In this article I aim at developing a phenomenology ofillness through a critical interpretation of the worksof Sigmund Freud and Martin Heidegger. The phenomenonof ``Unheimlichkeit'' – uncanniness and unhomelikeness– is demonstrated not only to play a key role in thetheories of Freud and Heidegger, but also toconstitute the essence of the experience of illness.Two different modes of unhomelikeness – ``The minduncanny'' and ``The world uncanny'' – are in thisconnection explored as constitutive parts of thephenomenon of illness. The consequence I draw (...) fromthis analysis is that the mission of health careprofessionals must be not only to cure diseases, butactually, through devoting attention to thebeing-in-the-world of the patient, also to open uppossible paths back to homelikeness. This mission canonly be carried out if medicine acknowledges the basicimportance of the meaning-realm of the patient's life– his or her life-world characteristics. (shrink)

A la hora de pensar lo más inmediato a nosotros mismos es necesario acudir a lo que somos en cuanto Dasein. Sin embargo, la experiencia de lo inmediato tiene la condición de presentarse bajo la forma de un extrañamiento, un «no saber». Se verá que la corporeidad y su extrañamiento abren a la posibilidad de una hermenéutica de nuestra propia condición porque la experiencia de lo Unheimlich es una vía de epojé que «detona» (revienta) la cadena de significaciones habitual (...) y reconfigura la experiencia. Se tomará como punto de referencia cuatro casos icónicos: 1) la convalecencia de Oliver Sacks, 2) el famoso caso Paul Schreber, 3) la referencia al joven esquizofrénico en los Seminarios de Zollikon, e incluso 4) el desfallecimiento de Heidegger entre los años 1945 y 1946, todo esto a la luz del extrañamiento de lo íntimo y la posibilidad que este abre a un «reordenamiento interno». En definitiva, las patologías y lo terrorífico que las acompaña son capaces de generar las condiciones de un vitalismo inusitado, pues solo quien se ha enfrentado a la más radical convulsión de todas sus verdades, podrá «abrirse camino» en medio del exceso de donación que desborda su «realidad». (shrink)

Este artigo disserta sobre alguns pontos presentes no texto Das Unheimliche, de Sigmund Freud. A partir de uma meta-análise filosófica, procura-se explicitar as intenções não aparentes de Freud com sua análise do termo Unheimliche. Determinadas particularidades da abordagem freudiana são observadas desvendando relações estéticas na construção de sentido do espírito próprio da psicanálise. Uma eventual aproximação dialética com a Teoria Crítica ajudará a identificar, nesse jogo de relações, a importância de conteúdos marginalizados pela história do conhecimento que são revitalizados por (...) Freud. (shrink)

Druck der Zensur, nicht Aufhebung der Zielvorstellungen ist die richtige Begründung für das Vorherrschen der ober-flächlichen Assoziationen. Die oberflächlichen Assoziationen ersetzen in der Darstellung die tiefen, wenn die Zensur diese normalen Verbindungswege ungangbar macht. Es ist, wie wenn ein allgemeines Verkehrshindernis, z.B. eine Überschwemmung, im Gebirge die großen und breiten Straßen unwegsam werden läßt; der Verkehr wird dann auf unbequemen und steilen Fußpfaden aufrechterhalten, die sonst nur der Jäger begangen hat.

Resenha de FREUD, S.. O infamiliar / Das Unheimliche, seguido de O Homem da Areia. Trad. Ernani Chaves e Pedro Heliodoro Tavares; e Romero Freitas. Belo Horizonte: Autêntica.

Este artículo regresa al clásico texto de Freud Das Unheimliche para tratar de exhibir la dimensión productiva y la perspectiva de futuro que le son inherentes. Para ello, se visitan las propuestas del artista Mike Kelley y del filósofo Giorgio Agamben que tratan de ilustrar plásticamente las características de esta noción. Se examinan, a continuación, las tesis freudianas sobre el manejo de los significantes en un marco de angustia unheimlich, esto es, de pérdida súbita de las referencias habituales. Se (...) termina defendiendo que es la apuesta de vanguardia del futurismo, de la que el texto de Freud sería epitafio, la que mejor permite exhibir la importancia crucial del término Unheimliche para la ontología psicoanalítica. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 47, Issue 1, pp 19 - 38 In its engagement with Derrida’s _unheimlich_ responsibility elaborated in _The Beast and the Sovereign_, Volume One, this essay is about death, words, silence, and lives of people and animals. It is also about experiences that to varying degrees bring lives to words and words to lives. Its guiding hypotheses are that death, words, silence, and lives in their _happenings exceed_ the laws that function to identify them and that none of (...) their happenings is sovereign in relation to the others. The essay culminates with Derrida’s engagement with ungrounded time when completion and beginning are simultaneous. That simultaneity constitutes a threshold in which people must respond. For Derrida the threshold is shadowed by his own approaching death. (shrink)

Through the many reinterpretations of Freud’s essay Das Unheimliche (1919) within French Postmodernism, in recent decades, the uncanny has become a vague synonym for the methodology of deconstruction. The article aims to disambiguate the uncanny by reestablishing its characterizing nucleus and relocating it within the aesthetics through the philosophy of Stanley Cavell. The American philosopher claims that this feeling can be generated by drawing attention to the ordinary, which is so close and familiar to fade out of focus. Cavell and (...) the German Philosopher Juliane Rebentisch following him show that artistic practices can reinforce this experience, as through displacements and dislocations, they deprive objects of daily use and ordinary matters of their familiarity and force us to look more closely at their material, sensorial, and phenomenological dimensions. In this way, Cavell and Rebentisch offer a path to reconstitute a stable conceptual framework for defining the uncanny, linking it to Freud’s definition of something familiar appearing in an unfamiliar light. At the same time, they also propose a novelty by interpreting the uncanny not as inherently frightening and disturbing but as a compelling affective state that encourages a willingness to reappropriate and rediscover the ordinary. (shrink)

Cultuurfilosofische essays over de oorsprong in de 18e eeuw van de belangstelling voor het verhevene en huiveringwekkende in de kunst.

