Der agyptische Zeitbegriff hat zwei Eigentumlichkeiten: erstens gibt es nicht einen, sondern zwei Begriffe fur das, was wir Zeit nennen, und zweitens konnen wir diese Begriffe zugleich mit Zeit und mit Ewigkeit wiedergeben. Sie bezeichnen die Zeit in ihrer Gesamtheit, ihrer unabsehbaren Fulle. Jan Assmann untersucht die Bedeutung dieses dualen Zeit/Ewigkeitsbegriffs in funf Schritten. Im ersten Teil wird diese Zweiteilung der Zeit aus der Aspektopposition des agyptischen Verbalsystems abgeleitet, das sich nicht, wie das uns vertraute auf die drei Zeitstufen (...) Vergangenheit Gegenwart Zukunft, sondern auf die zwei Aspekte Imperfektiv/Perfektiv bezieht und mit verschiedenen Symbolisierungen und Personifikationen in Verbindung gebracht. Die eine Zeit der unendlich in sich kreisenden Bewegung, aus der die Zeiteinheiten der Stunden, Tage, Monate, Jahre hervorgehen ist die Sternzeit, die Zeit des Sonnengottes, die andere Zeit der unwandelbaren Dauer ist die Steinzeit, die Zeit des Osiris. In einem zweiten Schritt wird diese Unterscheidung inhaltlich konkretisiert als kosmische und moralische Zeit. Die kosmische Sternzeit ist die Zeit der Riten, durch deren Vollzug sich der Mensch in die kosmischen Ordnungen eingliedert. Die Steinzeit der Grabmonumente, in denen sich der Mensch ins Gedachtnis der Nachwelt einzuschreiben hofft, ist die Zeit der Rechenschaft und der Geschichte. Speziell dem agyptischen Umgang mit Geschichte widmet sich der dritte Teil. Hier geht es um den engen Zusammenhang von Zeit, Geschichte und Staat, der fur das agyptische Zeitverstandnis charakteristisch ist. Der vierte Teil behandelt den Unterschied von linearer und zyklischer Zeit, Irreversibilitat und Reversibilitat, Steinzeit und Sternzeit unter dem Gesichtspunkt des Endes, das in beiden Dimensionen jeweils ganz unterschiedliche Formen annimmt. Im letzten Teil untersucht Assmann den grundlegenden Wandel des agyptischen Zeitdenkens in der 2. Halfte des 2. Jahrtausends v. Chr. Die aus der Bewegung der Sonne um die Erde ausstromende Sternzeit fullt sich immer mehr mit dem Inhalt von Schicksal und Geschichte, die Zeit, und mit ihr das menschliche Leben und das Geschick des Landes, wird in Gottes Handen gedacht. (shrink)

Der 9. Band der Reihe behandelt das Thema der Identität, allerdings von einer ganz anderen Seite, von seinem Gegenbegriff der Verwandlung aus. Es geht dabei um die Frage: Was ist der Mensch? Ist er der Verwandlungskünstler, Rollenspieler, Maskenträger gegenüber der Welt der Tiere, die sich immer treu bleiben und immer dieselben sind? Hat er sich im Laufe der Kulturgeschichte vom archaischen Menschen, der als Schamane Tiergestalt annimmt, als Benandante zum Werwolf wird, im Ritus ein Leopard ist, zum modernen Menschen entwickelt, (...) der sich festlegen muß und festgelegt wird auf eine Identität, die ihm zum stahlhart unentrinnbaren Gehäuse wird? Und welche Rolle spielt die Schrift in diesem Prozeß? Bedeutet der Gegensatz von Mündlichkeit und Schriftlichkeit zugleich den Übergang von der labilen zur stabilen, zugeschriebenen und festgeschriebenen Identität? Diese und andere Fragen werden an archaischen Gesellschaften und Werken der Hochkultur ebenso erörtert wie an popkulturellen Phänomenen der Gegenwart. (shrink)

Since the 1990s, Reinhart Koselleck has been one of the critics of the concept of collective memory. This includes contributions to practical debates on the one hand and reflections on a more theoretical level on the other. In contrast, with her concept of cultural memory, Aleida Assmann has taken a more positive view of the concept of collective memory. She defends this concept against Koselleck’s critical remarks, referring to him as an implicit addressee of her reflections. This essay takes (...) this disagreement as an opportunity to look more closely at the ‘dialogue’ between them by addressing three overlapping aspects, primarily on a theoretical level: the distinction between experience and recollection, the collective conditions of recollection, and the opposition between history of memory and memory of history. (shrink)

A book review of Jan Assman's book on Total Religion.

