Według Jürgena Habermasa w warunkach eugeniki liberalnej ludzka samowiedza gatunku może ulec zmianie, dlatego należy wprowadzić regulacje, które pozwolą sprawować kontrolę nad wykorzystywaniem i nad rozwojem nowych biotechnologicznych metod. Zachowanie obecnej samowiedzy jest ważne, aby zapewnić podstawę dla funkcjonowania uniwersalistycznie pojmowanej moralności, pozwalającej osobom w sposób sprawiedliwy regulować swoje konflikty. Na dwie przesłanki samowiedzy gatunku składa się: postrzeganie siebie przez osoby jako wyłącznych autorów własnego życia oraz jako członków społeczeństwa, między którymi panują symetryczne relacje. Zachowanie takiej samowiedzy nie jest możliwe (...) w sytuacji, gdy genetycznymi zadatkami jednych osób przed ich urodzeniem rozporządzali inni. Habermas proponuje, aby rozwój biotechnologii poddać regulacjom zgodnym z etyką gatunku, która jest rekonstrukcją warunków samowiedzy do tej pory przez nas posiadanej. Sformułowana przez niego etyka gatunku zakłada nierozporządzalność genetycznymi cechami nienarodzonych, jednak nie przesądza o stosowaniu genetycznych ingerencji w celach terapeutycznych, na które, według Jürgena Habermasa, można zakładać zgodę przyszłych osób, nie naruszając samowiedzy stanowiącej podstawę uniwersalistycznej moralności. (shrink)

The article, which is a fragment of a larger whole, presents the typical traits of the moral attitudes among the prisoners at the Concentration Camp in Auschwitz. The source on which the present reconstruction of the picture of the camp morality is based is the published memoirs of Polish prisoners of that camp.

Aside from the local (mostly Western) efforts to subject animal experimentation to public scrutiny, the extent of animal experimentation, the acceptance of alternative methods and the fate of animals in laboratories depend on experimenters’ morality (as defined by social psychology), whose shaping is of crucial importance for the future of animal use in science. Meanwhile, sociological and ethnographic research in laboratories demonstrates that in the matter of animal use the experimenters are unreflective, ethically incompetent, and incapable of taking a critical (...) view of the received morality. This appears to result largely from their higher education which is known to cause a regression in moral development, inculcate a routine exploitation and/or objectification of animals, and ignore both the scientific premises and moral consequences of animal subjectivity. From all we know, it is researchers’ morality rather than pressing needs and expectations of humanity that interferes with a major restriction of invasive animal research in general and a wide, proactive acceptance of alternative methods in particular. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to scrutinise the relationship between the moral attitude of an entrepreneur and their possibility to gain a competitive advantage. This declaration leads to the following question: Whether the everyday practice confirms or denies the economic usefulness ofthe postulate of corporate social responsibility. On the one hand, moral desertion is obviously profitable (also in an economic sense). Partners of the deserter, in most cases, are not able to avoid (unexpected and expansive) the consequences of this (...) new attitude towards them. On the other hand, this strategy – in the long run – is unlikely to be profitable. The former victims adjust to their new circumstances and become ready to face the attack. Therefore corporate social responsibility, in the final calculation, should be taken as the only way to protect an active participant of the market against the temptation to neglect his obligation towards people, who can punish or reward him (as stakeholders or whistleblowers). (shrink)

The article presents an analysis of the relationship between market as a social and economic sphere and morality as a fundamental aspect of human deeds. It discusses the nature of the market, with a special focus on a person as a main precondition for the existence of the market. The result of the analysis is a pro-posal for a new definition of the market: the market consists in the decisions and actions of persons concerning what product to buy or sell, (...) at what price, where and when. (shrink)

According to the essential arguments of post-modernism (relativism and subjectivism in particular), which was popular in last decades, there is no point in dealing with moral philosophy. Post-modernists admit, however, that moral is worth discussing yet with a different approach then before. This new approach is totally opposed to the morality of the bygone decades and lacks a wide spectrum of values such as the objective truth, norms or principles and other generally accepted values. The new morality is supposed to (...) compete effectively with the past morals because it is better. In order to prove that post-modernists characterize morality of the past as a set of norms and legal principles which rule the social life. This kind of ethics was bound to heteronymous obligation which determined human life and thus ruined human freedom and autonomy. Every deed which was at variance with the standards was regarded as an offence. In such circumstances people avoid making decisions and rejected responsibility. They felt comforted to obey regulations imposed by authorities. Post-modernists are unable to prove the superiority of their new approach since they have no rational or theoretical arguments. In this approach there is no unchanging human nature or fixed norms or values. Ethics is basically a question of sensitivity and imagination; it is depended on the instinct and impulse – therefore on something subjective, elusive and fastidious. There is no absolute certainty that human decisions and deeds are reasonable and good. If we pursue ethics in this particular way it will become senseless and will result in subjectivism, irrationalism, nihilism, relativism, etc. On the grounds of such ethics it would be possible to both praise and condemn the same deed. (shrink)

Moralists and philosophers of law often demand that the axiological systems be in conformity with “human nature”, or with “nature”. Among conceptions which look for footing in human nature two main trends may be distinguished.

