The writings of the Scottish physician and philosopher John Gregory play an important role in the modern codification of medical ethics. It is therefore appropriate to use his work as a historical example in approaching the question how elements of aesthetics were incorporated in 18th century medical ethics. The concept of a Gentleman is pivotal to the entire medical ethics of John Gregory as it provides him with the ethical source of the duty to patients. Gregory makes the trustworthiness of (...) the physician a central point of his medical ethics, and it is in this context that Gregory declares good manners as an essential moral quality of a physician. This paper delineates how good manners are ethically justified in Gregory's medical ethics and concludes with an exploration of the importance of Gregory's conception for present day reflection on the inherence of aesthetics in ethical determinations. (shrink)

That the Vergilian commentary by Aelius Donatus – one of the most influential late-antique commentaries that have not survived – was extant in the ninth century and available to some Carolingian scholars is still a widespread belief. The evidence in support of this thesis is said to have been provided by the Harvard Servianist J. J. H. Savage in three articles published between 1925 and 1931. In these articles, Savage claimed that a few marginal notes in one of the ninth-century (...) primary witnesses to the DS scholia, the so-called ‘Vergil of Tours’ (Bern, Burgerbibliothek, Ms. 165), were drawn almost directly from Donatus’ commentary and that a marginal note in a roughly coeval Servian witness (Bern, Burgerbibliothek, Ms. 363) provided information about a place where a copy of the commentary could be found. A re-examination of the two manuscripts shows that the evidence adduced by Savage does not stand scrutiny and that the terminus post quem for the loss of Donatus’ commentary should be antedated by at least one century. (shrink)

Leucippo -- Democrito -- Nessa -- Metrodoro di Chio -- Diogene di Smirne -- Anassarco -- Ecateo di Abdera -- Apollodoro -- Nausifane -- Diotimo -- Bione di Abdera -- Bolo.

Preyer and Krausse’s Sociology on Next Society proposes a new perspective on interpreting the global society of the future. In these Notes, the author discusses some of the key points of the volume. The paradigm shift in the sciences is often introduced by the creation of a new language, a new view of the relationship between words and things. The question is whether this semantic and epistemological feature also characterizes the approach proposed by Preyer and Krausse. The sociology of the (...) Next Society – observes the author – is in fact the latest attempt to get rid of the sociology of social systems based on the analogy between society and living organism. This attempt has been underway for at least 50 years and this volume constitutes the final result. In reality, it is a question of freeing sociology from the hegemony of the socio-biological sciences. And it is not an easy task. The author asks whether this attempt has been successful and what the results are in terms of interpreting the new form of the world. On the one hand, the sociology of the Next society places itself in the sphere of the new theories on the world but, on the other, it still adopts a traditional model. In fact, it aims at overcoming the “society of individuals”, typical of the modern-bourgeois western society, with a society based on the membership of social, professional, etc. orders. The ordering of society should be based on the “membership order”. The authors themselves qualify the next society as a neo-feudal society. How prolific is its approach is still an open question. The numerous researches promoted and directly conducted by the authors are an attempt to give an empirical basis to their proposal. Compared to other theories of global society, the sociology of the next society shows its vitality in placing itself at the level of the “global” analysis of the world. Its limits, perhaps, are in not seeing that there are different “projects” or “forms of globality” competing with each other. Each civilization has a claim to universality and a project of hegemony over the world that could be better understood through an approach based on the concept and paradigm of social conflict, both within societies and between societies and civilizations. (shrink)

Per superare i problemi relativi alla natura è necessario comprendere quanto essi derivino dalla società. La società contemporanea è contraddistinta dal dominio dell’uomo sull’uomo dal quale deriva la convinzione dell’asservimento della natura. Tale condizione è determinata dal capitalismo, figlio della gerarchia e del domino. In questa situazione l’Io è divenuto incapace di incontrare l’Altro ed entrare in relazione con lui. Ne segue la necessità di oltrepassare il solipsismo in cui l’individuo è chiuso e rinsaldare la relazione Io-Tu che si realizza (...) nella comunità. La produzione perenne e il consumo costante segnano, inoltre, irrimediabilmente il rapporto tra gli uomini e la natura. La soluzione possibile deriva, come propone Ivan Illich, dalla convivialità che può realizzarsi solamente ponendo dei limiti alla produzione. Il passaggio a una società conviviale consente di rinsaldare il legame comunitario e il riconoscimento del rapporto di simbiosi con la natura. (shrink)

