ch. 0. Vvedenie (Gnoseologii︠a︡ i nauka) -- ch. 1. Gnoseologii︠a︡ (Filosofii︠a︡ i gnoseologii︠a︡) -- ch. 2. Estestvennye nauki (Fizika i obshchenauchnai︠a︡ kartina mira) -- ch. 3. Obshchestvennye nauki (Ėtika, sot︠s︡iologii︠a︡ i didaktika).

Od metafizycznej neutralności do metafizyki problemów. Status metafizyki w filozofii Husserla Streszczenie Artykuł prezentuje przejście filozofii Husserla od psychologii fenomenologicznej do fenomenologii transcendentalnej jako zwrot metafizyczny. Husserlowska fenomenologia przedtranscendentalna jako deskryptywna analiza fenomenów mentalnych wyklucza wszelkie metafizyczne pytania dotyczące istnienia świata zewnętrznego, podczas gdy fenomenologia transcendentalna nie jest metafizycznie neutralna, ponieważ ma za zadanie odsłonięcie ostatecznego sensu świata w jego faktycznym istnieniu. Z jednej strony, zgodnie z pierwszeństwem ejdetycznych możliwości przed rzeczywistością, fenomenologia transcendentalna jako nauka ejdetyczna poprzedza metafizykę jako (...) naukę o rzeczywistości i umożliwia ją. Z tego punktu widzenia fenomenologia transcendentalna może być rozumiana w znaczeniu ostatecznego ugruntowania metafizyki jako uniwersalnej i absolutnej nauki o faktach, która jest zwieńczeniem naturalnych nauk o bycie. Z drugiej strony, zasada pierwszeństwa istoty przed faktem nie znajduje zastosowania do transcendentalnego faktu konstytucji świata i ten irracjonalny fakt prowadzi do metafizyki jako filozofii dotyczącej „najwyższych i ostatecznych zagadnień”, takich jak teleologiczne, teologiczne i etyczne zagadnienia. Zagadnienia te okazują się irracjonalną resztą (metafizycznym residuum) fenomenologii transcendentalnej i jej zwieńczeniem. Słowa kluczowe: ejdetyczne możliwości, fakt absolutny, fenomenologia transcendentalna, metafizyka krytyczna, metafizyka problemów, nauka o faktach. (shrink)

T. 1. Opytʺ psikhologicheskoĭ istorīi i kritiki osnovnykhʺ voprosovʺ zhizni. 3. izd. 1905.--T. 2. Metafizika zhizni i khrīstianskoe otkrovenīe. 2. izd. 1906.

Ve své studii se pokouším zdůvodnit význam Husserlova základního rozlišení mezi samostatnými a nesamostatnými částmi v celku jeho filosofování. K tomu je potřeba popsat, jak toto rozlišení vyrůstá z obecné systematiky Logických zkoumání a jak je touto systematikou jakožto nástroj jejího vypracování předpokládáno. Abychom tento rozdíl pochopili musíme jej nejdříve zasadit do kontextu Husserlovy čisté logiky. V ní tento rozdíl patří zprvu do oblasti čisté logiky, která se nazývá formální ontologií, neboť každý předmět může být chápán jako aktuální nebo možná (...) část nějakého celku. Přihlédneme-li blíže, můžeme v oblasti částí rozlišit samostatné a nesamostatné části. Zatímco samostatné části mohou být myšleny mimo spojení se svými celky, nesamostatné se vzpírají jakémukoliv pokusu o toto uchopení, neboť je v jejich případě logicky absurdní. To nás přivádí k ideji obecného zákona, který vyjadřuje „logickou“ potřebu nesamostatných částí po doplnění. Tento zákon je založen v obecné povaze nesamostatné části a předepisuje, jakým způsobem se odehrává její doplnění a jaké druhy částí mohou toto doplnění uspokojit. Přitom kladu důraz na to, že podle Husserla je možno získat specifický obsah tohoto zákona pomocí variace, jež užívá bytí nesamostatné části jako index pro rozlišení mezí neboli nejnižší species částí, které jej mohou doplnit. Takový popis výrazně napomáhá pochopení smyslu pojmu variace a fundace v Husserlově filosofii. Dále se pokouším ukázat, že Husserl používá tento pojem obecného zákona a variace v oblasti formální logiky, aby vysvětlil ideu syntaktických zákonů a že jej využívá i v průběhu svého pozdějšího vypracování materiálních ontologií, aby vysvětlil syntetické soudy apriori. Nakonec poukazuji na určitou obtíž, která se objevuje, chceme-li chápat rozdíl mezi samostatnými a nesamostatnými částmi jako skutečný formálně ontologický rozdíl. (shrink)

