This volume is by no means out of place for a reader in the twenty first century as resemblances between the age of the machine and our own digital age are surprisingly numerous, particularly with reference to the patterns of intellectual response to unprecedented stimuli. The worrisome parallelisms and analogues are purposefully kept off stage for the imaginative audience to complement the plot of the real drama of the Industrial Revolution as it was witnessed by such imaginative medievalist (...) 'knights' as Carlyle, Cobbett, Southey, Pugin, Ruskin and Morris, intelligent thinkers who performed the universal 'type' rather than the subjective or egocentric in so far as their intellectual responses to the discrepancy between two dissimilar epochs was concerned. The reader is, therefore, expected to be engaged with the arguments of the 'neo-feudal', the 'moral-aesthetic' and the utopian 'social-aesthetic' arguments at the core of the book both imaginatively and intellectually. On the first level, he is requested to shuttle between two centuries separated by the length of a different century. On the second, however, he is expected not only to appreciate the artistically excellent literary works of prominent belletrists, but also to examine the clever polemics they developed as methods of treatment and persuasion aiming at a solution of the social and psychological problems that arose from the incongruity between the present and the past, with specific references to such significant concepts as those of time, history, progress and authority which are examined against the superheated touchstones of democratization, liberty, laissez-faire ethics, mechanization, poverty and social protest in the industrial city. (shrink)

Baumard proposes that life history slowing in populations over time is the principal driver of innovation rates. We show that this is only true of micro-innovation rates, which reflect cognitive and economic specialization as an adaptation to high population density, and not macro-innovation rates, which relate more to a population's level of general intelligence.

I am grateful to have received so many stimulating commentaries from interested colleagues regarding the psychological origins of the Industrial Revolution and the role of evolutionary theory in understanding historical phenomena. Commentators criticized, extended, and explored the implications of the perspective I presented, and I wholeheartedly agree with many commentaries that more work is needed. In this response, I thus focus on what is needed to further test the psychological origins of the Industrial Revolution. Specifically, I (...) argue, in agreement with many commentators, that we need: better data about standards of living, psychological preferences, and innovation rates ; better models to understand the role of resources in driving cultural evolution and the multiple aspects of the behavioral constellation of affluence ; and better predictions and better statistical instruments to disentangle the possible mechanisms behind the rise of innovativeness. (shrink)

Since the Industrial Revolution, human societies have experienced high and sustained rates of economic growth. Recent explanations of this sudden and massive change in economic history have held that modern growth results from an acceleration of innovation. But it is unclear why the rate of innovation drastically accelerated in England in the eighteenth century. An important factor might be the alteration of individual preferences with regard to innovation resulting from the unprecedented living standards of the English during that (...) period, for two reasons. First, recent developments in economic history challenge the standard Malthusian view according to which living standards were stagnant until the Industrial Revolution. Pre-industrial England enjoyed a level of affluence that was unprecedented in history. Second, behavioral sciences have demonstrated that the human brain is designed to respond adaptively to variations in resources in the local environment. In particular, Life History Theory, a branch of evolutionary biology, suggests that a more favorable environment should trigger the expression of future-oriented preferences. In this paper, I argue that some of these psychological traits – a lower level of time discounting, a higher level of optimism, decreased materialistic orientation, and a higher level of trust in others – are likely to increase the rate of innovation. I review the evidence regarding the impact of affluence on preferences in contemporary as well as past populations, and conclude that the impact of affluence on neurocognitive systems may partly explain the modern acceleration of technological innovations and the associated economic growth. (shrink)

We suggest in this commentary an emotional origin of the Industrial Revolution. Specifically, increased living standards directly preceding the Industrial Revolution produced increased happiness and subjective well-being that, in turn, fueled the explosion of innovation and economic growth experienced in industrial England.

Did affluence lead to psychological changes such as reduced discounting, and did these changes facilitate the innovation associated with the Industrial Revolution? I argue that claims of this sort are best made when they can be supported by causal evidence and good psychological measurement. When we have neither identifying variation nor adequate measures, the toolbox of psychologists is not useful.

In recent years it has become commonplace to downplay notions of an industrial revolution and argue instead that Britain's transformation was gradual and incremental. In _The Industrial Revolution and the Atlantic Economy_ Brinley Thomas contests this view, arguing that change in the energy base and hence in technology has enabled Britain to overcome an energy crisis and sustain dramatic population growth. Throughout these essays illustrate the organic approach to economic growth that Brinley Thomas pioneered.

