MANY COMMENTATORS HAVE SAID THAT KANT'S DOCTRINE OF THE HIGHEST GOOD - AS EXPRESSED IN THE SECOND CRITIQUE, FOR EXAMPLE - IS SERIOUSLY FLAWED BOTH IN ITSELF AND IN THAT IT CONTRADICTS OTHER IMPORTANT CLAIMS OF KANT'S MORAL PHILOSOPHY. I ADVANCE AN INTERPRETATION OF KANT'S DOCTRINE ON WHICH IT SUFFERS FROM NONE OF THESE ALLEGED FLAWS.

Hill and Levine offer alternative explanations of these conceivabilities, concluding that these conceivabilities are thereby defeated as evidence. However, this strategy fails because their explanations generalize to all conceivability judgments concerning phenomenal states. Consequently, one could defend absolutely any theory of phenomenal states against conceivability arguments in just this way. This result conflicts with too many of our common sense beliefs about the evidential value of conceivability with respect to phenomenal states. The general moral is that the application of such (...) principles of explanatory defeat is neither simple nor straightforward. (shrink)

‘…one might easily wonder why no one has ever pointed out the mince pie syllogism…” (G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention, 2nd edition 1969, sec. 33).

"Distributed in the U.S.A. by Barnes & Noble, inc." Bibliography: p. [251]-257.

The following transcript is adapted from a case conference held in the Barnes and Wohl Hospitals, St. Louis, Missouri. The participants are members of the Departments of Internal Medicine and Pathology of the Washington University School of Medicine. Dr. Renée Fox, professor and chairman of the Department of Sociology at the University of Pennsylvania and co‐author of the book The Courage to Fail, was a guest at the conference.

While Sartre scholars cannot fairly be described as being opposed to science, they have, for the most part, stayed aloof. The field of psychology, of course, has been an exception. Sartre himself felt compelled to present his own existential psychoanalysis by marking the parallels and differences between his position and traditional approaches, particularly the Freudian. The same is true with respect to his concept of bad faith and of emotional behavior. Scholars have followed his lead with richly productive results. But (...) we may note that the debate has centered on psychic and therapeutic issues, aspects of what Sartre called le vécu or lived experience, rather than on the findings of cognitive science or neuroscience. Although all existentialists and phenomenologists accept as a central tenet the fact that consciousness is embodied, there has been virtually no concern with the biological substratum. But the study of consciousness cannot be restricted within its own narrow confines—unlike, say, Greek grammar, which can be learned without reference to the rules of Arabic. At some point, there must be established an organic foundation for the behavior of the conscious organism. (shrink)

Act Utilitarianism and Rule Utilitarianism, in one formu lation of each, are not extensionally equivalent, that is, they do not require of an agent precisely the same behavior as is shown by Gerald Barnes in "Utilitarianisms”, Ethics 82 (197I) 56-64. As a result each theory passes and sometimes fails different utilitarian tests: the comparative consequences of universal conformity by everyone (distributively) vs. universal conformity by everyone (collectively) Barnes argues that the latter is the appropriate test. I argue (...) that the test which AU passes is the appropriate one, since everyone, collectively, does not make moral choices. Moral choices are made by everyone individually. (shrink)

On the basis of certain tensions between Jacques Rancière’s aesthetics and his political philosophy, the article tries to trace new modes of subjectivation in contemporary activism and art. It explores how the actors of the overlapping terrains of aesthetic and political practices organize ‘different forms, different spaces of expression and distribution of ideas’ in Rancière’s sense. Yet, analysing the practices of the Occupy movement, the Spanish M15 movement, and the dOCUMENTA ‘agents’ AND AND AND as radically inclusive, polyvocal and transversal, (...) it proposes a position that differs from Rancière’s rejection of activist art, a non-totalizing political aesthetics as a component of molecular revolution. (shrink)

A full account of the philosophy of the Greek and Roman worlds from the last days of Aristotle until 100 BC. Hellenistic philosophy, for long relatively neglected and unappreciated, has over the last decade been the object of a considerable amount of scholarly attention. Now available in paperback, this 1999 volume is a general reference work which pulls the subject together and presents an overview. The History is organised by subject, rather than chronologically or by philosophical school, with sections on (...) logic, epistemology, physics and metaphysics, ethics and politics. It has been written by specialists but is intended to be a source of reference for any student of ancient philosophy, for students of classical antiquity and for students of the philosophy of later periods. Greek and Latin are used sparingly and always translated in the main text. (shrink)

This book contains the material for a first course in pure model theory with applications to differentially closed fields.

