Emotions, intentions and their expressions: Anscombe on Wittgenstein’s stalking cat

Enrahonar: Quaderns de Filosofía 67:173-197 (2021)
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Abstract

In this paper, I explore the difference between expression of intention and expression of emotion through a discussion of a passage from G.E.M. Anscombe’s Intention, where she claims that expression of intention, unlike expression of emotion, is “purely conventional”. I argue that this claim is grounded on the fact that, although emotions can be described, expressions of emotion are not descriptions at all. Similarly, expressions of intention are not descriptions of a present state of mind but are rather the expression of a special sort of foreknowledge of a purported action. They are, in this respect, distinct from expression of emotion, since they are a description of some future happening. Now, the centrally descriptive character of expressions of intention is what makes them “purely conventional”. But of course, Anscombe argues, one can have an intention without expressing it. And having an intention does not amount to having some description in mind.

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Valerie Aucouturier
Université Libre de Bruxelles

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