Tezy B. Williamsa z artykułu Wewnętrzne i zewnętrzne racje do działania bywają odrzucane jako zbyt trywialne, aby mieć jakąś doniosłość; czasem są odrzucane jako zbyt niebezpieczne, aby być prawdziwymi. Prawda, jak zwykle, leży gdzieś pośrodku. Williams ma coś ważnego do powiedzenia nam, lecz nie jest to coś, co mogłoby przewrócić nasz świat do góry nogami. Przeciwnie, może dostarczyć mu bardziej stabilnego fundamentu.

The application of law means making use of his competence by a subject of law in order to perform in a ”valid” way a definite legal act, basing on a given legal system. The legal act, in a wide meaning of this term, is every act of a conventional character by the adequate performance of which legal obligations of certain subjects, which previously were potentially in force, arise or are actualized. The manner of making use of a granted competence can (...) be unanimously determined, or – and that is of interest in our reasoning – certain limits may be granted to the subject who may decide what use he is willing to make of the awarder competence. (shrink)

MORALITY AS A SOURCE OF (BANAL) EVIL. HANNAH ARENDT READS KANT The experience of totalitarianism made Arendt notice how problematic the common understanding of morality is. If we identify it with the obedience to the rules governing human relationships it can happen that when those rules become questionable we are no longer able to distinguish right from wrong. But totalitarian leaders not only rejected the existing rules; they replaced them with the ones that prescribed evil things. Arendt thinks that the (...) real moral problem is with those "ordinary" people who adapted to the new situation. Both the ease of their conversion and the example of those who were able to resist it, led her to conclude that “morality of rules” might be detrimental to the activities that can make us refrain from doing evil. Analyzing these activities, which are thinking and judging, Arendt often refers to Kant’s philosophy. I want to demonstrate the fruitfulness of this interpretation, and its importance to moral and political thought of Arendt herself. The presentation of these topics is supposed to deepen the reflection on the problem of "banal" evil. (shrink)

The paper discusses the basic assumptions proposed by John Dewey in his pragmatist ethics, posing at the same time a question whether pragmatist ethics satisfies the basic conditions of the ethical theory. The central category and criterion assumed in pragmatist ethics is a habit. Only good habits ensure good action. Habits are shaped by the milieu, and any attempts to change them entail a change in the conditions of the milieu. Permanent modification of habits is written in the basic goal (...) of moral action, i.e. development. Dewey rejects the theory of ethics comprehended as an order of moral norms and evaluations settled in advance. The theory proposed by him does not satisfy the conditions that a standard ethical theory is supposed to meet. This does not mean that it cannot be called a theory. It is Dewey\'s programme to give up traditional tasks assigned to an ethical theory. (shrink)

August Ciszkowski was a philosopher, an author of economic treatises, a man dedicated to social activities, and a politician. His first book in philosophy Prolegomena zur Historiosophie came out in Berlin 1838. The author intended it to be a venture to overstep the Hegelian philosophy. But at the same time it represents the author’s own system – “the philosophy of action”. The book won a wide response in Poland and ha a notable impact on philosophic debates in Germany and Russia. (...) Not this book though, but Our Father should be considered the work of Cieszkowski’s life. (shrink)

Pytanie o metodologiczny i teoriopoznawczy status obrazu Boga we współczesnej teologii jest jednym z najważniejszych, jakie należy postawić w świetle przemian społeczno-religijnych, następujących we współczesnym społeczeństwie. Odchodzenie od instytucjonalnie praktykowanej wiary religijnej jest bowiem często spowodowane obrazem Boga, który dla współczesnego człowieka staje się coraz mniej możliwy do zaakceptowania. Nie jest to jedynie kwestia ludzkiej niezgody, motywowanej postawą antyreligijną, lecz przede wszystkim skutek zniekształcenia go we współczesnym przekazie teologicznym, homiletycznym i katechetycznym. Obraz ten, kreowany najpierw w teologii, został nadmiernie obciążony (...) elementami, nawiązującymi do powinności moralnej człowieka, a jednocześnie w znacznym stopniu zubożony o elementy wywodzące się z jego doświadczenia egzystencjalno-duchowego. Odzyskanie bardziej adekwatnego obrazu Boga wymaga wnikliwego namysłu filozoficznego nad samą teologią oraz zrekonstruowania tego obrazu na podstawie pogłębionego odniesienia do treści biblijnych, wraz z jednoczesnym powiązaniem ich z aktualnym doświadczeniem religijnym człowieka, ujawniającym się w jego egzystencji. -------------- Zgłoszono: 20/09/2020. Zrecenzowano: 09/11/2020. Zaakceptowano do publikacji: 20/11/2020. (shrink)

The paper discusses the nature of the logical constraints imposed on certain kind of moral judgement by the situations to which they are applied. This is often obscured by philosophers through a tendency to overestimate and misinterpret the role of general principles in the making of these judgements. It is argued that what is of central importance here is the role of moral concepts in determining how we understand the individual reality of particular human beings. This understanding is manifested in (...) the particular respect concern elicited by the people with whom we have dealings. Although this respect is intimately connected with what has been called the rationality of human beings, the Kantian and neo-Kantian account of this connection is mistaken and does not pay sufficient regard to the way in which certain fundamental moral responses are responses to human beings in their particularity rather than as instantiations of general categories. (shrink)