The ill body is sometimes phenomenologically interpreted as a "broken tool" encountered in an uncanny way. I argue that this is not what is most uncanny about illness. Within the context of an account of Freud and Heidegger’s work, I argue that in health, we are generally alienated from the way our bodies will become inert, lifeless corpses. In the uncanniness of illness (and sometimes other situations), we may be reattuned to this horrific certainty and disabused of the comforting view (...) that our bodies are reparable tools. I revisit Zaner’s characterization of the uncanny and show how his notion of "chill and implicatedness" captures the dynamic sense of alienation that characterizes how we are bodily Being-toward death. (shrink)

Este artigo aborda dois importantes conceitos freudianos que são mobilizados para a explicação do sintoma: o inquietante e o só-depois. Tais noções aparecem como complementares mediante a formação composta do sintoma que se dá entre elementos inconscientes e as vivências posteriores que permitem o retorno do recalcado. Essa composição nos permite tratar a teoria clínica freudiana a partir de um viés temporal, uma vez que a formação do sintoma se dá em etapas descontínuas na trajetória da vida subjetiva. Por isso, (...) nosso artigo discute a passagem dessa descontinuidade – quando o sintoma é sentido como uma repetição inquietante – para a constituição de uma narrativa de vida dotada de destinos pulsionais criativos, nos quais o que se mostrava estranho é assumido como próprio e familiar. Palavras-chave: sintoma; inquietante; estranhamento; só-depois; repetição.: This article discusses two important Freudian concepts that are mobilized for the explanation of the symptom: the uncanny and the afterwardsness. These notions appear together because of the composite formation of symptom that occurs between unconscious elements and aftermost experiences that allow the return of the repressed. This composition helps us in our goal to treat Freudian clinical theory in a temporal bias, since the formation of the symptom occurs in discontinuous steps along the path of subjective life. So our article discusses the passage of this discontinuity – when the symptom is felt as a uncanny repetition – for the establishment of a narrative of life based on creative instinctual destinations, in which what is showed strange is assumed as own and familiar. Keywords: symptom; uncanny; strangeness; afterwardsness; repetition. (shrink)

The paper discusses the psychoanalytical notion of sublimation from the perspective of Freud’s the Unheimliche , which is nothing but a structure of contradictory signification without synthesis. The Unheimlich is responsible, in Lacan’s phrase, for the elevation “of any given object to the dignity a thing ( Ding )”. But such a process could also be the occasion for the glancing at the indignity of a thing.

Hybride der Romantik: Frankenstein, Olimpia und das künstliche Leben. Dieser Beitrag untersucht Vorstellungen über die Möglichkeit der Erzeugung künstlicher Lebewesen in der Zeit der Romantik und die damit verbundenen Ängste am Beispiel zweier fiktionaler Texte: Mary Shelleys Frankenstein und Ernst Theodor Amadeus Hoffmanns Sandmann. Dr. Franksteins Monster und Dr. Spalanzanis Automat verkörpern – auf unterschiedliche Weise – die Möglichkeit einer Wendung wissenschaftlicher Produkte und insbesondere künstlicher Hybride ins Monströse. Ihre Geschichten thematisieren das Grauen, das vom drohenden Kontrollverlust ausgeht und als (...) der modernen Wissenschaft innewohnende Gefahr selbst nach der Zerstörung der monströsen Kreaturen bestehen bleibt. Der Begriff des Unheimlichen, von Ernst Jentsch und Sigmund Freud mit Bezug auf Hoffmanns Sandmann formuliert und 1970 von dem japanischen Robotiker Masahiro Mori als Phänomen „des unheimlichen Tals“ (Uncanny Valley) weiterentwickelt, erlaubt weitere Einblicke in die Frage nach künstlichen Lebewesen und ihre Interaktion mit Menschen. Summary: Hybrids of the Romantic: Frankenstein, Olimpia, and Artificial Life. This essay analyzes fantasies and fears related to the possible creation of artificial humans in two influential pieces of Romantic literature, namely E.T.A. Hoffmann's Der Sandmann and Mary Shelley's Frankenstein. Both the automaton Olimpia and Dr. Frankenstein's monster are hybrid creatures. These dystopian figures represent the Romantic fear of the loss of control over the outcome of human endeavour, they symbolize the dangers immanent in modern science and technology. As hybrids, Olimpia and Frankenstein's monster are capable of breaking apparently unpenetrable boundaries, such as those between human and non‐human, and between life and death. As such, these creatures become “unheimlich” (uncanny), a critical term developed by Ernst Jentsch and Sigmund Freud, who directly referred to Hoffmann's Sandman. The term “uncanny” was further developed by the Japanese roboticist Masahiro Mori in the 1970s. Mori's investigation of human responses to androids (“Uncanny Valley”), shows the persistence of doubts and fears surrounding artificial humans far beyond the Romantic times, and opens new questions related to the issues of creation, reproduction, hybrids, hubris and gender. (shrink)

