Black magic (henceforth BM) is acting in an attempt to harm human beings through supernatural means. Examples include the employment of spells, the use of special curses, the burning of objects related to the purported victim, and the use of pins with voodoo dolls. For the sake of simplicity, we shall focus on attempts to kill through BM. The moral attitude towards BM has not been, as far as we know, significantly discussed in contemporary analytic philosophy. Yet the topic (...) brings up interesting questions and poses challenges, occasionally even reaching the level of paradoxes. Ideas of respecting persons, in particular, will be seen to be challenged by this form of magic. The notion of respecting persons will be treated here broadly and pluralistically. Indeed part of the interest in the discussion will be the unfolding of the diverse ways in which this term should be understood, and the contrasts between its various uses. Often, as we shall see, respect for persons and disrespect for them, in different senses, will co‐exist, and the dilemma will be one where avoiding some forms of disrespect will involve us in disrespect in other senses. (shrink)

The concept of “magic realism” raises many problems, both theoretical and historical. I first encountered it in the context of American painting in the mid-1950s; at about the same time, Angle Flores published an influential article in which the term was applied to the work of Borges;1 but Alejo Carpentier’s conception of the real maravilloso at once seemed to offer a related or alternative conception, while his own work and that of Miguel Angel Asturias seemed to demand an enlargement of (...) its application.2 Finally, with the novels of Gabriel García Márquez in the 1960s, a whole new realm of magic realism opened up whose exact relations to preceding theory and novelistic practice remained undetermined. These conceptual problems emerge most clearly when one juxtaposes the notion of magic realism with competing or overlapping terms. In the beginning, for instance, it was not clear how it was to be distinguished from that vaster category generally simply called fantastic literature; at this point, what is presumably at issue is a certain type of narrative or representation to be distinguished from realism. Carpentier, however, explicitly staged his version as a more authentic Latin American realization of what in the more reified European context took the form of surrealism: his emphasis would seem to have been on a certain poetic transfiguration of the object world itself—not so much a fantastic narrative, then, as a metamorphosis in perception and in things perceived . In García Márquez, finally, these two tendencies seemed to achieve a new kind of synthesis—a transfigured object world in which fantastic events are also narrated. But at this point, the focus of the conception of magic realism would appear to have shifted to what must be called an anthropological perspective: magic realism now comes to be understood as a kind of narrative raw material derived essentially from peasant society, drawing in sophisticated ways on the world of village or even tribal myth. Recent debates, meanwhile, have complicated all this with yet a different kind of issue: namely, the problem of the political or mystificatory value, respectively, of such texts, many of which we owe to overtly left-wing revolutionary writers .3 In spite of these terminological complexities—which might be grounds for abandoning the concept altogether—it retains a strange seductiveness which I will try to explore further, adding to the confusion with reference points drawn from the work of Jacques Lacan and from Freud’s notion of the “uncanny,” and compounding it by an argument that magic realism is to be grasped as a possible alternative to the narrative logic of contemporary postmodernism.4 1. See Angel Flores, “Magical Realism in Spanish American Fiction,” Hispania 38 : 187-92.2. See Alejo Carpentier, “Prólogo” to his novel El Reino de este mundo ; the most useful survey of the debate remains Roberto Gonzalez Echeverria, “Carpentier y el realism magico,” in Otros Mundos, otros fuegos, ed. Donald Yates, Congreso International de Literature Iberoamericana 16 , pp. 221-31.3. See Angel Rama, La Novel en America Latina , and especially Carlos Blanco Aguinaga, De Mitólogos y novelistas , in particular the discussions of Gabriel García Márques and Alejo Carpentier.4. My own general frame of reference for “postmodernism” is outlined in my “Postmodernism; or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism,” New Left Review 146 : 53-92. Frederic Jameson, William A. Lane Professor of Comparative Literature at Duke University, is the author of The Prison-House of Language and The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act. He is also a member of the editorial collective of Social Text. His previous contributions to Critical Inquiry are “The Symbolic Inference; or, Kenneth Burke and Ideological Analysis” and “Ideology and Symbolic Action”. (shrink)

The past few years have seen a resurgence of interest in the scientific study of magic. Despite being only a few years old, this “new wave” has already resulted in a host of interesting studies, often using methods that are both powerful and original. These developments have largely borne out our earlier hopes (Kuhn et al., 2008) that new opportunities were available for scientific studies based on the use of magic. And it would seem that much more can still be (...) done along these lines. -/- But in addition to this, we also suggested that it might be time to consider developing an outright science of magic—a distinct area of study concerned with the experience of wonder that results from encountering an apparently impossible event1. To this end, we proposed a framework as to how this might be achieved (Rensink and Kuhn, 2015). A science can be viewed as a systematic method of investigation involving three sets of issues: (i) the entities considered relevant, (ii) the kinds of questions that can be asked about them, and (iii) the kinds of answers that are legitimate (Kuhn, 1970). In the case of magic, we suggested that this could be done at three different levels, each focusing on a distinct set of issues concerned with the nature of magic itself: (i) the nature of magical experience, (ii) how individual magic tricks create this experience, and (iii) organizing knowledge of the set of known tricks in a more comprehensive way (Rensink and Kuhn, 2015). Our framework also included a base level focused on how the methods of magic could be used as tools to investigate issues in existing fields of study. -/- Lamont (2010) and Lamont et al. (2010) raised a number of concerns about the possibility of such a science, which we have addressed (Rensink and Kuhn, 2015). More recently, Lamont (2015) raised a new objection, arguing that although base-level work (i.e., applications of magic methods) might be useful, there is too little structure in magic tricks for them to be studied in a systematic way at the other levels, ruling out a science of magic. We argue here, however, that although this concern raises some interesting challenges for this science, it does not negate the possibility that it could exist, and could contribute to the study of the mind. (shrink)

