Vicious Circles traces the history of development of public education and the near simultaneous advent of educational reform from its very beginning. Drawing on history, politics, law, sociology, and educational research, all aspects of public schooling are brought to light using a non-partisan analytical approach. Critically examining areas such as institutional racism, sexism, ableism, ethnocentrism, and xenophobia, as well as the corporatization and privatization of public schooling, Shyman extracts the fundamental problems that have ever plagued, and continue to plague, (...) successful education reform. (shrink)

To investigate the phenomenon of patient–physician mistrust in China, a qualitative study involving 107 physicians, nurses and health officials in Guangdong Province, southern China, was conducted through semi-structured interviews and focus groups. In this paper we report the key findings of the empirical study and argue for the essential role of medical professionalism in rebuilding patient-physician trust. Health professionals are trapped in a vicious circle of mistrust. Mistrust leads to increased levels of fear and self-protection by doctors which (...) exacerbate difficulties in communication; in turn, this increases physician workloads, adding to a strong sense of injustice and victimization. These factors produce poorer healthcare outcomes and increasingly discontented and angry patients, escalate conflicts and disputes, and result in negative media coverage, all these ultimately contributing to even greater levels of mistrust. The vicious circle indicates not only the crisis of patient-physician relationship but the crisis of medicine as a profession and institution. Underlying the circle is the inherent conflict of interest in the healthcare system by which health professionals and hospitals have become profit-driven. This institutional conflict of interest seriously compromises the fundamental principle of medical professionalism—the primacy of patient welfare—as well as the traditional Chinese ideal of “medicine as the art of humanity”. Patient trust can be restored through rectifying this institutional conflict of interest and promoting medical professionalism via a series of recommended practical measures. (shrink)

"'There is only one thing that is certain, namely that we can have nothing certain; and therefore it is not certain that we can have nothing certain,' Samuel Butler once said, expressing in that mindbloggler all the elements required to form a classical paradox. Throughout the ages wise men and jesters alike have been intrigued by such mental twists and riddles which defy common sense and yet appear to be true." -- Dust jacket.

This article sets up a graph-theoretical framework for argumentation-analysis (dialectical analysis) which expands classical argument-analysis. Within this framework, a main theorem on the existence of inconsistencies in debates is stated and proved: the vicious circle theorem. Subsequently, two corollaries which generalize the main theorem are derived. Finally, a brief outlook is given on further expansions and possible applications of the developed framework.

At the centre of Adorno’s critical theory of society lies the problem of Bann or Bannkreis: why do individuals systematically act in ways that reinforce conditions that are obviously incompatible with their freedom and pursuit of happiness? Despite criticism of Dewey’s experimentalism by several Frankfurt School critical theorists claiming that the American pragmatist fails to account for systematic blockages to critique, Dewey does in fact formulate his approach to social critique as a response to the problem that social life might (...) be made immune to transformative claims. In Human Nature and Conduct, thirty years prior to Adorno’s Bannkreis, he conceptualizes a ‘vicious circle’ in which attempts to transform social life seem to be caught and points to a way out. This article shows that Adorno and Dewey share in a project at the heart of critical theory, the project of a disclosing critique of society. In different and mutually completing ways, the Frankfurt School critical theorist and the American pragmatist point out the extent to which their contemporary societies are caught in antagonistic and painful vicious circles and thereby point to the objective possibility of another form of social life. The article is historical, but it is animated by the intent to brush a fruitful path for disclosing critique today. From Adorno, this critical practice gains the idea that theory of society can be a disclosing gesture, which presents an important corrective to Dewey’s failure to trace the eclipse of the public. From Dewey, it gets a reminder that these theories must find ways to continue into ordinary life experience through group action for their disclosure to come full circle. (shrink)