A teoria da evidência faz-nos pensar o conhecimento a partir da sua face mais obscura, ainda que, paradoxalmente, a estranheza surja aqui do lado da luz: arquétipo cognitivo, diz-nos Fernando Gil, a luz é universalmente “a matéria natural do verdadeiro”. As condições perceptivas de produção da evidência apelam inevitavelmente para a visão e suas metáforas; os sentimentos de satisfação que o sujeito experimenta perante a descoberta da verdade são a consequência de um desejo em direcção ao verdadeiro, que eclode como (...) um brilho, uma iluminação, até mesmo uma vibração. Temos na evidência uma presença misteriosa, a partir do olhar giliano; ela exprime-se pelo conceito freudiano de unheimlich – a “inquietante estranheza”. Trata-se de um dos factores de eficácia da própria evidência, já que esta liga o sujeito ao mundo externo, de maneira apodíctica e plena, para além de que é típica das situações em que o real e o irreal se confundem, segundo Freud: esta “estranheza familiar”, como também se pode dizer, abre caminho a um excesso cognitivo no vislumbre certeiro de um possível real e verdadeiro. (shrink)

Este trabajo presenta una interpretación fenomenológico-hermenéutica de la lectura heideggeriana del primer estásimo de la Antígona de Sófocles a través de su lectura de Hölderlin. Nos centraremos en uno de sus aspectos fundamentales que Heidegger expresa con la sentencia: la esencia del hombre es lo inquietante o inhóspito (das Unheimliche, traslación de Heidegger de la voz griega tò deinón). Este aspecto constituye el núcleo fenomenológico del problema del Heimischwerden (el regreso a casa). Nuestro objetivo será mostrar que el sentido de (...) la sentencia solo es sostenible en nuestra situación histórica, de modo que no tiene alcance ahistórico o supra-histórico. Con ello pretendemos ofrecer una hermenéutica del aspecto fenomenológico expresado con la palabra das Heimischwerden que conduzca a pensar en qué consiste el irremediable vínculo con lo familiar, lo doméstico, cuando nuestro mundo histórico es el de la ausencia de contenidos de antemano vinculantes. (shrink)

This paper hypothesises that museums are fundamentally haunted, and hauntological, institutions, and argues that understanding the spectre is necessary to understanding the true position and potential of the museum as a cultural form. In doing so, the paper will address what precisely spectres are, and what hauntology is, before discussing how museums are haunted and hauntological through their relation to memory, anxiety, and the unheimliche. Ultimately, the key argument and conclusion of this paper is that understanding and accepting the museum’s (...) inherently haunted status can enable us to change how museums behave in the twenty-first century, and how we understand their role in public life. (shrink)

The presence of dual and ambivalent characters (good/ bad) has always constituted the aesthetic and educational content in children’s fairy tales. Since the Nineteenth century, fairy tales and children’s books have had as an essential reference increasingly complex images and illustrations with vivid colors. This, together with the narration, has allowed the flourishing of a genre of fairy tale noir, whose explicitly pedagogical content is grafted into the plots not always “to happy ending” of fairy tales. The book by Heinrich (...) Hoffmann, _Struwwelpeter_, and that by Ernst Theodor Hoffmann, _Der Sandmann_, which are at the heart of this essay, constituted a first, important example of this new kind of narrative. They have revealed, from a pedagogical-psychoanalytic perspective, the value of what Freud in a 1919 paper, _Das Unheimliche_, analyzed as a necessary manifestation of presence/absence (conscious and unconscious) in the phases of human growth. (shrink)

Lo que aquí se presenta es una introducción a las posibles implicaciones de una «estética freudiana», estética que estaría atravesada por el proyecto inacabado de Freud: la fundamentación de la Trieblehre.

Überwindet Technik das unheimlich Unbeherrschbare? Oder wird sie uns selbst unheimlich? Zwei scheinbar widersprüchliche Narrative prägen die Geschichte und auch die Theorie der Technik: Das Narrativ der Entzauberung beschreibt, wie eine als fremd und gefährlich erfahrene Natur durch Verwissenschaftlichung und Technisierung gezähmt wurde. Das Narrativ der Verzauberung schildert, wie uns Artefakte und technologische Möglichkeiten unheimlich werden, insbesondere wenn sie sich zu verselbständigen scheinen oder mit „autonomem“ Eigensinn gegenübertreten. In den heutigen Debatten um selbstlernende, ubiquitär verteilte, im Assistenzmodus (...) unsichtbare, dabei opake Techniken schwingt das unheimliche Moment einer „Verselbständigung“ von Technik mit – und trägt im Anschluss an die Mechanisierungs- und Automatisierungsdiskurse des 20. Jahrhunderts zur „Dämonisierung“ der Technik bei. Technik macht Welt einerseits vertraut und nachvollziehbar: Paradigmatisch wird dies in der Idee, dass etwas dann verstanden wird, wenn es technisch rekonstruiert werden kann. Andererseits wird die technische Reproduktion von Welt – oder deren radikale Umgestaltung zu einer entfremdeten – als etwas Verstörendes erlebt. Spätestens, wenn Artefakte zu tun scheinen, „was sie wollen“ oder technische Großsysteme die Lebenswelt nach ihren „Eigenlogiken“ prägen, ist eine schon von Freud benannte Grenze erreicht, an der wir verunsichert werden, ob wir überhaupt noch in der modernen Welt leben. (shrink)