The article devoted to Magic Lamp magazine, the Russian periodical of 1817. The magazine was published in Saint Petersburg in small printing; only 12 issues were published. It makes Magic Lamp magazine to be a bibliographical rarity. Objective function of Magic Lamp magazine was to amuse and enlighten people. In addition, it could be used as peculiar phrasebook and guidebook for foreigners visiting Saint Petersburg. The articles display typical everyday episodes taking place in the capital of Russia in the early (...) 19th century. It is a valuable source of information about Saint Petersburg’s everyday life and folkways of the time, when Pushkin was living there. Magic Lamp magazine is an artifact of polygraphic culture, because it is one of the first illustrated magazines in Russia. Magic Lamp magazine can be qualified as sociocultural phenomenon valuable for comprehension and study of Russian history, way of life, and linguistics. (shrink)

Language, through the discrete nature of linguistic names and strictly determined grammatical rules, creates absolute, “quantized”, sharply separated “facts” within the external world that is continuous, “fuzzy” and relational in its essence. Therefore, it is similar, in some important sense, to magic, which attributes causal and creative power to magical words and formulas. On the one hand, language increases greatly the effectiveness of the processes of thinking and interpersonal communication, yet, on the other hand, it determines and distorts to (...) a large extent the picture of the world created within the mind. The relatively smallest (but still significant) magical admixture is present in science, because of its relatively reliable methodology, while the largest is found in religion and a large part of philosophy. The magical nature of language also manifests itself in logic and mathematics that refer to ill determined, fuzzy objects, sets and relations in the real world. The meaning of linguistic names is based on the conceptual network—an epiphenomenon (continuous in its essence) of the neural network—where interactions between particular concepts are based on the relation of connotation. The names and formulas of language correspond to these concepts which are best separated and determined. A direct relation of denotation between the elements of language and “facts” of the world is an illusion. While we cannot dispense with language because of its immense usefulness, we must remember about its “fact-creating” nature and influence on our thought and cognitive processes. The picture of the reality created as the result of them is to a large extent formed and deformed by the nature of language, and not by the “immanent” properties of the world in itself. (shrink)

David Lewis objected to theories that posit necessary connections between distinct entities and to theories that involve a magical grasping of their primitives. In On the Plurality of Worlds, Lewis objected to nondescript ersatzism on these grounds. The literature contains several reconstructions of Lewis’ critique of nondescript ersatzism but none of these interpretations adequately address his main argument because they fail to see that Lewis’ critique is based on broader methodological considerations. I argue that a closer look at his (...) methodology reveals the broader objection he presented against nondescript ersatzism. This objection, I further argue, remains a challenge for the ersatzer who posits structure-less entities as possible worlds. (shrink)

I look at what Walter Benjamin calls the “magic of matter,” a silent form of communication between material objects, including our bodies. This communion exists even when bodies are separated as they are during the pandemic and becomes especially sensible to us when the physical presence of others is removed.

The Magic of Truth defends truth’s relativity by examining its role in the arts and sciences, as well as in our own lives and traditions. This book argues that no field of study can progress without calling into question the traditional view of truth as a clear, objective image.

The paper shows how to use the Husserlian phenomenological method in contemporary philosophical approaches to mathematical practice and mathematical ontology. First, the paper develops the phenomenological approach based on Husserl's writings to obtain a method for understanding mathematical practice. Then, to put forward a full-fledged ontology of mathematics, the phenomenological approach is complemented with social ontological considerations. The proposed ontological account sees mathematical objects as social constructions in the sense that they are products of culturally shared and historically developed (...) practices. At the same time the view endorses the sense that mathematical reality is given to mathematicians with a sense of independence. As mathematical social constructions are products of highly constrained, intersubjective practices and accord with the phenomenologically clarified experience of mathematicians, positing them is phenomenologically justified. The social ontological approach offers a way to build mathematical ontology out of the practice with no metaphysical magic. (shrink)

