헤겔『철학대계』에서 정신철학의 제 1부를 이루는 주관정신 철학은 정신(Geist)을 그것의 내면적이고 주관적 측면에서 다루며 이 관점에서 인간 정신의 내적 구성 및 활동들을 다룬다. 따라서 헤겔의 주관정신 철학은 헤겔의 철학적 심리학을 대변한다 할 수 있는데 여기서 정신은 결코 오늘날 심리철학에서 전제하는 마음(mind) 개념으로 환원되지 않는다. 주관정신 철학은 그 중요성에도 불구하고 국내외 학계 모두에서 헤겔의 다른 대저작들에 비해 상대적으로 덜 연구되었으며, 특히 주관정신 철학의 세 부분 ｢인간학｣, ｢정신현상학｣, ｢심리학｣ 사이의 형식적, 내용적 연관 관계 속에서 그 전체를 조망하는 연구는 매우 드물다. 이러한 연구 상황을 (...) 염두에 두고 본고는 아리스토텔레스의 ｢영혼에 대하여｣에 나타난 수동적 지성 개념에 대한 헤겔의 해석에 주목하여 이를 토대로 ｢인간학｣을 중심으로 헤겔의 주관정신 철학을 조망해 보고자 한다. 이 연구를 통해 논자는 헤겔의 주관정신 철학의 세 부분, ｢인간학｣, ｢정신현상학｣, ｢심리학｣이 정신이 낮은 단계를 지양하고 높은 단계로 올라간다는 일직선적 정신 발전 혹은 전개 개념이나 즉자적 통일성으로서의 정신이 근원적 분열을 겪고 대자적으로 통합된다는 도식적 변증법 논리로 이해되어서는 안 되며, 인간정신을 구체성으로 특징짓고 내용으로 가득 찬 실체로 규정하여 이 하나의 동일한 대상을 상이한 형식적 관점에서, 특히 정신의 증가하는 주체화 과정 관점에서 기술하는 것으로 이해될 수 있다는 점을 보이고자 한다. (shrink)

Why does Hegel change “Dreaming Soul” to “Feeling Soul” in the 1830 edition of the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit? By tracing the content of the Dreaming Soul section, through Hegel’s 1794 manuscript on psychology, to sources such as C.P. Moritz’s Magazin zur Erfahrungsseelenkunde, the paper shows how the section embraces a late Enlightenment mission: combating supposedly supernatural expressions of spiritual enthrallment by explaining them as pathological conditions of the soul. Responding to perceived attacks on the 1827 edition of (...) the Encyclopedia by Schleiermacher, Hegel alters the section and its heading, thereby including the pastor’s religion of feeling in the pathology of Schwärmerei. (shrink)

This critical commentary on the three sections of the philosophy of subjective spirit as it appears in Hegel's final Berlin Encyclopedia uses them to come to a better understanding and evaluation of his general philosophical perspective. This is in contrast to two sorts of dangers which Hegel scholarship faces. One is getting so caught up in summarizing and interpreting the troublesome texts that no evaluation is provided. The other is to view Hegel unsympathetically through the criteria of contemporary (...) Anglo-America philosophy, so that very little is learned from him except that on most counts he falls short of the standards that this philosophy sets for itself. ;Contrary to these methods I present and evaluate the philosophy of subjective spirit in terms of its fulfillment of the aims of Hegel's system, and in terms of the questions that he suggests it is adequate to answer. There are three such questions. These concern the nature of the relationship between the mind and the body, the compatibility of free human will and natural determination, and the unity of the mind in light of its many activities. ;I also frequently compare Hegel to Kant for two reasons. One is pedagogical, the other intimately related to Hegel's project. We can gain greater understanding of Hegel by illuminating his departures from Kant, about whom much is known. What is more important philosophically, however, is Hegel's criticism of the limits which Kant's transcendental idealism places upon knowledge. The origins of these limits lie in Kant's view of the human mind, the forms of intuition and the spontaneity of understanding. However, if Hegel is to overcome the limits which Kant places upon knowledge, he must provide an account of the mind which circumvents what he considers to be the problems that arise out of Kant's account. ;On most of these counts Hegel's philosophy of subjective spirit is a failure, even if his vision is a captivating one. This analysis, however, does reveal certain advantages that Hegel's conception of freedom has over Kant's. (shrink)

