Can the right to private property be claimed as one of the `rights of mankind'? This is the central question of this comprehensive and critical examination of the subject of private property. Jeremy Waldron contrasts two types of arguments about rights: those based on historical entitlement, and those based on the importance of property to freedom. He provides a detailed discussion of the theories of property found in Locke's Second Treatise and Hegel's Philosophy of (...) class='Hi'>Right to illustrate this contrast. The book contains original analyses of the concept of ownership, the ideas of rights, and the relation between property and equality. The author's overriding determination throughout is to follow through the arguments and values used to justify private ownership. He finds that the traditional arguments about property yield some surprisingly radical conclusions. (shrink)

Property rights are integral part of the freedom and prosperity of every person, although their centrality has often been misprized and their provenance was doubted. Yet, traces of their origin can be found in Magna Carta, signed by the King of England in 1215. It was a turning point in human rights. Namely, it enumerates what later came to be thought of as human rights. Among them was also the right of all free citizens to own and inherit (...) property. The European Convention on Human Rights was heavily influenced by British legal traditions, including Magna Carta. Among other rights, it also guaranties the right to property as a human right. Moreover, the protection of property rights has been extended to intellectual property rights as well. Namely, the European Court of Human Rights has provided protection of intellectual property rights through the adoption of decisions that interpret the right to property, in relation to intellectual property protection claims. It has extended the human rights protection of property to the mere application for registration of the trade mark. This paper has placed its focus on the development and treatment of the right to property starting from Magna Carta to the European Convention on Human Rights, as modern version of Magna Carta. In this sense, the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and its role and approach in the protection of the right to property will be examined as well. (shrink)

Can the right to private property be claimed as one of the ‘rights of mankind’? This is the central question of this examination of the subject of private property. This book contrasts two types of arguments about rights: those based on historical entitlement, and those based on the importance of property to freedom. It provides a detailed discussion of the theories of property found in Locke's Second Treatise and Hegel's Philosophy of Right to illustrate (...) this contrast. The book contains original analyses of the concept of ownership, the ideas of rights, and the relation between property and equality. The book's overriding determination throughout is to follow through the arguments and values used to justify private ownership. It finds that the traditional arguments about property yield some surprisingly radical conclusions. (shrink)

I argue that Robert Nozick, in his well-known book “Anarchy, State, Utopia”, is working with Locke’s notion of the natural right to property merely instrumentally. I use the term “instrumentally” in the sense that the pieces of the source are not used within the context of the original work but are used atomically to support one’s argument or theory. Instrumental use of Locke’s theory causes incoherence in his theory. This paper introduces the incoherence in the question and explains (...) how this incoherency is inherent to Nozick’s interpretation and usage of Lockean Proviso. (shrink)

The subject of this article is the Rawlsian right to personal property. Adequate discussion of this right has long been absent from the literature, and the recent rise in interest in other areas of Rawlsian thought on property makes the issue particularly pertinent. The right to personal property as proposed by orthodox Rawlsians – in this article, the position is represented by Rawls himself – is best understood, I claim, either as a right (...) to be able to privately own housing and personal items or as a right to actually own these things. I argue, however, that the resources of a Rawlsian theory cannot justify a basic right to property which is as extensive as this. Instead, what can be justified is a more limited set of rights, comparable with the rights we have over objects that we rent. Rawlsian justice, then, has a more radical implications in terms of basic property rights than has previously been thought. (shrink)

Hayek's philosophy of law has Kantian features, but he offers indirect utilitarian arguments for them. Hayek's argument might be strengthened by considering that the utilitarian has an interest in issues of truth and falsity and thus in the individual as the bearer of critical judgments. Individuals might thus be accorded?dialogue rights?; upon a episte?mological basis, an idea which is further strengthened by the consideration that dialogue may be extended to the appraisal of the validity of utilitarianism. Moreover, such dialogue rights (...) should be interpreted in large part as property rights. (shrink)

