Contraception works by preventing fertilization of an egg or preventing implantation of a fertilized embryo. For those who believe pregnancy begins at implantation, contraceptives preventing implantation are not abortifacient. However, for those who assert that pregnancy begins at fertilization, any agent causing the intentional loss of an embryo, even prior to implantation, is abortifacient, both morally and for lack of a different term to describe the postfertilization, preimplantation loss. In the debate on this topic, much of the discourse (...) on both sides wrongly focuses on the opposing side's perceived ignorance in denying scientifically proven definitions rather than on the substance of the conflict. Indeed, both sides accuse the other of prioritizing its “subjective” views over “objective” facts. In this essay, we unpack the scientific, cultural, and religious factors that underlie this debate. We argue that the only way to move forward is to clarify our terminology and engage with the substance of the argument, rather than merely the rhetoric. (shrink)

This study was conducted in 1985 in Asuncion, Paraguay, 6 years after the closure of the state supported family planning services. Data from national surveys in 1977 and 1987 permit a comparison of sources of contraceptive supplies before and after the elimination of government support for family planning. The purchase of pseudo-abortifacients from private pharmacies was used as an indication of induced abortion. After the loss of government clinics, it is suggested that some women turned to pharmacists to obtain pseudo-abortifacients (...) when faced with unwanted pregnancy. There is an indication of increased pseudo-abortifacient use, particularly among unmarried women and those from poorer neighbourhoods. (shrink)

In the highly contentious abortion arena, the new oral abortifacient technology RU486 is one among many actors. This article offers an arena analysis of the heterogeneous constructions of RU486 by various actors, including scientists, pharmaceutical compa nies, medical groups, antiabortion groups, women's health movement groups, and others who have produced situated knowledges. Conceptually, we find not only that the identity of the nonhuman actor-RU486 -is unstable and multiple but also that, in practice, there are other implicated actors—the downstream users (...) and consumers of the technology. If we try to follow all the actors, we find a fuller and more historicized arena, and, ironically, we too can be construed as implicated actors in it. (shrink)

Robert Card has proposed a reasonability view of conscientious objection that asks providers to state the reasons for their objection for evaluation and approval by a review board. Jason Marsh has challenged Card to provide explicit criteria for what makes a conscientious objection reasonable, which he claims will be too difficult a task given that such objections often involve contentious metaphysical or religious claims. Card has responded by outlining standards by which a conscientious objection could be judged reasonable. In this (...) paper, I extend Marsh’s critique to key concepts in the standards outlined by Card such as abortifacient, harm, emergency, and discrimination, showing they can be given radically different interpretations given different metaphysical or religious presumptions. To resolve these conflicting interpretations, a reasonability view of conscientious objection will need more than the criteria outlined by Card, it will need the resources to evaluate the reasonability of metaphysical or religious claims. (shrink)

‘When did I, a human person, begin to exist?’ In developing an answer to this question, I utilize a Thomistic framework, which holds that the human person is a composite of a biological organism and an intellective soul. Eric Olson and Norman Ford both argue that the beginning of an individual human biological organism occurs at the moment when implantation of the zygote in the uterus occurs and the ‘primitive streak’ begins to form. Prior to this point, there does not (...) exist an individual human organism, but a cluster of biological cells which has the potential to split and develop as one or more separate human organisms (identical twinning). Ensoulment (the instantiation of a human intellective soul in biological matter) does not occur until the point of implantation. This conception of the beginning of human personhood has moral implications concerning the status of pre‐implantation biological cell clusters. A new understanding of the beginning of human personhood entails a new understanding of the morality of certain medical procedures which have a direct affect on these cell clusters which contain human DNA. Such procedures discussed in this article are embryonic stem cell research, in vitro fertilization, procured abortion, and the use of abortifacient contraceptives. (shrink)