This paper argues that Hegel's depiction of knowledge, as presented in the Encyclopaedia philosophy of subjective Spirit, is founded on what he deems to be the practical interests of self-consciousness. More specifically, it highlights the significance of the will in Hegel's understanding of the cognitive process. I begin with a survey of the relation between category-formation and the notion of self-determining freedom in the Logic , and therewith draw attention to the unity of thinking and willing in the (...) Concept. I then indicate how Hegel's philosophy of subjective Spirit should be read as the applied logic of the Concept, according to which the socially constituted self-conscious I seeks to realise its claims to freedom through its theoretical cognitions of objects. As part of what could be called Hegel's integrative theory of the faculties, I finally argue that the will underscores both the determinate character of our theoretical cognitions and the reflexivity of knowledge in general. On this score, I maintain that Hegel, whose relation to Kant and Fichte I also consider, is of the view that it is with reference to willing that we can account for the self-referential nature of reason in toto as the actualised unity of theoretical-practical subjectivity. (shrink)

This paper aims to understand Hegel’s claim in the introduction to his Philosophy of Mind that mind is an actualization of the Idea and argues that this claim provides us with a novel and defensible way of understanding Hegel’s naturalism. I suggest that Hegel’s approach to naturalism should be understood as ‘formal’, and argue that Hegel’s Logic, particularly the section on the ‘Idea’, provides us with a method for this approach. In the first part of the paper, I present an (...) interpretation of Hegel’s method in which life plays a central role. In the second part of the paper, I develop Hegel’s method by providing a reading of Hegel’s Subjective Spirit, focusing on the sections ‘Anthropology’ and ‘Phenomenology’ in particular, arguing that they display the dialectic between life and cognition outlined by Hegel’s Idea. (shrink)

While some would see the main theme of Hegel’s Subjective Spirit as the emergence of the nature-bound subjectivity to free spirituality, or the resolution of the subject-object problem and the overcoming of subjective idealism, Petry’s chief concern is Hegel’s relation to empiricism. The doctrine of Subjective Spirit is for Petry a “survey” of the “immediate constituent factors involved in our ordinary activity as conscious beings”, organized according to the “commonsense realism and empiricism of the Idea.” (...) The Idea makes possible a hierarchical order wherein the levels of “an empirically ascertained subject-matter form a progression in degree of complexity.” Hegel’s chief contribution in Subjective Spirit is to organize into levels of complexity an existing body of “professional knowledge” in anthropology, psychology, etc., and it is Petry’s main aim to point to such a body of knowledge and show how Hegel made use of it. Before we examine this approach to Hegel, let us note the main contents of the three volumes. (shrink)

The first English-language collection devoted to Hegel’s Philosophy of Subjective Spirit.

_The first English-language collection devoted to Hegel’s_ Philosophy of Subjective Spirit.

The eurocentrism of Hegel's philosophy of history is well known. Hegel's reputation has not benefited from many of the claims in the Philosophy of History; such as the one that African history, having no development, has contributed nothing to world history. Because of the general lack of attention that Hegel's philosophy of subjective spirit has received, it is little known that this eurocentrism is based, in part, on the racism of the philosophy of subjective spirit. Only (...) here does Hegel systematically treat the biological category of race. Reading through this section one can find passages about racial distinctions which seem initially to be rather ambivalent, but taken as a whole are decidedly racist. Much of what Hegel says about the �inferiority� of African culture and the �justification� for the slave trade finds its foundation here. This paper is an exhibition of the relevant passages of the �Philosophy of Subjective Spirit� and an attempt to link them to Hegel's other claims about African culture and the slave trade. I will argue that Hegel's philosophy of spirit is tainted by the unusual (for Hegel) causal role which he gives to a biological category, namely race. I will argue further that his philosophy of spirit is not necessarily racist, only contingently so, that is that his racism does not follow from any of his fundamental claims about spirit. Hegel's account of spirit makes his racism possible, not necessary. The source of his racism can be traced to the general ideology of the nineteenth century. Nonetheless, understanding how Hegel could hold racist views is important for understanding features of his political philosophy. It shows both the problems of the Hegelian conception of person hood and exemplifies the conservative bias built into his method of political philosophy generally. (shrink)