At the centre of Adorno’s critical theory of society lies the problem of Bann or Bannkreis: why do individuals systematically act in ways that reinforce conditions that are obviously incompatible with their freedom and pursuit of happiness? Despite criticism of Dewey’s experimentalism by several Frankfurt School critical theorists claiming that the American pragmatist fails to account for systematic blockages to critique, Dewey does in fact formulate his approach to social critique as a response to the problem that social life might (...) be made immune to transformative claims. In Human Nature and Conduct, thirty years prior to Adorno’s Bannkreis, he conceptualizes a ‘vicious circle’ in which attempts to transform social life seem to be caught and points to a way out. This article shows that Adorno and Dewey share in a project at the heart of critical theory, the project of a disclosing critique of society. In different and mutually completing ways, the Frankfurt School critical theorist and the American pragmatist point out the extent to which their contemporary societies are caught in antagonistic and painful vicious circles and thereby point to the objective possibility of another form of social life. The article is historical, but it is animated by the intent to brush a fruitful path for disclosing critique today. From Adorno, this critical practice gains the idea that theory of society can be a disclosing gesture, which presents an important corrective to Dewey’s failure to trace the eclipse of the public. From Dewey, it gets a reminder that these theories must find ways to continue into ordinary life experience through group action for their disclosure to come full circle. (shrink)

Recognized as a masterpiece of Nietzsche scholarship, NIETZSCHE AND THE VICIOUS CIRCLE is available here for the first time in English. Author Pierre Klossowski suggests that Nietzsche's ideas and beliefs did not stem from his personal pathology, but rather were applied in a pathological manner. Thereby Nietzsche's beliefs resonated dynamically and intellectually with his alternating lucidity and delirium.

The attempt to formulate a viable empiricist and non-foundationalist epistemology of science faces four problems here confronted. The first is an apparent loss of objectivity in science, in the conditions of use of models in applied science. The second derives from the theory-infection of scientific language, with an apparent loss of objective conditions of truth and reference. The third, often cited as objection to The Scientific Image, is the apparent theory-dependence of the distinction between what is and is not observable. (...) The fourth and last is the loss of the possibility of objective evaluation of rationality in scientific methodology. It is argued that each of these problems is illusory. (shrink)

I am a 40-year-old woman with lived experience of mental ill health and experience of the services and support available for patients. I accessed support from my teenage years until the present day...

Prompted by Poincaré, Russell put forward his celebrated vicious-circle principle (vcp) as the solution to the modern paradoxes. Ramsey, Gödel, and Quine, among others, have raised two salient objections against Russell's vcp. First, Gödel has claimed that Russell's various renderings of the vcp really express distinct principles and thus, distinct solutions to the paradoxes, a claim that gainsays one of Russell's positions on the nature of the solution to the paradoxes, namely, that such a solution be uniform. Secondly, (...) Ramsey, Gödel, and Quine have protested that the vcp's proscription against impredicative specification is incompatible with a realistic conception of the domain of quantification, a conception that Russell certainly held. I examine Russell's vcp and defend it against these objections. (shrink)

Securitization of Islam: A Vicious Circle: Counter-Terrorism and Freedom of Religion in Central Asia By Lenz-RaymannKathrin, 324 pp. Price PB €39.99. EAN 978–3837629040.

[full article, abstract in English; abstract in Lithuanian] Modern revolution as the beginning of founding a new political order has to confront the vicious circle inhered in all beginnings: in so far as it is the beginning, where does its principle come from? Or, if there is no principle, how could the beginning establish one? Set in the context of modern political experience, the aporia is equal to the problem of how modern politics to be self-grounded or how (...) to reestablish political authority in modernity? By an exploration into the relevant writings of Hannah Arendt, the article tries to investigate the vicious circle of beginning and principle in the political realm, and to point out that Arendt has told a story about the mutual generating of beginning and principle, turning the so-called vicious circle into a hermeneutic circle, in which those implicit principles become explicit through the performance of founding actions. (shrink)