Freud’s discussion of uncanny [unheimlich] experiences focuses on their peculiar ambivalence. On his view, the uncanny is a paradoxical feeling of both familiarity and alienation. While Freud’s analysis of this paradoxical feeling does succeed in explaining it away, it does little to explain it. One might expect a psychoanalytical demystification of the real experience that is hidden behind the superstitious overtones of uncanny experiences. Instead, the uncanny is attributed rather anti- climactically to the combination of a previous superstition (maintained (...) unconsciously) and an entirely coincidental verification of that superstition. The implication is that there is no uncanny per se. There is no distinctive category of experience, the unique character of which tends to cause or encourage superstitious beliefs; rather, such beliefs are prerequisite to having the experience. In other words, the experience suits the belief, and not vice-versa. The uncanny is the fantasized verification of a repressed fantasy. It involves a breakdown of the reality principle and the projection of beliefs into the external world, rather than a peculiarity of feeling that can be linked intrinsically to a specific category of experience. I do not intend to reject this analysis in its entirety. The basic structure, repression and return, is sound. However, Freud’s analysis of the uncanny, which resolves uncanny ambivalence into the separate categories of consciousness and unconsciousness, merely reinstates the problematical opposition of das heimliche and das unheimliche, familiar and unfamiliar, within the mind rather than in the external world. The coincidence of the two feelings in uncanny experience cannot be explained without an intervening stage between repression and return. I will suggest that Freud’s characterization of uncanniness as the return, in superstition, of the repressed is a misplacement of the experience of uncanniness. The aesthetical feeling is the cause of, but not identical to, the projected superstitions and ideas which surround it. An explanation of the feeling of uncanniness must fall not on the side of the repressed, but on the side of consciousness. The import of my position is that the feeling of uncanniness refers, in a manner of speaking, to something “real,” rather than merely to infantile ideas projected upon the external world. Freud’s explanation makes the unconscious a kind of scapegoat to be blamed for imposing fundamentally irrational beliefs into our interpretation of present experience, in that way preserving a model of the conscious ego as autonomous, fundamentally attuned to reality and ultimately independent of the unconscious. I will argue, on the contrary, that the experience of the uncanny is not merely a falling back into irrational or infantile beliefs, but an experience of a deep disunity in personhood that rightly causes us to question our everyday confidence in the unity, independence, and rationality of our conscious sense of self. The ambivalence of the feeling has its source in an irresolvable ambivalence that can exist in consciousness, and not simply in an analytically resolvable psychical ambivalence between consciousness and the unconscious. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Adrian Del Caro PAUL CELAN'S UNCANNY SPEECH On October 22, 1960, Paul Celan was in Darmstadt, West Germany, to accept the prestigious Georg-Bûchner-Preis. Winners of this prize are required by custom to give a speech on some aspect of Georg Büchner's writings, and Celan followed suit with a speech entitled "Der Meridian." The speech itself, as an address given in German in Germany to German listeners, was uncanny, but (...) it was Celan's "uncanny" discourse that had earned him this prize in the first place. In his poetry die uncanny takes on a life of its own. In the Meridian speech, dimensions of the uncanny in Büchner's writings are explored for the purpose of shedding light on the artistic impulse, and on poetry in particular. The poetic of Paul Celan is difficult to define from the aggregate of his poems, and hardly transparent in the Meridian speech, either. But it is the concentration on the uncanny in "Meridian" that makes the effort worthwhile. I will use the Meridian speech, examples from German literature, and examples of Celan's poems to unpack this uncanny. "Meridian," like so many words chosen by Celan, is full. Among the things it can mean are highest point, prime of life, circle from pole to pole, and lines numbered according to degrees of longitude. We speak also of a prime meridian, namely Greenwich, having the property of a center, of a locus from which we determine our bearings. Celan the linguist and etymologist knew and considered all meanings. "Uncanny" as a translation of German das Unheimliche is not quite sufficient, but it is a good starting point. German heim is English home, and unheimlich, unheimisch would be unhomely or unhomey—at least in the etymological spirit. When things are not as they are at home, they are unheimlich. Grimm's dictionary tells us that it wasn't until die end of Philosophy and Literature, © 1994, 18: 211-224 212Philosophy and Literature the eighteenth century that an emotive quality was added to this formerly cognitive adjective; it began at diis time to be associated with feelings of terror, dread, and anxiety. The Romantic Ludwig Tieck was among the first German writers to treat supernatural, uncanny themes, and as unheimlich became associated with the supernatural, it began to lose its sense of homeliness. Later on, E. T. A. Hoffmann became a master of die uncanny in his numerous weird tales. English "uncanny," which is still the best translation we have for unheimlich, experienced a similar development away from its origins in Scottish, where canny meant quiet, snug, cozy, and pleasant. The Oxford English Dictionary tells us that "supernatural, mysterious, uncomfortably strange or unfamiliar" were properties ascribed to "uncanny" after 1850. Poe's writings are uncanny in this modern sense. Freud devoted an essay to the uncanny in 1919. He made die point diat das Unheimliche is merely das Heimliche that we have repressed. Ifwe romanticize this idea, dien in the beginning all things were heimlich or homey to us, and it is only after consciousness thatwe become alienated from our home in nature, a condition which makes us feel unheimlich. Celan certainly had strong reason to focus on the earliest meaning of unheimlich, since he experienced homelessness in virtually every conceivable sense of the word, but then, so did his people, dieJews; first in their experience of the Diaspora, then in their "final" eradication during the Holocaust. The people without Boden or land became, by 1945, a people no longer of die earth. Freud linked the concept of das Unheimliche to its origin in heimlich. After exhaustively quoting the lexicologists Sanders and Grimm, Freud concluded that only Schelling had added a new dimension to das Unheimliche: "Uncanny would be everything that is supposed to remain a secret, remain concealed, but has emerged."1 This is credible enough, and fits Freud's repression theory. Freud's statement at the conclusion of the first part of his long essay would have appealed to Celan: "Heimlich is a word according to whose meaning an ambivalence develops until finally it corresponds in any uncanny way with its opposite. Unheimlich is somehow a kind ofheimlich... (shrink)