: On the grounds that rape is an act of violence, not a natural act of intercourse, Roman Catholic teaching traditionally has permitted women who have been raped to take steps to prevent pregnancy, while consistently prohibiting abortion even in the case of rape. Recent scientific evidence that emergency contraception (EC) works primarily by preventing ovulation, not by preventing implantation or by aborting implanted embryos, has led Church authorities to permit the use of EC drugs in the setting of rape. (...) Doubts about whether an abortifacient effect of EC drugs has been completely disproven have led to controversy within the Church about whether it is sufficient to determine that a woman is not pregnant before using EC drugs or whether one must establish that she has not recently ovulated. This article presents clinical, epidemiological, and ethical arguments why testing for pregnancy should be morally sufficient for a faith community that is strongly opposed to abortion. (shrink)

This essay offers a short overview of feminist history of science and introduces a new project into that history, namely feminist history of colonial science. My case study focuses on eighteenth-century voyages of scientific discovery and reveals how gender relations in Europe and the colonies honed selective collecting practices. Cultural, economic, and political trends discouraged the transfer from the New World to the Old of abortifacients.1.

Next SectionIt is commonly proposed that artifacts cannot be understood without reference to human intentions. This fact, I contend, has relevance to the use of artifacts in intentional action. I argue that because artifacts have intentions embedded into them antecedently, when we use artifacts we are sometimes compelled to intend descriptions of our actions that we might, for various reasons, be inclined to believe that we do not intend. I focus this argument to a specific set of artifacts, namely, medical (...) devices, before considering an extended application to emergency contraceptive devices. Although there is some debate about whether emergency contraception has an abortifacient effect, I argue that if there is an abortifacient effect, then the effect cannot normally be a side effect of one’s action. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 16.4 (2006) 379-396MuseSearchJournalsThis JournalContents[Access article in PDF]Pharmacists and Conscientious Objection *In March 2005, a Wisconsin pharmacist's act of conscience garnered headlines across the United States. After a married woman with four children submitted a prescription for the morning-after pill, the pharmacist, Neil Noesen, not only refused to fill it, but also refused to transfer the prescription to another pharmacist or to return the prescription (...) to the customer. As more such incidents occurred, many states "... decided to consider and enact laws setting the bounds of pharmacists' and other health care workers' professional obligations" (III, Grady 2006, p. 327). Discussions of objector legislation, also referred to as "conscience clauses," "refusal clauses," and "abandonment laws" (III, Appel 2005, p. 279), are not limited to professional ethics, but also draw from philosophical, theological, and legal perspectives. The purpose of this Scope Note is to present a wide variety of viewpoints on the health provider's right to conscience.More than 40 years ago the development of "The Pill" as the first reliable method of birth control not only ushered in a feminist revolution, but also provided a new focus for concerns of conscience for those who were part of the anti-abortion movement based on religious belief in the sanctity of life. Similarly, in the past ten years, worldwide, and seven years (1999) since the emergency contraception "morning after" pill first became available as a prescription item, there has been an upsurge in the number of medical personnel who refuse to prescribe or dispense it on grounds of personal conscience, whether for religious reasons or not. Their actions bring into play issues of power and control for health care personnel and for patients—in this case women, which also raises women's rights issues. Ironically, studies in France, Sweden, and the United Kingdom have shown that emergency contraception does not reduce the abortion rate—it is too infrequently used (II, Glasier 2006).It is important to underline the difference between the "morning-after" pill or "Plan B," which is made up of two progestin pills containing levonorgestrel (a synthetic derivative of the female hormone progesterone), and RU-486 (Mifiprex [End Page 379] or mifipristone with misoprostol). Plan B, if taken within 72 hours post-coitus prevents implantation, and therefore pregnancy, by suppressing the output of luteinizing hormone, the hormone that triggers the ovulation process. Scientists have been unable to determine whether this action could destroy already fertilized eggs, but even if it does, it uses the same mechanism as occurs with the birth-control pill, that was developed some 45 years ago. By contrast, RU-486 acts up to 49 days after implantation by blocking the action of progesterone in order to terminate the pregnancy and as such is an abortifacient (II, US FDA 1).On 24 August 2006, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration announced approval of the Plan B pill for over-the-counter (OTC ) sales (II, US FDA 2). Although this action makes the drug more widely available, it remains to be seen whether pharmacists who are conscientious objectors and who refuse to dispense it also will refuse to provide it OTC.A survey article by Rebecca Dresser (II, 2005, p. 9) succinctly sums up the problem for conscientious objectors: "Because emergency contraception can act to block implantation of a fertilized egg, people who believe in protection of human life after conception find it morally objectionable."When conscientious objections are raised over abortion or birth control services performed, prescribed, or dispensed, they affect not only the health professionals—physicians, pharmacists, nurses, and health technicians—who may object, as well as their colleagues and/or managers, but also the consumers: the female patients who are then forced to reconsider or to seek an alternative supplier, as well as their spouses or partners. Alta Charo (II, 2005, p. 2473) makes the point that the patient needs to have access to a system of counseling and referral "so... (shrink)