We express here the statement » The probability of a given b equals r « symbolically by » p = r «. A formal axiomatic calculus can be constructed comprising all the well‐known laws of probability theory. This calculus can be interpreted in various ways. The present paper is a criticism of the subjective interpretation; that is to say, of any interpretation which assumes that probability expresses degrees of incomplete knowledge: a is the statement incompletely known, b is our total (...) knowledge, and p is the degree to which a is entailed by b. The subjective interpretation has often been proposed as an explanation and even a sharpening of the various objective theories . It is shown in the paper that this proposal cannot be realised because the subjective theory cannot lead to results which are compatible with the objective theory. This is due to various reasons, the most important of which is that the objective theory interprets » b « in » p « as a statement of the objective conditions of an experiment and » a « as one of its possible results. The subjective theory on the other hand interprets » b « as our total relevant knowledge which will in general include some knowledge of previous results of the experiment. It is shown that this must lead to incompatibility owing to the fact that this knowledge of previous results must influence the value of the probability.It is shown, in this way, that any probabilistic theory of the process of learning from experience—that is to say, any probabilistic theory of induction—must lead to contradictions.RésuméL'énoncé: » La probabilité de a, si b est donné, est égale à r « est ici exprimé symboliquement par » p = r «. On peut construire un système axiomatique formel qui contient toutes les règles bien connues du calcul des probabilités. Ce calcul formel peut ětre interprété de manières très différentes. L'article contient une critique des interprétations subjectives, c'est‐à‐dire des interprétations qui admettent que la probabilité exprime des degrés de connaissance incomplète: a est un énoncé qu'on ne connaǐt que partiellement, b est notre connaissance totale, et p exprime le degré auquel a est implicitement contenu dans b. L'interprétation subjective a souvent été proposée comme une explication et un renforcement des différentes théories objectives . Dans cet article, l'auteur montre que ce projet n'est pas réalisable, car la théorie subjective mène à des résultats qui contredisent la théorie objective. Plusieurs circonstances sont responsables de cette situation; la plus importante, c'est que la théorie interprète le » b « dans » p « comme une description des conditions objectives d'une expérience . D'autre part, la théorie subjective interprète » b « comme notre savoir total , et ce savoir inclura en général des informations sur les résultats obtenus antérieurement pour cette expérience. L'auteur montre que ce fait conduit à une contradiction entre les deux interprétations, car cette connaissance doit avoir une influence sur la valeur subjective de la probabilité.A l'aide de ce raisonnement, on peut montrer que la théorie des probabilités appliquée au processus inductif tirant une expérience du domaine expérimental conduit à des contradictions.ZusammenfassungDie Aussage » Die Wahrscheinlichkeit von a, wenn b gegeben ist, ist gleich r « wird hier symbolisch durch » p = r « ausgedrückt. Ein formales Axiomensystem kann konstruiert werden, das alle die wohlbekannten Regeln der Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung enthält. Dieser formale Kalkül kann in sehr verschiedener Weise interpretiert werden. Der Artikel enthält eine Kritik der subjektiven Interpretationen; das heisst, jener Interpretationen die annehmen, dass die Wahrscheinlichkeit Grade von unvollständigem Wissen ausdrückt: a ist ein Satz der unvollständig gewusst wird, b ist unser Gesamtwissen, und p drückt den Grad aus zu dem a in b implizit enthalten ist. Die subjektive Interpretation wurde oft als eine Erklärung und Verschärfung der verschiedenen objektiven Theorien vorgeschlagen. In dem Artikel wird gezeigt, dass der Vorschlag undurchführbar ist, da die subjektive Theorie zu Resultaten führt, die der objektiven Theorie widersprechen. Verschiedene Umstände tragen zu dieser Situation bei. Der wichtigste dieser Umstände ist, dass die objektive Theorie das » b « in » p « als eine Beschreibung der objektiven Bedingungen eines Experimentes interpretiert . Andererseits interpretiert die subjektive Theorie » b « als unser Gesamtwissen , und dieses wird im allgemeinen Informationen bezüglich früherer Resultate dieses Experiments einschliessen. Es wird gezeigt, dass das zu einem Widerspruch zwischen den Interpretationen führt, da dieses Wissen Einfluss auf den subjektiven Wahrscheinlichkeitswert haben muss.Mit Hilfe dieses Gedankenganges wird gezeigt, dass die Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie des induktiven Lernens aus der Erfahrung zu Widersprüchen führt. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:"Magic Buffalo" and Berkeley's Theory ofVision: Learning in Society David M. Levy Introduction Berkeley's Theory of Vision contains the remarkable claim that the perception ofdistance is learned by experience. This thesis is rooted in Berkeley's doctrine that the physical basic of optical perception is angular. An impression of angle? impacts upon the optic nerve. The interpretative problem confronting an individual is that of reconstructing two pieces ofinformation, distance d (...) and magnitude m, from one datum T. Let the ratio ofm/d form arctan T. How do we come to distinguish between the pair m1,d1 and the pair m2,d2 when m^d 1 = m2/d2? How do we distinguish big objects at a distance from small objects up close? The evidence Berkeley provides for this thesis is of a funny sort. He gives examples that we do, in fact, distinguish large distant objects from small near objects. Since the arctan of the pair m1, d 1 is by hypothesisthe sameas thatofthepairm2, d2thenrecognizingdistance must be alearned abihty. We cannotextractd and m from? alone. The proper interpretation ofBerkeley's philosophy ofscience is a matter of considerable debate.1 Nonetheless, as a working theorist of visual perception he is afairly simple-minded falsificationist. Here is what he says: find a person born blind who comes by surgery to see. If that person can distinguish at a glance big distant objects from small near objects, 111 amend my theory.2 The literature on Berkeley's Theory ofVision can be fairly said to bifurcate between those who "see" the argument and those who don't. Berkeley's most important eighteenth century disciple, Adam Smith, extended Berkeley's teaching to encompass the remarkable claim that we learn to perceive our economic interest (Levy 1992a, 1992b). The negative reaction to Berkeley's theory starts in 1842 with Samuel Bailey who pronounced himself mystified by the very claim that we learn to perceive distance. The debate between Bailey and John Stuart Mill, a debate which has twentieth century counterparts, has all the characteristics ofpeople talking past each other. Volume XLX Number 1 223 DAVID M. LEVY The missing social dimension The problem, as I see it, with Berkeley's proposed critical test—stipulating his own doctrine—is that a blind person would grow up in a sighted community. Perhaps, if he grew up in a blind community, and most of the community became sighted at the same time he did, all the community might be able to perceive distance. The problem with Berkeley's test is that ifhe himself is correct about the importance ofheuristics in making the visual distinctions, the fate of one individual is somewhat beside the point. One individual surely cannot create the necessary heuristics. This learning requires some evolutionary social process. Thus, while Berkeley's thesis requires some claim about some verybasicsocial epistemology(Fuller 1988), his proposed test, asking about a blind person growing up in a community silently presumed to be sighted, does not take into account the social dimension oflearning. Having said this, it is easy to think ofa better test for Berkeley's theoryofvision. Let us find an entire community where life takes place without the visual perception of great distance. Take any individual from this community and ask Berkeleian questions. Now, we know the answer becausejust such a dialogue was reported thirtyyears ago. One society which fulfils the test criterion is that ofthe BaMbuti people who lived their life in a very dense African forest. The American anthropologist Colin Turnbull took his friend from the BaMbuti, Kenge, to the top of a hill. Here is TurnbuH's famous report: Then he saw the buffalo, still grazing lazily several miles away, far downbelow. He turned to me and said, "Whatinsects are those?" At first I hardly understood; then I realized that in the forest the range of vision is so limited that there is no great need to make an automatic allowance for distance when judging size. Out here in the plains, however, Kenge was looking for the first time Over apparently unending miles of unfamiliar grasslands, with not a tree worth the name to give him any basis for comparison. The same thing happened later on... (shrink)