Der vorliegende Sammelband widmet sich einem Thema der Sprachphilosophie: den Grenzen der Sprache. Die Begrenztheit des Sprechens, das Versagen der Sprache und das Schweigen sind Bereiche, denen das Interesse dieses Buches gilt. Groß e Bedeutung gewinnt deshalb die Frage, in welchem Sinne und ob überhaupt von einem Jenseits der Sprache gesprochen werden kann. Dabei steht das Verhältnis von Immanenz und Transzendenz im Mittelpunkt. Das Unnennbare, Unaussagbare, das Unheimliche, das hinter dem Rücken des Sprechenden lauert, ist der Sprache selbst transzendent. Trotzdem (...) gelingt es, das Transzendente sprachlich einzuholen. Es ist der Sprache immanent: ein immanentes Transzendentes. Darin scheint sich eine Potenz der Sprache anzudeuten, selbst darüber zu sprechen, worüber man nicht sprechen und gleichwohl nicht schweigen kann. Kaum ein Thema der Sprachphilosophie eignet sich daher mehr für einen interdisziplinären Band als gerade dieses. Es ist nicht nur Gegenstand der Philosophie, sondern verweist auf und korrespondiert mit wichtigen Forschungsrichtungen aus der Wissenschaftstheorie, der Theologie, der Sprachwissenschaften, der Germanistik, der Ästhetik, der Musikwissenschaften, der Wirtschaftswissenschaften, der Soziologie und Ethnologie und schließlich auch der Medizin. Der vorliegende Sammelband versucht, den unterschiedlichen Aspekten dieses Themas sowohl in historischer als auch in systematischer Hinsicht gerecht zu werden. (shrink)

Is Dasein primordially—that is, at the very core of its being—“at home” or “not at home” in Being? One of the more overlooked or understated issues in Heideggerstudies is how Heidegger, over the course of a lifetime of thinking, transformed his answer to such a question about Dasein’s fundamental relation to Being. In several important texts of the 1920s and 1930s, The History of the Concept of Time, Being andTime, and Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger maintained the position that Dasein is (...) primordially unheimlich, “unsettled,” and thus also unheimisch, “unhomely,” at the core of its being. Yet, we discover a significant turning in his thinking toward home, especially in the early 1940s. The 1942 commentary on Hölderlin’s poem “The Ister” stands out as a bridge text between the early and later Heidegger on this issue; in particular, we find a striking and significant difference in his reading of Sophocles’ Antigone compared with the more well-known reading in the 1935 Introduction to Metaphysics. In the “Ister” commentary, Heidegger engaged both Sophocles and Hölderlin to work out the motif—so prominent in his later work—that human beings are primordially “at home” in Being, the sheltering source and origin of all beings. We also find a further development in his thinking in the 1950s and 1960s. In all, I propose that the “middle” Heidegger of the early 1940s offers the most satisfying phenomenological account of being human. (shrink)

Gibt es ein B ses der Nachmoderne, das sich von demjenigen fr herer Zeiten auf spezifische Weise unterscheidet? Macht es berhaupt Sinn, von "dem" B sen zu sprechen - in einer Welt, in der wir auf keine Personifikationen alten Zuschnitts mehr treffen? K nnten wir nicht, wenn sich die Bedingungen unserer Existenz auf so grundlegende Weise ndern, wie das gegenw rtig der Fall ist, nun endg ltig auf eine metaphysische Redeweise verzichten, die auch schon in der Moderne nur noch den (...) Charakter eines Relikts hatte? Der Essay von Max Lorenzen geht, um diese Fragen zu beantworten, einen Weg, der in dieser Weise bisher noch nie beschritten wurde. Er verbindet die ungesch tzte Darstellung pers nlichen Erlebens und die philosophische Reflexion, um in diesem wechselseitigen Bezug eine Haltung der denkenden Erfahrung entstehen zu lassen. In ihr, einer Zone der wirklichen und direkten Betroffenheit, setzt sich das Ich der Begegnung mit den Bildern des nachmodernen Lebens aus. Sie sind r tselhaft und unheimlich. Um sie zu verstehen, bedarf es einer neuen Metaphysik, die keinen ontologischen Systemcharakter mehr hat und sich von den tradierten Vorgaben l st. Diese Metaphysik ist ein Desiderat der gegenw rtigen philosophischen Situation: sie kann dazu beitragen, die Erstarrung eines eingefahrenen Frage- und Antwortspiels zu durchbrechen. Auch unsere Zeit muss die Erfahrung des Lebens und des Todes, des Fremden und Kalten, aufeinander beziehen, um ihre spezifischen Bedingungen der Freiheit, von Kunst, Literatur und Philosophie, zu schaffen. Der Beitrag Lorenzens hierzu besteht nicht zuletzt darin, eine nachmoderne Ethik zu entwerfen, in der sich plurale und flexibilisierte Formen mit einem ernsthaften Engagement verbinden. (shrink)