Jan Assmann, one of the world’s most outstanding Egyptologists, has written a remarkable and fascinating book, Moses the Egyptian: The Memory of Egypt in Western Monotheism. Assmann, however, is not primarily concerned with the historical question that has intrigued thinkers throughout the ages : Was Moses an Egyptian? Nor is the book primarily a contribution to Egyptology—although Assmann is a master of the discipline. What then is it really about? The question is simple and direct, but the (...) answer—as we shall see—is complex and subtle. Assmann’s primary aim is to contribute to a new field of study that he calls “mnemohistory.” Moses, Assmann tells us, is a “figure of memory, not of history.” There is no independent historical or archaeological evidence that the biblical Moses ever really existed. Our knowledge of Moses is based primarily on the biblical account, although there are also legends, stories, and anecdotes that can be found in apocryphal sources. Yet there is no other human figure of memory that has exerted such a powerful influence in shaping the tradition of Western monotheism. Assmann explores the image of Egypt in Western thinking; he probes the dynamics of religious intolerance and tolerance, and the origins of anti-Semitism. He also contributes to an enriched understanding of the Enlightenment and its legacy. Furthermore, Assmann’s study can be read as a lucid reflection on issues that have been at the center of recent controversies about multiculturalism and cultural identity. Moses The Egyptian is erudite, beautifully conceived, and passionately written. (shrink)

Jan Assmann, one of the world’s most outstanding Egyptologists, has written a remarkable and fascinating book, Moses the Egyptian: The Memory of Egypt in Western Monotheism. Assmann, however, is not primarily concerned with the historical question that has intrigued thinkers throughout the ages : Was Moses an Egyptian? Nor is the book primarily a contribution to Egyptology—although Assmann is a master of the discipline. What then is it really about? The question is simple and direct, but the (...) answer—as we shall see—is complex and subtle. Assmann’s primary aim is to contribute to a new field of study that he calls “mnemohistory.” Moses, Assmann tells us, is a “figure of memory, not of history.” There is no independent historical or archaeological evidence that the biblical Moses ever really existed. Our knowledge of Moses is based primarily on the biblical account, although there are also legends, stories, and anecdotes that can be found in apocryphal sources. Yet there is no other human figure of memory that has exerted such a powerful influence in shaping the tradition of Western monotheism. Assmann explores the image of Egypt in Western thinking; he probes the dynamics of religious intolerance and tolerance, and the origins of anti-Semitism. He also contributes to an enriched understanding of the Enlightenment and its legacy. Furthermore, Assmann’s study can be read as a lucid reflection on issues that have been at the center of recent controversies about multiculturalism and cultural identity. Moses The Egyptian is erudite, beautifully conceived, and passionately written. (shrink)

Jan Assmann, one of the world’s most outstanding Egyptologists, has written a remarkable and fascinating book, Moses the Egyptian: The Memory of Egypt in Western Monotheism. Assmann, however, is not primarily concerned with the historical question that has intrigued thinkers throughout the ages : Was Moses an Egyptian? Nor is the book primarily a contribution to Egyptology—although Assmann is a master of the discipline. What then is it really about? The question is simple and direct, but the (...) answer—as we shall see—is complex and subtle. Assmann’s primary aim is to contribute to a new field of study that he calls “mnemohistory.” Moses, Assmann tells us, is a “figure of memory, not of history.” There is no independent historical or archaeological evidence that the biblical Moses ever really existed. Our knowledge of Moses is based primarily on the biblical account, although there are also legends, stories, and anecdotes that can be found in apocryphal sources. Yet there is no other human figure of memory that has exerted such a powerful influence in shaping the tradition of Western monotheism. Assmann explores the image of Egypt in Western thinking; he probes the dynamics of religious intolerance and tolerance, and the origins of anti-Semitism. He also contributes to an enriched understanding of the Enlightenment and its legacy. Furthermore, Assmann’s study can be read as a lucid reflection on issues that have been at the center of recent controversies about multiculturalism and cultural identity. Moses The Egyptian is erudite, beautifully conceived, and passionately written. (shrink)

Jan Assman traces the roots of Mosaic Religion back to its Aegyptian origin. Reading the Holy Bible often makes one think that Moses was Hebrew. But Moses was an adopted Agyptian, as we become aware. Cultural memory is certainly stored in books, but at the same time it is a memory that forms our perception as human beings.