This is a condensed description of the contents and overarching argument found in Hippocrates’ Oath and Asclepius’ Snake: The Birth of the Medical Profession. In that work, I maintain that the basic medical ethical problem concerns iatrogenic harm. I focus particularly on what I refer to as ‘role-conflation’. This most egregious form of iatrogenic harm occurs when a physician deliberately adopts the role of wounder. A contemporary practice such as physician-assisted suicide exemplifies a doctor’s deliberate wounding. I argue that the (...) author of the Hippocratic Oath – aware of the chronic risk of role-conflation – responds to this threat by having the oath-taker specifically forswear signal acts that wound the sick, such as giving a deadly drug even if asked, giving an abortifacient, sexual predation, and gossiping. I argue that by means of the Oath, Hippocrates founds medicine as a profession, a practice intimately involving promising. (shrink)

A fetus may survive an intentional interference with its intrauterine environment (1) if gestational age is mistaken and the procedure of induced abortion does not kill the fetus, (2) if a change of heart takes place after abortifacient drugs are taken and the abortion does not proceed, and (3) if a high-multiple pregnancy is reduced to a singleton or a twin pregnancy to improve the likelihood that the remaining fetuses will reach viability. In each case, through cause or coincidence, (...) an abnormal baby may be born. The well-intentioned physician, responding to a patient's medical or psychological needs, risks a legal action in negligence or assault brought by a deformed surviving child. This hazard means that medical termination of pregnancy and selective pregnancy reduction put the practising physician at substantial risk in a way not usually associated with induced abortion. (shrink)

The article titled The pearl of the ‘Pro-Life’ movement? Reflections on the Kermit Gosnell controversy is a thoughtful piece in which the author raises some important questions, including those impinging on the motivations and apparent inconsistencies of the more vocal officials of the more visible segments of a vast and somewhat diverse grass-roots social uprising.1The pro-life movement has indeed showcased the Gosnell trial, but not because many of its members actually believe that gestational age is a morally relevant criterion. In (...) fact, there is probably a nearly uniform desideratum among the most influential groups to abolish all induced abortion from the first moment of conception, even if that goal logically also requires a ban on all potentially abortifacient contraceptives .2 Even the umbrella National Right to Life Committee with its 50 state affiliates, many of which have been criticised for their incremental approach to ending elective abortion,3 holds that ‘a new individual human being begins at fertilisation, when the sperm and ovum meet to form a single cell.’4 There is no practical necessity to split temporal or geographical hairs about when or how far the sperm must enter the ovum for formal union to occur, because the process is virtually inexorable once it starts, and is, thence, confined to a short span of time and space.Nor are the pro-life leaders being ‘disingenuous’ in their focal interest on this particular case. The underlying motivation is not to go delving for a mere ‘pearl’ , but rather to dive into some deep metaphysical waters about the …. (shrink)

This paper is about a drug called misoprostol and its controversial clinical and social lives. Although originally developed as a prevention for gastric ulcers, in the 1980s, it developed an off-label reputation as an abortifacient. The drug’s association with clandestine abortion has profoundly shaped its social life as a marginal and suspect character in the realm of global maternal and reproductive health where it has the potential to prevent two major causes of maternal death––postpartum hemorrhage and unsafe abortion. The (...) social life of misoprostol has also been shaped by the question of authoritative practice, that is, the question of who can deliver medicine. Both issues are about the specters of misuse of misoprostol: off-label, illegal, immoral, or by unlicensed providers. In this paper, I focus ethnographically on two women’s health nongovernmental organizations that have been conducting clinical testing and advocacy for the use of misoprostol for reproductive indications in global maternal health settings. Drawing on the notions of pharmaceutical activism and protocol feminism, I describe and analyze how the tools of evidence and authoritative practice have been reassembled in new networks of expertise toward the social justice goals of life, access, and dignity for women. (shrink)