In this reply I try to show that, contrary to Milberry’s apparent assertion, the general intellect of the multitude does not have the explanatory robustness she accredits to it. Digital network technologies are currently overwhelmingly effective in proletarianizing and disempowering the cognitariat and only an active technopolitics of deproletarianization could reverse this hegemonic situation. In my response to Verbeek, I attempt to correct his misinterpretation of the Stieglerian approach as being dialectical in nature and show that, far from reinstating the (...) humanist dichotomy between human beings and technologies, my analysis assumes their original, albeit fundamentally ambiguous and even ‘uncanny’ [unheimlich] interconnection. I conclude with pointing out some implications of this view for a ‘really realistic’ political theory of technology. (shrink)

This paper aims to examine the very unstable concept of the “uncanny” from an atmospherological point of view. Its official theoretical “sanction” is due to Heidegger, who considered it the latent but fundamental ground of any being-in-the-world, and especially to Freud, who described it as the feeling that arises when something familiar suddenly becomes unfamiliar. Freud claimed to be inspired in this conception by Schelling's definition of unheimlich, which I try to explain to better understand what an uncanny atmosphere (...) is. It seems characterized by elements such as ontological ambiguity-vagueness and paranoid subjectification, alien corporeality and unpredictable situations. The paper ends with a brief analysis of the specific uncanny of houses, both in terms of their transformation from a secure interior to an uncanny place and in terms of the anxiety about materially inheriting a house and thus cohabiting with the past. In the perspective adopted here, the uncanny shows that we are not at home within our own body because we always coexist with an external-foreign and in this sense “monstrous” presence. (shrink)

Is Dasein primordially—that is, at the very core of its being—“at home” or “not at home” in Being? One of the more overlooked or understated issues in Heideggerstudies is how Heidegger, over the course of a lifetime of thinking, transformed his answer to such a question about Dasein’s fundamental relation to Being. In several important texts of the 1920s and 1930s, The History of the Concept of Time, Being andTime, and Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger maintained the position that Dasein is (...) primordially unheimlich, “unsettled,” and thus also unheimisch, “unhomely,” at the core of its being. Yet, we discover a significant turning in his thinking toward home, especially in the early 1940s. The 1942 commentary on Hölderlin’s poem “The Ister” stands out as a bridge text between the early and later Heidegger on this issue; in particular, we find a striking and significant difference in his reading of Sophocles’ Antigone compared with the more well-known reading in the 1935 Introduction to Metaphysics. In the “Ister” commentary, Heidegger engaged both Sophocles and Hölderlin to work out the motif—so prominent in his later work—that human beings are primordially “at home” in Being, the sheltering source and origin of all beings. We also find a further development in his thinking in the 1950s and 1960s. In all, I propose that the “middle” Heidegger of the early 1940s offers the most satisfying phenomenological account of being human. (shrink)

This article characterizes Florence Nightingale's nursing reform as the cleaning of the Victorian home which she found unheimlich. She laid strong emphasis on an improvement in the hygiene of the house as a significant part of nursing, and, by establishing the nurse as a new occupation, gave the surplus of unmarried women a decent means of escape from the stifling domesticity in which they had been helplessly trapped. Her nursing at once reformed and reinforced the traditional role of woman (...) as a domestic figure, for she created the nurse as a mother figure in charge of the home space. In the Crimean War, Nightingale successfully nursed the idea of England as Home by attending to the dying soldiers at the front. Her crusade to nurse the unhomely space into a home, however, dismissed one uncanny place inside the imperial Home that needed urgent nursing, that is, Ireland, which had been suffering from the Great Famine and its aftermath. Nightingale confronted Irish Sisters of Mercy, who came to the Crimea to save the lives and souls of the Irish soldiers. These Irish nuns not only embodied the memories of the Famine which they had recently relieved, but also threatened Nightingale's single female authority by representing Ireland as a nation through their equally motherly presence. The service of the Irish nuns in the Crimean War was erased from the myth of the Lady with the Lamp. Nightingale could establish herself as an authoritative female subject and assumed the voice of England only by suppressing another female voice which challenged England's competence in Home management. (shrink)