The ArgumentThe purpose of this essay is revisionist on two counts: first, that the American colonies and early United States republic kept pace with Great Britain in reaching a relatively advanced stage of industrialization by the early nineteenth century and second, that the Middle Atlantic States shared equally with New England the innovative role in creating America's industrial revolution. In both cases the industrial leaders achieved their preeminence by different routes. By concentrating on the importance of the (...) sources of machine power as the defining characteristic of industrialism, scholars have overlooked alternative paths to industrial change. In Britain steam power and the textile industry were the foundations of an industrial revolution. But in American colonies the use of water power and the growth of industries such as woodworking and building led to an equally revolutionary change in the production of machine-made products. Benign geography in colonial America provided abundant wood and water power and an excellent transportation system based on navigable rivers and a hospitable coastline. But the crucial factors were cultural: the compelling urge to do things with less human work, the open reception to new immigration, a younger and more venturesome population, a favorable legal and fiscal environment for enterpreneurs. In the American context the tendency of scholars to emphasize the leadership of New England was largely a result of the greater local availability of manufacturing records. But recent research has demonstrated that Philadelphia, the largest port of entry in the eighteenth century, was quite naturally a center of innovation in construction materials, woodworking machinery and shipbuilding to meet the needs of the expanding agricultural hinterland and the coastal trade. In sum, the values of an expanding, youthful, skilled population replenished by fresh and venturesome sources from abroad helped shape cultural values that were particularly favorable in the geographic environment of North America for alternative paths of rapid industrial growth. (shrink)

Baumard proposes a model to explain the dramatic rise in innovation that occurred during the Industrial Revolution, whereby rising living standards led to slower life history strategies, which, in turn, fostered innovation. We test his model explicitly using time series data, finding limited support for these proposed linkages. Instead, we find evidence that rising living standards appear to have a time-lagged bidirectional relationship with increasing innovation.

The Industrial Revolution was the heyday of entrepreneurial activity, fuelling an unprecendented expansion of the UK's industrial base. The entreprenuer is a central figure in modern business economics, and this set draws together some of the classic studies of this subject. The volumes reprinted include important historical studies, as well as discussions of entrepreneurial behaviour.

In this paper, we argue that antecedents of modern corporate social responsibility prior to the Industrial Revolution can be referred to as “proto-CSR” to describe a practice that influenced modern CSR, but which is different from its modern counterparts in form and structure. We develop our argument with the history of miners’ guilds in medieval Germany—religious fraternities and secular mutual aid societies. Based on historical data collected by historians and archeologists, we reconstruct a long-term process of pragmatic experimentation (...) with institutions of mutual aid that address social problems in the early mining industry, and thus before the rise of the modern state and the capitalist firm. Co-shaped by economic and political actors, these institutions of mutual aid have influenced the social responsibility programs of early industrialists, modern social welfare legislation, and contemporary CSR. We conjecture that other elements of proto-CSR might have evolved according to similar trajectories. (shrink)

Francis Fukuyama postulated that there are two powerful forces at work in human history. One, he calls, ‘the logic of modern science’ and the other, ‘the struggle for recognition’. I agree with Fukuyama that human developmental progression is propelled by these twin principles. It is my position that these principles have been the drivers of geopolitics. In this paper, I argue that, in addition, knowledge production is a major factor in geopolitics and that the Euro-American worldview has occupied the place (...) of hegemony by reason of knowledge production. Africa has been denied having any form of epistemic tradition by the Euro-American world to sustain itself in the position of hegemony. In the era of Fourth Industrial Revolution, it will be antithetical for Africa to continue to adopt or consume technologies driven by Eurocentrism without projecting its contribution to the global space. Hence, using a critical hermeneutical approach, I contend that Africa needs to make a unique African contribution in the era of Fourth Industrial Revolution. It is Africa’s unique contribution that will guarantee Africa a place in geopolitics. (shrink)

Abstract Ten years ago, Clark Nardinelli shocked conventional historians by reinterpreting child labor as a sensible response to the Industrial Revolution. Nardinelli's exculpation of child labor follows front the way in which he deploys neoclassical economic theory. How relevant is his neoclassical model to the early industrial economy, and how realistic is methodological individualism to the decisions that sent young children into the appalling work places of early industrial Britain? Rather than seeing neoclassical economics as a (...) substitute for historical judgment, as Nardinelli suggests, I propose that we use it critically to probe the meaning and implications of child labor in its historical context. (shrink)

What impelled the Industrial Revolution's spectacular economic growth? Life History Theory, Baumard argues, explains how England's world-supreme affluence psychologically fostered innovation; moreover, wherever similar affluence abounds, a “civilizing process” bringing enlightenment and democracy is apt to evolve. Baumard insightfully analyzes a “constellation of affluence” but proffers somewhat whiggish history given England's prior and unique proto-capitalist culture of economic liberty and individualism.