SummaryP. Vardy asserts the thesis that the vicious circle principle has the same structure as Russell's paradox. But structure is not the thing itself. It is the thing objectivated from the wiewpoint of a mathematician. So this structure can be expressed in a mathematical formalism, e. g. the Λ‐calculus. Russell's paradox is understood as a result of the error of taking purely logical concepts, like negation, as lkiewise formalisable without change of meaning. The illusion of meaning in the (...) liar's proposition: Yl'am telling a lie can also be explained be the formalisable self‐referential structure of this proposition. Yet it remains an illusion because the logical intention cannot follow the structure.ResumeLe « Principe du cercle vicieux » a la même structure que le paradoxe de Russel: c'est une thèse de P. Várdy. Mais la structure n'est pas la chose même. Elle est la chose objectivée du point de vue du mathématicien et peut done être exprimée dans un formalisme mathématique, p. ex. le Λ‐calcul. L'erreur qui conduit au paradoxe de Russel, c'est de juger des concepts purement logique, p. ex. la négation, comme étant également exprimable dans un formalisme sans que leur sens ne change.L'illusion de sens que donne l'énoncé«je mens» dans le paradoxe du menteur peut aussi être expliquée par la structure formalisable d'autoréférence de cette proposition. Mais l'illusion persiste, parce que l'intention logique ne peut pas suivre la structure.ZusammenfassungRussells «Vicious circle principle» hat dieselbe Struktur wie die Russellsche Antinamie. So lautet die These P. Várdys. Aber die Struktur ist nicht die Sache selbst, sondern nur die vom mathematischen Standpunkte aus objektivierte Sache, die in einem Formalis‐onus ausgedrückt werden kann. Die Antinomie Russells wird Als Folge der irrigen Auffassung verstanden, rein logische Begriffe, wie z. B. die Negation, konnten formalisiert werden, ohne dass dabei ihr Sinn verwandelt würde. Die Sinnillusion des Satzes «Ich lüge» kann dann auch aus der selbstbezüglichen formalen Struktur des Satzes erklärt werden. Doch bleibt dies blosse Illusion, weil die logische Intention der Struktur nicht gerecht werden kann. (shrink)

Traditional hardcopy publishing brought about a division of labor between producers and disseminators of information. Online publishing makes it feasible for authors to disseminate their work much more widely without any investment in equipment beyond the ubiquitous laptop, without labor costs and without any special technical expertise. As a consequence, the division of labor is no longer important and is, in a range of cases, inefficient. For some scholarly works and teaching materials in particular, traditional hardcopy publishing rather than rather (...) than facilitating the dissemination of creative works not only restricts access to these materials but also undermines their production. Arguably, hardcopy journals and textbook anthologies, are inefficient and only persist because of institutional inertia and what has become the vicious circle of academic publishing. (shrink)

SummaryP. Vardy asserts the thesis that the vicious circle principle has the same structure as Russell's paradox. But structure is not the thing itself. It is the thing objectivated from the wiewpoint of a mathematician. So this structure can be expressed in a mathematical formalism, e. g. the Λ‐calculus. Russell's paradox is understood as a result of the error of taking purely logical concepts, like negation, as lkiewise formalisable without change of meaning. The illusion of meaning in the (...) liar's proposition: Yl'am telling a lie can also be explained be the formalisable self‐referential structure of this proposition. Yet it remains an illusion because the logical intention cannot follow the structure.ResumeLe « Principe du cercle vicieux » a la même structure que le paradoxe de Russel: c'est une thèse de P. Várdy. Mais la structure n'est pas la chose même. Elle est la chose objectivée du point de vue du mathématicien et peut done être exprimée dans un formalisme mathématique, p. ex. le Λ‐calcul. L'erreur qui conduit au paradoxe de Russel, c'est de juger des concepts purement logique, p. ex. la négation, comme étant également exprimable dans un formalisme sans que leur sens ne change.L'illusion de sens que donne l'énoncé«je mens» dans le paradoxe du menteur peut aussi être expliquée par la structure formalisable d'autoréférence de cette proposition. Mais l'illusion persiste, parce que l'intention logique ne peut pas suivre la structure.ZusammenfassungRussells «Vicious circle principle» hat dieselbe Struktur wie die Russellsche Antinamie. So lautet die These P. Várdys. Aber die Struktur ist nicht die Sache selbst, sondern nur die vom mathematischen Standpunkte aus objektivierte Sache, die in einem Formalis‐onus ausgedrückt werden kann. Die Antinomie Russells wird Als Folge der irrigen Auffassung verstanden, rein logische Begriffe, wie z. B. die Negation, konnten formalisiert werden, ohne dass dabei ihr Sinn verwandelt würde. Die Sinnillusion des Satzes «Ich lüge» kann dann auch aus der selbstbezüglichen formalen Struktur des Satzes erklärt werden. Doch bleibt dies blosse Illusion, weil die logische Intention der Struktur nicht gerecht werden kann. (shrink)

The standard version of the story of Russell's theory of types gives legitimately precedence to the vicious circle principle, but it fails to appreciate the significance of the doctrine of incomplete symbols and of the ultimate universalist perspective of Russell's logic. It is what the Author tries to do. This enables him to resolve the apparent contradiction which exists in "Principles" between the ontological commitment of the theory itself with respect to individuals, propositions, and functions, and the inventory (...) of the world, according to which there are only individuals and elementary facts. (shrink)