This chaper discusses homelessness from the perspective of the corporeal consciousness. Psychologists such as Ernst Jentsch and Sigmund Freud report and discuss a strange psychological state of Unheimliche. Philosophers such as Martin Heidegger and Jacques Lacan elaborate and analyze this alienating strangeness in our experience of the self and the world. Since the German word Heim means home, Unheimliche refers to a state of homelessness or unhomeliness. Unheimliche is often translated into English as uncanniness. Uncanniness refers to the disturbing and (...) puzzling experience of familiarly unfamiliar images or scenes. It is a mode of experience that reveals the in-between-ness of human existence and the primordial anxiety that derive from the dual nature of the body, i.e., the body as both an object of perception and a subject of feeling. From the perspective of the fundamental corporeality and the externalizing intimacy of human existence and consciousness, the author will argue that lived experience of uncanniness or homelessness is one of the intriguing aspects of human psychology and humane existence, caused by the continuous cycle of the familiarizing and the alienating processes of the intrinsically embodied mind. The conscious mind is living in this dual image of going home and going out to the world as it experiences the familiarly unfamiliar self that is intrinsically corporeal. The author will explain and analyze the homelessness and uncanniness from the viewpoint of the duality of corporeal consciousness. (shrink)

Introduction: Bachelard belittled -- The forgetting of space and Gaston Bachelard's concrete metaphysics -- The temple and the cabin: Heidegger's metaphysics of being-in -- The unheimlich house: Danielewski's concrete being-in -- Our first home: Irigaray's metaphysics of being-within -- The hut in the storm: Bosco's concrete being-within -- Conclusion: the recovery of space and Gaston Bachelards concrete metaphysics.

The first part of the paper, “Foyer: feeling, look- ing, between-us” establishes the role of touch in intersubjectivity. Starting with Irigaray’s notion of the entre-nous, the “between-us,” I use touch as an example of deeply intersubjective communi- cation, an attempt to overcome estrangement. The ambiguity of touching, the physical action of touching and the affective reaction of feeling, is central to this. The second section, “Reception: receptivity, orderings of the sensible,” consolidates this experience of intersubjective touching within the confines of (...) the demarcated spatial divisions of the hotel, which leads to insights concerning the physical and psychical architecture of the archetypal hotel. We return to examine the notion of “estrangement,” questioning how and why it is altered by spatial layout and sequencing. In this section I subject the usual discussion of Freud’s unheimlich or “uncanny” to some affective spatial observations, and suggest Caillois’ idea of “psychasthenia” (1987) as a useful supplement to think about touching and feeling in the unhomely home of the hotel. The third section, “Room: the caress,” of Levinas’ notion of the caress and Irigaray’s reading of this, from which I grasp towards an ethical-affective relation of between-ness, as much through non-touching as through physical touching. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Awful Patriotism: Richard Rorty and the Politics of KnowingDavid Palumbo-Liu* (bio)Richard Rorty. Achieving Our Country: Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century America. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1998.This essay addresses the current debates surrounding what some have labeled the Two Lefts: a “cultural left” and an activist left. 1 Debate over this “divide” has made many strange bedfellows, but perhaps none quite so unheimlich as “liberal leftist” Richard Rorty and cultural conservative (...) Harold Bloom. To be sure, Rorty has often alluded to Bloom’s work, especially Bloom’s notion of “strong poets,” but in his most recent book, Rorty has appropriated Bloom in a particularly telling manner. In 1994, Harold Bloom published his polemic The Western Canon. At once eloquent and pathetic, it pressed all the right buttons. Bloom succinctly (or shall we say, reductively?) deployed his version of the “aesthetic” against any other approach. Cultural conservatives were gratified that someone of Bloom’s stature had done them the service of voicing their interests in a highly visible and contestatory manner; more moderate sorts squirmed uncomfortably at Bloom’s unabashed elitism and the shrillness of his tone; theorists and cultural studies folks were outraged at Bloom’s absolute ignorance of their work and his resort to parody instead of anything vaguely resembling an engaged critique; and ethnic, minority, queer, and feminist critics had more than enough to be insulted by in his racist and sexist arrogance. So far out is Bloom’s jeremiad that it probably came close to realizing his worst nightmare—it may have driven students screaming into all those horrid cultural studies classes to find out what was so seductive, so powerful as to corner The Canon. So I didn’t worry too much about The Western Canon. That is, until I read Richard Rorty’s essay “The Inspirational Value of Great Works of Literature” and its companion pieces in Achieving Our Country: Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century America. What was Rorty, a self-proclaimed leftist, doing, calling to his aid the social and cultural archconservative Harold Bloom?In the first part of my essay I ponder this strange alliance, particularly as it joins forces against ethnic studies (to be sure, its common target is more generally “theory” of any stripe or color, but I want specifically to address the issue of ethnic literary study). Rorty adapts Bloom’s School of Resentment to characterize what he calls a certain, bad “knowingness,” against which he poses “hope” and “inspiration.” I want to examine more closely the nature and content of that destructive “knowledge,” for it becomes clear that [End Page 37] this knowledge is for Rorty the recognition of Otherness as a politically (as opposed to “merely” ontologically) functional identity. This knowledge is disturbing to Rorty and deeply informs his notions of “patriotism” and Americanism. For him, such knowledge impedes the formation of a leftist politics. It is precisely the disjunction between the “knowing” discourse of the cultural left obsessed with identity politics and an activist political left (modeled after the old reformist left) that troubles Rorty.My essay will be largely devoted to showing how Rorty’s recent work develops his earlier work on “ethnocentrism” into an “Americanism” that erodes precisely the liberal foundations of that earlier work and discloses the weakness of its claims. I understand this development as compelled by a certain impatience with identity politics that is shared by a number of liberal and leftist critics of American political society, an impatience fueled perhaps not so much by a conservative threat as by a perceived threat from “within” progressive politics. Basically, I ask, how and why are knowledge and recognition of “difference” taken to immobilize progressive politics? To frame that same question in a slightly different manner—what is the presumed content of that “progressive” politics, and what assumptions do we have to make in order to arrive at that point of view?Against the rather odd Bloom/Rorty pairing, set against “knowledge,” one would naturally seek out an enemies list for possible allies. Rorty in fact begins his essay by providing us with one in the figure of Fredric Jameson, an archpractitioner of theory whose “antiromantic” skepticism Rorty finds both debilitating and... (shrink)