Under the balmy Mediterranean skies of Santa Margherita Ligure on the beautiful Italian Riviera, forty Hegelian scholars from nine countries put their heads together on the theme “Hegel’s Philosophie des subjectiven Geistes” at the Conference of the Internationale Hegel-Vereinigung, May 24–27, 1973. Enjoying the generosity of the Italian Government and the official hospitality of the Municipality of Santa Margherita, the participants heard and discussed four papers by German scholars, two each by Italians and Americans, and one each by a Dutch (...) and a French scholar. Professor Valerio Verra of the University of Rome served as host, and Professor Dieter Henrich, President of the Internationale Hegel-Vereinigung, introduced the theme of the Conference and officiated the proceedings. Chairing individual sessions and participating in the discussions were such internationally known figures as Hans-Georg Gadamer of Germany, Eric Weil and Marcel Régnier of France, W. H. Walsh and Anthony Kenny of Great Britain, and Enrico de Negri of Italy. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Hegel's Account of Subjectivity: General Remarks The Phenomenology as the Theory of Concrete Subjectivity Conclusion References Further Reading.

In this paper, I will try to propose a general characterisation of the spirit in Hegel'sEncyclopaedia. This characterisation is based on the opposition between nature and spirit. More precisely, in my view the Hegelian spirit can be defined as the activity of bringing the natural exteriority back to a living totality.We know that for Hegel the notion of spirit takes so many shapes that their unity is difficult to find. For instance, what does the soul in (...) the subjective spirit, property in the objective spirit and the cult of the Greek gods in the absolute spirit have in common? Furthermore, when we consider property, for example, the problem is knowing if the spirit is here constituted by the owner, by the deeds of ownership or by the living relationship between the owner and the possessed goods.Moreover, the Hegelian spirit is a philosophical descendant of several different traditions. The question is, therefore, to know how these traditions are linked in the Hegelian notion. I will present these briefly before stating my general hypothesis about the definition of the spirit.First, the Hegelian spirit is connected to thenoûsof the Greek philosophers. Thenoûs— on the one hand, an immaterial entity leading the universe, and, on the other, a faculty of the soul — is most often distinguished by its separate and rational nature. For Hegel too, the spirit, as a non-perceptible entity, constitutes the freest and most rational stage in the development of the Idea. (shrink)

In this paper, I will try to propose a general characterisation of the spirit in Hegel's Encyclopaedia. This characterisation is based on the opposition between nature and spirit. More precisely, in my view the Hegelian spirit can be defined as the activity of bringing the natural exteriority back to a living totality.

Hegel raises many real problems on the basis of the phenomenology of spirit: logico-ontological, gnoseological, and philosophico-historical problems. But in all spheres, levels, and forms of consciousness, Hegel investigates particularly the formation of the socially developed and historically oriented universal subject of thought, will, and action in the context of the forms of the manifest spirit, forms that in reality assume the status of being. It is precisely this investigation that constitutes the real problematic of Hegel's Phenomenology of (...) Spirit. (shrink)

Globalization and Human Subjectivity argues that Hegelian subjectivity could serve as a philosophical basis for a new conception of human subjectivity for the age of globalization. Why, then, does globalization demand a new conception of human subjectivity at all? What constitutes the Hegelian subjectivity such that it is not only relevant and but also necessary to the contemporary, postmodern context of globalization? This book largely addresses these two questions. Capitalist globalization, the context in which we find ourselves today, strategically leads (...) to the “death of the subject,” in the sense that it reduces human beings merely to consumers who, without critical subjectivity, simply succumb to the imperialism of a globalizing market. In this context, we are impelled to envision a new conception of human subjectivity for the age of globalization. This book explores Hegel’s view on human subjectivity as spiritual subjectivity, particularly presented in his Phenomenology of Spirit, which could function as a new anthropological vision about what it means to be authentically human in a globalizing world, that is, a sort of cosmopolitan citizen who is constantly universalizing oneself through self-transcending, self-determined ethico-political actions in solidarity with others to create a global community of co-existence and co-prosperity for all. (shrink)

Has not such a promiscuous, ill-defined concept come to obscure and confuse rather than clarify a genuine understanding of our experience?Harvie Ferguson ...

The greatest philosopher of the modern experience, G. W. F. Hegel, was deeply rooted in Plato, Aristotle, and Spinoza, and he synthesized the riches of Kantian and post-Kantian idealism. He put dynamic panentheism into play in modern theology, and in some way he inspired nearly every great philosophical idea and movement of the past two centuries. Yet no thinker is as routinely misconstrued as Hegel, partly because his greatest work, the Phenomenology of Spirit, defies categorization and is notoriously hard (...) to understand. In the mid-1790s, while Immanuel Kant was elderly and fading and J. G. Fichte was prominent for amplifying Kant’s subjective ethical idealism, a group of youthful post-Kantian .. (shrink)