We can observe a connection between some serious environmental problems caused by the overexploitation of environmental resources and the particular conceptions of property rights that are claimed to hold with regard to these resources. In this paper, I investigate whether Kant’s conception of property rights might constitute a basis for justifying property regimes that would overcome some of these environmental problems. Kant’s argument for the right to property, put forward in his Doctrine of right, (...) is complex. In Section 2, I attempt an interpretation. Section 3 works out the defining characteristics of the conception of property rights that Kant’s argument establishes and investigates their implications for determining property regimes in environmental resources. Kant proposes a minimalist notion of the right to property as a triadic relation between persons with regard to an object, justified only on the condition that it is universalizable in the given circumstances. I argue that this notion offers a promising account for determining property relations with regard to environmental resources. By way of illustration, in Section 4, I focus on an example of Kantian property rights in one type of environmental resource: the marine fisheries. (shrink)

In this article, Andrew Collier critiques the method, but not the aim, of Rerum Novarum, the Catholic argument against socialism, as interpreted by G.K. Chesterton. He holds that Rerum Novarum may...

This article examines women’s rights to property in marriage, upon divorce, and upon the death of a spouse in Uganda, highlighting the problematic aspects in both the state-made (statutory) and non-state-made (customary and religious) laws. It argues that, with the exception of the 1995 Constitution, the subordinate laws that regulate the distribution, management, and ownership of property during marriage, upon divorce, and death of a spouse are discriminatory of women. It is shown that even where the relevant statutory (...) laws are protective of women’s rights to property, their implementation is hindered by customary law practices, socialization, and the generally weak economic capacity of many women in the country. The article delves into the even weaker position of women’s rights to matrimonial property at customary and religious laws. In many homes, wives provide labor to support their husbands without having a stake in the use or monetary benefit from it. Under Islamic law regulating intestate succession to property, the entitlements for widows fall short of the constitutional standards on equality and non-discrimination. Polygyny is widely practiced by Muslims implying that the widows share the one eighth whenever there are children or one fourth in cases when there are no children. Radical reforms such as adopting an immediate community property regime instead of the present separate property regime are inevitable if women’s rights to property are to advance. (shrink)

The purpose of my paper is to show the derivation of what is sometimes called the ‘new liberalism’ (or ‘progressive liberalism’) from the basic principles of classical liberalism, through a reading of John Locke’s treatment of the right to property in his Second Treatise of Government. Locke’s work sharply distinguishes between the natural right to property in the ‘state of nature’ and the societal right to property as established in a socio-economic political system. Whereas (...) the former does not depend on the consent of others, it is qualified by strict limits on the amount of property that may be rightly acquired. The societal right to property lifts these limits but is justified only under the principle of universal consent. This principle, I argue, implies the Rawlsian difference principle; i.e., that the regulation and distribution of property must be such as would elicit the freely proffered consent of society’s least advantaged members. (shrink)

Jeremy Shearmur's consequentialist argument for universality in the distribution of individual ?negative?; liberties claims that what is gained as a consequence of extending such liberties to the last hitherto excluded group is likely to outweigh what is lost by doing so. In trying to make such a claim convincing, does it help to notice that whoever is denied negative liberties is thereby impeded from contributing to social dialogue about the arts and ethics of human well?being? Perhaps, but only on two (...) conditions: First, we understand individual identities as intersubjectively constituted. Second, we pursue universality in the distribution of social requisites of dialogic competence beyond negative liberties. (shrink)

In this short essay I argue that the main insight of Murphy and Nagel’s book, The Myth of Ownership, that people have no right to their pre-tax income, is not supported by their claim that the right to private property is not a natural right. The non-naturalness of the right to private property, I argue, is irrelevant to their moral argument. The plausibility of their moral conclusion derives from the thesis that people have a (...) right to the fruits of their labor, maintaining, however, that there is no possible conception, morally speaking, of what the fruits of one’s labor are, independent of a system of legal and social norms that constitute the terms of fair bargaining, pricing, etc. People can only have a right to a fair assessment of the added value of their labor, and the latter cannot make any sense independent of the entire system of norms prevailing in the relevant society. I argue that this last conclusion is not affected by the nature of the right to private property. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In ‘The Pro‐Life Argument from Substantial Identity: A Defence’, Patrick Lee argues that the right to life is an essential property of those that possess it. On his view, the right arises from one's ‘basic’ or ‘natural’ capacity for higher mental functions: since human organisms have this capacity essentially, they have a right to life essentially. Lee criticises an alternative view, on which the right to life arises from one's ‘developed’ capacity for higher mental (...) functions (or development of some other accidental property). I argue that his criticisms of this alternative view are misguided or self‐defeating, and that there are good reasons to hold we have a right to life accidentally rather than essentially. (shrink)