Adopting a much broader notion of thinking than that associated with the Critical Thinking movement, this paper addresses the question of thinking skill generality. An analysis of the concept of ‘thinking skill’ suggests ways in which this notion has been misapplied. The paper demonstrates the importance of thinking tasks and argues for a non–universalistic notion of thinking skill generality. The domains–view of thinking is assessed, evidence from secondary research being used to show that thinking skills are not domain–specific simply by (...) virtue of being instantiated with disciplinary content. The prevalence of general procedural knowledge in our thinking practices notwithstanding, empirical evidence suggests the existence of at least two kinds of domain–specific thinking skills: those in which thinking is essentially the application of domain–specific declarative knowledge; and those addressing specialised, domain–specific, thinking tasks. (shrink)

The present book is the English version of a monograph 'Die aristotelische Syllogistik', which first appeared ten years ago in the series of Abhand 1 lungen edited by the Academy of Sciences in Gottingen. In the preface to the English edition, I would first like to express my indebtedness to Mr. J. Barnes, now fellow of Oriel College, Oxford. He not only translated what must have been a difficult text with exemplary precision and ingenuity, but followed critically every argument (...) and check ed every reference. While translating it, he has improved the book. Of those changes which I have made on Mr. Barnes' suggestion I note only the more important ones on pages 4, 12, 24sq, 32, 39, 6lsq, and 158. Since the second edition of the German text appeared in 1963 some further reviews have been published, or come to my notice, which I have 2 been able to make use of in improving the text of this new edition. I must mention here especially the detailed critical discussions of my results and arguments published by Professor W. Wieland in the Philosophische Rundschau 14 (1966), 1-27 and by Professor E. Scheibe in Gnomon 39 (1967), 454-64. Both scholars, while agreeing with the main drift and method of my interpretation, criticise some of my results and disagree with some of my arguments. It would not be possible to discuss these technical matters here with the necessary thoroughness. (shrink)

I INTRODUCTION - THE TOPIC EXPLAINED 1 GENERAL DIFFERENCES From its inception to the present, philosophy may be viewed as a series of struggles between ...

Parmenides didn't mention reference as such, but if he had he would have undoubtedly agreed with the philosophers who nowadays hold what is called "the axiom of existence": that one can only refer to what exists. The sources of possible support for this view are examined and rejected. Primary support for the axiom is given by two sorts of argument; one concerning quantification, the other summarizing a standard Parmenidean puzzle. Weaknesses in both are exposed. Finally, the relations between the axiom (...) and connected claims about predication and truth are probed, and an attempt is made to determine the limits of the mutual support these claims give one another. (shrink)

Much of Grünbaum's work may be regarded as a careful development and systematic elaboration of the Riemann-Poincaré thesis of the conventionality of congruence, the thesis that the continuous manifolds of space, time, and space-time are intrinsically metrically amorphous, i.e. are devoid of intrinsic metrics. Therefore, to appreciate Grünbaum's philosophical contributions, one must have a clear understanding of what he means by an intrinsic metric. The second and fourth sections of this paper are exegetical; in them we try to piece together, (...) from his sundry remarks about intrinsic metrics, what Grünbaum means by the term 'intrinsic metric.' We shall argue that, the customary carefulness and precision of Grünbaum's writings notwithstanding, there are residual unclarities and difficulties which beset his conception of an intrinsic metric. In the fifth section we shall propose an explication of Grünbaum's notion of an intrinsic metric which seems on the whole faithful to Grünbaum's intuitions and insights and which also seems capable of performing the philosophical services which his work demands of that notion. The third section is a digression on Zeno's metrical paradox of extension. (shrink)