Given the wide range of mythical/occult lore, stage legerdemain, and popular fantasy-based fictional stereotypes that have long been associated with the term magic in human culture, it is quite possible that some academically-minded readers may initially be put off by the title of this book. But these are not the kinds of magic that Dean Radin is talking about. Rather, he is subtly alluding to a certain class of seemingly extraordinary human experiences and abilities for which the exact underlying physical (...) and biological mechanisms are not too well understood as of yet – namely, the experiences and abilities that may be classed as psychic (or psi). He focuses on examining three general sub-classes which, in keeping with the theme of this book, are labeled in the parlance of magic: force of will (referring to psychokinesis, aka. mind-matter interaction), divination (referring to extrasensory perception), and theurgy (referring to experiences related to survival after death). Yet even with such clarification being made from the outset, there might still be readers who would wonder whether it is even a good idea to discuss psi phenomena in conjunction with magic, as some parapsychologists may be reminded of the effort once made by psychologist (and noted skeptic) James Alcock (1981) to portray an association between the two as being something fanciful and not fitting with the pursuit of science in his book Parapsychology: Science or Magic? Arguing on the basis of its seeming incompatibility with mainstream science, Alcock implied that psi is something that could be seen as being akin to occult conjuring, where one is able to spontaneously gain certain knowledge or mentally bring about certain event outcomes at will, without any apparent logic or reason. And as psychologist and psi researcher John Palmer (1983) had pointed out in his critical review of the book, Alcock even went on to imply that parapsychologists tend to act more like occult magicians than scientists, claiming that they are motivated by a predisposed belief in psi rather than an objective search for facts and data-driven theory. In light of such blatant accusations being made in the past, one might figure that parapsychologists would be wary of their subject matter being discussed or referred to in relation to magic again, in any shape or form. (shrink)

A theoretical framework called "Quantum Brain Dynamics" to describe long range ordered dynamics of the quantum system of electromagnetic field and water dipole field in the brain is proposed as a revival of the original idea developed by Umezawa in the early 1960s. Based on Umezawa’s world view of quantum field theory, the manifestation of long range ordered dynamics is a macroscopic object of quantum origin, and so it reveals the existence of specific macroscopic objects in the brain called (...) "tunneling photon water." Tunneling photon water is shown to manifest several interesting quantum phenomena involving coherent photon emission and transmission, and is suggested to play an important role in quantum brain dynamics. The ordered quantum dynamics of such a macroscopic condensate of tunneling photons with nonvanishing effective charge and mass as tunneling photon water is governed by the macroscopic Schrödinger equation, and ensures superconducting phenomena in the brain at body temperature. The meaning of quantum brain dynamics is clearly explained for brain and cognitive scientists who have been confused by either the overstatement with misplaced quantum concepts usually given by those not appropriately schooled in physics or the understatement with textbook quantum concepts given by technical physicists. (shrink)

David Lewis' objection to a generic theory of modality which he calls ‘magical ersatzism’ is that its linchpin, a relation he calls ‘selection’, must be either an internal or an external relation, and that this is unintelligible either way. But the problem he points out with classifying selection as internal is really just an instance of the general problem of how we manage to grasp underdetermined predicates, is not peculiar to magical ersatzism, and is amenable to some familiar (...) solutions. He provides no compelling grounds for thinking that classifying selection as external is unintelligible, and his argument has a false presupposition. I conclude that magical ersatzism is still a viable option in the metaphysics of modality. (shrink)