Long recognized as a masterpiece of Nietzsche scholarship, _Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle_ is made available here for the first time in English. Taking a structuralist approach to the relation between Nietzsche's thought and his life, Klossowski emphasizes the centrality of the notion of Eternal Return for understanding Nietzsche's propensities for self-denial, self-reputation, and self-consumption. Nietzsche's ideas did not stem from personal pathology, according to Klossowski. Rather, he made a pathological use of his best ideas, anchoring them in his (...) own fluctuating bodily and mental conditions. Thus Nietzsche's belief that questions of truth and morality are at base questions of power and fitness resonates dynamically and intellectually with his alternating lucidity and delirium. (shrink)

In a definition (∀ x )(( x є r )↔D[ x ]) of the set r, the definiens D[ x ] must not depend on the definiendum r . This implies that all quantifiers in D[ x ] are independent of r and of (∀ x ). This cannot be implemented in the traditional first-order logic, but can be expressed in IF logic. Violations of such independence requirements are what created the typical paradoxes of set theory. Poincaré’s Vicious (...) class='Hi'>Circle Principle was intended to bar such violations. Russell nevertheless misunderstood the principle; for him a set a can depend on another set b only if ( b є a ) or ( b ⊆ a ). Likewise, the truth of an ordinary first-order sentence with the Gödel number of r is undefinable in Tarki’s sense because the quantifiers of the definiens depend unavoidably on r. (shrink)

'The greatest book of philosophy I have ever read, on a par with Nietzsche himself.' Michel Foucault.

SummaryRussell's vicious‐circle principle is an endeavour to express a general principle of mathematics which, as the author feels, is fundamental for mathematics. This principle, in a sense warranty of formal consistency, interdicts in some form or other the selfapplication of mathematical entities. It is shown that the VCP is a vicious‐circle fallacy; that, although it can't be given an expression which is simultaneously formal and generally valid, it is generally presupposed by mathematics as far as a (...) consistent formalism is concerned; that this paradoxical situation refers to an essentially informal and non‐mathematical domain which forms a necessary condition for mathematics, but can't exhaustively be expressed in any mathematical formalism. Finally the distinction between semantical and syntactical import and the character of negation are restated in view of these results.RésuméLe principe du cercle vicieux de Russell a, selon l'auteur, une portée générale et fondamentale en mathématiques: il interdit, sous quelque forme que ce soit, lapos;application dapos;entités mathématiques à elles‐mêmes. Ce principe est équivalent au paradoxe de Russell; on ne peut pas le formaliser sous peine de compromettre sa validite universelle, et pourtant il constitue une présupposition de tout formalisme qui veut éviter la contradiction. Cette situation paradoxale nous renvoie à un domaine essentiellement in‐formel et non‐mathématique, qui embrasse le formalisme mathématique, en constitue une condition nécessaire, mais ne peut être exprimé dans aucun formalisme dapos;une manière exhaustive. Finalement le problème logique de la négation et celui de la distinction entre les rapports sémantiques et syntactiques sont repris à la lumière de ces résultats.ZusammenfassungRussells Zirkelprinzip ist der Versuch, ein allgemeingültiges Prinzip der Mathematik auszudrücken, das, wie der Verfasser meint, von grundsätzlicher Bedeutung ist. Dieses Prinzip, das in einem gewissen Sinne die formale Widerspruchsfreiheit verbürgt, verbietet die Selbstbezüglichkeit mathematischer Entitäten. Der Artikel zeigt, dass es mit Russells Paradox äquivalent ist, und dass es eine allgemeine Voraussetzung der Mathematik als eines konsistenten Formalismus darstellt, obwohl man ihm selbst keinen zugleich allgemeingültigen und formellen Ausdruck geben kann; es wird des weiteren gezeigt, dass diese paradoxale Situation auf ein wesentlich informelles und nicht‐mathematisches Gebiet verweist, das eine notwendige Bedingung für die Mathematik darstellt, jedoch selber nicht erschöpfend im Formalismus dargestellt werden kann. Schliesslich werden a) die Unterscheidung zwischen semantischen und syntakti‐schen Beziehungen und b) die Negation im Lichte dieser Ergebnisse neu überdacht. (shrink)

