in (...) the latter, evidence is relevant in virtue of providing insights into, or tests of, an abstract body of theory. Because paleobiological data is by-and-large irrelevant to the theory which underwrites the traditional conception of major transitions, it is of limited use to that research program. I suggest that although the traditional conception of major transitions is neither ad-hoc or problematically incomplete, its promise of providing unificatory explanations of the transitions is unlikely to be kept. Further, examining paleobiological investigations of mass extinctions and organogenesis, I further argue that whether or not transitions in paleobiology count as ‘major’ turns on how we conceive of major transitions ; although major transitions potentially have a unified theoretical basis, recent developments suggest that investigations are becoming increasingly phenomena-led; adopting phenomena-led investigations maximizes the evidence available to paleobiologists. (shrink)

The scientific investigation of music requires contributions from a diverse array of disciplines. Given the diverse methodologies, interests and research targets of the disciplines involved, we argue that there is a plurality of legitimate research questions about music, necessitating a focus on integration. In light of this we recommend a pluralistic conception of music—that there is no unitary definition divorced from some discipline, research question or context. This has important implications for how the scientific study of music ought to proceed: (...) we show that some definitions are complementary, that is, they reflect different research interests and ought to be retained and, where possible, integrated, while others are antagonistic, they represent real empirical disagreement about music’s nature and how to account for it. We illustrate this in discussion of two related issues: questions about the evolutionary function of music, and questions of the innateness of music. These debates have been, in light of pluralism, misconceived. We suggest that, in both cases, scientists ought to proceed by constructing integrated models which take into account the dynamic interaction between different aspects of music. (shrink)

For among most contemporaries, the concept of Eros seems to have nothing to do with Christianity. Sifting through the psychoanalysis of sexual fantasy, theologically it says nothing. Our study gives reasons showing that for theologians since the dawn of the Christian era, Eros-love plays a fundamental role.. The connotations of this concept, however, are different from those of today, when its sensory meaning is more restricted to sexuality. Greek theologians of the first centuries after Christ, taught the concept of Plato (...) enshrined as a unifying enthusiasm, the attraction of inferior to superior states, as “hungry and thirsty” for something continuously higher, developing, and enriching the connotation. The work of Dionysius Areopagite, the Idea of Good, leads us step by step up the ascent of the erotically chaste, and is identified with the One-God, who is the very source of love. Consequently, Eros-love originates from God, Eros- love being not only an ascending but firstly a descending love, which calls for a reciprocal communion. (shrink)

Altered state theories of hypnosis posit that a qualitatively distinct state of mental processing, which emerges in those with high hypnotic susceptibility following a hypnotic induction, enables the generation of anomalous experiences in response to specific hypnotic suggestions. If so then such a state should be observable as a discrete pattern of changes to functional connectivity (shared information) between brain regions following a hypnotic induction in high but not low hypnotically susceptible participants. Twenty-eight channel EEG was recorded from 12 high (...) susceptible (highs) and 11 low susceptible (lows) participants with their eyes closed prior to and following a standard hypnotic induction. The EEG was used to provide a measure of functional connectivity using both coherence (COH) and the imaginary component of coherence (iCOH), which is insensitive to the effects of volume conduction. COH and iCOH were calculated between all electrode pairs for the frequency bands: delta (0.1–3.9Hz), theta (4–7.9Hz) alpha (8–12.9Hz), beta1 (13–19.9Hz), beta2 (20–29.9Hz) and gamma (30–45Hz). The results showed that there was an increase in theta iCOH from the pre-hypnosis to hypnosis condition in highs but not lows with a large proportion of significant links being focused on a central-parietal hub. There was also a decrease in beta1 iCOH from the pre-hypnosis to hypnosis condition with a focus on a fronto-central and an occipital hub that was greater in high compared to low susceptibles. There were no significant differences for COH or for spectral band amplitude in any frequency band. The results are interpreted as indicating that the hypnotic induction elicited a qualitative change in the organization of specific control systems within the brain for high as compared to low susceptible participants. This change in the functional organization of neural networks is a plausible indicator of the much theorized “hypnotic-state”. (shrink)

Here’s something I’m willing to claim we know: Homo sapiens, in particular the Polynesian settlers who first arrived in Aotearoa around the twelfth century, take the lion’s share of causal blame for the extinction of a lineage of enormous flightless birds: the moa. Stretching to three metres at their tallest, moa were a distinctive and remarkable feature of Aotearoa’s primeval forests, playing the main browser and grazer role in this unique bird-based ecosystem. Once humans turned up forests were burned, moa (...) were stalked, and human-0introduced arrivals such as kiore had dramatic ecological repercussions. Within a few centuries, the moa were gone. (shrink)

In this concise study, Nicole Brenez argues for Abel Ferrara’s place in a line of grand inventors who have blurred distinctions between industry and avant-garde film, including Orson Welles, Monte Hellman, and Nicholas Ray. Rather than merely reworking genre film, Brenez understands Ferrara’s oeuvre as formulating new archetypes that depict the evil of the modern world. Focusing as much on the human figure as on elements of storytelling, she argues that films such as Bad Lieutenant express this evil through visionary (...) characters struggling against the inadmissible. (shrink)

Consideration of evidence and data in historical science is dominated by textual metaphor: we reconstruct the past on the basis of various incomplete records. I suggest that although textual metaphors are often apt, they also lead philosophers and scientists to think about historical evidence in particular ways, and that other perspectives might be fruitful. Towards this, I explore the notion of natural historical evidence being thought of as ‘ruins’. This has several potential benefits. First, the architectural aspect of the metaphor (...) emphasizes the contingency of historical subjects and the coherency of design-based reconstruction. Second, historical data, like ruins, are co-constructed, involving intimate interaction with materials. (shrink)

We argue for conceptual pluralism about music. In our view, there is no right answer to the question ‘What is music?’ divorced from some context or interest. Instead, there are several, non-equivalent music concepts suited to different interests – from within some tradition or practice, or by way of some research question or field of inquiry. We argue that unitary definitions of music are problematic, that the role music concepts play in various research questions should motivate conceptual pluralism about music, (...) and that taking music pluralism seriously grounds a fruitful research programme in aesthetics. We suspect that pluralism about music is a good test case for the utility of pluralism in aesthetics more generally, and we present it as such. (shrink)