The negotiations of the intergovernmental group known as the ‘IGWG’, undertaken by the Member States of the WHO, were the result of a deadlock in the World Health Assembly held in 2006 where the Member States of the WHO were unable to reach an agreement on what to do with the 60 recommendations in the report on ‘Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights submitted to the Assembly in the same year by a group of experts designated by the (...) Director General of the WHO. The result of these negotiations was the ‘Global strategy and plan of action on public health, innovation and intellectual property’ which was approved by the World Health Assembly in 2008. The intention of the Global Strategy and Plan of Action (GSPOA) which was produced by the IGWG was to substantially reform the pharmaceuticals' research and development system in view of the findings that this system, whose purpose is to produce medicines for diseases which affect the greater part of the world population which lives in developing countries, had failed. The intellectual property rights imposed by the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and the recent trade agreements could become one of the main obstacles to access to medicines. The GSPOA makes a critical analysis of this reality, and opens the door to searching for new solutions to this problem. (shrink)

This research article analyzes the right of disposal of marital property in relation to the undertaking of those legal actions that imply the highest authorizations that legal subjects can have over things. Having in consideration the fact that according to the legislation in the Republic of Macedonia, marital property is joint as are the authorizations of spouses over their joint items, it is important to determine the extent of the disposal, i.e. who disposes of the items of (...) the joint property and to what extent. Referring to the normative framework, which regulates disposal relations of spouses, the article emphasizes the concept and importance of the authorization of disposal of things, through legal activities. In this context, the article tends to draw a divisive line between the administration with the joint item, referring to continuative actions and measures and the disposal of the thing, which is not continuative but, due to legal consequences it causes, has great importance in practice, and as a result, enjoys greater attention in legislators in terms of its limitation compared to the acts of administration with joint items in marriage. (shrink)

Intellectual property typically involves claims of ownership of types, rather than particulars. In this article I argue that this difference in ontology makes an important moral difference. In particular I argue that there cannot be an intrinsic moral right to own intellectual property. I begin by establishing a necessary condition for the justification of intrinsic moral rights claims, which I call the Rights Justification Principle. Briefly, this holds that if we want to claim that there is an (...) intrinsic moral right to φ, we must be able to show that (a) violating this right would typically result in either a wrongful harm or other significant wrong to the holder of the right, and (b) the wrongful harm or other wrong in question is independent of the existence of the intrinsic right we are trying to justify. I then argue that merely creating a new instance of a type is not the kind of action which can wrongfully harm the creator of that type. Insofar as there do seem to be wrongs involved in copying a published poem or computer program, these wrongs presuppose the existence of an intrinsic right to own intellectual property, and so cannot be used to justify it. I conclude that there cannot be an intrinsic right to own intellectual property. (shrink)

The proposed justification avoids problems that invalidate the familiar entitlement, utility, and interest-based justifications; interprets private property as necessary for controlling resources we need for our well-being; recognizes that the possession, uses, and limits of private property must be justified differently; and combines the defensible portions of the familiar but unsuccessful attempts at justification with a more complex account that combines the defensible portions of previous justificatory attempts with a new pluralistic approach that treats the right to (...) private property as a conventional, defeasible, but indispensable right. (shrink)

It is often argued that the fact that intellectual objects—objects like ideas, inventions, concepts, and melodies—can be used by several people simultaneously makes intellectual property rights impossible or particularly difficult to morally justify. In this article, I assess the line of criticism of intellectual ownership in connection with a central category of intellectual property rights, economic rights to intellectual property. I maintain that it is unconvincing.

