This paper adds to our understandings of women’s post-separation experiences of coercive control through the introduction of a new concept—custody stalking. It is defined as a malevolent course of conduct involving fathers’ use of custody and/or child protection proceedings to overturn historic patterns of care for children. The experience of custody stalking is explored through three composite narratives derived from twelve mothers who participated in an exploratory, qualitative study on the involuntary loss of maternal care time following separation. (...) The losses suffered caused these mothers tremendous grief, damaged their psychological wellbeing and had a detrimental effect on their mothering relationships. Yet custody stalking, as a form of malevolent attack, is not well recognised and mothers’ resultant losses are largely culturally invisible. This is in marked contrast to paternal filicides, another form of post-separation avenging attack committed by some fathers that also leads to maternal loss experiences, albeit more absolute. (shrink)

Stalk‐eyed flies of the family Diopsidae exhibit a unique form of hypercephaly, which has evolved under both natural and sexual selection. Male hypercephaly is used by female diopsids as an indicator of male quality. By choosing to mate with males expressing the most‐exaggerated hypercephaly, females can benefit both from the enhanced fertility of these males and the transmission of other heritable advantages to their offspring. Stalk‐eyed flies are close relatives of the model organism, Drosophila melanogaster. We have shown that similar (...) genetic and cellular mechanisms regulate the initial development of the head capsule in fruitflies and diopsids. The great diversity of stalk‐eyed fly species, exhibiting varying degrees of hypercephaly and sexual dimorphism, constitutes a major advantage for comparative studies of their development and evolution. BioEssays 29: 300–307, 2007. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

Much stalking consists in behavior which would normally be permissible; indeed, many stalking behaviors are protected liberties. How, then, does the stalker wrong the victim? I consider and reject different answers as failing to identify the essential wrong of stalking: stalking perpetuates gender oppression; it threatens or coerces, disrespects autonomy, or violates privacy. I argue that the stalker forces a personal relationship on the target and that our interest in being able to refuse such relationships is (...) strong enough to ground a right. It is a benefit if my account changes the standards of which intimacy-seeking behaviors we consider permissible. (shrink)

Such activities as tracking, watching, and photographing animals are frequently presented as morally superior alternatives to hunting, but could they themselves be morally problematic? In this paper I argue that, despite certain differences from the stalking of humans, a strong case can be made for the prima facie wrongness of stalking sentient animals. The chief harm of stalking is the fear and altered patterns of behavior which it forces upon its victims.

In his exciting and original view of the universe, Itzhak Bentov has provided a new perspective on human consciousness and its limitless possibilities. Widely known and loved for his delightful humor and imagination, Bentov explains the familiar world of phenomena with perceptions that are as lucid as they are thrilling. He gives us a provocative picture of ourselves in an expanded, conscious, holistic universe. _.

This research takes a retrospective look at modern consumption opportunities of the U.S. poor from both sides of the marketing exchange relationship. The paper opens with a critical assessment of the consumer-behavior literature and its primary focus on middle-class Americans. The next section profiles the impoverished and their purchasing habits and closes with a summary of how both have changed over the last forty years. Then a theoretical account is presented using consumer literature from the same timeframe. The paper ends (...) with a discussion of common business practices and moral dilemmas that have continued over these decades, along with an ethical paradigm involving distributive justice to guide future management tactics. (shrink)

"A rough spade for a rugged landscape" : on savage selves and more civil places -- "What remains of the harvest when the fence grazes the crop?" : on the proper violence of agrarian citizenship -- "The life of the thief leaves the belly always boiling" : on the nature and restraint of the criminal animal -- "Millets sown yield millets, evil sown yields evil" : on the moral returns of agrarian toil -- "Let the water for the paddy also (...) irrigate the grass" : on the sympathies of an aqueous self. (shrink)