Can the totality of consciousness be found within the waking state? Can human consciousness be understood in its entirety by only considering the contents presented to us in the waking state? Why is the waking state so privileged? -/- This treatise from Indian author D.B. Gangolli presents the tri-basic method or the method of the three states of consciousness as the principle device or strategy employed in the science of Advaita Vedanta for arriving at knowledge and understanding of Ultimate Reality (...) as expounded in the Upanishadic tradition. This tri-basic method of wisdom inquiry into Pure Consciousness is contrasted with the pervasive mono-basic or waking-state-only method of inquiry common to science, western, and most other philosophical systems wherein explication of the Ultimate Reality is sought solely within waking consciousness. -/- The tri-basic method of the Advaita system takes waking consciousness as only one of three great states of conscious awareness within Intuition or Intuitive experience, the other two being dreaming and sleeping (deep sleep) states. Instead of privileging the waking state, the tri-basic method views all three states from the viewpoint of Intuition and sets about to inquire into the whole of conscious experience giving equal importance to all three states. It helps us to recognize how we are taught to see waking consciousness as predominant, as the sole perspective from within which we discover knowledge of truth and reality, and to see the limitations of the truncated view of consciousness that it is. -/- Advaita Vedanta is the only philosophical system that consciously inquires within all three great states of consciousness in order for the discrimination of Ultimate Reality. “To observe these states and discriminate about them means whatever is witnessed in the states – all that is to be taken en masse (rolled up into one mass) and is to be made an object to one’s Intuition, i.e., the essence of Being as the Witness or the Self, and then discriminate.” . (shrink)

The contemporary discourse on disgust takes place in a “nature-culture” debate where it is considered as a basic instinct that is nonetheless uniquely human. Herein, disgust is usually defined as an aversive, real emotion that always has a “core”, automatic physical element, which can then also be taken up onto a more abstract, moral plane. Disgust, thus considered, is often unavoidable on the “physical” level, but avoidable and damaging on the “symbolic” level. This project aims to critique some key presuppositions (...) in the contemporary discourse by invoking some psychoanalytic and phenomenological insights. With Freud one will see that disgust is not just an emotion – it is also, in fact, a basic psychical mechanism that constitutes human character as such, but also often runs the risk of leading to many psychopathologies, both individual and social. With Kolnai, disgust is not simply “aversive” but on the contrary has a complex nature wherein human consciousness is both repelled and attracted by the revolting object. And with Sartre, for disgust to be “real”, the role of the imaginary must always already be at work. Ultimately such analyses, by using disgust as a case study, will inform us with regard to the general nature of the emotions and the role of the imaginary therein, meaning a rather novel theory of the latter two may be developed and then practically applied to various individual and social psychical phenomena. (shrink)

David Lewis' objection to a generic theory of modality which he calls ‘magical ersatzism’ is that its linchpin, a relation he calls ‘selection’, must be either an internal or an external relation, and that this is unintelligible either way. But the problem he points out with classifying selection as internal is really just an instance of the general problem of how we manage to grasp underdetermined predicates, is not peculiar to magical ersatzism, and is amenable to some familiar (...) solutions. He provides no compelling grounds for thinking that classifying selection as external is unintelligible, and his argument has a false presupposition. I conclude that magical ersatzism is still a viable option in the metaphysics of modality. (shrink)

I present a detailed ethnographic study of magic and divination of the Nuosu people in southwest China and offer a cognitive account of the surprising prevalence of these objectively ineffective practices in a society that has ample access to modern technology and mainstream Han culture. I argue that in the belief system of the Nuosu, ghosts, divination, and magical healing rituals form a closely interconnected web that gives sense and meaning to otherwise puzzling practices, and such a belief system (...) is importantly supported and reinforced by individual’s everyday experiences. Contemporary Nuosu people overwhelmingly treat these practices as instruments for achieving specific ends and often entertain considerable uncertainty regarding their efficacy, which may be overestimated for a number of reasons, including the following: (1) the intuitive plausibility of divination for ghost identification and exorcist rituals is enhanced by the belief in the existence of ghosts as a result of abductive reasoning, (2) negative instances (divinatory or healing ritual failures) are underreported, and (3) people’s misperception of the probability of uncertain events’ occurrence often prevents them from realizing that the efficacies of magical/divinatory practices do not outperform chance. I conclude with some comments on the generalizability of the psychological and social mechanisms discussed. (shrink)

The task of this paper is to gather together Guattari’s scattered references to magic, from Chaosmosis and Schizoanalytic Cartographies, and to reconstitute his position, using animism as a guide. For magic is a bulwark against positioning schizoanalysis as another specialism, and in maintaining what Guattari called its ‘eccentric’ relation to professional psychotherapeutic practices. Magic serves Guattari as an antidote to the scientific schemas that dominate psychoanalysis and psychology. Guattari’s effort to reanimate magic as a viable reference within schizoanalysis flies in (...) the face of the ‘ideal of scientificity’. Whereas animism served Guattari’s decentring of subjectivity from the human individual, and his critique of the prevailing dichotomies of subject/object, human/nature, sign/real, to bring magic into play in schizoanalysis is to open it to ethno-psychiatric investigations of sorcery, as well as neo-pagan ecosophy. Magic is indispensable for understanding contemporary assemblages of enunciation, as it exists concurrently with the very forces that would try to banish it, as well as those which would attempt to exploit it for fascistic purposes. (shrink)

If the property _being a methane molecule_ is a universal, then it is a structural universal: objects instantiate _being a methane molecule_ just in case they have the right sorts of proper parts arranged in the right sort of way. Lewis argued that there can be no satisfactory account of structural universals; in this paper I provide a satisfactory account.