Receptive potencies are the essence in relation to the act of being (esse) and the matter in relation to the form. Suárez identifies the essence with the existence. A potential essence, according to Suarez, is nothing; therefore it cannot be receptive potency for being (esse). The actuality of an actual essence is its being (esse). Hence, the actual essence does not need to receive any further being distinct from it. Essence does not differ really from being (esse); nevertheless, we can (...) conceive it without being. Essence as “whatness”, quiddity, is closely connected with concept and definition. In this regard we may make some critical remarks on Suarez’s doctrine: If the “whatness” is identical to the being (esse), this fact has to be reflected in the adequate notion of the “whatness”. If it is so, it seems that the essence conceived without being (esse) is not the same essence any more. Furthermore: If essence and existence are identified, what is it to which existence can be non-trivially ascribed? What is the receptive potency for being (esse)? Arriaga follows Suárez in the doctrine of essence and being, in his teaching on the prime matter however he goes even further. Whereas Suárez ascribes to the prime matter its own actuality, Arriaga assigns to it some attributes of substance. In contradistinction to the Suarezian conception of receptive potencies, the Thomistic doctrine of the relation of participation between potency and act permits metaphysics to withstand the threats of mechanicism and the post-fregean trivialization of the notion of being (esse). (shrink)

Receptive potencies are the essence in relation to the act of being (esse) and the matter in relation to the form. Suárez identifies the essence with the existence. A potential essence, according to Suarez, is nothing; therefore it cannot be receptive potency for being (esse). The actuality of an actual essence is its being (esse). Hence, the actual essence does not need to receive any further being distinct from it. Essence does not differ really from being (esse); nevertheless, we can (...) conceive it without being. Essence as “whatness”, quiddity, is closely connected with concept and definition. In this regard we may make some critical remarks on Suarez’s doctrine: If the “whatness” is identical to the being (esse), this fact has to be reflected in the adequate notion of the “whatness”. If it is so, it seems that the essence conceived without being (esse) is not the same essence any more. Furthermore: If essence and existence are identified, what is it to which existence can be non-trivially ascribed? What is the receptive potency for being (esse)? Arriaga follows Suárez in the doctrine of essence and being, in his teaching on the prime matter however he goes even further. Whereas Suárez ascribes to the prime matter its own actuality, Arriaga assigns to it some attributes of substance. In contradistinction to the Suarezian conception of receptive potencies, the Thomistic doctrine of the relation of participation between potency and act permits metaphysics to withstand the threats of mechanicism and the post-fregean trivialization of the notion of being (esse). (shrink)

Receptive potencies are the essence in relation to the act of being (esse) and the matter in relation to the form. Suárez identifies the essence with the existence. A potential essence, according to Suarez, is nothing; therefore it cannot be receptive potency for being (esse). The actuality of an actual essence is its being (esse). Hence, the actual essence does not need to receive any further being distinct from it. Essence does not differ really from being (esse); nevertheless, we can (...) conceive it without being. Essence as “whatness”, quiddity, is closely connected with concept and definition. In this regard we may make some critical remarks on Suarez’s doctrine: If the “whatness” is identical to the being (esse), this fact has to be reflected in the adequate notion of the “whatness”. If it is so, it seems that the essence conceived without being (esse) is not the same essence any more. Furthermore: If essence and existence are identified, what is it to which existence can be non-trivially ascribed? What is the receptive potency for being (esse)? Arriaga follows Suárez in the doctrine of essence and being, in his teaching on the prime matter however he goes even further. Whereas Suárez ascribes to the prime matter its own actuality, Arriaga assigns to it some attributes of substance. In contradistinction to the Suarezian conception of receptive potencies, the Thomistic doctrine of the relation of participation between potency and act permits metaphysics to withstand the threats of mechanicism and the post-fregean trivialization of the notion of being (esse). (shrink)