The purpose of my paper is to show the derivation of what is sometimes called the ‘new liberalism’ (or ‘progressive liberalism’) from the basic principles of classical liberalism, through a reading of John Locke’s treatment of the right to property in his Second Treatise of Government. Locke’s work sharply distinguishes between the natural right to property in the ‘state of nature’ and the societal right to property as established in a socio-economic political system. Whereas (...) the former does not depend on the consent of others, it is qualified by strict limits on the amount of property that may be rightly acquired. The societal right to property lifts these limits but is justified only under the principle of universal consent. This principle, I argue, implies the Rawlsian difference principle; i.e., that the regulation and distribution of property must be such as would elicit the freely proffered consent of society’s least advantaged members. (shrink)

For private property to be legitimately recognized as a universal human right, its meaning should pass the test of self-imposability by an end. In this Essay, we argue, negatively, that the prevailing understanding of private property cannot plausibly meet this demanding standard; and develop, affirmatively, a liberal conception which has a much better prospect of meeting property’s justificatory challenge. Private property, on our account, is an empowering device, which is crucial both to people’s personal autonomy (...) and to their relational equality. The liberal conception of the human right to property has both vertical and horizontal significance — it implies respect from both the public authority and other individuals — which means that it is thoroughly political but not necessarily statist. Our account generates important implications, both domestic and transnational. Domestically, it implies that whereas some property rights should be subject to strong constitutional protection, state law should facilitate other types of private and non-private property institutions, and these property institutions may well be subject to non-owners’ claims to access and, more broadly, to being treated respectfully. Furthermore, our conception of the human right to property requires that everyone have the unusual authority typical of full-blown private ownership. Transnationally, our analysis highlights a freestanding dimension of relational justice, which is relevant across borders even given that our distributive obligations are statist. This injunction of relational justice in transnational interactions brings into question the adequacy of the current state of the law, according to which these interactions are mainly governed by choice-of-law rules that conceptualize them as wholly subsumed under the capacities of the parties as citizens of their respective polities. (shrink)

A three‐tiered legal structure of the substances constitutive of human beings can accommodate property rights in new products created by the investment of labor in human tissue.

This chapter contains sections titled: Contractualist Justification and Private Property Three Models of Welfare Rights The Proposals as Reasonable Alternatives Objections Conclusion References.

The right to private property is among the most fundamental in liberal theory. For many liberals the idea of the state is grounded in its role as a protector of private property. If the liberal state is justified by its ability to protect property, the modern welfare state is often justified by its ability to meet needs. According to a view commonly referred to as “welfarism,” the very fact that needs exist implies there is a moral (...) obligation to meet them. In this Article I appeal to Rawlsian contractualist justification, including the “criterion of reciprocity,” in developing a third manner of thinking about the relationship between property and welfare. I argue that welfare rights are necessary conditions for justifying a role for the state in enforcing the “right to exclude,” a fundamental element of private ownership. My Article thus aims to use Rawls’ account of justification, outlined in his later works, to theorize the notion of property-owning democracy from Theory of Justice. (shrink)

Should property owners have a unique right to express their opinion just because they own property? While current law recognizes owners’ rights to express their voices in certain instances, it does not provide comprehensive and coherent answers to this question. This article provides an analytical framework for recognizing the owners’ right to voice as an independent property entitlement within the owners’ property bundle of rights and delineates its boundaries. Yet even when the owners’ voice (...) is property-dependent, there is a difference between voice that facilitates the realization of another property entitlement (such as the right to exclude, use, or trade) and voice that is constitutive to ownership in and of itself. Only the latter instances justify recognition of the owners’ right to a voice as an independent property entitlement. By examining different branches of both tangible and intellectual property law, such as inheritance law, eminent domain, homeowners’ association law, zoning law, and copyright law, this article demonstrates the usefulness of the proposed analytical framework in explaining certain parts of the current law and suggests modifications of other parts. (shrink)

The purpose of my paper is to show the derivation of what is sometimes called the ‘new liberalism’ from the basic principles of classical liberalism, through a reading of John Locke’s treatment of the right to property in his Second Treatise of Government. Locke’s work sharply distinguishes between the natural right to property in the ‘state of nature’ and the societal right to property as established in a socio-economic political system. Whereas the former does (...) not depend on the consent of others, it is qualified by strict limits on the amount of property that may be rightly acquired. The societal right to property lifts these limits but is justified only under the principle of universal consent. This principle, I argue, implies the Rawlsian difference principle; i.e., that the regulation and distribution of property must be such as would elicit the freely proffered consent of society’s least advantaged members. (shrink)