This paper seeks to identify the distinctive moral wrong of stalking and argues that this wrong is serious enough to criminalize. We draw on psychological literature about stalking, distinguishing types of stalkers, their pathologies, and victims. The victimology is the basis for claims about what is wrong with stalking. Close attention to the experiences of victims often reveals an obsessive preoccupation with the stalker and what he will do next. The kind of harm this does is best (...) understood in relation to the value of privacy and conventionally protected zones of privacy. We compare anti-stalking laws in different jurisdictions, claiming that they all fail in some way to capture the distinctive privacy violation that stalking involves. Further reflection on the seriousness of the invasion of privacy it represents suggests that it is a deeply personal wrong. Indeed, it is usually more serious than obtrusive surveillance by states, precisely because it is more personal. Where state surveillance genuinely is as intrusive as stalking, it tends to adopt the tactics of the stalker, imposing its presence on the activist victim at every turn. Power dynamics —whether rooted in the power of the state or the violence of a stalker —may exacerbate violations of privacy, but the wrong is distinct from violence, threats of violence and other aggression. Nor is stalking a simple expression of a difference in power between stalker and victim, such as a difference due to gender. (shrink)

This article proposes an ecophilosophy of the cinema. It builds on Martin Heidegger’s articulation of art as ‘world-disclosing,’ and on a Whiteheadian and Deleuzian understanding of the universe as a lively and eventful place in which subjects and objects are persistently coming into being, jointly constituted in the process of their becoming. Accordingly, it proposes that cinema be considered a machine that produces or discloses worlds. These worlds are, at once, anthropomorphic, geomorphic, and biomorphic, with each of these registers mapping (...) onto the ‘three ecologies,’ in Felix Guattari’s terms, that make up the relational ontology of the world: the social, the material, and the mental or perceptual. Through an analysis of Andrei Tarkovsky’s Stalker (1979), I suggest that cinema ‘stalks’ the world, and that our appreciation of its potentials should similarly involve a kind of ‘stalking’ of its effects in the material, social, and perceptual dimensions of the world from which cinema emerges and to which it returns. (shrink)

Stalking the elusive physicalist thesis Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-5 DOI 10.1007/s11016-011-9528-2 Authors D. Gene Witmer, Department of Philosophy, University of Florida, P. O. Box 118545, Gainesville, FL 32611-8545, USA Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.

How making up our minds and the makeup of our minds can help us live better and die better. We live in a climate where feelings trump reason and evidence. Lies are treated as "alternative facts." At the same time, it seems our culture does not want us to treat altered or higher states of consciousness seriously. Focusing both on evidence and on such states of consciousness can reorient our attitudes. Jack Crittenden asks the reader to think about life after (...) death, about the basis of morality and the essence of spirituality, about the meaning of happiness, about the path of dying, and about the proper role of work in our lives and how education connects to that role. What if our memories, thoughts, and whole personality lived on after we died? What if morality were based on reasons and evidence and not on God and sacred texts? What if happiness lies not in what we think, how we feel, and what we long for, but in living in the present and in the dying of the self itself? Experiences of and the evidence on altered and higher states of consciousness can lead us to better lives and better deaths. (shrink)

Takes up Kripke's theory of reference for proper names and natural kind words. Advocates investigation by means of ordinary language examples. Finds the problem for which Kripke's theory is offered as an answer seems to rest on an implausible picture of language.

After thirty years of the current “imagery debate,” it appears far from resolved, even though there seems to be a growing acceptance that a cortical display cannot be identified directly with the experienced mental image, nor can it account for the experimental findings on imagery, at least not without additional ad hoc assumptions. The commentaries on the target article range from the annoyed to the supportive, with a surprising number of the latter. In this response I attempt to correct some (...) misreadings of the target article and discuss some of the ideas and evidence introduced by the commentators – much of which I found helpful, even though they do not alter my basic thesis. I also further develop the idea that the spatial character of images may come from the way they are connected to our immediate or immediately-recalled environment (by attention or by visual indexes) and towards which we may orient while we are imaging, thus leaving the alleged spatial properties of images outside the head and freeing image-representations from having to be displayed on any surface. (shrink)

While reading philosophical literature, once in a while I come across passages which say that a particular essay or book is very good, and sometimes an additional remark is made that it is neglected. While reading such passages, I say to myself that I should take a look at this essay or book -- but then I forget to do so, or don't remember who or what was mentioned. Well, I have decided to start keeping..

The ten largest food and beveragecorporations control over half of the food sales inthe United States and their share may be increasing.Using data from a range of secondary sources, weexamine these corporations and their boards ofdirectors. Social and demographic characteristics ofboard members gleaned from corporate reports, thebusiness press, and elsewhere are presented.Information on interlocking corporate directorates andother common ties among members of the boards ofdirectors show that US based food and beveragecorporations are tied together through a web ofindirect interlocks.