Se desarrolla la concepción normativista de la autoconciencia hegeliana, de acuerdo con los aportes de los denominados "neohegelianos de Pittsburgh", así como de otros autores anglosajones como Robert Pippin, Terry Pinkard y Paul Redding. Se presenta el recorrido de la autoconciencia en el capítulo IV de la Fenomenología del Espíritu, y se desarrollan algunos rasgos que pueden extraerse de dicha presentación, de acuerdo con la lectura normativista de los autores mencionados. The normativist conception of Hegelian self-consciousness according to the contributions (...) of the so-called "Pittsburgh neo-Hegelians" is developed along with the contributions of other English-speaking scholars such as Robert Pippin, Terry Pinkard and Paul Redding. An overview is given of self-consciousness as laid out in chapter IV of the Phenomenology of Spirit, and some of the features that can be extracted from this overview are developed according to a normativist reading of the authors mentioned. (shrink)

Hegel's discussion of the concept of “habit” appears at a crucial point in his Encyclopedia system, namely, in the transition from the topic of “nature” to the topic of “spirit” (Geist): it is through habit that the subject both distinguishes itself from its various sensory states as an absolute unity (the I) and, at the same time, preserves those sensory states as the content of sensory consciousness. By calling habit a “second nature,” Hegel highlights the fact that incipient (...) class='Hi'>spirit retains a “moment” of the natural that marks a limitation compared to “pure thought” but that also makes perceptual consciousness possible. This makes Hegel's account analogous in important respects to John McDowell's “naturalism of second nature.” But Hegel's account of habit can be seen as a version of a Kantian synthesis of the productive imagination—and hence presupposes a given material that can become one's own by means of habit. This does not mean that Hegel falls into the Myth of the Given, but it does suggest that an appropriate account of second nature might be committed to something McDowell wants to deny: that nonconceptual states of consciousness play a role (even if not a justificatory role) in perception. (shrink)

This paper attempts to show that an expansive normative vision can be drawn from Hegel's texts, one whose scope significantly exceeds the anthropocentric model presented in the ‘objective spirit’ parts of his system. This expansion of normativity is linked to an expansive vision of relationality underpinning Hegel's model of ‘concrete freedom’. In order to put into sharper relief the links between expansive relationality and normativity, the late thinking of Maurice Merleau-Ponty is mobilized as a heuristic contrasting point. In the (...) ‘subjective spirit’ sections of theEncyclopaediaare found insights that anticipate key features of Merleau-Ponty's notion of ‘flesh’. Locating these insights allows us to detect the underlying thread this paper seeks to mine. Hegel's own ‘theory of flesh’ culminates in the notion of ‘constitutive attachments’, the idea that the content of subjectivity is made up of all the bonds linking the human subject to her surrounding worlds and objects. Since freedom for Hegel is ‘being with’, and since normative demands arise from the different ways in which freedom is concretely realized, it would seem that Hegel's relational conception of subjectivity should lead to an equally expansive conception of normativity. Against the objection that Hegel denied any normative status to non-human beings, the paper points to passages in his work, notably his account of aesthetic judgement and natural beauty, which appear to suggest the opposite. (shrink)

Yoga is thousands of years old, but because of its current popularity, some people wrongly dismiss it as just another exercise fad made fashionable by celebrities. In fact, as author Kathy Phillips demonstrates in this large, beautifully illustrated book, yoga is a gentle but powerful means of achieving strength, flexibility, serenity, and a healthy balance between body and mind. Originating on the Indian subcontinent at the dawn of civilization, yoga is now accepted worldwide as an effective way to deal with (...) physical and emotional stress. The Spirit of Yoga is a sensible introduction for beginners, and a source of inspiration for current practitioners who would like to learn more. It explains differences among the various yoga disciplines, enabling readers to make a considered choice that best fits their needs. The author uses her experience as a yoga teacher to describe exercises and postures-also shown in color photos-that can promote physical health and body flexibility while inducing emotional tranquility. Yoga positions are suggested as effective remedies for physical ailments and for discomforts produced by everyday stress. The author's witty approach to her subject demystifies today's yoga hype while offering readers sound guidance and emphasizing the entirely real benefits they can derive from this honorable discipline. The book's foreword is by the international fashion model Christy Turlington. Hundreds of color photos and illustrations. (shrink)

