In this paper, I discuss critical realists’ and contemporary sociological pragmatists’ approaches to conceptualizing social mechanisms, which, on my reading, each involve some ambiguities or confusions. I sketch some corrections and clarifications that bring into view ways pragmatism and critical realism might inform each other in a constructive fashion on the question of what social mechanisms are. Finally, I suggest a concept of social mechanisms that is compatible with both critical realist and pragmatist insights, (...) as a starting point from which to launch further conversation. (shrink)

Several authors have claimed that mechanisms play a vital role in distinguishing between causation and mere correlation in the social sciences. Such claims are sometimes interpreted to mean that without mechanisms, causal inference in social science is impossible. The author agrees with critics of this proposition but explains how the account of how mechanisms aid causal inference can be interpreted in a way that does not depend on it. Nevertheless, he shows that this more charitable (...) version of the account is still unsuccessful as it stands. Consequently, he advances a proposal for shoring up the account, which is founded on the possibility of acquiring knowledge of social mechanisms by linking together norms or practices found in a society. Key Words: causality • social mechanisms • interpretation • anthropology. (shrink)

The paper has two aims. First, to show that we need social mechanisms to establish the policy relevance of causal claims, even if it is possible to build a good argument for those claims without knowledge of mechanisms. Second, to show that although social scientists can, in principle, do without social mechanisms when they argue for causal claims, in reality scientific practice contexts where they do not need mechanisms are very rare. Key Words: (...) social mechanisms • causal inference • social policy. (shrink)

Systemism and social mechanisms, as articulated by Bunge, are concepts with great potential for application to assessment of research progress. This study will use the conceptual tools made available by systemism and social mechanisms to evaluate the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) Project as a scientific effort toward the greater understanding of crises in world politics. Systemism and social mechanisms are articulated as key concepts in the quest for scientific progress. The goals and basic characteristics (...) of the ICB Project as a scientific venture then are described. The ICB Project is assessed in terms of how well it lives up to standards for scientific progress. Finally, conclusions and ideas about future research are presented. The basic finding of this study is that the ICB Project is quite successful in meeting the standards for scientific progress entailed by the concepts of systemism and social mechanisms. Key Words: scientific progress • international relations • international crises • paradigm. (shrink)

The revival of action based explanations as well as their formal structuring have been two of the most important topics within explanatory sociology since the 1980s. The two newly developed approaches, being structural individualism and analytical sociology based on mechanism models, will be outlined in this article. The article is dedicated to a comparison of the aims and the formal structure of both approaches. It is shown that explanations within analytical sociology tend to be more realistic but also more complex. (...) They do not differentiate between micro and macro levels in analytical terms and use micro mechanisms instead of an analytically strong action theory that makes it difficult to systemize mechanism models. On the other hand, structural individualistic explanations that use a general action law from which social interdependencies are to be interpreted as an opportunity structure can formulate a default-option from which models can be expanded and also worked out to mechanism types. (shrink)

