In the wake of scandals about the unauthorised retention of organs following postmortem examination, the issue of valid consent has returned to the forefront. Emphasis is put on obtaining explicit authorisation from the patient or family prior to any medical intervention, including those involving the dead. Although the controversies in the UK arose from the retention of human material for education or research rather than therapy, concern has been expressed that public mistrust could also adversely affect organ donation for transplantation. (...) At the same time, however, the British Medical Association continues to call for a shift to a system of presumed consent for organ transplantation. This apparent inconsistency can be justified because valid distinctions exist between the reasons requiring explicit consent for retention and the acceptability of presumed consent for transplantation. This paper argues for introducing a system of presumed consent for organ donation, given the overwhelming expressions of public support for transplantation. Ongoing legislative review in the UK provides an ideal chance to alter the default position to one where potential donors can simply acquiesce or opt out of donation. Combined with consultation with their relatives, this could be a much better method of realising individuals’ wishes. It would also achieve a better balance between the duties owed to the deceased and those owed to people awaiting a transplant. (shrink)

Alexei V. Samsonovich, Int. J. Mach. Conscious., 06, 49 (2014). DOI: 10.1142/S1793843014400083.

In [GK], Gurevich and Kokorin proved that any two non-trivial ordered abelian groups (o-groups, for short) satisfy the same existential sentences. Let nowG, H be non-trivialo-groups with a commono-subgroupG 0. We determine whetherG andH are existentially equivalent overG 0. As a corollary, we obtain algebraic criteria for deciding, whether ano-subgroupG is existentially closed in ano-groupH. Corresponding results are proved foro-groups in which congruences are regarded as atomic relations.

The transition from self-consciousness as the unhappy consciousness to reason as the critique of idealism is among the most important in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. Yet this transition is implicit and not readily discernible. This paper investigates whether we can discover and describe any roadblock that the unhappy consciousness is able to knock down, or despite which it is able to maneuver, and so become reason; or whether the unhappy consciousness arrives at an impassable dead end and either manages to (...) create a detour around it or just begins again, unexplained and unexplainably, almost ex nihilo, as reason; or whether, despite its implicitness, there exists a continuous, tenable, and unimpeded path from self-consciousness to reason. (shrink)

In his book Gabriele Lolli discusses the notion of proof, which is, according to him, the most important and at the same time the least studied aspect of mathematics. According to Lolli, a theorem is a conditional sentence of the form ‘if T then A’ such that A is a logical consequence of T, where A is a sentence and T is a sentence or a conjunction or set of sentences. Verifying that A is a consequence of T generally involves (...) considering infinitely many interpretations; so it is something which is impossible to do in finite terms. Proofs may serve as ‘shortcuts’ in this respect. A proof is defined by Lolli as any finite argument certifying that A is a consequence of T. A proof is a shortcut in the sense that it spares us considering infinitely many interpretations.The reason for such a very general definition of proof is Lolli's strong belief that mathematics is not a rigid system of explicit rules, but rather a set of tools; as a consequence, there is no prescription as to what a proof should or should not be. Actually, mathematics is historically situated and not timeless, and the history of mathematics is the …. (shrink)

The commonplaces, all grammatically confused, are that ?conditionals? are ternary in structure, have ?antecedents? and conform to the traditional taxonomy. It is maintained en route that ?The bough will not break? is consistent with ?If the bough breaks ??, that there is no logical difference between ?future indicatives? and ?subjunctives?, and that there is a difference between the logic of propositions (e.g. ?The bough broke?) and that of judgments (?The bough will/might/could/should/must/needn't break?).

It is suggested that wittgenstein's picture theory of meaning is, In part a synthesis and resolution of the early metaphysics of moore and the theory of judgment held by russell about 1910. Moore's theory of the objective existence of concepts and their propositional role is considered. Russell's unsuccessful attempt at the problem of the false proposition is discussed. The ptm offers a more successful solution, Through the concept of logical form, Akin to the russellian concept of order. But this solution (...) still fails because it does not hold for ordinary language. (shrink)

The problem of the electromagnetic coupling for spin-3/2 particles is discussed. Following supergravity and some previous researches in the field of classical supersymmetric particles, we found that the electromagnetic coupling must not obey a minimal coupling in the sense of coupling the electromagnetic potential, but some kind of an electromagnetic field strength.