Aquinas famously argues that there exists a purely active intellective power—i.e., the agent intellect—in each human agent that is capable of “abstracting” universals, including natures, from sensible phantasms. Robert Pasnau has worried, however, that Aquinas’s thin account of how the agent intellect performs abstraction makes abstraction appear to be little short of “magic.” In this paper I reply to Pasnau’s objection by arguing for the necessity of expanding the standard account of Aquinas’s theory to include the oft-neglected role of the (...) so-called “interior sense powers,” in particular memory and the cogitative power, in his epistemology. I argue that for Aquinas memory and the cogitative power, operat­ing in close cooperation with intellect, are responsible for bridging the ontological and epistemological divide between sensation of the singular and intellection of the universal by producing the pre-intellective, quasi-knowledge of experience (experimentum), which is propaedeutic to abstraction. (shrink)

David Lewis’s arguments against magical ersatzism are notoriously puzzling. Untangling different strands in those arguments is useful for bringing out what he thought was wrong with not just one style of theory about possible worlds, but with much of the contemporary metaphysics of abstract objects. After setting out what I take Lewis’s arguments to be and how best to resist them, I consider the application of those arguments to general theories of properties and relations. The constraints Lewis motivates (...) turn out to yield an argument for concretism about possible individuals that is quite different from the better-known Lewisian arguments for that position. The discussion also touches on the puzzling question of whether things are the way they are because of the properties they have, or are the properties and relations the way they are because of the things that have them. (shrink)

FEATURED IN EVENTAL AESTHETICS RETROSPECTIVE 1. LOOKING BACK AT 10 ISSUES OF EVENTAL AESTHETICS. In this article I ask: how to rescue “magical thinking” (a notion I inherit from Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno) in and from Hegel and imagine its possibilities for posthuman society, ethics, and aesthetics? To address this question, I read Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit through Horkheimer and Adorno, who argue that Enlightenment’s program is “the disenchantment of the world”: with the end of magical thinking (...) and the beginning of enlightened thinking came chasm and disparity between subject and object and, for Horkheimer and Adorno, the onset of barbarism. Hegel himself speaks directly to the danger of failed recognition between two consciousnesses, a failure followed by a duel to the death, in which the two figures leave each other indifferently, like things. After reading a distinctly “magical thinking” into the shape of Hegel’s dialectic, I show how contemporary posthumanism and ecopoetics make use of Hegel’s thought in order to reimagine subject-object relations in and as response to ecological crisis. I discuss how Donna Haraway, following in the traditions of Hegel and Adorno, magically thinks her way toward new models for relating more ethically (to borrow Haraway’s own terminology) to human and other-than-human others in the new century. Then, I look at how such models are being adapted in and by aesthetic practice — specifically, in the experimental ecopoetics of contemporary poet Brenda Hillman. In the end, I argue that contemporary posthumanisms and ecopoetics in fact need magical thinking in order to begin reimagining the social and the ecological and resuscitate a devastatingly enlightened world. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The imagination has always been thought to operate primarily in conjunction with the sense of vision, imagined objects and scenes being conjured up before the ‘mind’s eye’. In early nineteenth-century Scotland the natural philosopher David Brewster developed a theory of the imagination that explained its operation through a reversal of the normal processes of visual perception. These ideas were rooted in the mental philosophy of the eighteenth-century Scottish Enlightenment. For Brewster the mind’s eye was also the eye of (...) the body, and images from the memory and imagination were projected onto the retina in the same manner that images were projected onto the screen in a magic lantern show. This theory underpinned his belief that imagination played an essential role in scientific discovery. Brewster believed that this process was as essential to the discoveries of science as it was to the creation of great poetry. The writings of Brewster can tell us a great deal about the connections between science and literature in the early nineteenth century, as well as showing that the philosophy of science in contemporary Britain was far from monolithic. (shrink)

Very soon after I began working on the identity of magic-workers in classical antiquity, I realized that it was necessary to come to terms with a thesis about depictions of erotic magic-working in Greek and Roman literature. It asserted that male writers engaged in a systematic misrepresentation of the realities of magic-working in portraying erotic magic as an exclusively female preserve; the reality was that men were the main participants in this form of magic-working. The thesis is based on the (...) supposition that the truth about erotic magic and the people who performed it is to be found in the formularies or spell-books preserved in papyrus and in defixiones. These two sources of information are said to show us that erotic magic was performed by men and not by the women who are the persons depicted engaging in love-magic in literature. The scholar who first presented the thesis was the late John Winkler. A version of it is to be found in Fritz Graf's general account of Greek and Roman magic. There is agreement over what are taken to be the facts, but views diverge over their interpretation. Winkler appeals to the Freudian notion of denial and transference to offer an explanation not only of the discrepancy between life and literature, but of what he took to be the belief held by the young men who cast erotic spells that the girls who were the objects of their spells were as sexually eager as they were: men, when overwhelmed by sexual desire for unattainable women, through a process of denial transfer that feeling to women, whether old or young, whom they fondly imagine suffer the same intense sexual longings as themselves. (shrink)