The notion of social mechanisms has experienced an increasing use in the social sciences as an alternative explanatory framework to the logic of co-variation present in multivariate analyses, emphasizing the causal explanation of social phenomena over their mere description. This paper seeks two goals. In the one hand, summarise recent literature on social mechanisms in order to clarify their meanings, different modes of use and their contribution to empirical research. In the other hand, we (...) will shed some light onto the relation between social mechanisms and the micro-macro problem in social sciences. We argue that the search for social mechanisms and reductionism in social sciences correspond to two interrelated but analytically distinguishable questions: while the first one seeks to define intermediary processes and causal connections between causes and effects, the second question asks for the different levels of reality in which the relation between initial conditions and effects shall be understood. Following Daniel Little´s methodological localism, we will suggest that social mechanisms can well take place at the supra-individual level, and that the reduction of social phenomena to their micro-foundations is not a methodological prescription, but rather depends on the state of art of specific fields of inquiry. La noción de mecanismos sociales ha experimentado un uso creciente en ciencias sociales. Estos se han consolidado como un marco explicativo alternativo a la lógica de co-variación propia del análisis multivariado, enfatizando además la explicación causal de los fenómenos sociales por sobre su mera descripción. Este artículo tiene dos objetivos. Primero, sistematizar la reciente literatura sobre mecanismos sociales, con el fin de clarificar sus significados, modos de uso y aporte a la investigación empírica. Y segundo, entregaremos luces a la relación entre mecanismos sociales y el problema de la relación macro-micro en ciencias sociales. Sostendremos la idea de que la búsqueda de mecanismos sociales y el reduccionismo en ciencias sociales corresponden a dos preguntas relacionadas pero analíticamente distinguibles: mientras la primera busca definir procesos intermedios y conexiones causales entre condiciones iniciales y efectos, la segunda se pregunta por los distintos niveles de la realidad en los cuales la relación entre condiciones iniciales y efectos deben ser entendidos. Siguiendo el localismo metodológico de Daniel Little, sugeriremos que los mecanismos sociales pueden bien operar a niveles supra-individuales, y que la reducción de fenómenos sociales a interacciones individuales no es una prescripción metodológica, sino que se desprende del estado del arte de campos de investigación específicos. (shrink)

During the last decades, social mechanisms have been broadly discussed in general sociology, but, in family sociology, they seem to be non-existent. Therefore, the first aim of this paper is to show that., although the term can hardly be found, prominent theoretical ideas use more or less explicitly mechanistic explanations. Focusing on the determinants of separation can show that all arguments connect (structural) input with (social) outcome and search for theoretical explanations in the sense of social (...) mechanisms. We will demonstrate how macro-structural traits are mechanistically connected with individual variables and how they lead to a stable or fragile partnership. As often mentioned, “mechanism-based storytelling” (Hedström/Ylikoski 2010, 64) should be accompanied by empirical research. Therefore, in a simple statistical model in the second part, we will show the results of our testing of some examples of well-known variables for the explanation of separations. It will show how correlations can be mechanistically explained and not simply statistically described. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to examine the notion of social mechanisms by comparison with the notions of evolutionary and physical mechanisms. It is argued that social mechanisms are based on trends, and not lawlike regularities, so that social mechanisms are different from mechanisms in the natural sciences. Taking as an example of social causation the abolition of the slave trade, the paper argues that social mechanisms should be (...) incorporated in Weber’s wider notion of adequate causation in order to achieve their explanatory purpose. (shrink)

By applying a bribery model, this paper will deal with those constellations of conditions and activities by actors that are capable of explaining corrupt behavior in economic and sociological theory. Some of these explanations reveal the properties of ‘social mechanisms’ in the sense of analytical sociology (AS). Both disciplines suggest and test the mechanisms of corruption. By taking into consideration the link between monitoring and the frequency of corruption, for example, this paper shows that the proposed way (...) of explaining corrupt behavior using AS offers the opportunity to test counteracting mechanisms. A monitoring mechanism which refers to deterrence may lead to less corruption but may also strengthen an already existing bond of trust between corruption partners. Thus, the trust mechanism may counteract the impact of deterrence and pave the way for new corrupt activities. (shrink)

The thesis that in social sciences causal explanations are possible only in terms o mechanisms due to the lack of genuine laws has been increasingly popular among social scientist and philosophers. In this article it is examined whether the explanation by mechanism is necessarily an explanation without laws or, on the contrary, it can involve some kind o laws. To this end it is argued, firstly, that mechanisms are not always the antonym of law insofar as (...) they express propensities and so tendencies; secondly, that these tendencies ar causal and entail capacities and dispositions; thirdly, that capacities and dispositions involve in human behaviour have to face the problem of free will; and finally, reasons are offered i favor of considering causal tendencies as authentic laws. The ultimate aim of this article is to demonstrate that explanation of social facts can involve well-established laws in its explanans although they are not universal laws. (shrink)

Discusses the importance and development of analytical sociology, emphasizing the centrality of mechanisms in explaining social life.