A recently widely accepted view has it that the nature-spirit distinction in Hegel is to be understood as a distinction between a space or realm that is not normative or does not involve norms, and one that is or does. Notwithstanding the merits of this view, it has tended to create a separation between nature and spirit which is both philosophically troubling and difficult to reconcile with the picture of Hegel as the arch enemy of abstract or unreconciled (...) dualisms. In this paper I aim to show that the defining phenomenon for this view—collective self-government by norms—is on Hegel’s account both dependent on living nature that involves normativity broadly conceived all the way down and also subject to the normative or evaluative super-principle of Hegel’s Philosophy of Spirit—concrete freedom—the essence of spirit according to him. This is to say that for Hegel the normativity of collectively administered norms is neither the most basic nor the highest form of normativity. -/- Published online first 27 January 2021. (shrink)

The explosion of interest in consciousness among scientists in recent decades has led to a revival of interest in the work of Whitehead. This has been associated with the challenge of biophysics to molecular biology in efforts to understand the nature of life. Some claim that it is only through quantum field theory that consciousness will be made intelligible. Most, although not all work in this area, focusses on the brain and how it could give rise to consciousness. In this (...) paper, I will support this challenge, but I will suggest that the focus of work in this area reflects the failure to fully overcome the assumptions of Cartesian thought, associated above all with a defective understanding of consciousness as a ‘thinking substance’. Firstly, as Bergson, Whitehead and Merleau-Ponty argued, consciousness is embodied. Secondly, as Jacob von Uexküll argued, consciousness is only comprehensible in relation to the organism’s world defined as such by the organism. Thirdly, in the case of humans, this is a ‘with-world’, a world shared with others. The consequent social nature of human consciousness is better captured by the German word for mind: Geist, which also translates as ‘Spirit’. And as Hegel argued, along with Subjective Spirit, there is also Objective Spirit, the realm of institutions, and Absolute Spirit, the realm of culture, with Subjective, Objective and Absolute Spirit being conditions, and even components, of each other. My argument is that this broader notion of mind as Spirit should be embraced, but without abandoning the work in biophysics. What is required is a further expansion of the notion of mind and Spirit as humanity comes to appreciate that it is part of nature and that it is through the development of institutions and culture that nature, through human subjects, is becoming conscious of itself and its significance. The development of process philosophy inspired by Whitehead, associated with the development of the concepts of field and ecology, should be seen as a development of the semiosphere and the advance of the Spirit of Gaia, essential for the creation of a global civilization able to augment the life of the current regime of the global ecosystem of which we are part. It is to orient humanity to create an ecologically sustainable civilization; an ecological civilization. (shrink)

On rivers, mountains and secrets : an introduction to the study and its subjects -- Talking to God-- and God talking back -- Mind embodied : spiritual practice and consciousness -- Place and the making of religious practice -- The spirit of the work : challenging oppression, nurturing diversity -- Conscious sex, sacred celibacy : sexuality and the spiritual path.

Strong Spirits, Kind Hearts is the first practical teacher resource to provide comprehensive coverage of all aspects of developing strong spirits and caring young people. It is focused on middle years’ students but most lessons can be adapted for older and younger students as well. This resource describes ways to incorporate emotional and spiritual supports into daily routines and interactions with students and provides ready-to-use activities, lessons and units that can be integrated into subject area teaching.

Australia experienced the most devastating bush-fire season in recorded history, and right after that the world economy stalled due to a global virus outbreak the severity of which has no modern precedent. Crises tend up speed paradigm shifts, and the one begun in 2020 certainly will. In this paper I will contribute to a shift that has been gathering momentum for some time now, the need for which the current crisis has made all too obvious. This is a shift in (...) Kant and Hegel influenced philosophy from thinking of ‘spirit’ (Geist) as an abstract realm or dimension insulated from nature—frictionlessly spinning without touching it, or at least with a tendency to do this as essential to it—to thinking of spirit as a life-form, situated in nature at large, just as all life is. I will work on this theme by elaborating on three broadly Hegelian ideas. Firstly, that the subjective and objective aspects of ‘spirit’, that is to say the psychological and social structures distinctive of persons and their life, are co-constitutive elements of a whole. This whole is the human life-form, or as I call it more technically ‘the life-form of persons’. Secondly, that recognition (Anerkennung) as self-transcendence and inclusion of otherness is ontologically constitutive of both, and key to their internal interrelations. Thirdly, that though freedom as collective autonomy is distinctive of this life-form, thought on the model of abstraction from necessarily determining otherness it is theoretically mistaken and put in practice pathological of the life-form in a literal sense of ‘pathology’. (shrink)