How do we know what violence is? And how do we acquire knowledge of violence? The key to these questions can be found in the epistemology of testimony. Testimonies of violence are first-person narratives of violence, therefore unless first-person narratives are recognized and legitimized as philosophically and epistemologically valuable, our knowledge of violence would be seriously compromised. The value of testimonies of violence lies in part in the transmission of truth-claims, but also crucially in the speech-act of giving a testimony. (...) It is the latter that is the focus of this article. I will argue that the act of giving a testimony of violence, being listed to and believed, is essential for the survivor of violence in the process of rebuilding the sense of self and personhood in the aftermath of the violence endured.By looking at the work of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions worldwide, and highlighting in particular the role of trust within the dynamics of testimonies, I will argue that first-person testimonies of violence are also indispensable for another reason; namely, they prevent acts of violence from turning into instruments of epistemic injustice.Survivors of violence often find themselves being the victims of two forms of violence: apart from enduring the violence being afflicted on them, they also often suffer the epistemic injustice of being marginalized as credible sources of knowledge. Recognizing the validity of testimonies of violence in the form of first-person narratives of violence not only enables us to acquire knowledge of violence, but acknowledging the credibility of the narrator acts as a strong antidote to epistemic injustice. (shrink)

abstract Much of the literature on torture in recent years takes the position of denouncing the barbarity of torture, while allowing for exceptions to this veto in extreme circumstances. The ticking‐bomb argument, where a terrorist is tortured in order to extract information of a primed bomb located in a civilian area, is often invoked as one of those extreme circumstances where torture becomes justified. As the War on Terrorism intensifies, the ticking‐bomb argument has become the dominant line of reasoning used (...) by both academics and policy advisers to justify a legalized, state‐sponsored program of torture. This paper argues for the unconditional refutation of any attempt to justify torture, without exceptions. We argue against the consequentialist reasoning of the ticking‐bomb argument not from a deontological position, but on consequentialist grounds. Empirical evidence suggests that the institutionalization of torture practices creates serious problems. Torture interrogation fails to fulfil its initial purpose as a low‐cost life saver, while its long‐term potential is the devastation of democratic institutions. (shrink)

In the search for a globally binding ethical minimal consensus in dealing with research on human beings the awareness of the cultural specificity of such questions will be of central importance. France provides a good example of such cultural specificities. Three basic structures of French discussion on research ethics can be enumerated: first the particular weight placed on therapeutic benefit, second a particular accentuation on freedom and voluntarism, and third its lesser attention to the aspect of ability to give consent. (...) The weak emphasis on the ability to give consent is rooted as much in the traditionally paternalistically imbued physician-patient relationship as in the French legal system, in which the doctrine of consent is not given the fundamental position of importance found in the Anglo-Saxon countries. As an important Roman country, a different accentuation in the ethical discussion on research on humans can be recognised, a discussion in which for a long time the right of self determination was less of a criterion for decision than the teleology of medical action. It is precisely this aspect of latent cultural influence in ethical convictions which is of decisive importance for future discussion on research on humans. (shrink)

Summary The politeia established in Athens in 317 after a covenant between Cassander and Demetrius of Phalerum was variously described by ancient authors as a tyranny, an oligarchy, and a democracy. Even among modern scholars there is no agreement about its definition. A close study of the architecture of the so-called regime of Demetrius and a comparison with the almost contemporary constitution of Cyrene, imposed on the African town by Ptolemaeus I, lead us to characterize it as a mixed constitution, (...) which balanced elements from the three principal types of political organisation. This experiment had a strong impact on the Hellenistic and Roman political traditions, as testified by Cicero, who recalled Demetrius as the last great Athenian lawgiver and inventor of the blended constitution. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is that of putting intoquestion the dichotomy between fact-judgments andvalue judgments in the legal domain, with its epistemologicalpresuppositions (descriptivist image of knowledge) andits methodological implications for legal knowledge (valuefreedom principle and neutrality thesis). The basicquestion that I will try to answer is whether and on whatconditions strong ethical value-judgments belong withinlegal knowledge.I criticize the traditional positivist positionsthat have fully accepted the value-freedom principle andvalue-neutrality thesis, but I also submit to critical scrutinythe new post-positivist views, that, (...) even if they showinteresting conceptual developments on the matter, end up,nevertheless, by presupposing the same epistemologicalimage, while I call descriptivism. I stress that only by giving updescriptivism and accepting constructivism as a generalimage of knowledge is it possible to see the problem ofvalue-ladenness of legal knowledge in a new light.On the basis of the constructivist image, I present two theses:firstly, at a much broader epistemological level, I advance theminimalist thesis on value-judgments, which simply removes thegeneral ban on treating values as present withinknowledge; secondly, I advance the strong thesis on legalvalue-judgments, which consists in arguing for thenecessary presence of ethical value-judgments in legal knowledge.I draw, in the end, some important implications from acceptanceof the strong thesis. One of these implications isa new distinction that replaces the traditional distinctionbetween fact-judgments and value judgments, namely, thedistinction between value-judgments exhibiting a cognitivefunction and value-judgments exhibiting a creativefunction. (shrink)

A new class of visuomotor neuron has been recently discovered in the monkey’s premotor cortex: mirror neurons. These neurons respond both when a particular action is performed by the recorded monkey and when the same action, performed by another individual, is observed. Mirror neurons appear to form a cortical system matching observation and execution of goal-related motor actions. Experimental evidence suggests that a similar matching system also exists in humans. What might be the functional role of this matching system? One (...) possible function is to enable an organism to detect certain mental states of observed conspecifics. This function might be part of, or a precursor to, a more general mind-reading ability. Two different accounts of mind-reading have been suggested. According to “theory theory‘, mental states are represented as inferred posits of a naive theory. According to “simulation theory‘, other people’s mental states are represented by adopting their perspective: by tracking or matching their states with resonant states of one’s own. The activity of mirror neurons, and the fact that observers undergo motor facilitation in the same muscular groups as those utilized by target agents, are findings that accord well with simulation theory but would not be predicted by theory theory. (shrink)