Kimberly Chuang’s detailed and very helpful reply to my article concerns Jon Elster’s struggle to develop a mechanistic account that sheds light on explanation in social science. I argue that a problem exists with Elster’s current conception of mechanistic explanation in social contexts. Chuang defends Elster’s conception against my critique. I still believe I have identified a problem with Elster’s conception. In this reply I want to recapitulate briefly Elster’s idea, as I understand it, and then use some (...) of Chuang’s critical points to advance the position I advocate. (shrink)

At the centre of this study is the theoretical and empirical analysis of action-formation mechanisms in norm-relevant, situations. Basically two mechanisms are employed, namely action according to a) moral principles and b) the principle of deterrence. Conflicting assumptions concerning the way these mechanisms work are deduced from two theoretical perspectives, the high-cost/low-cost. hypothesis and Situational Action Theory (SAT). While the high-cost/low-cost. hypothesis leads to the assumption that, criminal action is explained by the principle of deterrence in high-cost, (...) situations and, in low-cost, situations, by moral principles, it. follows from SAT that., in high-cost, situations, the principle of deterrence has an effect, only on those persons with weak moral principles, and influences of moral principles are expected in low-cost, situations. Empirical analysis of these hypotheses is conducted with the help of data that, have been collected as part, of a mail survey (n=2383) of a disproportionately layered random sample of residents of an East. German city. Data analyses are carried out. in order to estimate the influences of the theoretically specified predictors simultaneously for high-cost, and low-cost, situations with multiple group comparisons. The study’s results partially support, both theoretical perspectives. They are finally discussed with respect, to theoretical and methodological aspects. (shrink)

It is usually the case that scientists examine either ecological systems or social systems, yet the need for an interdisciplinary approach to the problems of environmental management and sustainable development is becoming increasingly obvious. Developed under the auspices of the Beijer Institute in Stockholm, this new book analyses social and ecological linkages in selected ecosystems using an international and interdisciplinary case study approach. The chapters provide detailed information on a variety of management practices for dealing with environmental change. (...) Taken as a whole, the book will contribute to the greater understanding of essential social responses to changes in ecosystems, including the generation, accumulation and transmission of ecological knowledge, structure and dynamics of institutions, and the cultural values underlying these responses. A set of new (or rediscovered) principles for sustainable ecosystem management is also presented. Linking Social and Ecological Systems will be of value to natural and social scientists interested in sustainability. (shrink)

In this article we propose an extended approach in terms of Cognitive Pragmatics (CP) to the explanation of the development of the higher cognitive processes. Therefore, we explain in terms of CP how linguistic and pre-linguistic social practices shape the mind. CP, as we understand it here presents a broader transdisciplinary position covering developmental psychology, primatology, comparative psychology, cultural psychology, anthropology and philosophy. We present an argumentation for the thesis that CP provides an explanation to the origins and developmental (...) mechanisms of some of higher mental functions unique to humans. Thus, we want to extend the notion of CP beyond its standard definition by emphasizing the transformative component of communicative acts. In our approach, CP first and foremost examines the cognitive mechanisms underlying social pre-linguistic and linguistic communication. Secondly, it explores how this communication reorganizes and transforms cognitive abilities and processes. We would like to extend the tasks of CP as well, because its goal is to not only describe cognitive processes that enable communication, but also to explain the social mechanisms of transformation of mind and cognition. We provide an example of said mechanisms of development of higher cognitive functions through the account of metacognition. (shrink)

Human behavior is not always independent of the ways in which humans are scientifically classified. That there are looping effects of human kinds has been used as an argument for the methodological separation of the natural and the human sciences and to justify social constructionist claims. We suggest that these arguments rely on false presuppositions and present a mechanisms-based account of looping that provides a better way to understand the phenomenon and its theoretical and philosophical implications.