Wallerstein states that the only social revolution, or the «great turning point» of Modern Times, is the formation of the European capitalist world–economy during the «long» XVI century. Contrary to this, the author argues that two more great fractures can be distinguished in the history of Modern Times. The first of them was the industrial revolution of the XIX century, when three processes coincided, pro­voked by the invention of the steam engine – the mechanization of factory production, (...) the energy rev­olution and the change of logistics. The emergence of globalization required a combination of several circumstances that developed into a single complex at the end of the twentieth century: the absorption of the remaining large external zones by the capitalist world system, the information and communication revolution, the establishment of geopolitical unipolarism, the dominance of the ideology of neoliberal globalism on a global scale. (shrink)

'This is a very good and important book that is must reading for anyone interested in evolutionary economics and/or the relationship between history and economics. In addition, you get a very well documented and argued interpretation of long run capitalist development from the industrial revolution to the present that will be a standard reference... a first rate contribution to the discussion of how evolutionary economics should develop.' -Journal of Evolutionary Economics 'The book offers numerous insights into particular aspects (...) of technological change... Social theorists and policy advisors today need to be able to understand technological change in relation to cultural, political and economic life, and to situate contemporary developments in a longer term perspective. The authors provide a framework to do exactly that. Their book is a welcome demonstration of the usefulness of historical context for contemporary debates regarding science and technology policy.' -Business History 'A thought-provoking work that is valuable for more than its detailed account of the technological revolutions that shape our economy today. By directing our attention to a perspective outside the current wave, it shapes our thinking about events inside the current wave.' -Academy of Management Review 'This major contribution to economic history is the most impressive and convincing attempt I know to apply the concept of the 'long waves', a basic rhythm of historical development in the era of capitalism, to the entire stretch from eighteenth-century Lancashire to twenty-first-century Silicon Valley. It is also a call for economic history to escape from the handcuffs of narrow retrospective econometrics to the freedom of its vocation: understanding and explaining secular historical transformations.' -Eric Hobsbawm FBA, American Academy of Arts andamp; Sciences, Emeritus Professor of Social and Economic History, Birkbeck College; Author of The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914-1991The Internet and mobile telephones have made everyone more aware than ever of the computer revolution and its effects on the economy and society. 'As Time Goes By' puts this revolution in the perspective of previous waves of technical change: steam-powered mechanization, electrification, and motorization. It argues for a theory of reasoned economic history which assigns a central place to these successive technological revolutions. (shrink)

Cognition played a pivotal role in the acceleration of technological innovation during the Industrial Revolution. Growing affluence may have provided favourable environmental conditions for a boost in cognition, enabling individuals to tackle more complex problems. Dynamical systems thinking may provide useful tools to describe sudden transitions like the Industrial Revolution, by modelling the recursive feedback between psychology and environment.

The current industrial revolution is said to be driven by the digitization that exploits connected information across all aspects of manufacturing. Standards have been recognized as an important enabler. Ontology-based information standard may provide benefits not offered by current information standards. Although there have been ontologies developed in the industrial manufacturing domain, they have been fragmented and inconsistent, and little has received a standard status. With successes in developing coherent ontologies in the biological, biomedical, and financial domains, (...) an effort called Industrial Ontologies Foundry (IOF) has been formed to pursue the same goal for the industrial manufacturing domain. However, developing a coherent ontology covering the entire industrial manufacturing domain has been known to be a mountainous challenge because of the multidisciplinary nature of manufacturing. To manage the scope and expectations, the IOF community kicked-off its effort with a proof-of-concept (POC) project. This paper describes the developments within the project. It also provides a brief update on the IOF organizational set up. (shrink)

The gap between the metatheoretical inquiries of the analytical philosophy of history, formulated in terms of general principle, and the actual research practices of the historical discipline needs to be bridged. This investigation of the determinants -preconditions, causes, factors, forces - of technological development during the Industrial Revolution makes explicit the range of theoretical instruments used in such studies. The methodologically unavoidable plurality of aspects and perspectives for each concrete inquiry precludes any generally binding model for technological development. (...) Discussion of epistemological presuppositions, by comparing various approaches, can serve to make fully conscious these presuppositions and make them accessible to analysis and criticism. (shrink)

The Internet and mobile telephones have made everyone more aware than ever of the computer revolution and its effects on the economy and society. As Time Goes By puts this revolution in the perspective of previous waves of technical change: steam-powered mechanization, electrification, and motorization. It argues for a theory of reasoned economic history which assigns a central place to these successive technological revolutions.

The most general theory of life history evolution, that of r versus K selection, implies that innovation in the form of plasticity is more likely to be adaptive under poor rather than good resource conditions, the opposite of how Baumard has it. However, this does focus on benefits rather than costs, and including both allows for greater diversity of outcomes.

It is emphasized that environmental predictability is another important condition that plays roles in slow strategies that are related to innovation; that economic inequality, except as measured by Gross Domestic Product per capita, influences innovation; and that switching global life history from a slow to a fast strategy is a response adopted in response to new challenges during the post-Industrial Revolution period.