Receptive potencies are the essence in relation to the act of being (esse) and the matter in relation to the form. Suárez identifies the essence with the existence. A potential essence, according to Suarez, is nothing; therefore it cannot be receptive potency for being (esse). The actuality of an actual essence is its being (esse). Hence, the actual essence does not need to receive any further being distinct from it. Essence does not differ really from being (esse); nevertheless, we can (...) conceive it without being. Essence as “whatness”, quiddity, is closely connected with concept and definition. In this regard we may make some critical remarks on Suarez’s doctrine: If the “whatness” is identical to the being (esse), this fact has to be reflected in the adequate notion of the “whatness”. If it is so, it seems that the essence conceived without being (esse) is not the same essence any more. Furthermore: If essence and existence are identified, what is it to which existence can be non-trivially ascribed? What is the receptive potency for being (esse)? Arriaga follows Suárez in the doctrine of essence and being, in his teaching on the prime matter however he goes even further. Whereas Suárez ascribes to the prime matter its own actuality, Arriaga assigns to it some attributes of substance. In contradistinction to the Suarezian conception of receptive potencies, the Thomistic doctrine of the relation of participation between potency and act permits metaphysics to withstand the threats of mechanicism and the post-fregean trivialization of the notion of being (esse). (shrink)

Artykuł stanowi uzasadnienie twierdzącej odpowiedzi na pytanie, czy możliwa jest „Nauka o książce Katalogi oraz bibliografie pełnią funkcję przewodników wskazujących czytelnikom drogi poznania; zawierają one wiedzę szczególną i specyficzną. Przedmiotem rozważań jest analiza definicji bibliografii sformułowanych przez teoretyków zajmujących się tą problematyką: scharakteryzowane zostały koncepcje, których autorami są: W. Greg, F. Bowers, D. P. Mc Kenzie. Porównanie różnych poglądów, dotyczących przedmiotu, zakresu oraz zadań bibliografii, jest źródłem refleksji, ukazującej znaczenie pracy bibliografa w różnych aspektach. „Nauka o książce” jako (...) główny przedmiot swych zainteresowań uznaje tę oryginalną wiedzę, która jest rezultatem pracy bibliografa. (shrink)

This article contains a summary of selected theses of the theory of the state developed by Hermann Heller, who was one of the leading representatives of the so-called Weimar Theory of the State. State theorists of the Weimar era formed an independent, formally unrelated group of scientists who had often opposing views, but were united by a common effort to conduct even philosophical investigation of the nature of the state, the European, continental state, as well as its internal ratio and (...) mission. In addition to Hermann Heller, this group included Carl Schmitt, Rudolf Smend, Erich Kaufmann and Heinrich Triepel. They asked questions which are absent in today’s science, such as: “What is a state?”, “What kind of being is it and what is its nature?”. The answers determine many issues, including our perception of the durability and strength of the state, our understanding of its structure and development, the relation between the state and the individual and the relation between politics and history, etc. No settlement of this basic issue is not only simple negligence, but – as can be judged – it stems from today’s tacit assumption that the state is not a being, but only an artificial human construct, a combination of elements and a set of institutions. Heller perceives the state substantially: as particular organization of social affairs; organization of specific areas of public life: economy, law and public opinion. These were created in the modern era and have been specific to Europe from the sixteenth century to modern times. The matter of these areas is transformed into a state order by sovereign authorities. Therefore, their policies and their law have their concrete object whose reality they face, and they need to demonstrate that they are capable of organizing this reality. The ethos of the state and at the same time the legitimacy of its power require that elementary principles of justice are ensured, or at least injustice is eliminated from social life. (shrink)