J. Assmann, Religion and Cultural Memory: Ten Studies (R. Livingstone trans; Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), ISBN 0804745226, 222 pp.

프로이트의 모세 및 유일신교의 성립 배경에 대한 연구는 정치신학의 논의 확산과 최근 이집트학의 재발견이라는 새로운 분위기 속에서 주목의 대상이 되고 있다. 이 논문은 프로이트의 마지막 저서 『인간 모세와 유일신교』의 출판 배경과 의도를 살펴보면서, 그의 모세-이집트인설과 유일신교 비판이 독일 나치주의의 반유대주의의 확산을 저지하려는 정치신학적 의도를 숨기고 있다는 사실을 부각시키고자 한다. 이집트학자 얀 아스만에 의하면, 모세의 유대교는 유일신교이나 아케나텐의 아톤교는 우주신교라는 점에서 차이가 있으며, 프로이트가 ‘역사적 인물’ 모세를 중시하는 반면, 문화적 기억이론에서는 ‘기억의 인물’ 모세를 대상으로 한다.BR 프로이트가 유대인 증오의 근원이 유일신교를 수립한 (...) 모세 그 자신에 있다고 말한 것처럼, 아스만 역시 유일신교는 참된 종교와 거짓 종교를 구별하는 이른바 ‘모세구별’에서 시작되었고, 따라서 모세구별의 폐지를 통해서만 억압과 폭력의 해체가 가능하다고 주장한다. 아스만은 프로이트가 “모세구별의 가장 노골적인 반대자”로서 반유대주의의 확산을 저지하려는 분명한 입장을 가졌다고 평가한다. 반유대주의적 증오가 나치주의 시대의 기독교인들에게 전이되는 가운데, 프로이트는 기독교의 실질적인 창시자 유대인 바울을 ‘유대교의 파괴자’인 동시에 ‘유대교의 계승자’라고 평가한다. 바로 이 지점에서 타우베스는 바울을 정치신학적으로 해석하기 시작하였으며, 아스만이 그것을 계승하였다. 프로이트가 기술하는 ‘역사적 모세’는 ‘예언자 모세’가 아니라 ‘법제정자와 정치적 개조로서 모세’이고, 그가 단행한 ‘구별’에서 유대인 혐오가 발생한 것이다. 따라서 ‘역사적 환원에 의한 해체’(니체)로서 프로이트의 유일신교 비판은 정치신학적 권능을 가지고 있다. 타우베스가 바울을 정치신학자로 해석한 것처럼, 아스만은 프로이트의 유일신교 비판에서 정치신학적 요소를 발굴한 것이다. (shrink)

The paper discusses various aspects of the concept of “cultural memory” coined by Jan Assmann and related both to the problem of determining the categories of culture that became the first objects of philosophical reflection in the era of the Axial Age and to the issues of the modern crisis of the ideology of globalism and multiculturalism. Using the example of some categories of an archaic myth that have not lost their cultural and social relevance at present, the variability (...) of the genesis of philosophy in various civilizations of the epoch of the “Axial Age” is demonstrated - both those in which it arises as an independent form of worldview and those where this process stops at the stage of a highly speculative myth. Special attention is paid to the cultural and social aspects of memory and recollection of the past as forms of spiritual “resistance” to external cultural influences and the preservation of religious and ethnic identity, which is equally relevant both during the genesis of philosophy and in modern post-industrial society during the crisis of globalist ideology and the philosophy of multiculturalism. (shrink)