This article is a critique of the failure of Wagner's Der Ring des Nibelungen. It considers this as a metaphysical problem rather than an aesthetic or formal one. The article, considering Wagner’s inheritance from Haydn, claims him as the first composer of the culture industry. This will lead the author to conclusions regarding a gendered Das Unheimlich, the distinction between technology and technique, and the philosophy of aesthetics.

This article examines the relationship between organizational ethics, the uncanny, and the annual celebration of Halloween. We begin by exploring the traditional and contemporary organizational function of Halloween as ‘tension-management ritual’ :44–59, 2000) through which collective fears, anxieties, and fantasies are played out and given material expression. Combining the uncanny with the folkloric concept of ostension, we then examine an incident in which UK supermarket retailers made national news headlines for selling offensive Halloween costumes depicting ‘escaped mental patients’. Rather than (...) treating this incident as a problem of moral hygiene—in which products are removed, apologies made, and lessons learned—we consider the value of Halloween as a unique and disruptive ethical encounter with the uncanny Other. Looking beyond its commercial appeal and controversy, we reflect on the creative, generous, and disruptive potential of Halloween as both tension-management ritual and unique organizational space of hospitality through which to receive and embrace alterity and so discover the homely within the unheimlich. (shrink)

This article examines the relationship between organizational ethics, the uncanny, and the annual celebration of Halloween. We begin by exploring the traditional and contemporary organizational function of Halloween as ‘tension-management ritual’ :44–59, 2000) through which collective fears, anxieties, and fantasies are played out and given material expression. Combining the uncanny with the folkloric concept of ostension, we then examine an incident in which UK supermarket retailers made national news headlines for selling offensive Halloween costumes depicting ‘escaped mental patients’. Rather than (...) treating this incident as a problem of moral hygiene—in which products are removed, apologies made, and lessons learned—we consider the value of Halloween as a unique and disruptive ethical encounter with the uncanny Other. Looking beyond its commercial appeal and controversy, we reflect on the creative, generous, and disruptive potential of Halloween as both tension-management ritual and unique organizational space of hospitality through which to receive and embrace alterity and so discover the homely within the unheimlich. (shrink)

In response to Helmut Heid's critique of domesticated philosophical critique, I focus on the metaphor of domestication, which is central to his article. Drawing on the work of Jacques Derrida, I offer a deconstructive critique of the opposition between domesticated and undomesticated critique, arguing that a clear conceptual demarcation between the two is impossible, and that ‘domesticated’ and ‘undomesticated’ critique always carry each other's traces. I explore connections between the undomesticated and das Unheimliche (Freud's ‘Uncanny’), as well as differences between (...) Helmut Heid's and Paulo Freire's interpretation and use of the concepts of ‘domestication’ and ‘liberation’. Lastly, I examine how educators might go about a pedagogy of critique. I argue that critique can and should be understood and taught as a tradition, but one that is heterogeneous rather than monolithic. A careful reception of this translated and metonymic tradition of critique will enable students to see the spaces in which new critique—and critique of critique— is possible. (shrink)

Modernist Architecture and Ruins: On Ruins as a Minus, Neoclassicism and the Uncanny.

Geschrieben 1936-38, am Vorabend des Zweiten Weltkriegs, mit furchtlosem Blick auf die Medusenhäupter der Diktaturen, eines Dritten Reiches, eines sowjetischen Kollektivismus, auch eines Papstes, ist dieser Aufruf zur Selbsterkenntnis der Macht der Vernunft, zur Autonomie des ICH nach fast 80 Jahren noch von geradezu unheimlicher Aktualität. In konstruktiver Auseinandersetzung mit Kant und Ernst Marcus entwirft Friedlaender/Mynona das „System der Immanenz“, der Erfahrung, des Lebens. Es gibt auch „eine intelligente Wut,“ sagt er, „einen weisen Zorn gegen Irrtum, Lug, Trug“ und gegen (...) eine Toleranz, die alles zuläßt, anstatt von klar begründeter Position aus allen Zweifel und Opportunismus scharf abzuweisen. Der Mensch, hatte er schon vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg erklärt, „hat ein wahrhaft kolossales Vertrauen zum,Tode’“ – „er ist das wahre Rindvieh des Todes.“ Der Philosoph korrigiert nur die Druckfehler im Buch des Lebens. Die Vereinzelten Bemerkungen (243 Abschnitte) werden hier zum ersten Mal publiziert. Mit Einleitung, Stellenkommentar und Illustrationen. (shrink)