Whether levonorgestrel taken as an emergency contraceptive has an abortifacient effect is a matter of great importance for Catholic bioethics. While many have argued that LNG-EC does not have a postovulatory effect, a recent literature review has convincingly established that inhibition of ovulation cannot account for all of the pregnancy reduction observed in clinical settings among those who take LNG-EC. This essay proposes a secondary mechanism of action of LNG-EC that is postovulatory but prefertilization; it argues that LNG-EC may (...) act in a contraceptive fashion by interfering with transport of the ovum to the site of fertilization in the timely fashion needed for reproductive success. While this mechanism of action cannot be established with the moral certitude required of these matters of life and death, further research may validate this mechanism beyond a reasonable doubt. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 14.2 : 235–244. (shrink)

After the US Supreme Court’s reversal of Roe v. Wade, a number of states have immediately banned abortion. Pro-choice activists are responding by promoting medication abortions – a do-it-yourself form of abortion. Women can take pills at home to induce an abortion in the first few weeks of pregnancy. -/- The Biden Administration [1] has backed the abortion pill, too. Attorney-General Merrick B. Garland and Health and Human Services Secretary Xavier Becerra both issued statements endorsing it. -/- “We stand ready (...) to work with other arms of the federal government that seek to use their lawful authorities to protect and preserve access to reproductive care,” said the Attorney-General. “In particular, the F.D.A. has approved the use of the medication mifepristone. States may not ban mifepristone based on disagreement with the F.D.A.’s expert judgment about its safety and efficacy.” -/- As the New York Times [1] has noted, this sets the scene for legal battles. The obvious one is: will anti-abortion states prosecute medication abortions? -/- But – based on experience in the United Kingdom - the use of the abortion pill could give pro-life doctors headaches as well. -/- In the past year, UK has witnessed the saga of two Catholic doctors who have been brought in front of the professional regulator, the General Medical Council, after accusations of professional misconduct. Their crime? They had supplied abortion pill reversal (APR) treatment to women. Accusations of this misconduct have been brought forward by pro-choice organisations [2]. -/- The problem is that some women might panic when they discover that they are pregnant or are pressured to make a rash decision. They obtain abortion pills, often without seeing a doctor faceto- face, and soon after taking the first pill, they regret their decision. -/- Is it too late for them to save their pregnancy? Not necessarily. -/- A treatment developed in the US works about half the time. It involves the woman taking progesterone after the first abortion pill to counteract the abortifacient action of the drug. -/- Seventy-three women in the UK are reported to have taken a full APR course, of whom, 38 – more than half — successfully remained pregnant. Admittedly, the procedure is controversial [3], with pro-choice writers denouncing it as unproven, unscientific, and unethical. This has triggered some healthcare practitioners and scholars to analyse the commitments of the pro-choice movement to APR. In a recently published paper in The New Bioethics [4], two colleagues, Dominic Whitehouse and Steven Bow, and I argue that those espousing a pro-choice worldview should actually support abortion pill reversal and that the current evidence indicates that they should actually be doing it. -/- While some pro-choice activists might be happy simply to expand women’s reproductive choices, some might also want to ensure that these choices are safe and effective at achieving the desired outcome, which in principle includes maintaining a pregnancy. -/- We then review the scientific evidence with respect to the ability of APR to halt an abortion, look at the potential impact of APR on mental health, as well as its procedural safety. While highlighting that gold-standard evidence is lacking, we note that APR is associated with about two times higher rate of embryo survival compared to not completing the full early medical abortion course, that there is large agreement in the literature that women who are ambiguous about abortion are at risk of poorer mental health outcomes after abortion (and argue that women who request APR fall into this category), and highlight that there is no evidence that APR is more dangerous than abandoning an initiated early medical abortion. -/- The latter fact is important, as the results of the only randomised-controlled trial of APR have been at times misrepresented in the media [5.6], creating the impression that APR is not safe while most of the adverse effects occurred in the study group that did not receive APR. As our paper argues, with respect to APR the two UK doctors were “champions of women’s choice and should be congratulated, not condemned, by pro-choice advocates”. -/- While the cases against the two doctors have now been dropped (and there have even been accusations against a member of one of these pro-choice organisations that they pressurised a patient into complaining about one of the doctors and twisted the patient’s experience of the treatment [7]), we argue that it is important to set-up systems to facilitate the future provision of APR to protect both patients and healthcare staff. -/- Our conclusion is that, while being open to any change in evidence, those espousing a pro-choice outlook should “support calls for an APR framework that will protect women and the healthcare professionals caring for them” “and certainly not oppose” APR. -/- The debate over abortion pill reversal will be heading to the United States soon. It is quite possible that it will be denounced as dangerous misinformation. It’s not. But pro-life defenders should be prepared to defend their ground. -/- This article was first published by Mercatornet. (shrink)