Resumen En este documento, a partir de lo que desde la literatura especializada se registra como los puntos de acuerdo y como los avances en el campo de la teoría ética del desarrollo, se lleva a cabo una descripción de las ventajas y desventajas que se observan en tres mecanismos muy populares como vías para la realización de los postulados de la ética del desarrollo, en especial respecto a aquel que apunta a la necesaria erradicación de la pobreza extrema en (...) el mundo. Una vez realizado el estudio de la Ayuda Oficial para el Desarrollo, la tasa Tobin y la Renta Básica Universal, se analizan las propuestas económica y jurídica, respectivamente, de Thomas Piketty y Luigi Ferrajoli a fin de identificar los aportes teóricos que las mismas pueden realizar al campo de la ética del desarrollo y las ventajas que presentan frente a los mecanismos hasta ahora explorados.In this document, based on what is recorded on the specialized literature as the points of agreement and as the advances in the field of the ethical theory of development, a description is realized on the advantages and disadvantages that can be observed in three mechanisms that are very popular as avenues for the realization of the postulates of development ethics, especially with respect to the one that points to the necessary eradication of extreme poverty in the world. Following the study of the Official Aid for Development, the Tobin tax and the Universal Basic Income, the economic and legal proposals of Thomas Piketty and Luigi Ferrajoli are analyzed in order to identify the theoretical contributions that they can make to the field of development ethics and the advantages they present over the mechanisms explored so far. (shrink)

The analysis of approaches to understanding of jural facts is accomplished in the article. The definition of right depriving jural facts in civil law is brought. It’s researched the classical for Roman-Germany legal system reasons for deprivation of right of property and the concrete actions or events that deprive such a right are analyzed. All examined facts of property rights deprivation could be classified and arranged into four basic groups: cessation of the property existance (...) (destruction of property), cessation of the owner existance (death of a natural person, liquidation of the legal entity), transaction on alienation (alienation of the property by the owner, requisition), administrative act (abandonement of the property by the owner, foreclosure on the property for the owner obligations, seizure). Such deprivation of property rights as termination of the right to property, which can not belong to the person, and the compulsory acquisition may occur through jural facts like seizure or administrative act. In the case of requisition termination of right takes place directly at the moment the relevant administrative act comes into force. In other words only destruction of property, death of a natural person or legal entity liquidation can be regarded totally as depriving jural facts. All jural facts of right of property deprivation can be grouped but can not be reduced to basic groups. The law model must determine the circumstances under which the model will lead to the desired legal result, otherwise the legal facts were too extensive and could take place even in undesirable cases. In this context these circumstances are conditions of jural fact o occurence. That is why, for example, "termination of the right to property, which can not belong to the person" is only a general name of right-depriving jural fact or even a specific mechanism of depriving the right itself, and therefore includes in its content as well as the actual jural fact and conditions of its occurence. In conclusion all the right-depriving jural facts are divided into unconditional, those which occurence is not associated with additional conditions established by rule of law (death of natural person, destruction of property) and conditional, the result of which is achieved only under certain circumstances (conditions). (shrink)

A basic human right to the delivery of health care, even to the delivery of a decent minimum of health care, does not exist. The difficult with talking of such rights should be apparent. It is difficult if not impossible both to respect the freedom of all and to achieve their long-range best interests. -/- Rights to health care constitute claims against others for either their services or their goods. Unlike rights to forbearance, which require others to refrain from (...) interfering, rights to beneficence require others to participate actively in a particular understanding of the good life. Rights to health care, unless they are derived from special contractual agreements, depend on the principle of beneficence rather than that of autonomy, and therefore may conflict with the decisions of individuals who may not wish to participate in realizing a particular system of health care. If the resources involved in the provision of health care are not fully communal, private owners of resources may rightly have other uses in mind for their property than public care….[T]he principles of autonomy and beneficence that lie at the foundations of justice will spawn conflicts within any portrayal of a just allocation of health care resources. (shrink)