In this article, I show that (i) from what I call a “Kripkean” account of the relations between conceivability and metaphysical necessities, (ii) an apparently plausible principle relating conceivability and epistemic modality, and (iii) the duality of epistemic modalities, one can show the utterly anti-Kripkean result that every metaphysical necessity is an epistemic necessity. My aim is to present and diagnose the problem and evaluate the costs of some possible Kripkean reactions. In particular, I will evaluate the consequences and theoretical (...) costs of rejecting the main ingredients of the argument, namely that we cannot genuinely conceive the negations of metaphysical necessities, that there is no postulated relation between conceivability and epistemic possibility (actually, between unconceivability and epistemic impossibility), and that epistemic possibility and necessity are not dualities. (shrink)

Foucault and Derrida react in two different ways to the new paradigm imposed by structuralism. Foucault uses structuralism to overcome phenomenology, in fact structuralism shows the naivety of phenomenology, in its claim to rely on conscience to constitute meaning. Instead, Derrida on the contrary immediately nurtures a certain distrust of structuralism, especially in its philosophical ambitions and uses the resources of phenomenology to criticize it, showing the metaphysical implications operating in it. We want to show how this opposing position is (...) generated by the specific way in which the two philosophers have responded to the open problems and bequeathed by Husserlian phenomenology. In particular, the theme of “passive genesis,” which was raised in the French debate by Tran-Duc-Thao and Merleau-Ponty, is central. In the first writings it emerges how Foucault has received Merleau-Ponty’s theses and it is precisely to overcome them that he inaugurates an archaeological analysis to try to distance himself from the normalizing anthropological discourse present in the passive synthesis. Derrida reads passive genesis in a radically different way from Merleau-Ponty (and therefore Foucault): the radical nature of Husserl’s phenomenology has opened a space to question the transcendental genesis of philosophical discourse and its possibility of transcending its historical, social and psychological genesis and therefore the sciences that preside over these dimensions. Consequently, showing the naivety of structuralism, Derrida’s research of the sixties is configured as post-structuralist. (shrink)

In this essay I consider the fundamental features of Althusser’s reading of Machiavelli in its historical development, starting from the 1962 lecture course, passing through the 1972–76 course published with the title of Machiavel et nous as well as the writings of 1977–78, concluding with the group of writings written during the 1980s. I show that any teleological reading that sees in the final writings the truth finally revealed of the path of Althusser’s reading of Machiavelli should be rejected, and (...) instead present the thesis that Althusser, through the figure of Machiavelli, theoretically reworks his relationship with the Party. (shrink)

O autor estabelece uma comparação entre Althusser e Derrida a partir da questão da temporalidade, por meio da leitura que os dois autores propõem de Marx sub specie theatri. A partir disso emerge uma teoria da temporalidade em Althusser que está além tanto da teleologia da tradição hegeliano-marxista, quanto do messianismo sem messias proposto por Derrida em sua releitura benjaminiana de Marx. Nesse sentido, a escatologia em Althusser só é pensável à la cantonade.

This paper analyzes some of the theoretical formulations of Ernst Bloch, Antonio Gramsci and Louis Althusser that indicate the way in which the problem of plural temporality appears in the marxist tradition of thought. Acknowledging that the term “plural temporality” is not used explicitly in the work of these authors, it is seeked to show that, however, marxism has not always thought of history in a univocal and stable way, but has been able to recognize, in different ways and at (...) different times, the complexity of the plurality of historical time. The aim of the work is to account for certain traces of plural temporality within marxist tradition that contribute to strengthening a critique of the linear and progressive model of historical time. (shrink)

Concepts are the elementary units of reason and linguistic meaning. They are conventional and relatively stable. As such, they must somehow be the result of neural activity in the brain. The questions are: Where? and How? A common philosophical position is that all concepts—even concepts about action and perception—are symbolic and abstract, and therefore must be implemented outside the brain’s sensory-motor system. We will argue against this position using (1) neuroscientific evidence; (2) results from neural computation; and (3) results about (...) the nature of concepts from cognitive linguistics. We will propose that the sensory-motor system has the right kind of structure to characterise both sensory-motor and more abstract concepts. Central to this picture are the neural theory of language and the theory of cogs, according to which, brain structures in the sensory-motor regions are exploited to characterise the so-called “abstract” concepts that constitute the meanings of grammatical constructions and general inference patterns. (shrink)

In this article we provide a unifying neural hypothesis on how individuals understand the actions and emotions of others. Our main claim is that the fundamental mechanism at the basis of the experiential understanding of others' actions is the activation of the mirror neuron system. A similar mechanism, but involving the activation of viscero-motor centers, underlies the experiential understanding of the emotions of others.