Recent research suggests that corporate social responsibility is institutionalised amongst multinational corporations. Yet CSR scholarship faces considerable challenges. An agreed definition is lacking, even amongst researchers adopting aligned approaches. Studies remain heavily focused on making a business case for CSR, despite its widespread acceptance into business practice. Few studies examine CSR’s on-ground implications for the communities it purports to help, favouring instead a macro-level focus. And concerns about CSR’s sincerity, motivations and ethics perpetuate questions about its integrity. This article (...) argues that new institutionalism is well placed to respond to these core challenges for CSR, and that new institutionalist perspectives can complement and enrich other common theoretical approaches. It contributes a social mechanism-based framework for CSR, identifying and exploring the key social mechanisms that institutionalise it; namely, discourse, mimesis, normative learning and coercion. Understanding CSR as an institution facilitates new and different explorations of its causes and effects and opens new avenues for scholarly inquiry. Illustrative examples from a 3.5-year study of CSR in the global mining industry are presented to explore the implications of CSR as an institution and to suggest pathways for innovative research. (shrink)

The article makes four interrelated claims: (1) The mechanism approach to social explanation does not presuppose a commitment to the individual-level microfoundationalism. (2) The microfoundationalist requirement that explanatory social mechanisms should always consists of interacting individuals has given rise to problematic methodological biases in social research. (3) It is possible to specify a number of plausible candidates for social macro-mechanisms where interacting collective agents (e.g. formal organizations) form the core actors. (4) The distributed cognition (...) perspective combined with organization studies could provide us with explanatory understanding of the emergent cognitive capacities of collective agents. (shrink)

The article makes four interrelated claims: (1) The mechanism approach to social explanation does not presuppose a commitment to the individual-level microfoundationalism. (2) The microfoundationalist requirement that explanatory social mechanisms should always consists of interacting individuals has given rise to problematic methodological biases in social research. (3) It is possible to specify a number of plausible candidates for social macro-mechanisms where interacting collective agents (e.g. formal organizations) form the core actors. (4) The distributed cognition (...) perspective combined with organization studies could provide us with explanatory understanding of the emergent cognitive capacities of collective agents. (shrink)

While many studies from analytical sociology apply agent-based modeling to analyze the transformational mechanisms linking the micro to the macro level, we hold the view that both situational and action formation mechanisms can rather be unveiled by means of more advanced quantitative methods. By focusing on selective exposure to quality newspapers, our study has both an analytical and a substantive aim. First., our analytical aim is to amend the psychological mechanism of avoiding cognitive dissonance by social (...) class='Hi'>mechanisms allowing postulates on how the selective exposure effect might vary by particular social groups. Second, our substantive aim is to set the ground for a longitudinal analysis of selective exposure to quality papers by placing these social mechanisms in the context of social and cultural change. By referring to hypothetical data, we illustrate which kind of (multilevel) moderator effects would have to hold if our hypotheses were true. (shrink)

The past two decades have witnessed an increase in interest in social mechanisms and mechanistic explanations of social macro-phenomena. This paper addresses the question of what the components of social mechanisms in mechanistic explanations of social macro-phenomena must be. Analytical sociology’s initial position and the main new proposals by analytical sociologists are discussed. It is argued that all of them are faced with outstanding difficulties. Subsequently, a minimal requirement regarding the components of social (...) mechanisms is introduced. It is held that a component of a social mechanism in a mechanistic explanation of a social macro-phenomenon must not have the explanandum phenomenon as a part of it. (shrink)

This article argues that analytical sociology an approach that attempts to study social mechanisms ‘without, black boxes’ can benefit from the use of explanatory mixed methods. Analytical sociologists mainly relate their theoretical and agent-based models to representative surveys and experiments. While their central claim is to find and test the actual mechanisms that have produced the explanandum. the mechanisms they postulate often remain speculative. Neither agent-based models, nor experiments or mainstream quantitative methods, give access to some (...) of the central elements of the causal mechanisms and the relevant subjective and objective contextual parameters. One of the most important reasons for this lies in the fact that social reality is changing fast., characterized by strong diversity and complexified by the phenomenon of cultural meanings. I argue that by creating and testing the models of analytical sociology with explanatory mixed methods, researchers have the possibility of getting closer to their object of research and therefore of having the chance to create more valid explanations. (shrink)