: This essay offers a short overview of feminist history of science and introduces a new project into that history, namely feminist history of colonial science. My case study focuses on eighteenth-century voyages of scientific discovery and reveals how gender relations in Europe and the colonies honed selective collecting practices. Cultural, economic, and political trends discouraged the transfer from the New World to the Old of abortifacients (widely used by Amerindian and African women in the West Indies).1.

In July 2019, Stella Creasy MP and her team succeeded in attaching an amendment to a largely administrative bill which would require the UK government to liberalise abortion laws in Northern Ireland by 21 October 2019, provided the Northern Ireland government does not resume before that date.1 The amendment succeeded in the Commons, 332 votes to 99 and later, with some adjustments, in the Lords, 182 votes to 37. The Bill received Royal Assent on 24 July 2019. In Northern Ireland, (...) abortion remains a criminal offence punishable by up to life imprisonment in all except exceptional circumstances, that is, where it is ‘necessary to preserve the life of the woman’ or where there is a ‘risk of serious adverse effect which is either long term or permanent’.2 The law makes no provision for women who are pregnant as a result of rape, incest or in the case of fatal fetal abnormality. Because there is a lack of clarity around which circumstances or conditions would have a sufficiently ‘serious and long-term adverse effect’, it has been argued that the law has had a ‘chilling effect’ on service provision.3 As a result, only 13 abortions were performed in Northern Ireland in 2018/2019.4 Instead, more than 1000 women travelled from Northern Ireland to England to access legal abortion services.5 A recent review of the law in Northern Ireland concluded that this situation disadvantages women who cannot afford to or are unable to travel.3 Women are also reportedly purchasing abortifacients unlawfully online, exposing them to the risk of prosecution as well as to risks where the pills are unsafe or lead to complications. Creasey’s amendment requires the Secretary of State for …. (shrink)

Dignitas personae has garnered significant attention both inside and outside Roman Catholic circles, but it lacks the argumentative force not only to present the Church’s ethical judgment but also to persuade non-sympathetic readers. More direct engagement with contrary views would provide a stronger foundation for constructing arguments in public discourse. This article highlights various assertions found in Dignitas personae which call for greater explicit argumentation. Subjects treated include the ontological and moral status of human embryos, prenatal adoption, potentially abortifacient (...) contraceptives, reproductive cloning, and alternatives to human embryonic stem cell research, such as induced pluripotent stem cells and animal–human chimeras. (shrink)

Researches over many years have examined whether levonorgestrel emergency contraception has a postfertilization effect. In a recent article in the Catholic Health Association’s journal Health Progress, Sandra Reznik, MD, asserts that “levonorgestrel acts to prevent pregnancy before, and only before, fertilization occurs.” A companion article by Ron Hamel, PhD, argues for the moral certainty that Plan B is not an abortifacient. Reznik fails to address the principal model supporting a potential postfertil­ization mechanism of action, specifically, that preovulatory administration of (...) levonorgestrel disrupts the delicate ratio of estrogen and progesterone essential to healthy endometrial development and induces the equivalent of luteal phase insufficiency, thereby jeopardizing implantation. Hamel’s argument for moral certitude is similarly inadequate. This article critically reviews both articles and the sources on which they rely. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 10.4 : 741–772. (shrink)