The classical paradox of the stone, namely, whether an omnipotent being can create a stone that the being itself cannot lift is traditionally circumvented by a response propounded by Thomas Aquinas, that even omnipotent beings cannot accomplish the logically impossible. However, in their paper “The New Paradox of the Stone,” Alfred R. Mele and M.P. Smith attempt to reinstate the paradox without falling foul of the Thomistic logical constraint. According to Mele and Smith, instead of interpreting the paradox as posing (...) a competition between a pair of omnipotent beings—represented by God at two different times—the paradox can be reformulated as posing a question about simultaneous competition between a pair of omnipotent beings. The purpose of this paper is, therefore, to probe the possibility of the simultaneous existence of two omnipotent beings in view of the theological arguments for the “unicity of the omnipotent.”. (shrink)

The classical paradox of the stone, namely, whether an omnipotent being can create a stone that the being itself cannot lift is traditionally circumvented by a response propounded by Thomas Aquinas, that even omnipotent beings cannot accomplish the logically impossible. However, in their paper “The New Paradox of the Stone,” Alfred R. Mele and M.P. Smith attempt to reinstate the paradox without falling foul of the Thomistic logical constraint. According to Mele and Smith, instead of interpreting the paradox as posing (...) a competition between a pair of omnipotent beings—represented by God at two different times—the paradox can be reformulated as posing a question about simultaneous competition between a pair of omnipotent beings. The purpose of this paper is, therefore, to probe the possibility of the simultaneous existence of two omnipotent beings in view of the theological arguments for the “unicity of the omnipotent.”. (shrink)

This is a review of Vicious Circles: On the Mathematics of Non-Wellfounded Phenomena, written by Jon Barwise and Lawrence Moss and published by CSLI Publications in 1996.

Societies with a higher level of income inequality tend to have lower levels of intergenerational income mobility. Known as the Great Gatsby Curve, this negative relationship in part derives from greater intergenerational economic heritance among the poor. Societies with higher rates of relative poverty will have a higher level of income inequality, but they will also tend to have lower intergenerational mobility due to the reduced capacity of low-income persons to become upwardly mobile. Reviewing relevant research in psychology, we describe (...) how poverty is associated with decreased psychological resources that compromise the competitiveness of low-income persons for superior attainment in the educational system and for greater productivity in the labor market. Economic deprivation in itself thus leads to a “vicious circle” of disadvantage that diminishes intergenerational mobility even without the existence of any culture of poverty or monopolistic institutions in the economy. (shrink)

Here we give a semantical account of propositional quantification that is intended to formally represent Russell’s view that one cannot express a proposition about "all" propositions. According to the account the authors give, Russell’s view bears an interesting relation to the view that there are no sets which are members of themselves.

In Spring 2008 I went textbook-free. I linked all and only the readings for my Contemporary Analytic Philosophy course to the class website, along with powerpoints, handouts and external links to online resources.

Metaphysicians of a certain stripe are almost unanimously of the view that grounding is necessarily irreflexive, asymmetric, transitive, and well-founded. They deny the possibility of circles of ground and, therewith, the possibility of species of metaphysical coherentism. But what's so bad about circles of ground? One problem for coherentism might be that it ushers in anti-foundationalism: grounding loops give rise to infinite regresses. And this is bad because infinite grounding regresses are vicious. This article argues that circles of ground (...) do not necessarily give rise to infinite regresses, and where they do, those regresses are not necessarily vicious. (shrink)

I approach the philosophical analyses of the phenomenon of trust vis-à-vis online communication beginning with an overview from within the framework of computer-mediated communication (CMC) of concerns and paradigmatic failures of trust in the history of online communication. I turn to the more directly philosophical analyses of trust online by first offering an introductory taxonomy of diverse accounts of trust that have emerged over the past decade or so. In the face of important objections to the possibility of establishing and (...) fostering trust in online environments—objections that emerge especially from the perspective of virtue ethics and phenomenological approaches to how we know and navigate the world as _embodied_ beings—I then take up three major arguments in recent work in favor of the possibilities of trust online, followed by three _vicious circles_ that run counter to more optimistic views. I close with a summary of some additional reasons for optimism regarding trust online, followed by a final question that emerges out of recent CMC research on social networking sites that poses, I argue, fundamental challenges indeed to how we understand and may foster and experience trust online. (shrink)