The article investigates the relationship between Leibniz’s and Huygens’ theory of possibility and the principle of conservation of energy. It assumes that their criticisms of Cartesian views concerning those questions as well as their own achievements contributed to the formation of a new metaphysical basis for modern discussions on the freedom of the will. There are especially two problems whose role is crucial in this context, namely the question of God’s knowledge of future conditionals (contingentia futura) and the mind-body distinction.

By levelling its criticism it traditional sociology ethnomethodology focuses directly or indirectly on the role of norms in description and explanation of human behaviour. Although sociologists respond to this criticism the way in which they accommodate it is rather superficial. That is why this article is written in the form of a dialogue. One protagonist quotes selected tenets of ethnomethodology, phrasing them as he would be apt to in the programmatic phase of the development of that discipline, while the other (...) offers corrections and undertakes to analyse and evaluate the views that he hears. In the course of their discussion it becomes clear that, according to ethnomethodology, norms out of context have no bearing on behaviour which is always occasioned by particular circumstances hic et nunc. Yet, it would not be true to say that remembrance of norms never affects decisions responsible for individual behaviour, any more than it would be to say that ethnomethodology can dispense with objective language as allegedly incompatible with the very nature of social life. Additionally, the dichotomy ‘indexical versus objective language’ distorts the continuum of the contextuality of expressions beyond recognition. Thus we are left with the old problem, familiar to both practitioners and theorists of normative disciplines, the problem of interpretation, its ramifications are neglected by ethnometodologists. Application of a concrete norm to a concrete situation presupposes an interpretation of the situation, and in this sense, it is true that knowledge of norms is not sufficient for a description of the behaviour by a man who follows them. But a norm can play a role in the interpretation of a situation too. Besides, in their attempt to get rid of surface norms, ethnomethodologists create latent or interpretative norms whose ontological status is rather doubtful. Though they are reconstructed they need not be Identified with deep-structure norms which in fact have influence on human behaviour. In case when the two might conflict the ethnometodologists would be hard put to know what to say. But without precluding any answer to this query, it must be stressed that the interpretative procedures, as they have been reconstructed from ethnomethodological analyses, are vague and underdeveloped which is probably due to this vagueness of criteria with which ethnomethodology defines the object of its interests. (shrink)

Centre and Periphery in the Historiography of Philosophy: Peter Olivi and Medieval Psychology The paper inquiries into the (historiographical) question what does it mean to be a “marginal thinker” in the context of the medieval philosophy. The question is investigated on the example of Franciscan philosopher and theologian Peter Olivi (1248/49–1298) and his philosophical psychology. First, a preliminary option is introduced: for a thinker, being “marginal” depends on his relation to who is considered to be canonical. Since the most famous (...) thinker of the Middle Ages is Thomas Aquinas (at least according to the traditional canon of medieval philosophy), Olivi’s positions in psychology are compared with these of Aquinas. It is revealed that Olivi’s psychology is very different from the Aquinas’ one. (E.g. Olivi stresses the activity of perception, proprioceptual nature of the sense of touch, and direct access of the intellect to its own acts.) Moreover, Olivi is very critical towards the Aristotelian philosophy as is done by some thinkers of his time. Nevertheless, it does not follow that Olivi is a marginal thinker only because of his dissimilarity from the more Aristotelian-minded ones. It is argued that “centre” and “periphery” in the history of medieval philosophy depends not on the canon (which is rather a historians’ construct and instrument), but rather on the tradition. Hence, although Olivi can be considered as a marginal thinker if we take into the account the Aristotelian tradition of medieval philosophy, he is definitely a central and important thinker, if considered as a member of the Augustinian tradition. (shrink)