The author attempts to verify whether defining totalitarianism in terms of a state striving to obtain total control over the life of individuals and collectives is a proper approach. Does totalitarianism genuinely imply a society completely subordinated to a state? And, in dealing with the political realities of a totalitarian regime, can we consider a totality other than that created by the state? The author reaches for Carl Schmitt’s reflections on political totality and its subjects. It is thanks to this (...) approach that we are able to look at a totalitarian structure more primal than a state, the structure that is a total society. The author presents a historical and philosophical description of the process of forming a total society, which begins with the discontinuation of the distance between that which falls to the state and that which falls to society. (shrink)

The idea of a law-governed state, which is referred to so commonly, exists as a synonym of the principle of the supreme meaning and standing of the constitution in the state system. The law-governed state in its pure form is one where the law provides not only the framework and barriers for the state and the actions of the authorities, but a state wherein its beginning and foundations are rooted in the law. The concept of the law-governed state has many (...) highly detailed elements ; its essence, however, is the recognition of the law as a particular means and a yardstick with which both the state’s system and the recognition of the legal standards vested with the power to shape social relationships, the regulatory power, are moulded. It is the prestige of the law – nomos basileus – which should be the source of state order. The supremacy of the law provides the premise on which the introduction of every detailed solution which turns the idea of the law-governed state into specifics, is based. If the rule of law, rather than that of the authorities is to exist, this must be a law wherein each citizen may contribute to its shape; ideally it will be one established directly by the citizens rather than by the established authorities, democratic in an indirect way. This must be a law binding upon everyone equally, observed by everyone, operating effectively and surely. It must also be a law made for society’s sake rather than for that of an idea, and it must be fitting to those realities, standards and common practices that exist in that society. It must also be a law not too rigorous and imposing neither excessive requirements nor strange measures. (shrink)

This article contains a summary of selected theses of the theory of the state developed by Hermann Heller, who was one of the leading representatives of the so-called Weimar Theory of the State. State theorists of the Weimar era formed an independent, formally unrelated group of scientists who had often opposing views, but were united by a common effort to conduct even philosophical investigation of the nature of the state, the European, continental state, as well as its internal ratio and (...) mission. In addition to Hermann Heller, this group included Carl Schmitt, Rudolf Smend, Erich Kaufmann and Heinrich Triepel. They asked questions which are absent in today’s science, such as: “What is a state?”, “What kind of being is it and what is its nature?”. The answers determine many issues, including our perception of the durability and strength of the state, our understanding of its structure and development, the relation between the state and the individual and the relation between politics and history, etc. No settlement of this basic issue is not only simple negligence, but – as can be judged – it stems from today’s tacit assumption that the state is not a being, but only an artificial human construct, a combination of elements and a set of institutions. Heller perceives the state substantially: as particular organization of social affairs; organization of specific areas of public life: economy, law and public opinion. These were created in the modern era and have been specific to Europe from the sixteenth century to modern times. The matter of these areas is transformed into a state order by sovereign authorities. Therefore, their policies and their law have their concrete object whose reality they face, and they need to demonstrate that they are capable of organizing this reality. The ethos of the state and at the same time the legitimacy of its power require that elementary principles of justice are ensured, or at least injustice is eliminated from social life. (shrink)

According to Carl Schmitt, the phenomenon of the political has different forms. These forms can be distinguished based on different possible relationships between political action and the state. This article presents the history of what Schmitt refers to as the phenomenon of partisanship. Partisanship is a specific form of politics, established in the early ninetieth century, which has gradually expanded its presence. Partisan activity is characterized by totality, which has evolved to become the dominant component of political action over time, (...) particularly in the twentieth century. This totality affects not only the size and range of political activity, but it is also – and perhaps first of all – ruthless in its use of terror and violence, which is considered entirely justified by total partisans/terrorists. (shrink)

The author describes the moment of the emergence of the concept of sovereignty, its causes, historical significance, as well as the issues raised in the debate over this concept since the seventeenth century. Sovereignty refers to the state and points to its essential feature, which defines the state as the result of occidental rationalism (Max Weber). According to this definition, the state is different from other, earlier and parallel political forms, such as republics and empires. However, changes in the history (...) of the state also affect the way in which sovereignty is understood. Consequently, the concept of sovereignty is often difficult to justify or is even – as some authors claim – anachronistic. The author outlines different approaches in the discussion about the validity of this concept and their premises. He also describes the relationship between the principle of sovereignty and the democratic rule of law. (shrink)

The main issue is: what is the State? An article presents what the concept of State entails, the essential elements of its structure, and the basic stages of its development. The State is a historical creation. It has a specific existential cause and purpose, and a set organizational framework within which its entire ethical and political substance must be inscribed. The framework and the substance of the State are distinct spheres, and the awareness of the distinction between these two spheres (...) is important. At the same time, they can only be distinguished in the abstract. In reality one cannot separate them or glimpse them functioning separately, as if on different levels. In reality both dimensions interpenetrate and are mixed together. The organizational dimension only exists as a condition for the axiological, albeit a necessary condition. The other, axiological dimension is also necessary, but in a different way. The first is necessary because of the realities of life, the real situation. The second is necessary in the moral sense. Necessity in the moral sense is immutable, whereas the necessity of an organizational framework depends on the historical-social situation and can therefore change. Thus, if the conditions, circumstances or the factual situation should change, then the organizational framework could actually turn out to be useless, whereas the values and ideals remained necessary. (shrink)

The author presents defi nitions of the concepts ‘state’ and ‘sovereignty’, which were formed in the modern era on the grounds of the European philosophy of politics, and reads them in the context of the Polish historical and political experience. He posits that the two concepts make up an inseparable whole belonging to the European tradition of statehood, in which sovereignty is the fundamental feature of a state and of a political structure, a feature which such a structure, if it (...) constitutes a state must, in a way, by definition, possess. Sovereignty is a unique feature of a state because it stands apart from state’s other traits; it also stands apart from the state itself. It is distinct among other features, because the latter assume its existence, as it is only a sovereign state which can have the real, authentic and lasting features which determine its identity and character. (shrink)