There is a growing trend in European countries for childbearing to occur later in women’s lives. The recent increase in the use of ART, together with the long-term trend towards later childbearing, raises questions as to the acceptable age of childbearing in contemporary society. ART legislation varies considerably across Europe and age limits for access to fertility treatment are rarely defined. The legislation takes into account the preferences of potential parents; children’s preferences, however, are not ascertained. The article discusses a (...) research method used in a survey of older children and young adults. The objective of the survey was to answer the following questions: What age would children prefer their parents to be if they could choose? What are their reasons? Respondents were asked the following question: “How old would you like your mother and father to be when you are 20 (version for respondents younger than 16) or 25 (version for those older than 16) if you could wave a magic wand?” Furthermore, their reasons for wishing a change were identified through an open question, “Why would you like to change the age of your parents?”. (shrink)

This paper considers how players of Magic: The Gathering (MTG) limited draft turn their acquired gameplay style or disposition (their MTG “gamer habitus”), with respect to drafting, into an object of knowledge. This is done in order to then consciously rework it, to respond to new formats and to the changing metagame. I will focus on a particular case study: how streamer Chord_O_Calls' instructional video shows his own re-evaluation of certain cards. Evidently, it is a process requiring reflexivity, although I (...) aim to be specific with regard to the particular “form of reflexivity” involved. I distribute this outward to the MTG “habit assemblage” (an ensemble of techniques, things, relations) and argue that any individual player's instantiation of this reflexivity involves a practice-based synthesis of paratexts from the MTG habit assemblage that is not codified but is shaped by the assemblage. This leads to a consideration of the “intelligence” and limits of not only particular habits but that of the MTG “habit assemblage” itself. I argue that the broader socio-technical significance of the form of reflexivity that is being proliferated here is one which is defined by its flexibility, by an attentional style of delayed and shifting categorization. (shrink)

It has always been a matter of curiosity what kind of information art, which is far from ordinary and untouchable, provides people. Confronting a person with an art object means looking at the window of a world different from the world of daily routines, with his head stuck out. We can describe this world as magical in a romantic way. This magic arises from the difference in the functioning of perception, interpretation and judgment processes, which the person confronted with (...) an art object has difficulty in explaining to himself from time to time. Because the acquisition of perception in the world of routines and the acquisition of perception from the art object are different in terms of the functioning of mental processes... (shrink)

In this article I discuss the 'procedural postulationist' view of mathematics advanced by Kit Fine in a recent paper. I argue that he has not shown that this view provides an avenue to knowledge of mathematical truths, at least if such truths are objective truths. In particular, more needs to be said about the criteria which constrain which types of entities can be postulated. I also argue that his reliance on second-order quantification means that his background logic is not free (...) of ontological commitment and that his doctrine of 'creative expansion' only makes sense from a radically anti-realist perspective. (shrink)

Although young children might be uncertain about the nature of certain representations, most modern adults would explicitly maintain that photographs have no ongoing physical connection the objects that they depict. We demonstrate here in three studies that destruction of a photograph of a sentimental object produces significantly more electrodermal activity than destruction of photographs of other control objects. This response is not attributable to anxiety about being observed whilst destroying the picture, nor is it entirely due to simple (...) visual association ‐ the same response occurs when the photograph does not resemble the object. We suggest that this effect may reflect a tacit acceptance of “sympathetic magic”. (shrink)

Can emancipatory, decolonial histories of science be extracted from objects collected from—or made visible to history by—the archives of colonialism? To answer this question, this essay presents the case study of a rhinoceros horn amulet (qarn al-khartit), an ethnographic object collected by the British anthropologist Winifred Blackman during her fieldwork in Egypt in the late 1920s. Markedly decentering the traditional colonial history of how the rhinoceros horn was collected and displayed as an object in European museums, the essay follows (...) the trail of the rhinoceros horn back to the site of its collection in Egypt to reveal a strikingly different story: one of non-Western histories of science/magic/medicine, gender, race, and enslavement, all set against the backdrop of Egypt’s imperial pursuits in East Africa. The essay proposes the method of decolonial materialism to “read” objects, like the rhinoceros horn, as archives of scientific knowledge otherwise. (shrink)

The article examines the first phase of the universalistic interpretations in Juri Lotman’s semiotics, which is characterized by holism and maximalism derived from the Saussurean cultural concept. There is an analysis of Juri Lotman’s 1967 lecture, previously unpublished, where universal status is accorded to text functions (including magic functions). Such an approach is a substantial revision of the Saussurean understandings of the relationship between language and speech. This interpretation of magic is compared with the examination of the same concept in (...) Juri Lotman’s 1981 article “Contract and self-sacrifice as archetypical cultural models”, which substantially contradicts the concept developed in his 1967 lecture. Both these magic models produce a number of objections, and apparently seem to bear the deforming traces of their respective universalistic theoretical schema. (shrink)