The aim of this article is to reclaim social class as a central concern within education, not in the traditional sense as a dimension of educational stratification, but as a powerful and vital aspect of both learner and wider social identities. Drawing on historical and present evidence, a case is made that social inequalities arising from social class have never been adequately addressed within schooling. Recent qualitative research is used to indicate some of the ways in which class is lived (...) in classrooms. The article also raises concerns about the ability of the education system to positively address social class in the classroom when contemporary initial teacher training rarely engages with it as a relevant concern within schooling. (shrink)

. This is one of the better books on Indian religion" ÑChoice In this book, Farella combines the classic studies of Gladys Reichard and Berard Haile with recent interviews with tribal elders, in order to develop an understanding of the ...

Anand Pandian: Crooked Stalks Cultivating Virtue in South India Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-2 DOI 10.1007/s10806-011-9308-4 Authors A. Whitney Sanford, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL USA Journal Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics Online ISSN 1573-322X Print ISSN 1187-7863.

n a 25-year career as a successful public intellectual, Stephen Jay Gould has accrued nearly all the trappings of celebrity: a new loft in SoHo, tenure at Harvard, a gig at NYU, book sales totaling in the millions (his twentieth title, The Lying Stones of Marrak ech, comes out next month), not to mention a schedule that takes him to London, Paris, or L.A. almost weekly. Not bad for a college professor. But recently, he's picked up one of the less (...) desirable accoutrements of fame. The graying, 58-year-old Queens native has become the first paleontologist in history with his own stalker—albeit an intellectual one. (shrink)

James Lasdun’s memoir of being stalked, Give Me Everything You Have, has provoked considerable controversy. Whilst the quality of the writing is widely praised, some critics object to the way Lasdun documents in unsparing detail his experiences without taking any account of the stalker’s apparent mental health problems. There are ethical and conceptual problems with Lasdun’s approach, but side-stepping medical knowledge and relying on what we might call common sense help Lasdun to find ways to interpret his stalker’s actions as (...) meaningful and human. I suggest three interlinked implications concerning: medicalization, stigma, and the relationship between ethics and scientific knowledge. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore the difference between expression of intention and expression of emotion through a discussion of a passage from G.E.M. Anscombe’s Intention, where she claims that expression of intention, unlike expression of emotion, is “purely conventional”. I argue that this claim is grounded on the fact that, although emotions can be described, expressions of emotion are not descriptions at all. Similarly, expressions of intention are not descriptions of a present state of mind but are rather the expression (...) of a special sort of foreknowledge of a purported action. They are, in this respect, distinct from expression of emotion, since they are a description of some future happening. Now, the centrally descriptive character of expressions of intention is what makes them “purely conventional”. But of course, Anscombe argues, one can have an intention without expressing it. And having an intention does not amount to having some description in mind. (shrink)

North American scholarship has charted resonances between 1990s legislative and feminist discourse concerning violence against women. Feminist critique of official discourse surrounding the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 suggests that 1990s resonances did not reach the UK: however, an examination of the Hansard debates suggests this under-estimates the influence of feminist discourse. Halley’s discussion of “bad faith” helps to explain both the tendency of feminists to under-estimate their influence and why this matters. A commitment to an understanding of themselves as (...) powerless may encourage feminists to underplay similarities between feminist and official discourse, leading feminists to find only what they expect. Such an understanding gives feminism the capacity to change social life without acknowledging, let alone agonising over, the full range of its distributive effects. This is most troubling in relation to “carceral” feminism, since under-assessment of feminist impact encourages amplification and intensification of the carceral message. (shrink)

We introduce a new simple way of defining the forcing method that works well in the usual setting under FA, the Foundation Axiom, and moreover works even under Aczel's AFA, the Anti-Foundation Axiom. This new way allows us to have an intuition about what happens in defining the forcing relation. The main tool is H. Friedman's method of defining the extensional membership relation ∈ by means of the intensional membership relation ε .Analogously to the usual forcing and the usual generic (...) extension for FA-models, we can justify the existence of generic filters and can obtain the Forcing Theorem and the Minimal Model Theorem with some modifications. These results are on the line of works to investigate whether model theory for AFA-set theory can be developed in a similar way to that for FA-set theory.Aczel pointed out that the quotient of transition systems by the largest bisimulation and transition relations have the essentially same theory as the set theory with AFA. Therefore, we could hope that, by using our new method, some open problems about transition systems turn out to be consistent or independent. (shrink)