The aim of this article is to scrutinise the relationship between the moral attitude of an entrepreneur and their possibility to gain a competitive advantage. This declaration leads to the following question: Whether the everyday practice confirms or denies the economic usefulness ofthe postulate of corporate social responsibility. On the one hand, moral desertion is obviously profitable (also in an economic sense). Partners of the deserter, in most cases, are not able to avoid (unexpected and expansive) the consequences of this (...) new attitude towards them. On the other hand, this strategy – in the long run – is unlikely to be profitable. The former victims adjust to their new circumstances and become ready to face the attack. Therefore corporate social responsibility, in the final calculation, should be taken as the only way to protect an active participant of the market against the temptation to neglect his obligation towards people, who can punish or reward him (as stakeholders or whistleblowers). (shrink)

The object of my last year’s presentation were communication (ethical, integration, political) threats posed by a foundation seen as an extension to a company in its traditional sense. I came to the conclusion that an automatic transfer of social trust capital to the parent company (in certain, specified by me, contexts) causes the foundation to betray its mission. It is the company that becomes the main beneficiary of mutual aid activities. This year, the paper addresses the following three issues. Firstly, (...) I intend to show the symbolic pressure exerted on both consumers and producers, which is made possible by the ‘labeling’ of products of ‘socially sensitive’ companies. There would be no point questioning the fact of shaping social attitudes if it weren’t for an ambiguous position of the co-ordinator of the enterprise, who becomes vested with the rights of a certification authority. Another question under consideration is the transformation of a foundation into a quasi-company. A third-sector organization adds business activity to the goals specified in its by-laws. It results in taking on highly-skilled professionals who have nothing to do with charitable activity of a third sector organization. Finally, there is a danger of a foundation’s approximation to a second-sector organization. A foundation may be financed by a public administration body. This may lead to the division of the final product of a foundation between the beneficiaries and the body which sponsors its operation using a ‘lump sum’ payment. Whichever the problem, the key aspect seems societal control over mutual aid activities. Its lack results in an abuse of power and the diminished trust of the manipulated society in effective cooperation. (shrink)

Two parallel problems come under close scrutiny in my paper. First of them concerns the question whether victims of a (politically or economically) stronger thief are ethically entitled to steal their property in revenge? I argue that this kind of theft could be seen as a hidden form of protection because the symbolic relation between the first aggressor and his victim is extremely unequal. An ordinary man usually has no public means to oppose corporation or political institution. He has then (...) to decide whether he chooses ethical perfection, which would stop him from doing anything; or he is ready, by himself, to inflict punishment on an (institutionalized) thief. The other problem concerns the consequences of the acceptance of ‘the balancing strategy’. The case of modern state shows how hidden fighting against a stronger thief brings about opposite results. On one hand, an unfair political institution is deprived of its rights. But, on the other hand, the insubordinate citizen, who plays the part of the only owner of the criterion of fairness, destroys the rules of common life. (shrink)

Representatives of business ethics examine the economic challenges of our time. They believe that in the use of ethics they are able to keep under control this sphere of human activity. Alas, this attempt meets the following obstacle. This ethical claim does not work as an objective criterion for measuring good vs evil as long as it is not supported by epistemological evidence (on its validity). Therefore business ethicists focus their attention on the codes of ethics which they see as (...) the expected solution to the problem. A code of ethics is drawn up by an economic organisation which – in this way – declares its acceptance. Meanwhile, this declaration leads to the question of how to sift the ethical guarantees from empty promises? Can the social addressee of an ethical code trust its author? This doubt relates in particular to professional associations. Having a legal prerogative they are expected to recognize their fiduciary duty of loyalty to their social interlocutor. When they do not want to meet these obligations, they may use a code of ethics as a tool of manipulation. Under those circumstances, the code is something opposite to what is expected. (shrink)

Business ethics is usually seen as set of communicates addressed to representatives of the sphere of economy. Meanwhile this attitude towards the kind of knowledge seams to be false. There are two points which justify this opinion. First of them concerns the relation between legal and ethical perspectives useful to evaluate business phenomena. Both axiological systems (in indicated background) are complementary to one another. It tends to the second argument. The relation between low and ethics makes necessary to indicate the (...) public sphere as the place, where managers together with citizens and politicians – day by day – take part in debate about rules of social and economic correctness each of them. (shrink)