Previous research has shown that the more individuals view observable entities as animate, the more those entities are associated with having psychological and physiological experiences. This study examined the relationship between children's animistic and anthropomorphic reasoning for concepts of unobservable scientific (i.e., germ) and religious (i.e., God) entities. This study further explored how children's conceptions vary according to the social learning opportunities (i.e., discourse, rituals) parents reportedly create. Parent–child dyads with young children from diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds participated. (...) Three central findings emerged. First, children readily associated God with psychobiological characteristics but did not do so to the same extent for germs. Second, children applied more psychobiological properties to both entity types when they believed that the entity was animate. Third, engaging in rituals and discourse with parents was indirectly related to children's concepts of God but not related to their concepts of germs. Overall, this study presented support for a connection between children's animistic and anthropomorphic reasoning for unobservable entities, and an indirect effect of cultural input on this reasoning. The implications of these findings will be discussed. (shrink)

During the past decade, social mechanisms and mechanism-based ex- planations have received considerable attention in the social sciences as well as in the philosophy of science. This article critically reviews the most important philosophical and social science contributions to the mechanism approach. The first part discusses the idea of mechanism- based explanation from the point of view of philosophy of science and relates it to causation and to the covering-law account of explanation. The second part focuses (...) on how the idea of mechanisms has been used in the social sciences. The final part discusses recent developments in analytical sociology, covering the nature of sociological explananda, the role of theory of action in mechanism-based explanations, Merton’s idea of middle-range theory, and the role of agent-based simulations in the development of mechanism-based explanations. (shrink)

Are mechanisms for social attention influenced by culture? Evidence that social attention is triggered automatically by bottom-up gaze cues and is uninfluenced by top-down verbal instructions may suggest it operates in the same way everywhere. Yet considerations from evolutionary and cultural psychology suggest that specific aspects of one's cultural background may have consequence for the way mechanisms for social attention develop and operate. In more interdependent cultures, the scope of social attention may be broader, (...) focusing on more individuals and relations between those individuals. We administered a multi-gaze cueing task requiring participants to fixate a foreground face flanked by background faces and measured shifts in attention using eye tracking. For European Americans, gaze cueing did not depend on the direction of background gaze cues, suggesting foreground gaze alone drives automatic attention shifting; for East Asians, cueing patterns differed depending on whether the foreground cue matched or mismatched background cues, suggesting foreground and background gaze information were integrated. These results demonstrate that cultural background influences the social attention system by shifting it into a narrow or broad mode of operation and, importantly, provides evidence challenging the assumption that mechanisms underlying automatic social attention are necessarily rigid and impenetrable to culture. (shrink)

mechanism" is frequently encountered in the social science literature, but there is considerable confusion about the exact meaning of the term. The article begins by addressing the main conceptual issues. Use of this term is the hallmark of an approach that is critical of the explanatory deficits of correlational analysis and of the covering-law model, advocating instead the causal reconstruction of the processes that account for given macro-phenomena. The term "social mechanisms" should be used to refer to (...) recurrent processes generating a specific kind of outcome. Explanation of social macro-phenomena by mechanisms typically involves causal regression to lower-level elements, as stipulated by methodological individualism. While there exist a good many mechanism models to explain emergent effects of collective behavior, we lack a similarly systematic treatment of generative mechanisms in which institutions and specific kinds of structural configurations play the decisive role. Key Words: causal regression • correlational analysis • emergent effects • micro-macro processes • social mechanisms • structural determinants. (shrink)

Critics of functional explanations in social science maintain that such explanations are illegitimate unless a mechanism is specified. Others argue that mechanisms are not necessary for causal inference and that functional explanations are a type of causal claim that raise no special difficulties for testing. I show that there is indeed a special problem that confronts testing functional explanations resulting from their connection to second-order causal claims. I explain how mechanisms can resolve this difficulty, but argue that (...) this does not provide support for methodological individualism since it is not necessary that the mechanisms be described in terms of individual interactions. (shrink)