In 2008, the Musée des Beaux-Arts de Lyon acquired a painting called The Flight into Egypt which was attributed to the French artist Nicolas Poussin. Thought to have been painted in 1657, the painting had gone missing for more than three centuries. Several versions were rediscovered in the 1980s and one was passed from hand to hand, from a family who had no idea of its value to gallery owners and eventually to the museum. A painting that had been sold (...) as a decorative object in 1986 for around 12,000 euros was acquired two decades later by the Musée des Beaux-Arts de Lyon for 17 million euros. What does this remarkable story tell us about the nature of art and the way that it is valued? How is it that what seemed to be just an ordinary canvas could be transformed into a masterpiece, that a decorative object could become a national treasure? This is a story permeated by social magic the social alchemy that transforms lead into gold, the ordinary into the extraordinary, the profane into the sacred. Focusing on this extraordinary case, Bernard Lahire lays bare the beliefs and social processes that underpin the creation of a masterpiece. Like a detective piecing together the clues in an unsolved mystery he carefully reconstructs the steps that led from the same material object being treated as a copy of insignificant value to being endowed with the status of a highly-prized painting commanding a record-breaking price. He thereby shows that a painting is never just a painting, and is always more than a piece of stretched canvass to which brush strokes of paint have been applied: this object, and the value we attach to it, is also the product of a complex array of social processes – with its distinctive institutions and experts – that lies behind it. And through the history of this painting, Lahire uncovers some of the fundamental structures of our social world. For the social magic that can transform a painting from a simple copy into a masterpiece is similar to the social magic that is present throughout our societies, in economics and politics as much as art and religion, a magic that results from the spell cast by power on those who tacitly recognize its authority. By following the trail of a single work of art, Lahire interrogates the foundations on which our perceptions of value and our belief in institutions rest and exposes the forms of domination which lie hidden behind our admiration of works of art. (shrink)

This article contextualizes digital practices within architectural spaces, and explores the opportunities of experiencing and perceiving domestic environments with the use of media and computing technologies. It suggests methods for the design of reflexive and intimate interiors that provide informational, communicational, affective, emotional and supportive properties according to embedded sensorial interfaces and processing systems. To properly investigate these concepts, a fundamental criterion is magnified and dissected: dwelling, as an important ingredient in this relationship entails the magical power to merge (...) physical environment with the psyche of inhabitants. For this reason, a number of views are presented and discussed, providing necessary conditions to include matters of affectivity, ubiquity and layering complexity of interior space. Moreover, specific processes of the possibilities of the digital are mentioned, and examples are presented of the infusion and diffusion of ubiquitous computing technologies within domestic spaces. To briefly conclude, this article is an attempt to discuss the relationship of human-architecture-computer symbiosis and the design process of creative and innovative spaces that affect states of memory, perception, experience, as well as mood and emotion. (shrink)

Objective correlates—behavioral, functional, and neural—provide essential tools for the scientific study of consciousness. But reliance on these correlates should not lead to the ‘fallacy of misplaced objectivity’: the assumption that only objective properties should and can be accounted for objectively through science. Instead, what needs to be explained scientifically is what experience is intrinsically— its subjective properties—not just what we can do with it extrinsically. And it must be explained; otherwise the way experience feels would turn out to be (...) class='Hi'>magical rather than physical. We argue that it is possible to account for subjective properties objectively once we move beyond cognitive functions and realize what experience is and how it is structured. Drawing on integrated information theory, we show how an objective science of the subjective can account, in strictly physical terms, for both the essential properties of every experience and the specific properties that make particular experiences feel the way they do. (shrink)

Why is it that whenever a structural property is instantiated, its constituent properties are instantiated as well, by proper parts of the original object? By developing a suggestion from Lewis :25–46, 1986), Hawley :117–133, 2010) rises to this explanatory challenge by taking structural properties to be mereologically composed by their constituents, and by taking composition to be analogous to identity. However, setting up a plausible framework for composition and CAI claims about properties, I will argue that structural properties are not (...) identical to their constituents, at least not in any sense robust enough to warrant an Hawley-style argument—and perhaps not identical to them in any sense whatsoever. More generally, core principles of extensional mereology are in danger when applied to structural properties, which may force an extensionalist to either reconsider the application altogether, or reconsider mereological monism, thus granting the mereology of structural properties a peculiarly non-extensional status. Finally, although this debate has been traditionally framed as a debate about universals, an appeal to structural tropes can reconcile, at least to some extent, the mereology of structural properties with Lewisian extensional mereology— CAI included. (shrink)

This paper investigates the consequences of taking seriously the metaphysics of Object-Oriented Ontology, as defined by Graham Harman, in the field of literature. Acutely focusing on just one possible mobilisation and application of the theory, the essay deploys OOO to read two major writers of the late 20th century, Don DeLillo and Murakami Haruki, in novel configurations made possible by applying an Object-Oriented method to the genre of Magic Realism. Using this method, the essay unearths an unarticulated avenue for studying (...) the genre and these authors against established national, cultural, and canonical boundaries in literature, putting into conversation various literary traditions based on formal characteristics found in the texts through OOO’s metaphysics, and suggesting wholly untested paths for literary study in the wake of Object-Oriented philosophies. (shrink)

Global interests in bioethics have increased drastically since the end of 20th century. The reason for this should be ascribed to a broad application of molecular-genetic methods introduced in human bio-medicine. This has, in turn, produced an involvement and development of numerous inter-disciplines, which have started to apply bioethics as a part of their own subject of interest. This article presents more than a decade of experience of teaching bioethics in our country, particularly under the auspices of the National Com?mittee (...) for Bioethics of UNESCO-commission of Serbia. Globalni interes za bioetiku drasticno se povecao krajem dvadesetog stoleca, sto treba pripisati sirokoj primeni molekularno-genetickih metoda uvedenih u oblasti humane biomedicine. Ovo je dovelo do prikljucenja i razvitka brojnih interdisciplinarnih oblasti koje su bioetiku prihvatile kao deo svog opsega interesa. U ovom se clanku iznosi iskustvo dugo preko deset godina o primeni edukacije bioetike u nasoj zemlji, posebno u organizaciji i pod okriljem Nacionalnog komiteta za bioetiku UNESCO-ve komisije R. Srbije. (shrink)