English summary: The modern age understands justice not only as being an object of jurisprudence. Historical, philosophical, social and cultural studies along with theological approaches each draw near to justice in their own way. This collection devotes itself to the intricate interaction of outside perspectives with the judicial-interdisciplinary thematisation of the law, presenting revised papers delivered at the Protestant Institute for Interdisciplinary Research's symposium in honour of Professor Dr. Dres. h.c. Eberhard Schmidt-Aamann. The case studies and basic considerations deal with, (...) among other things, the function of the law in antique city states, the immanence and transcendence of justice from a theological perspective, as well as the relationship between economics and legal study. German description: Das Recht ist in der Moderne langst nicht nur Gegenstand der Rechtswissenschaft. Historische, philosophische, sozial- und kulturwissenschaftliche wie auch theologische Ansatze nahern sich dem Recht in je eigener Weise. Solche Aussenperspektiven stehen in komplexer Wechselwirkung mit der juristisch-binnendisziplinaren Thematisierung des Rechts. Dieser Sammelband ist dem Wechselspiel von Aussen- und Binnenperspektiven gewidmet. Er vereint die uberarbeiteten Beitrage eines Symposions, das an der Forschungsstatte der Evangelischen Studiengemeinschaft in Heidelberg zu Ehren von Prof. Dr. Dres. h.c. Eberhard Schmidt-Assmann veranstaltet wurde. Die exemplarischen Fallstudien und Grundsatzuberlegungen thematisieren unter anderem die Funktion des Rechts in antiken Stadtstaaten, die Immanenz und Transzendenz des Rechts aus theologischer Perspektive sowie das Verhaltnis von Okonomik und Rechtswissenschaft. Mit Beitragen von: Hans Diefenbacher, Hans-Joachim Gehrke, Klaus Gunther, Christoph Mollers, Thorsten Moos, Michael Moxter, Bernhard Nagel, Martin Ramstedt, Karl-Siegbert Rehberg, Magnus Schlette, Eberhard Schmidt-Assmann. (shrink)

'What is real?' has been one of the key questions of philosophy since its beginning in antiquity. But it is not just a question that philosophers ask. This Very Short Introduction discusses what reality is by looking at a variety of arguments, theories, and thought-experiments from philosophy, physics, and cognitive science.

The relevance of metamathematical researches for philosophy of math- ematics is an indubitable matter. In the paper I shall speak about impli- cations of metamathematics for general philosophy, especially for classical epistemological problems. Let us start with a historical observation con- cerning Hilbert's programme, the rst research programme in metamathe- matics as a separate study of formal systems. This programme was strongly in uence by epistemological considerations. In fact, Hilbert wanted to se- cure all classical mathematics against inconsistencies and this (...) aim had be achieved with the help of nitary consistency proof. Hilbert's claim is like the Cartesian project of reduction of all concepts to clarae et distinctae ideae. The epistemological commitment of original Hilbert's programme may be treated as a prelim- inary heuristic motivation for looking for epistemological implications of metamathematical results. It seems reasonable to examine in this respect three so-called limitative theorems: the rst Godel's incompleteness theo- rem , the second Godel's incom- pleteness theorem consistency of S, cannot be proved in S, providing that S is consistent) and Tarski's undenability theorem ; \S" stands for formal system containing elementary number theory. From the above-mentioned theorems we obtain an important, from philosophical point of view, conclusion: semantics of S cannot be expressed in S. Now, I shall present three applications of limitative theorems to the analysis of classical epistemological problems. (shrink)

Stephenson (2022) has argued that Kant’s thesis that all transcendental truths are transcendentally a priori knowable leads to omniscience of all transcendental truths. His arguments depend on luminosity principles and closure principles for transcendental knowability. We will argue that one pair of a luminosity and a closure principle should not be used, because the closure principle is too strong, while the other pair of a luminosity and a closure principle should not be used, because the luminosity principle is too strong. (...) Stephenson’s argument also depends on a factivity principle for transcendental knowability, which we will argue to be false. (shrink)

1. Die erste Hälfte des Kommentars, mit Ausnahme der Kapitel über die Weltseele.

The Natural Philosophy of Jan Bayer The main focus of this study is a reconstruction of the natural philosophy of the early modern Prešov's scholar Jan (Johannes) Bayer (1630–1674), with special regard to its Mosaic profile. After a critical reading of the research done on Bayer up to this point, the author concludes that Bayer’s natural-philosophical work, as such, has not yet been satisfactorily analyzed, nor has its connection to its supposedly two most important sources, Francis Bacon and Jan Amos (...) Comenius, been sufficiently explored. The study therefore concentrates on a critical analysis of Bayer’s interpretation of creation and his natural history, which are then both situated in the philosophical context of their time. The author then notes that although Bayer’s project of erecting an original and on the (especially Aristotelian) tradition independent Mosaic natural philosophy ended in failure, the thinker’s work can be assessed as a valuable attempt to synthesize Baconian and Comenian motifs while at the same time reflecting broader intellectual contexts of the period. (shrink)