In this paper we review the literature on social learning mechanisms in the domestic chick, focusing largely on work from our own laboratories. The domestic chicken is a social-living bird that searches for food in flocks, avoids predators by following warnings from other flock members, and forms (stable) social hierarchies. All of these behaviors develop throughout ontogeny, largely during the very early stages post-hatch. Newly hatched chicks appear to have predispositions to orient towards and to pay (...) greatest attention to the biologically relevant characteristics of their immediate environment (i.e. to conspecifics: the mother bird and/or fellow hatchlings) from which they may subsequently learn. In addition, the chick has a lateralized brain; left and right hemispheres being specialized for certain behavioral functions and responses, and it appears that such behavioral lateralization is also transposed onto certain social learning situations, which will also be considered. Keywords: social learning; social cognition; chick; brain asymmetry. (shrink)

In this paper we review the literature on social learning mechanisms in the domestic chick, focusing largely on work from our own laboratories. The domestic chicken is a social-living bird that searches for food in flocks, avoids predators by following warnings from other flock members, and forms social hierarchies. All of these behaviors develop throughout ontogeny, largely during the very early stages post-hatch. Newly hatched chicks appear to have predispositions to orient towards and to pay greatest (...) attention to the biologically relevant characteristics of their immediate environment from which they may subsequently learn. In addition, the chick has a lateralized brain; left and right hemispheres being specialized for certain behavioral functions and responses, and it appears that such behavioral lateralization is also transposed onto certain social learning situations, which will also be considered. Keywords: social learning; social cognition; chick; brain asymmetry. (shrink)

Social boundaries separate us fromthem. Explaining the formation, transformation, activation, and suppression of social boundaries presents knotty problems. It helps to distinguish two sets of mechanisms: (1) those that precipitate boundary change and (2) those that constitute boundary change. Properly speaking, only the constitutive mechanisms produce the effects of boundary change as such. Precipitants of boundary change include encounter, imposition, borrowing, conversation, and incentive shift. Constitutive mechanisms include inscription–erasure, activation–deactivation, site transfer, and relocation. Effects of (...) boundary change include attack–defense sequences. These mechanisms operate over a wide range of social phenomena. Key Words: social boundary • mechanisms. (shrink)

In the increasing body of metatheoretical literature on "causal mechanisms," definitions of "mechanism" proliferate, and these increasingly divergent definitions reproduce older theoretical and methodological oppositions. The reason for this proliferation is the incompatibility of the various metatheoretical expectations directed to them: (1) to serve as an alternative to the scientific theory of individual behavior (for some social theorists, most notably Jon Elster); (2) to provide solutions for causal inference problems in the quantitative social sciences, in social (...) history, and in the (3) qualitative research context; and (4) to serve as an alternative for narratives (Charles Tilly). Mechanisms can do (1) only as under-specified law-like regularities, deliver (2) as robust generative processes represented by models, and accomplish (3) as fragile generative processes (stories), but these are not all compatible. (edited). (shrink)

Social machines are a prominent focus of attention for those who work in the field of Web and Internet science. Although a number of online systems have been described as social machines, there is, as yet, little consensus as to the precise meaning of the term “social machine.” This presents a problem for the scientific study of social machines, especially when it comes to the provision of a theoretical framework that directs, informs, and explicates the scientific (...) and engineering activities of the social machine community. The present paper outlines an approach to understanding social machines that draws on recent work in the philosophy of science, especially work in so-called mechanical philosophy. This is what might be called a mechanistic view of social machines. According to this view, social machines are systems whose phenomena are explained via an appeal to socio-technical mechanisms. We show how this account is able to accommodate a number of existing attempts to define the social machine concept, thereby yielding an important opportunity for theoretical integration. (shrink)